Comparing Picketts Charge w/ Charge up Missionary Ridge and Longstreet at Chickamauga

I was going to post this myself. I believe Hood's assault had about 20,000 men . Am I right ?
It really boggles the mind to comprehend that a survivor of the carnage of Pickett's charge (Hood), where Lee ordered just a small portion of his army to assault and entrenched enemy could be insane enough to duplicate the same charge not with some portion of his army but his entire army in a straight on assault against a completely prepared and entrenched opponent.
 
I was going to post this myself. I believe Hood's assault had about 20,000 men . Am I right ?
It really boggles the mind to comprehend that a survivor of the carnage of Pickett's charge (Hood), where Lee ordered just a small portion of his army to assault and entrenched enemy could be insane enough to duplicate the same charge not with some portion of his army but his entire army in a straight on assault against a completely prepared and entrenched opponent.
 
As I see it, the key difference with Chickamauga is that Longstreet's attack had the depth that Pickett's Charge and the others lacked. Although the Gettysburg attack was a wide front that was supposed to concentrate on a fixed point, the wings of the attack were unable to support the center and there was nothing behind to exploit the breakthrough at The Angle. Longstreet's assaulting column at Chickamauga was in columns of divisions so that when they hit that hole, those veteran brigades had depth, power, and momentum. This proved a problem after the breakthrough, since it took longer to swing that momentum away from pursuing the routed Union right wing and direct it towards the hastily forming defensive line on Horseshoe Ridge (Hood was wounded trying to accomplish that task), but the initial attack was a very effective sledgehammer. The attack at Franklin was also wider than it needed to be, given the weak point in the center of the Union line where the Columbiana Pike entered town, and suffered much the same problem as the wings got bogged down and offered little support to the center. As noted by others in this thread, Union success at Missionary Ridge was the combination of the Army of Cumberland's resolve, Bragg's poor planning, and the precipitous decline in morale within the Army of Tennessee.
All well and good but without Rosecrans blunder which provided an empty hold, not troops allowed an immediate breakthrough which of course led to the collapse of the entire Union line. I assume Longstreet's columnar formation would probably have broken through eventually, but with actual defenders opposing them, it would have taken longer, allowed Rosecrans to respond to the attack with reinforcements and would have inflicted greater losses upon the attacking Confederates which would have made following up on their initial successes much more difficult.

I became interested in the column vs line conundrum when I started studying the Napoleonic peninsular campaigns. Wellington demonstrated that the British line could keep the French column from penetrating his formation with the famous "3 volleys a minute" tactic made famous in the Sharpe books and movies. Wellington's experience in India facing and defeating greatly larger Indian opponents had made him an expert.

Unfortunately for the French he began his efforts against them facing comparatively less competent opponents. As each new French commander had no direct experience at facing the British line, they simply supposed they could remedy previous failures by making the column fatter and wider. Napoleon also having no previous experience against this formation again repeated his subordinates previous mistakes but in a larger fashion. The formation which he sent the Old Guard in a last ditch effort to break Wellington's line was not so much a formation as a walking blob.
 
In one respect, Thomas' defense of his position at Horseshoe Ridge at Chickamauga was successful: his flanks were being engulfed, Confederate forces had already achieved a breakthrough that doomed the AotC, so Thomas could only hope to hold out for a limited amount of time before either surrender or withdrawal. He chose withdrawal (I guess he was technically ordered by Rosecrans), and that was the right move.
Not to criticize Thomas in any way. He brilliantly succeeded in his job which was to draw the attention of Bragg to him while allowing the rest of the fleeing Union army to reach Chattanooga and reconstitute itself for the ensuing battle to keep Bragg from taking the city back--incidentally bagging most of the Union army by denying it a path to retreat through Chattanooga.

Thomas's job was never to repel Bragg's assault on his position, just to hold them up from following up on his successes.
 
