Why were Civil War casualties so high?

Why were Civil War casualties so high?

  • 1. Because Civil War generals employed outdated tactics?

    Votes: 27 36.0%
  • 2. Because it lasted four years?

    Votes: 14 18.7%
  • 3. Because death and sickness due to disease were common in that era, especially in cities?

    Votes: 55 73.3%
  • 4. Because the United States did not fully and properly engage its advantage in naval power?

    Votes: 3 4.0%
  • 5. Because Grant was a butcher?

    Votes: 3 4.0%
  • 6. Because Jefferson Davis did not want to admit that the Confederacy was beaten?

    Votes: 6 8.0%
  • 7. Because minie`ball wounds could not be treated with existing medical technology?

    Votes: 24 32.0%
  • 8. Because casualties of both combatants are counted as US casualties?

    Votes: 17 22.7%

  • Total voters
    75
Aspern/Murfreesboro

Austrians 26%
USA 27%
No, you're really not getting what I was asking for. I'm not asking for you to provide the entire comparison - I'm asking for you to provide your example of a "too high casualties" ACW battle, and then I'd see if I can find a Napoleonic battle of comparable or greater size with a comparable or greater casualty %.
 
No, you're really not getting what I was asking for. I'm not asking for you to provide the entire comparison - I'm asking for you to provide your example of a "too high casualties" ACW battle, and then I'd see if I can find a Napoleonic battle of comparable or greater size with a comparable or greater casualty %.
I think you misunderstand what I am aiming at; the OP quotes you saying ACW losses are not that high for mass formations . I am showing you that on the contrary they were almost equally deadly and sometimes more so. Find a European battle after Eylau where the victor suffers more than Bragg at Chickamauga(%).
 
I think you misunderstand what I am aiming at; the OP quotes you saying ACW losses are not that high for mass formations . I am showing you that on the contrary they were almost equally deadly and sometimes more so. Find a European battle after Eylau where the victor suffers more than Bragg at Chickamauga(%).
I said something along the lines of how they weren't particularly high for mass formations; that is, they are comparable to Napoleonic battles. They are not "particularly high".

That is, you can say "they are particularly high for mass formations" or you can say "they are not particularly high for mass formations" and I tend to think the second.

Incidentally, what you're now asking for is two battles with casualties comparable to Chickamauga. But more than that you're counting it as casualties for one specific side, when it's not like three Prussian dead for one French dead involves fewer dead than two each Union and Confederate dead.
 
I would have to go with the change in technology first (rifled guns and artillery), then outdated tactics and then the total lack of an adequate medical system (medical personnel, facilities, training, supplies and logistics). Napoleon was a student of war and kept changing his tactics as the wars went on and the quality of his solders changed. His battles were fought within 75 yards of the enemy, unlike the civil war were the rifled musket allowed you to start killing at 500 yards.
 
I would have to go with the change in technology first (rifled guns and artillery), then outdated tactics and then the total lack of an adequate medical system (medical personnel, facilities, training, supplies and logistics). Napoleon was a student of war and kept changing his tactics as the wars went on and the quality of his solders changed. His battles were fought within 75 yards of the enemy, unlike the civil war were the rifled musket allowed you to start killing at 500 yards.
I'm afraid that there's a couple of issues here.

Firstly, the range at which the smoothbore musket was considered to have useful effect was longer than 75 yards in most cases. The British reserved their fire late, compared to other countries.

Secondly, the rifled musket is able to let you start killing at up to 900 yards for a good marksman - but Civil War soldiers were almost universally not good marksman. You see some who are, but most are not trained to estimate range and consequently are only able to shoot within "point blank" range (that is, the range at which a levelled rifle-musket - or smoothbore musket - will send a ball forwards to hit before it strikes the ground).
This is why at Antietam an artillery battey reports taking occasional annoying sharpshooter fire from nearby infantry at under 100 yards, and moving a little further away remedies the problem; it's why Pickett's men don't come under rifle-musket fire as soon as they come into view.
 
Did 19th Century battles in Europe have higher casualties? It seems that some of European battles, the defeated army would have extremely high percentage of losses.
I picked a few post-Napoleonic battles I thought would be representative, straddling the ACW. We might expect Gravelotte to be higher with Needle-guns, Chassepots, and mitrailleuses (war had taken a step "forward"), but a lot of those 300,000 weren't actively engaged.

I don't see much difference in rates. AS far as actual casualties, Solferino had the most at 39,000. Gravelotte, with the lowest rate as calculated, still had 32,000, more than the ACW battles listed except Chickamauga.

