"The Art of War" and the American Civil War - Sun Tzu and Gettysburg

Grant ordered the most effective cavalry raid of the ear, ran the gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries, established a bridgehead, cut off communications, fought three successful battles, captured an enemy capital, encircled & successfully besieged a fortress, captured an entire army, opened the Mississippi River & effectively cut the CSA in half. I am having a little trouble seeing how anything Lee might have done is the equivalent of Grant’s operations.

In his letters to Davis, Lee stated that the intent of his PA incursion was to inflict a blow that would break Union civilian morale & bring about a negotiated peace. I know of no historians or even Lost Cause theorists that believe that some kind of tactical victory in nowhere PA could have achieved that goal.

The triple hammer blows of Vicksburg, Tullahoma & Gettysburg were strategic victories that set the stage for the ultimate CSA defeat. Going 40 miles into nowhere PA & loosing a meeting engagement is a textbook example of a disastrous strategic mistake.
Lee didn’t have a Navy to bail him out. Grant would still be trying to take Vicksburg without one. If Lee wins at Gettysburg, the AoP retreats to either Pipe Creek or the Washington defenses. The re-armed and provisioned ANV then decides which city to destroy first, Harrisburg or Baltimore. Those are actually somewhere places in Pennsylvania and Maryland, and they’re in the rear of the Federal army. You think the NYC draft riots were bad that summer? In that scenario one could see a peace plan on the table despite what happened in Vicksburg or nowhere Tullahoma, Tennessee.
 
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Lee didn’t have a Navy to bail him out. Grant would still be trying to take Vicksburg without one. If Lee wins at Gettysburg, the AoP retreats to either Pipe Creek or the Washington defenses. The ANV then decides which city to destroy first, Harrisburg or Baltimore. Those are actually somewhere places in Pennsylvania and Maryland. And you think the NYC draft riots were bad that summer?
You are correct, Lee never commanded an amphibious force or accepted the surrender of two armies. Grant’s victories resulted in the capture of Memphis & Nashville. Those were actual events, not would a could a fantasies.

I confess that what a drag riot of Irish immigrants in New York has a to do with either Grant or Lee escapes me.
 
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Easy to say after the fact. I think his overall plan was a good one. I believe Lee's strategy was a mostly political one, to sway Northern public opinion, & bring public opinion closer to negotiation. I don't believe that Lee had any delusions of running all over Northern territory, & or continuing further into Yankee territory. I think he was doing exactly as I suggested, trying to strike fear, & or put pressure on Northern folks to end the war.

One has to remember, human nature has always been rather aloof to things that don't personally affect us. It's one thing to be pro-war, when that war is hundreds or thousands of miles away. It's quite another when it's literally happening in your front yard, as it was for many a Southern family. People are affected quite differently reading about casualties in the newspaper, vs seeing people die, & the real horrors of war, with your own eyes.

While Lee's strategy on this lost, his thinking wasn't as ridiculous as implied. In my opinion, it was one of very few actual opportunities, to win the war. By winning the war, I'm not suggesting a military defeat of the US was even possible. I'm specifically referring to a political victory. ie: The northern populace losing the taste for war, & allowing the Southern states to separate from the US without further bloodshed.

I've read, The Art of War. While I agree Sun Tzu would've had some negative things to say about Lee's actual battlefield orders at Gettysburg, & combat operations, I believe he would've approved of Lee's initial strategy for the campaign.
I agree, the campaign that Lee laid out in his letters to Davis could have succeeded. The concentration of 100,000 men from the Carolinas under Beauregard directly threatening Washington, forcing the A of the P to fall back on DC & then crushing it between the combined armies could have worked. Whether or not it would have emboldened the peace party & led to election victories by their candidates is moot. There are simply too many moving parts to have any certainty on that line of thought.
 