With respect to Chattanooga, Bragg's engineers, for whatever reason, indifference or incompetence, laid out the defenses incorrectly. They were primarily located more nearer the geographic crest of the ridge rather than the "military" crest. Thus the Federal assaulting troops, once having overrun the Rebel defenses closer to the base of the ridge, were in defilade for much of the assault and the thinly-stretched Confederates on the crest were simply overwhelmed.
A few years ago, I visited Chattanooga and the various battle sites there. I stopped at the Park Center. I must have been a very slow day as a man and his son were the only other people in the center. I overheard the boy ask his Dad a question which the Father in turn relayed to the Ranger. It was about Bragg and the Lookout Mt battle. The ranger dithered a bit not able to offer a definitive reply.

I spoke up and said that as I remembered it Bragg upon graduating from West Point was assigned due to his class standing to the artillery. Which means that technically at least he was a professional artillerist. If so how could he have failed so completely to competently site his artillery for the battle. Thomas's troops having made it through the hail of fire from the summit finally realized, huddled at the base of the mountain that their enemy's artillery could not fire at them. The cannon's muzzles could not be depressed enough if they simply began to climb the mountain.

At that point the Ranger spoke up and said that he could look that up and sure enough Bragg was technically an artillerist--albeit an incompetent one.
 
You specifically ask the question about commonality between the 3 battles. I think the answer is absolutely NOT.

G'burg of course stands alone. As much as I admire and respect Lee the attack should never have been made. It was a frontal attack against an entrenched enemy. He did nothing to ensure that the concomitant flank attacks were prosecuted and Stuarts monumental failure to overwhelm the pitiful Union cavalry opposing him was the nadir of him military career. Compounding this was the failure of his artillery barrage due to defective fuses leaves one to wonder how much more effective Pickett's charge might have been with effective fuses. And finally simply giving up the assault and maneuvering--something which his army could do enormously more effectively than the AoP.

Chickamauga just has to be viewed in light of Rosecrans enormous blunder in opening a hole in his defensive line which allowed Longstreet/Bragg's attack it's initial tactical breakthrough. The most significant result of this battle was not a tactical victory/defeat, it was the total discrediting of Rosecrans and concomitant elevation of Grant as overall CinC of the West. It is not inconceivable that had Longstreet's breakthrough taken longer, Rosecrans might well have been able to redirect his troops to prevent such a complete Confederate victory.

It just occurred to me that I've made several responses to this post referring to the Lookout Mt battle as Missionary Ridge battle. Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. But regardless Union success here was directly proportionate to Bragg's incompetence.
 
You mean the same Bragg who had just achieved the single greatest battlefield victory for the CSA during the entire war just 2 months earlier at Chickamauga. Or was that just a fluke? The what about his invasion of KY back in the Fall of 62 which had the entire North in catatonic fits for weeks and recovered middle TN for the CSA for another 9 months, till Jun 63; Or the Bragg who kicked the hell out of the Yanks at Murfreesboro for 3 days, and surprised the heck out of them when he retreated, unmolested, by the grateful Yanks. Bragg was the best fighting general in the West the CSA had, likely. Is greatly underrated for a variety of reasons. If he was such a dolt, why would Davis rely on him as his chief adviser for the last yr of the war?
I would respond that for years I've applauded Bragg as the single greatest factor in the Confederate defeat.

His invasion of Ky????? As soon as Union forces assembled he ran back to Tenn. as fast as his little legs could carry him.

Murfreesboro??? His attack at unattended campfires at the extreme end of the Union western flank, instead of the actual flank resulted in unrecoverable lost time which eventually turned guaranteed victory into partial victory and eventual defeat.

Instead of following up his initial successes by maneuvering past his opponent and cutting his supply line and instead ordered inexcusable frontal assaults against artillery lined up quite literally wheel to wheel with concomitant losses. In doing so he ignored the one critical Confederate advantage--that they could operate without a secure supply line, while their opponents were inextricably tied to theirs. A Union army severed from the supply line was literally a fish of water.

Furthermore do you think the Union would have paid Brag to repeat his assaults another day or two or three at Murfreesboro. He could have died the richest man in America if not the entire world.