EUROPEEngagedCasualty Rate
Inkerman (Crimean War)56,200
30%​
Solferino (2nd Italian War)260,106
15%​
Gravelotte (Franco-Prussian)301,132**
11%​
CIVIL WAREngagedCasualty Rate
Antietam125,164
20%​
Shiloh103,335
23%​
The Wilderness162,920
18%​
Chickamauga125,000
28%​
 
There was something of a trend noticed by observers at the time that the increased lethality of arms actually made the typical casualty rate go down - going hand in hand with the expansion of the size and lethality of the "no man's land" area of the battlefield.

I believe this to be the result of the increased shock that more lethal weapons can produce, the expansion of the psychological penalty to the attacker of crossing the dangerous space, and of course the expansion of armies while at the same time the more lethal weapons drive dispersion of the men near the front. The combination means that it takes fewer casualties to create a situation where the fighting front of the army is psycholgically unable to continue pressing the attack on any given day.
Battles then start to take longer as they're less decisive on any given day.


This is a continuation of a process started when fighting moved away from being primarily about melee combat. The psychological difficulty with swinging a sword at someone visibly trying to kill you, when you're a few feet away from them, is minor; the psychological difficulty of approaching an enemy formation, knowing that you'll have to do it for a minute or more to get through the area their muskets can cover, is larger. With rifles the beaten zone gets larger still, and in addition you can fire back from further away and while your rifle at 800 yards is vanishingly unlikely to score more than one or two hits against an enemy positioned to defend themselves you can feel good about what you're doing - you're not scared of the enemy, you're contributing.

While in the day of melee weapons, you were only really faced with the psychological challenge of crossing the zone the enemy can attack you inside the last few yards - and it's a lot harder to deliver suppressive stab.
 
The muskets of the Napoleonic Wars (1800 - 1815) lacked sites for aiming and the tactics of the day called for firing at the enemy to commence at a distance of about 75 yards, which was considered the affective range. The British, Wellington in particular, reserved their fire for the dual impact of the volley and to "give them the bayonet". To increase the number of possible "hits" the Americans in the War of 1812 used "buck and ball" ammunition, which was still being used at the Battle of Antietam.
 
The muskets of the Napoleonic Wars (1800 - 1815) lacked sites for aiming and the tactics of the day called for firing at the enemy to commence at a distance of about 75 yards, which was considered the affective range.
That's for some countries. The French for example when giving fire would do so at longer ranges than the British.


Also, they did have sights. The Brown Bess has a front-sight that also acts as bayonet lug.
 
Disease was a big part of the era, one cut turned into an infection, then a punctured wound, then gas gangrene, and lastly an amputation, or death if untreated fast enough. Sicknesses were also a big factor, as disease was more common due to less personal hygiene then as compared to today, like for example, when I asked my grandfather if he brushes his teeth, he said that it was something the wealthy could afford, but the poor and middle-class were too busy working to bother, it is quite a sad disposition to look upon, but also an advancement in our own self awareness to this day. In 50 years, long past my time, their will probably be some new hygiene that us humans today never think of as unholy and disgusting. It proves how our advancements block out the bad past of the human as a whole, but doesn’t block out the historical purposes it pertains. Like just imagine the civil war without disease related deaths, disability discharges, and better medical care. If we only involved combat deaths, the Civil War wouldn’t have costed more American life than both of the World Wars that devastated our planet.

My grandfather was lucky to make it to 99 years of age, but his death in Christmas made it a tough day as we would celebrate at both grandparents houses, maternal in the mid-morning, and paternal in mid-afternoon, but on that Christmas I was instead brought grief as I lost my historical representative in my terms. Grandpa Will was my namesake, and he deserved so much more than he received in life. I hope he is in heaven, and I pray daily that god forgives his sin of the cause he was fighting for, as my grandfather had to live with the pain in his heart of serving for slavery his entire life. My grandfather would like to wear his Confederate forager cap when he would take me to the store to get a $.05 piece of bubblegum from the cashier when he was watching me and my siblings while my parents would go on vacation, and in a particular incident, I was probably eight, so 1937, and when we approached the cashier, he said that his brother was arrested for violating the Mississippi state constitution for marrying a person of color when he himself was not of color, and he made my grandfather tear up as the cashier yelled at him about how he fought for this and that his kind should be strung up instead of the colored people. This made my grandfather till the day he die forbid talking about his service, and that is why he only told me one story when I was 6 and nothing after. My grandfather was the most humble person I have ever met, he was a very good cook, which was strange as we have all said at least said once how good grandma’s cooking is, but no one could make better cookies then my grandfather, it was a family recipe, have the recipe to this day. I will share more stories on other posts.

Thank You all for Reading.
 
