Was Lee a Poor Strategic Thinker?

OldReliable1862

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Beginning in the 1970s with Alan Nolan and Thomas Lawrence Connelly, the view of Lee as the unassailable, perfect general has started to be thoroughly taken to task. One of the most charges against Lee's supposed mastery of war was that he allegedly failed to grasp war above the operational, or "grand tactical" level. Lee had strategic "tunnel vision," unable to see the war outside of the Virginia theater of operations.

On the face of it, this seems somewhat substantiated when looking at how pessimistic he was of Longstreet's desire to use his troops in the West.
 
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We were discussing the prospects of reinforcing the Western Theatre from the ANV in 1863, not you are talking about McClellan's Peninsula Campaign in 1862. Most of your information is either suspect or wrong., as for instance, a great debate between McClellan, Lincoln and the War Dept. raged all during and after the campaign ended.
But it matters in terms of whether Lee has to worry about an 1863 Peninsular campaign. This would completely obviate the whole defensive strategy for Richmond if the strategy is "defend the line of the Rapidan".

The thing preventing a threat to Richmond is the threat Lee's army poses to Washington.

great debate between McClellan, Lincoln and the War Dept. raged all during and after the campaign ended. concerning exactly how many men were in the AoP at any point in time and from the history off events at the time, it seems likely that if Lee had any thing like 100,000 men in the ranks he would have beaten little mac more soundly than he did in real life.
Lee's army at the Seven Days had 2150 companies in it, and he suffered 20,000 casualties in the fighting.

The force Lee had left at Richmond after sending Jackson and Ewell back north (and after suffering the 20,000 casualties mentioned) had 94,700 Aggregate Present in it. Jackson and Ewell represent about 20% of the companies engaged at the Seven Days.

The forces with which he fought at Second Bull Run suffered about 10,000 casualties, and had 94,500 effectives in it after those casualties had been suffered. (note, effectives not Union PFD and not Aggregate Present). This force had 2030 companies in it.
 
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I think the fundamental question here then is what the projected end-state of the campaign is. Is the end-state of the campaign that the Confederacy has re-established control of large chunks of Kentucky and Tennessee, and is expecting to be able to defend them long term? Is that with Longstreet still west (as part of the defence) or not?

Does the campaign goal include the destruction or mauling of a major Union army? If so then that makes the defence aspect easier but means the campaign itself is a larger ask.

Which of the possible routes to Confederate independence does it advance?
Instead of reading the text books of strategy, perhaps a closer look at history would be a better guide.

As I have noted many times before on other threads. Bragg's invasion of Ky, relieved the immediate threat of Buell's advance on Chattanooga. and delayed the loss of that city by at least a year. In other words

Bragg did it once, I see no reason to believe he had lost his aggressiveness and so could not do it again.

Tn and especially Ky. would become strategic. focal points that Lincoln could afford to leave in enemy hands . In actual fact, Lincoln did send reinforcements to Tn. from the AoP and there was no longer any talk of 'On to Richmond'.
 
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As I have noted many times before on other threads. Bragg's invasion of Ky, relieved the immediate threat of Buell's advance on Chattanooga. and delayed the loss of that city by at least a year. In other words

Bragg did it once, I see no reason to believe he had lost his aggressiveness and so could not do it again.
So, to be clear, the intent here is to cause a delay. That's fine, that's what I was wondering.
 
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But it matters in terms of whether Lee has to worry about an 1863 Peninsular campaign. This would completely obviate the whole defensive strategy for Richmond if the strategy is "defend the line of the Rapidan".

The thing preventing a threat to Richmond is the threat Lee's army poses to Washington.


Lee's army at the Seven Days had 2150 companies in it, and he suffered 20,000 casualties in the fighting.

The force Lee had left at Richmond after sending Jackson and Ewell back north (and after suffering the 20,000 casualties mentioned) had 94,700 Aggregate Present in it. Jackson and Ewell represent about 20% of the companies engaged at the Seven Days.

The forces with which he fought at Second Bull Run suffered about 10,000 casualties, and had 94,500 effectives in it after those casualties had been suffered. (note, effectives not Union PFD and not Aggregate Present). This force had 2030 companies in it.
Even if all of that were true, it says nothing about the quality of Lee's strategic thinking. One of the main claims to fame for Lee as a general, was how he defended the South with a smaller
army than the North and now you are saying, this is not so? In any case, if Lincoln, the War Dept. and McClellan could not agree on how many troops were in the AoP, I have to doubt your figures, as a matter of historical accuracy.

I find from my study of the history of the ACW, that little evidence that Lee at any time did not have the battle of Second Manassas, well in hand, as indeed he did in at Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, even without Longstreet.
 
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So, to be clear, the intent here is to cause a delay. That's fine, that's what I was wondering.
No, delay of the the loss of Chattanooga, was the result of Bragg's invasion of Ky. The intent of his strategy was to bring Ky into the Confederacy. A second try might have accomplished it and that was certainly a better prospect that Lee marching 40 miles North and 40 miles back .
 