One other event you fail to mention about Bragg's career was his actions during Shiloh. He could have single-handedly won the battle on day one had he granted the request for artillery to break the Union line at the Sunken Lane. Instead of granting the request and deploying the necessary artillery which could have easily broken the Union defense at the Lane, he insulted the commander and ordered him to make a "real assault" on the Union defenders. Instead he allowed Grant to consolidate his forces, make an organized defense of the landing and give the Union Army a place to land reinforcement from the other side to reinforce the Union defenders into a significantly greater defender than the attacking Confederates.

Finally as to your initial question about Chickamauga being a fluke. Well YEAH!!!!!!!!! And before you bring up the issue of his fractious and incompetent sub commanders, and I am the first to agree that they were indeed that, then it was his duty and responsibility to relieve them of command. If they appealed to Richmond, then it was his duty to give Davis a choice--them or me. His ultimate victory there rested less in his military prowess than in Rosecrans incopempetence.
 
Cist is a big part of the problem. And by ambiguity, I should have been clear that I meant "in the context". The major takeaway I got from Dave's analysis is that Wood did not act as Cozzens argued - a guy who was po'd at the earlier rebuke and had an implicit "I'll show him" intent. As for Rosecrans blaming Wood ( as he did repeatedly), I've always found it ironic that Rosey has become a figure that some of his more zealous supporters claim was falsely scapegoated by Grant for Iuka. "What goes around comes around ........"
Yeah, Rosecrans was brilliant but weird. A guy I played Little League baseball with wrote a book on the Rosecrans-Grant feud. Interesting book I enjoyed reading, but I am not sure I agree with the slant. Rosecrans wasn't as bad as Bragg, but he sparked controversy in the command chain (and was one of the people who feuded with Stanton, which was how Rosecrans got sent to Tennessee in the first place). Grant liked him early (Rosecrans immediately after Halleck took Corinth), was happy enough to see him go after Iuka-Corinth campaign (although ticked Sheridan went with him), got more upset through the Vicksburg-Tullahoma period, and deliberately chose Thomas (who Grant didn't like much) over Rosecrans at Chattanooga. Rosecrans held grudges too, and would later vote to block the Grant pension bill when he was in Congress.

This whole thing about Chickamauga was an inside-the-AoC, over-the-campfire debate topic in 1863-64. Any specific story you see is contradicted by someone else's version, and people took positions that hardened with time. Cist's sources are probably other veterans who had discussed this for 10 or 15 years before he wrote his book. He was not actually at Chickamauga, but he was AAG on Rosecrans staff, and then on Thomas staff.

The order is clear as written, but makes no sense given the situation Wood knew about. OTOH, the reason for the report of the gap in the line is that Brannan was going to pull out to go to Thomas, which was being reported to Rosecrans, but then Brannan decided not to obey that order. Rosecrans knew that Brannan was going to pull out, but did not know Brannan had decided not to go, which makes the order irrelevant and non-applicable. Wood did not know Brannan was going to leave and he did not know Brannan had cancelled the move -- but he did know that he could not "close up on" Reynolds because Brannan was in between them. The situation screams for clarification -- and Rosecrans was only a brief ride by an aide away, on the other side of the field. Wood should have checked -- he would have had an answer back in minutes -- certainly in less time than it took to get his division pulled into column and moving up the road.

Most probably, there should have been an inquiry into all this to clear the mess up -- but the army was besieged, Rosecrans was relieved, Thomas replaced him, and another major battle followed, leading into the 1864 Atlanta Campaign. Rosecrans and Wood both look bad enough here.
 
It really boggles the mind to comprehend that a survivor of the carnage of Pickett's charge (Hood), where Lee ordered just a small portion of his army to assault and entrenched enemy could be insane enough to duplicate the same charge not with some portion of his army but his entire army in a straight on assault against a completely prepared and entrenched opponent.

Hood wasn't part of the July 3 charge. He went down early on Longstreet's July 2 attack, having been shot badly in the arm.