Over the years, we have had many statements that the South needed to adopt a strategy that matched its capabilities --- but no one has ever articulated such a plan. Was there one that could have been adopted?
A most excellent question. Aside from the personality conflicts that hampered things, especially in the important western theater, the strategic situation is just difficult: the war can’t be too long but must be long enough to convince the other side to give; too much territory ceded and the whole effort collapses but some space must be traded for time in the face of superior numbers… etc..

Here is my opinion on the requisite strategy.


Firstly - the Confederacy cannot win a long war, at best it can tire the Union out that way. If it is going to win it must fight a short war.

This is the methodology with which Prussia gradually parlayed a small, poor province into the German Empire.
A thoughtful response. I would only observe that Prussia, unlike the Confederacy, had time…
 
A thoughtful response. I would only observe that Prussia, unlike the Confederacy, had time…
Perhaps so, but every individual one of their wars was fought to be as short and quick and focused as possible. This is why the Germans in WW2 did things like used their multi-engine training aircraft and multi-engine training crews as their paratrooper transports and to fly around spares for their fighters - it's because it's cheaper than a whole separate transport corps and training corps, and they felt (1) the boost to operational tempo was worth it and (2) by the time the fighting started it was more important to get the war won in this operational cycle than to get an extra few weeks of training on their multi-engined aircraft.

The same pattern is going on for pretty much all of Prussian/German history. Front load everything and win ASAP before the enemy can mobilize their own greater potential.

The counter-strategy to it is basically to (1) not assume the enemy will give you time to mobilize your full strength, (2) not leave a vulnerability they might be able to use to get the quick war they want, and (3) mobilize heavily yourself without burning yourself out like they are.
 
Here is my opinion on the requisite strategy.


Firstly - the Confederacy cannot win a long war, at best it can tire the Union out that way. If it is going to win it must fight a short war.
Secondly - this means it should front load everything. Sell cotton early rather than hoarding it, buy up weapons, etc. in 1861 in quantities as large as possible. Every Enfield they get hold of robs the Union of one in the critical 1861-2 months, and they can compete on price. Go for whatever methods you can to maximize enlistment, maximize logistical support etc.
Thirdly - the Confederacy cannot match the Union on quantity, not if the Union is trying hard as well, but it can exceed the Union on quality. Adopt a set of tactics which rely on maximizing the utility of the modern rifles they can import, which means sharpshooter training for some men per regiment giving all regiments organic long ranged support; aside from that, drill well.
And fourthly - commit to strategic concentration somewhere with all disposable units at some point early in the war, and fight a manoeuvre campaign (possibly including sections of defending strong works) in order to trap a Union field army in a "kessel" before destroying it with concentric attacks.

This is the methodology with which Prussia gradually parlayed a small, poor province into the German Empire.
They tried that. They tried to win the war in land battles, but it took the Confederacy until April-June 1862 to fight the first big land battles that shocked both sides with the consequences of a real war. But that had little affect on US naval and combined arms operations. By the time the land escalation was succeeding, the US was making substantial strategic gains on the coasts, rivers and in the far west.
 
The Confederacy escalated the land war, because they had a relative advantage there. The US escalated the war aims. The war continued far past the point at which two kingdoms would have fought, because the US was practically and legally going to eliminate one of the power structures in the deep south. The war did not end imediately after Lincoln's re-election, because the Confederacy was subjecting its population to a fantasy that the shards of the Confederacy could be re-assembled.
 
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I think the US got a tremendous return on its investment in naval power. The casualties in the big naval battles were also measured in dozens, not thousands.
It may be coincidence, but in the west, the Confederacy achieved almost nothing to compensate for the loss of life after Mobile Bay was closed to blockade runners. By October of 1864 the US was able to deepen the blockade zone around Wilmington and in January it captured Fort Fisher. The rate of surrender among Confederate soldiers increased after that. And I doubt that the Confederacy was able to secure adequate munitions after Wilmington closed to blockade smugglers. How many Confederates stayed with the colors, but had discarded their weapons during the retreat from Richmond/Petersburg?
 
I said something along the lines of how they weren't particularly high for mass formations; that is, they are comparable to Napoleonic battles. They are not "particularly high".

That is, you can say "they are particularly high for mass formations" or you can say "they are not particularly high for mass formations" and I tend to think the second.

Incidentally, what you're now asking for is two battles with casualties comparable to Chickamauga. But more than that you're counting it as casualties for one specific side, when it's not like three Prussian dead for one French dead involves fewer dead than two each Union and Confederate dead.
I just listed comparable battles where they are particularly high and you have yet to refute the claim with numbers or examples.
I’m asking for any example like Chickamauga because I know you can’t cite one. Victor losses are key here as they are “fighting” losses, not defeated losses subject to retreat or route where prisoners and deserters tip the scales.
 