Lee didn’t have a Navy to bail him out. Grant would still be trying to take Vicksburg without one. If Lee wins at Gettysburg, the AoP retreats to either Pipe Creek or the Washington defenses. The re-armed and provisioned ANV then decides which city to destroy first, Harrisburg or Baltimore. Those are actually somewhere places in Pennsylvania and Maryland, and they’re in the rear of the Federal army. You think the NYC draft riots were bad that summer? In that scenario one could see a peace plan on the table despite what happened in Vicksburg or nowhere Tullahoma, Tennessee.
The Tullahoma Campaign resulted in the conquest of Middle Tennessee & the capture of Chattanooga. A little research would seem to be in order.
 
Yet Grant did the same thing in the Vicksburg campaign and is hailed as a genius. That goes with winning. Had Lee been more emphatic in his order to take Culps hill or had a more aggressive corps commander like say Jackson in place, he very well might have won. And we’d be calling him a genius.
How does Grant’s envelopment and capture of Vicksburg qualify as a “meeting engagement”?
 
While it's certainly true Lee's orders to Ewell were ambiguous, I believe it has been argued previously that Jackson would've made the attack. Even though Lee could've/should've been more clear, I've heard multiple people studied on the subject suggest that, Jackson & Lee were much more on the same page. Meaning, Jackson would not have interpreted Lee's words as ambiguous.

An analogy or example would be, your spouse tells you, "go ahead, do what you want". Yet, you know full well what their preferred result, or outcome is. They may have made it appear as an open choice for you, but reality is, it's not.

Does Lee deserve some criticism for this..? Absolutely. The onus was on Lee to be clear, & precise in his orders. Did that scenario's outcome influence Lee to be more precise on his orders to go ahead with Pickett's charge..? Probably. I've heard plenty of criticism over the years about that charge. I can admit it's somewhat justified however, I've always viewed it as a "hail mary pass", or "onside kick". Even though the odds are very slim of success, one thing is certain. If you don't try, you're guaranteed to lose.
This whole idea of “Jackson would have attacked” is wanting. We don’t know what Jackson would have done. He may have been late as he was prone to do. He may have agreed with Ewell that an attack was not “practicable”. It’s been argued that any further attack on Cemetery or Culps Hill on July 1 would have met with disaster. Even if St. Jackson would have attacked, it could just as likely have been the worst mistake he ever made. Likely, he’d be too smart to attack.

I don’t understand the “Lost Cause” faith that an evening attack on the United States right on July 1st would have been successful. Where does this unwarranted faith come from?
 
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Lee didn’t have a Navy to bail him out. Grant would still be trying to take Vicksburg without one. If Lee wins at Gettysburg, the AoP retreats to either Pipe Creek or the Washington defenses. The re-armed and provisioned ANV then decides which city to destroy first, Harrisburg or Baltimore. Those are actually somewhere places in Pennsylvania and Maryland, and they’re in the rear of the Federal army. You think the NYC draft riots were bad that summer? In that scenario one could see a peace plan on the table despite what happened in Vicksburg or nowhere Tullahoma, Tennessee.
Bunch of rivers around Gettysburg? Lol. We’re to think less of Grant because he understood the value of coordination and combined arms? Perhaps if Lee and the CSA understood such concepts better they could have defended slavery and had their own country!

Thank god your fantasy didn’t happen. Again, fantasy.
 
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This whole idea of “Jackson would have attacked” is wanting. We don’t know what Jackson would have done. He may have been late as he was prone to do. He may have agreed with Ewell that an attack was not “practicable”. It’s been argued that any further attack on Cemetery or Culps Hill on July 1 would have met with disaster.
Hmmm... I disagree. The best forecast of future behavior, is previous behavior. I believe common study on the professional relationship between Lee & Jackson suggest, they "got" each other, notably better than most folks.

Was Jackson's record considered aggressive or passive..? Jackson was an incredibly driven person. His troops weren't called the "foot cavalry" for nothing. I believe two things are certain about Stonewall; he was deeply religious, & fiercely aggressive as a commander.

There is zero doubt in my mind that Jackson would've done exactly what Lee wanted. There is also zero doubt in my mind that, Jackson understood Lee better than Ewell did.
 