Hood's attack at Franklin was also an act of desperation. If he didn't destroy Schofield there then Schofield reaches Nashville and his campaign was doomed.
 
I spoke up and said that as I remembered it Bragg upon graduating from West Point was assigned due to his class standing to the artillery. Which means that technically at least he was a professional artillerist
In fact, Bragg first gained military prominence for his role as an artillerist during the Mexican War when General Zachary Taylor, famously requested Bragg during the battle of Buena Vista to give "a little more grape."
 
It really boggles the mind to comprehend that a survivor of the carnage of Pickett's charge (Hood), where Lee ordered just a small portion of his army to assault and entrenched enemy could be insane enough to duplicate the same charge not with some portion of his army but his entire army in a straight on assault against a completely prepared and entrenched opponent.

The Federal position on Cemetery Ridge was not intrenched. Many of the Federal troops were behind low stone walls, some had shallow scrapes that hardly merit the term trenches and some were out in the open.
 
In conception, I think Chickamauga and Gettysburg are comparable. They were planned(apparently)as battles of anihalation; Pickett to breakthrough the Union Center and with support from Hill , eta.l., would force the norther part of the Union dislocated line up against the Union forces on Ceemetary Hill and Culps Hill , in effect surrounded by Hill and Ewell's Corps(and hopefully Longstreet).

Conceptually, Chickamauga was also meant to destroy the opposing army. Bragg's main attack was on the Federal Left which was protecting the Pass leading to Chattanooga If the Federal left can be forced away from the pass, then the Union army is trapped in the trackless wilderness to destruction or surrender.

Missionary Ridge, was simply a mistake that went right, conceptually, it was only supposed to be a diversionary demonstration to keep rebels from reinforcing those fighting at Tunnel Hill.
 
In conception, I think Chickamauga and Gettysburg are comparable. They were planned(apparently)as battles of anihalation; Pickett to breakthrough the Union Center and with support from Hill , eta.l., would force the norther part of the Union dislocated line up against the Union forces on Ceemetary Hill and Culps Hill , in effect surrounded by Hill and Ewell's Corps(and hopefully Longstreet).

Conceptually, Chickamauga was also meant to destroy the opposing army. Bragg's main attack was on the Federal Left which was protecting the Pass leading to Chattanooga If the Federal left can be forced away from the pass, then the Union army is trapped in the trackless wilderness to destruction or surrender.

Missionary Ridge, was simply a mistake that went right, conceptually, it was only supposed to be a diversionary demonstration to keep rebels from reinforcing those fighting at Tunnel Hill.


Hood was always looking for that battle of annihilation, which explains much of his failure in 1864. When Hood fell wounded at Chickamauga, the Confederates seemed on the verge of destroying the Army of the Cumberland. That image, along with his other delusions based on the belief that one army could wipe out another, explains his aggressiveness outside of Atlanta, where he went after large chunks of the Union forces investing the city. Having failed to destroy Schofield at Spring Hill (where it might have actually been possible) he determined that crushing the 23rd Corps on the south side of the Harpeth River would be the next best thing. Ironically, his failure there not only cost him the flower of his army, but set him up for near-annihilation at the hands of the allegedly "slow" defensive Yankee, George H. Thomas (don't even get me started...). Once thing you can say about Hood, he was consistent in his mistakes.
 
In fact, Bragg first gained military prominence for his role as an artillerist during the Mexican War when General Zachary Taylor, famously requested Bragg during the battle of Buena Vista to give "a little more grape."
Bragg actually ended up assuming command of the company/battery that was commanded by Ringgold until he was MW at Palo Alto. Another officer, Ridgeley, had taken command following Ringgold's death, but he was killed accidentally at Monterey and it was then assigned to Bragg. That company - "C" of the 3rd US - was probably the first permanent horse artillery battery in the US Army (there was a dispute years later between John Tidball and William Birkhimer on that issue, but my research shows that Birkhimer probably was correct regarding "C"). Bragg transferred from command of Company/Battery "E" of the 3rd, which was generally "mounted" but not true horse artillery. So Bragg was directly involved in the Poinsett reforms of the field artillery that commenced in 1838 with the 3rd and were largely driven by Ringgold, including his 1845 tactics manual.
 
