In "Opposing Sherman's Advance to Atlanta" in Vol. 4 of Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Johnson writes that after being replaced by Hood, he shared that "if the enemy should give us a good opportunity in the passage of Peach Tree Creek, I expected to attack him. If successful, we should obtain important results, for the enemy's retreat would be on two sides of a triangle and our march on one. If we should not succeed, our intrenchments (sic) would give us a safe refuge, where we could hold back the enemy until the promised state troops should join us...then...I would attack the Federals in the flank with the three Confederate corps. If successful, they would be driven against the Chattahoochee below the railroad, where there are no fords, or away from their supplies, as we might fall on their left or right flank. If unsuccessful, we could take refuge in Atlanta, which we could hold indefinitely..." (275-76).
In his essay in the same volume, "The Struggle for Atlanta" O. O. Howard states that "Johnston had planned to attack Sherman at Peach Tree Creek, expecting just such a division between our wings as we made," and states that "Hood endeavored to to carry out the plan." (313)
Of course, Hood's version a few pages later gives Johnston no such credit. After lamenting that the Army of Tennessee had been subjected to the "ruinous policy" of fighting on the defensive to the extent that it was "unfitted for a united action in a pitched battle," he goes on to state that "Sherman's violation of the established maxim that an army should always be held well within hand, or its detachments within easy supporting distance, afforded one of the most favorable occasions for complete victory which could have been offered; especially as it presented an opportunity, after crushing his right wing, to throw our entire force upon his left." He adds as a qualifying shot to Johnston's guarded optimism and contingency plans, "such a blunder affords a small army the best, if not the sole, chance of success when contending with a vastly superior force." (336-37)
Even 30 years later, knowing that the plan failed, we can see the difference in intent. Hood's language conveys his desire to destroy one or more of Sherman's armies in an all-or-nothing effort, while Johnston's version promised only "important results" if it worked, followed by two "if unsuccessful" scenarios rooted in returning to the tactical defensive behind massive fortifications.