Hmmm... I disagree. The best forecast of future behavior, is previous behavior. I believe common study on the professional relationship between Lee & Jackson suggest, they "got" each other, notably better than most folks.

Was Jackson's record considered aggressive or passive..? Jackson was an incredibly driven person. His troops weren't called the "foot cavalry" for nothing. I believe two things are certain about Stonewall; he was deeply religious, & fiercely aggressive as a commander.

There is zero doubt in my mind that Jackson would've done exactly what Lee wanted. There is also zero doubt in my mind that, Jackson understood Lee better than Ewell did.
But is there any reason to think such an attack would have been successful? Is there any reason to think that Lee wanted an attack no matter what or did he mean what he said and such an attack was plainly not practicable. I know it’s an article of faith in certain circles that Jackson would have taken that hill but I think Jackson would have been too smart to even try. Imagine, forming a battle line after coming through town and taking pot shots the whole way, under the watchful eye of 43 guns and two federal corps. Then trying to attack uphill without support.

Had the CSA attacked Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 the war would have ended. An entire ANV Corp would have been destroyed. The Union had fallen back to the position THEY WANTED TO BE IN.
 
But is there any reason to think such an attack would have been successful? Is there any reason to think that Lee wanted an attack no matter what or did he mean what he said and such an attack was plainly not practicable. I know it’s an article of faith in certain circles that Jackson would have taken that hill but I think Jackson would have been too smart to even try. Imagine, forming a battle line after coming through town and taking pot shots the whole way, under the watchful eye of 43 guns and two federal corps. Then trying to attack uphill without support.

Had the CSA attacked Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 the war would have ended. An entire ANV Corp would have been destroyed. The Union had fallen back to the position THEY WANTED TO BE IN.
There plenty of speculation as to what would have, or could have transpired. You're viewing the possibility from a different perspective than I am. I believe Jackson would've come up with a solution different than Ewell's. Jackson may have come up with something that diverted Yankees attention, & resources enough to change what actually happened that day.

I'll agree that we'll never know. However, based on the historical record, I'll continue to believe that Jackson was superior to Ewell, & had a much better working relationship with Lee, & would've done something that would've been more helpful, than what actually did take place.
 
Bunch of rivers around Gettysburg? Lol. We’re to think less of Grant because he understood the value of coordination and combined arms? Perhaps if Lee and the CSA understood such concepts better they could have defended slavery and had their own country!

Thank god your fantasy didn’t happen. Again, fantasy.

Understanding and availability are not mutually exclusive. Grant learned early on at Belmont that an unopposed Union Navy could bail him out when he screwed up. It happened again at Shiloh. Turn the table around to what-ifs and give Lee naval control of the James River during the Seven Days. How do you think that would have turned out?
 
Returning to the OP, may I suggest a different approach... analyzing the campaign not by reference to Sun Tzu's Art of War but to Jomini's Art of War. That was the military theory that both sides would have been familiar with-- I don't know when Sun Tzu became known to Western military scholars, but I highly doubt either Lee or Meade had any familiarity with him.

They definitely knew Jomini-- Dennis Hart Mahan at West Point based a number of his lectures on Jomini's principles. I believe Lee went through the academy prior to Mahan's tenure (? or am I confusing him with Winfield Scott), but Jomini was certainly the best-known writer of strategy of the era (Clausewitz became fashionable only somewhat later in the 19th Century).
 
Returning to the OP, may I suggest a different approach... analyzing the campaign not by reference to Sun Tzu's Art of War but to Jomini's Art of War. That was the military theory that both sides would have been familiar with-- I don't know when Sun Tzu became known to Western military scholars, but I highly doubt either Lee or Meade had any familiarity with him.

They definitely knew Jomini-- Dennis Hart Mahan at West Point based a number of his lectures on Jomini's principles. I believe Lee went through the academy prior to Mahan's tenure (? or am I confusing him with Winfield Scott), but Jomini was certainly the best-known writer of strategy of the era (Clausewitz became fashionable only somewhat later in the 19th Century).
It would be interesting to compare the different philosophies and see how, or if in any way, they match up.