Hood was always looking for that battle of annihilation, which explains much of his failure in 1864. When Hood fell wounded at Chickamauga, the Confederates seemed on the verge of destroying the Army of the Cumberland. That image, along with his other delusions based on the belief that one army could wipe out another, explains his aggressiveness outside of Atlanta, where he went after large chunks of the Union forces investing the city. Having failed to destroy Schofield at Spring Hill (where it might have actually been possible) he determined that crushing the 23rd Corps on the south side of the Harpeth River would be the next best thing. Ironically, his failure there not only cost him the flower of his army, but set him up for near-annihilation at the hands of the allegedly "slow" defensive Yankee, George H. Thomas (don't even get me started...). Once thing you can say about Hood, he was consistent in his mistakes.
I would qualify this to an extent regarding PeachTree/Atlanta, since there is some evidence that the plan executed by Hood was actually developed and communicated by Johnston just before he was fired on July 17, 1864.
 
I would qualify this to an extent regarding PeachTree/Atlanta, since there is some evidence that the plan executed by Hood was actually developed and communicated by Johnston just before he was fired on July 17, 1864.
In "Opposing Sherman's Advance to Atlanta" in Vol. 4 of Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Johnson writes that after being replaced by Hood, he shared that "if the enemy should give us a good opportunity in the passage of Peach Tree Creek, I expected to attack him. If successful, we should obtain important results, for the enemy's retreat would be on two sides of a triangle and our march on one. If we should not succeed, our intrenchments (sic) would give us a safe refuge, where we could hold back the enemy until the promised state troops should join us...then...I would attack the Federals in the flank with the three Confederate corps. If successful, they would be driven against the Chattahoochee below the railroad, where there are no fords, or away from their supplies, as we might fall on their left or right flank. If unsuccessful, we could take refuge in Atlanta, which we could hold indefinitely..." (275-76).

In his essay in the same volume, "The Struggle for Atlanta" O. O. Howard states that "Johnston had planned to attack Sherman at Peach Tree Creek, expecting just such a division between our wings as we made," and states that "Hood endeavored to to carry out the plan." (313)

Of course, Hood's version a few pages later gives Johnston no such credit. After lamenting that the Army of Tennessee had been subjected to the "ruinous policy" of fighting on the defensive to the extent that it was "unfitted for a united action in a pitched battle," he goes on to state that "Sherman's violation of the established maxim that an army should always be held well within hand, or its detachments within easy supporting distance, afforded one of the most favorable occasions for complete victory which could have been offered; especially as it presented an opportunity, after crushing his right wing, to throw our entire force upon his left." He adds as a qualifying shot to Johnston's guarded optimism and contingency plans, "such a blunder affords a small army the best, if not the sole, chance of success when contending with a vastly superior force." (336-37)

Even 30 years later, knowing that the plan failed, we can see the difference in intent. Hood's language conveys his desire to destroy one or more of Sherman's armies in an all-or-nothing effort, while Johnston's version promised only "important results" if it worked, followed by two "if unsuccessful" scenarios rooted in returning to the tactical defensive behind massive fortifications.
 
In "Opposing Sherman's Advance to Atlanta" in Vol. 4 of Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Johnson writes that after being replaced by Hood, he shared that "if the enemy should give us a good opportunity in the passage of Peach Tree Creek, I expected to attack him. If successful, we should obtain important results, for the enemy's retreat would be on two sides of a triangle and our march on one. If we should not succeed, our intrenchments (sic) would give us a safe refuge, where we could hold back the enemy until the promised state troops should join us...then...I would attack the Federals in the flank with the three Confederate corps. If successful, they would be driven against the Chattahoochee below the railroad, where there are no fords, or away from their supplies, as we might fall on their left or right flank. If unsuccessful, we could take refuge in Atlanta, which we could hold indefinitely..." (275-76).