I just listed comparable battles where they are particularly high and you have yet to refute the claim with and numbers or examples.
I’m asking for any example like Chickamauga because I know you can’t cite one. Victor losses are key here as they are “fighting” losses, not defeated losses subject to retreat or route where prisoners and deserters tip the scales.
I was certainly under the impression that what I thought we were after was casualties in the Civil War and whether they were especially high, comparable battles in nature or not. If the Civil War had a number of battles that were not comparable to the Napoleonic Wars and that resulted in higher casualties in those battles then that would show itself by there being a high casualty battle that was not matched to the Napoleonic Wars.


The problem (to my mind) in looking at "victor losses" is that it means that evenly matched "slugfest" battles where neither side can gain tactical superiority or conduct offensive tactics effectively are favoured. A Napoleonic battle in which side A defeats side B convincingly may mean side A takes fewer casualties, but also that side B takes more casualties - and the overall casualty count is similar. There's still as many bodies on the field at the end of the day.


If your argument is that Civil War KIA/WIA casualties (not missing) are high as a portion of those engaged, then we can certainly look at that. Would you say that that is an acceptable consequence of your position?
 
I was certainly under the impression that what I thought we were after was casualties in the Civil War and whether they were especially high, comparable battles in nature or not. If the Civil War had a number of battles that were not comparable to the Napoleonic Wars and that resulted in higher casualties in those battles then that would show itself by there being a high casualty battle that was not matched to the Napoleonic Wars.


The problem (to my mind) in looking at "victor losses" is that it means that evenly matched "slugfest" battles where neither side can gain tactical superiority or conduct offensive tactics effectively are favoured. A Napoleonic battle in which side A defeats side B convincingly may mean side A takes fewer casualties, but also that side B takes more casualties - and the overall casualty count is similar. There's still as many bodies on the field at the end of the day.


If your argument is that Civil War KIA/WIA casualties (not missing) are high as a portion of those engaged, then we can certainly look at that. Would you say that that is an acceptable consequence of your position?
Yes essentially that is my gist in your last paragraph. Not sure what you mean by there “…still as many bodies on the field at the end of the day”. I am comparing similar European battles to a ACW fields and showing mass formations did suffer high rates of loss. It can be broken down to even the regimental level with truly appalling results.
 
Some Civil War land battles resulted in casualties that were comparable to Napoleonic warfare. But people saw those casualties and continued the fighting. The Confederacy was fighting for the existence of its experiment and most people in the north were willing to see the thing through, rather than see the US break into two segments and warfare become the permanent state of affairs. A person cannot answer the question by blaming generals. The politicians and the public saw the casualties and continued the fight. That is what needs to be explained.
Of course there were decisive US naval and combined arms victories that did not involved large number of KIA and WIA casualties. And multiple generals on both sides did engage in operations involving extensive movement in which both sides incurred fewer casualties. Thomas Jackson on the Confederate side, and William Sherman on the US side, both employed movement to minimize fighting.
 
Yes essentially that is my gist in your last paragraph. Not sure what you mean by there “…still as many bodies on the field at the end of the day”. I am comparing similar European battles to a ACW fields and showing mass formations did suffer high rates of loss. It can be broken down to even the regimental level with truly appalling results.
What I mean is that if there's a battle with 10,000 engaged on each side and one side suffers 5,000 while the other suffers 4,000, and another battle where one side suffers 2,000 while the other suffers 7,000, then in both cases there are 9,000 casualties at the end of the day. Both battles have been as bloody.


Now, looking specifically at Chickamauga:

Casualties and losses
∼ 60,000[6][7]∼ 65,000[8]
16,170[9][10]
1,657 killed
9,756 wounded
4,757 captured or missing
18,454[10]
2,312 killed
14,674 wounded
1,468 captured or missing


So of 125,000 men on the field there are 28,399 men KIA/WIA. This is 23%.



Borodino sees 250,000 troops involved in the fighting, which conveniently is double the number at Chickamauga.

There were 52,000 Russian troops reported as dead, wounded or missing in the battle, but of these 8,000 subsequently returned to their units and 1,000 were prisoners; this implies 43,000 KIA/WIA.
The French returns for one day of battle (the 7th) give 6,562 dead and 21,450 wounded, totalling to 29,000 KIA/WIA.
In total this comes to 72,000 KIA/WIA, discounting the French losses on the 5th (which is part of the same fighting).
French casualties on the 5th were on the order of 4,000-5,000.

In combination this is about 75,000, or 30%. The "buttress" or the number of Russian MIA who could be removed without affecting the "bloodier than Chickamauga" calculation is about 17,000.
 
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