I also doubt that there was any familiarity with Sun Tzu's philosophy and on that basis his theories could not have been applied at the time. As an exercise in hindsight I still think it's interesting to overlay them on the events at Gettysburg as a way to gain more insight.

And I do think Clausewitz had some impact on the thinking at the time. I would need to refresh my memory on that though.
 
It would be interesting to compare the different philosophies and see how, or if in any way, they match up.

I also doubt that there was any familiarity with Sun Tzu's philosophy and on that basis his theories could not have been applied at the time. As an exercise in hindsight I still think it's interesting to overlay them on the events at Gettysburg as a way to gain more insight.

And I do think Clausewitz had some impact on the thinking at the time. I would need to refresh my memory on that though.

Halleck's book notes the existence of Clausewitz, but only in passing; he spends most of his time on Jomini. Since Jomini was thought to encapsulate the military theory of Napoleon (a debatable point, but that's what was thought), it held sway through the mid-1800s. Clausewitz and various Germans really only attracted notice after the Franco-Prussian War and the unification of Germany.
 
But is there any reason to think such an attack would have been successful? Is there any reason to think that Lee wanted an attack no matter what or did he mean what he said and such an attack was plainly not practicable. I know it’s an article of faith in certain circles that Jackson would have taken that hill but I think Jackson would have been too smart to even try. Imagine, forming a battle line after coming through town and taking pot shots the whole way, under the watchful eye of 43 guns and two federal corps. Then trying to attack uphill without support.

Had the CSA attacked Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 the war would have ended. An entire ANV Corp would have been destroyed. The Union had fallen back to the position THEY WANTED TO BE IN.

It’s interesting that Longstreet failed on the second basically due to failed recon & a misconception of where the federal left flank lay. It’s true Meade had to send in significant reinforcements to bolster 3rd Corps but having the interior lines helped him accomplish this. I won’t second guess history here as it’s interesting enough… but it is fun to contemplate.

This excerpt is from a lengthy Essay by license Battlefield Guide Michael Phipps, regarding leadership at Gettysburg & Dennis Hart Mahan’s influence on American officers tactics. Covers a lot of ground, but it’s interesting thesis if one has time to read it.

“Another passage of Mahan’s tactical manual is almost a word-for-word copy of Lee’s plan of attack for July 2, 1863 at Gettysburg:

‘The main effort of the assailant is seldom directed against more than one point of the position; that one being usually selected which, if carried, will lead to the most decisive results; as, for example, one of the flanks. ... But the main attack is always combined with demonstrations upon some other point; both with a view of deceiving the assailed as to the real point of attack, and prevent him from withdrawing troops from other points to strengthen the one menaced.

Lee, on the second day of Battle at Gettysburg, gave almost these exact orders to generals Longstreet and Ewell. Longstreet was to make the main attack south to north, guiding on the Emmitsburg road, and strike the Union left along Cemetery Ridge. Simultaneously, Ewell was to demonstrate against the Union right flank on Cemetery and Culp’s hills. The reasons why this battle plan did not develop into the battle actually fought are complex and well documented, and I will not discuss them here. But it remains an irrefutable fact that once Longstreet launched his attack on July 2, Meade responded by sending almost his entire army to the southern end of the field. In the north, Ewell’s entire Rebel corps, supported by a large portion of A.P. Hill’s corps, was opposed only by Greene and Carroll’s small brigades and the decimated remnants of the 1st and 11th corps. Ewell and Hill had a two-to-one numbers advantage. A major assault by the Rebels on Cemetery and Culp’s hills, instead of a diversion, may have cut through Meade’s weakened right like a knife through butter. What could have happened on the Union right that day certainly played as large a role in the outcome of the battle as what did happen in front of the Round Tops.”


http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/9/essay1.pdf
 
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