In his essay in the same volume, "The Struggle for Atlanta" O. O. Howard states that "Johnston had planned to attack Sherman at Peach Tree Creek, expecting just such a division between our wings as we made," and states that "Hood endeavored to to carry out the plan." (313)

Of course, Hood's version a few pages later gives Johnston no such credit. After lamenting that the Army of Tennessee had been subjected to the "ruinous policy" of fighting on the defensive to the extent that it was "unfitted for a united action in a pitched battle," he goes on to state that "Sherman's violation of the established maxim that an army should always be held well within hand, or its detachments within easy supporting distance, afforded one of the most favorable occasions for complete victory which could have been offered; especially as it presented an opportunity, after crushing his right wing, to throw our entire force upon his left." He adds as a qualifying shot to Johnston's guarded optimism and contingency plans, "such a blunder affords a small army the best, if not the sole, chance of success when contending with a vastly superior force." (336-37)

Even 30 years later, knowing that the plan failed, we can see the difference in intent. Hood's language conveys his desire to destroy one or more of Sherman's armies in an all-or-nothing effort, while Johnston's version promised only "important results" if it worked, followed by two "if unsuccessful" scenarios rooted in returning to the tactical defensive behind massive fortifications.
There's a lot of "play in the joints" here. So far as I've seen, Johnston's first written expression of his "plan" came in November 1864. One of his subordinates said many years later that Johnston communicated it to him, but I don't think any others confirmed that they were told about it. It's clear he didn't tell Bragg or Davis, even though he knew he was about to be sacked for having no plan to attack Sherman. If true, Johnston's version contemplated attack at PeachTree and a flanking attack but Hood collapsed those into a 48-hour period. For myself, I wouldn't put too much weight on the difference in stated "intent" - that gets a little subjective. My bigger question has always been whether Johnston's "plan" is reality. I think it was, but there are questions.
 
if the enemy should give us a good opportunity in the passage of Peach Tree Creek, I expected to attack him

That does sound like Joe Johnston: only attack when you can concentrate most or all of your army against a portion of the enemy (see Bentonville).

Whether Johnston would have recognized a "good opportunity" and seized it quickly enough is of course another matter.
 
Pickett et al at Gettysburg was across open terrain again a solid, elevated Union line including artillery. They were hit it both flanks by artillery fire and even a few regiments moving out temporarily in front of the Union line.

Longstreet at Chickamauga had some of the greatest depth of any attack of the war. He also had cover for his attack as Chickamauga battlefield is very wooded. No flank fire. Wood's division still being in place would have only slowed the attack, not stopped it.

The AOC at Missionary Ridge pretty much everything went wrong for the Confederates. They didn't have enough men to cover their line properly. The Confederate positions were poorly situated. Confederate morale was low. I don't think there was much flank fire. Union artillery at Orchard Knob was I think actively firing on Missionary Ridge until the infantry got close, as opposed to stopping before the attack began at Gettysburg (and being irrelevant at Longstreet's Chickamauga attack, and absent entirely for the attackers at Franklin).



Hood's attack at Franklin was over a very wide frontage, with no depth. It's basically the opposite of Longstreet at Chickamauga.



A big difference between the Mule Shoe and the other attacks discussed was that it occured at dawn. Also, the defenders' line curved away from the attack rather that being a straight line.

When I visited Spotsylvania, a NPS ranger pointed out the Confederate trench line was improperly placed relative to the crest of the slight ridge it was on due to being dug in the dark.
General Lee's army got to Spotsylvania first, but the terrain they entrenched did not have a good field of fire and the gradient hid the approaching attackers for a large part of the approach. Plus when Sheridan and Stuart were engaged in a cavalry pursuit to Richmond, Lee temporarily lost track of US intentions and began moving critical batteries. His line was hastily chosen and not completely stationary.
 
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