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Even if all of that were true, it says nothing about the quality of Lee's strategic thinking. One of the main claims to fame for Lee as a general, was how he defended the South with a smaller
army than the North and now you are saying, this is not so? In any case, if Lincoln, the War Dept. and McClellan could not agree on how many troops were in the AoP, I have to doubt your figures, as a matter of historical accuracy.
Lee defended the South with a smaller total army than the North. However, in order to force the Union army away from Richmond in the Seven Days he needed a larger army around Richmond than the Union had around Richmond.

The way Lee was able to prevent that happening again was by presenting a threat to Washington.


As it happens, the problem in agreeing was Lincoln, because he could not properly understand McClellan's returns. Lincoln had a bad habit of reading the number of men who were in the organizations that had gone into McClellan's army (the Present and Absent) and assuming that that equated to the number of men who should be with the army, and then essentially asking why it is that McClellan's Present For Duty wasn't the same as his Present and Absent.


I find from my study of the history of the ACW, that little evidence that Lee at any time did not have the battle of Second Manassas, well in hand, as indeed he did in at Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, even without Longstreet.
Do you think Lee's army at Second Manassas was smaller than I've indicated?

How many men do you think he had at Fredericksburg? How many casualties in the Maryland campaign?

Lee's army started large and he suffered casualties over time that made it smaller. This doesn't seem controversial.


No, delay of the the loss of Chattanooga, was the result of Bragg's invasion of Ky. The intent of his strategy was to bring Ky into the Confederacy. A second try might have accomplished it and that was certainly a better prospect that Lee marching 40 miles North and 40 miles back .
But what is the long term result of that?

That is what I am trying to get at.

If Bragg's invasion succeeds, then does it mean:

- that Kentucky is now permanently in the Confederacy?
If so, it will need to be defended long-term or the Union will just take it away again. This will absorb troops for a long time.
- that Kentucky is in the Confederacy until it can be retaken by the Union?
If so, then this means that the invasion of Kentucky is delaying the point at which the Union can move on to their next objective (i.e. Chattanooga etc).
- that taking control of Kentucky is intended to force a peace?
If so, by what mechanism?


This is because the strategic benefits (actual and possible) of Lee invading the North are related to doing damage to the Union, advancing the possibility of a peace favourable to the Confederates, and effectively tying up the 1863 summer campaign season in something other than another Union offensive.
 
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As far as I read now even Lee was as early as March 1863 contemplating that the Union was shifting it´s main effort to the West. But even then this left Hooker with about 120.000 effectives in Virginia to wage an attack -
on the other hand : if Lee felt comfortable with his capabilities to defend Va. without Longstreet (as he to some extent did) it would have been strategical the best if he had have acted accordingly and sent Longstreet to Bragg.
I deem it quite convincing that Bragg could have been more successful using Longstreet´s whole corps - and shattering Rosecrans and maybe taking Kentucky would have turned the tables somehow - as Grant´s offensive against Vicksburg most probably would have been called off then (regardless if Kentucky could be held finally).
So we may conclude that Lee´s strategic vision was not at it´s best then - regarding that point.

But isn ´t this a bit of hindsight? I will of course delve now deeper into Lee ´s letters -
but I am suspecting that he was not so sure what the Union was exactly planning in the East -

1) could it be that sending Longstreet south of the James was more a question of being prepared against an eventual threat in that region (than to forage - something I generally never found convincing was that he should have used one of the best corps of the ANV just for foraging operations...)

2) Could it be that he actually was not so sure that he could hold the line without Longstreet (as 120.000 is quite an impressive host...) - and sending him away would deprive him of his services for quite a long time....

3) Could it be that he generally mistrusted Bragg and his abilities - the worrisome situation in the AoT he should have been aware of...

I deem it even possible that Lee maybe acted not only out of strategical considerations here - but maybe just because he wanted to stay active with the ANV and felt the desire to smash his opponents in NVa. - maybe also out of more personal motivations (but these can only be conjectured)....

But
- maybe he just tried to play safe? Sending Longstreet away was much safer after it became clear that the Union was using the old Overland route again - and after Chancellorsville (who had expected such an outcome in a battle where the forces were that lopsided?)

Maybe that western concentration strategy was in that spring time just gambling at too high stakes for him (and his character)
- laying too much into the hands of people he had no real reason to trust and giving too much out of his own hand made things a lot more uncontrollable to him (and he liked to control situations...).

Of course the Confederacy had to gamble extremely high to have a chance - but can we really say he was a bad strategist just because he wasn ´t willed to play at such stakes?
(If he would NOT have been able to hold the line against Hooker and would have been crushed with Longstreet absent in Tennessee at his own request...how would we assess his strategical planning THEN?)
 
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If Lee has a guarantee that:
- The Union will only launch overland attacks, not restart the peninsular route
and
- The Union will launch those attacks in such a way that Lee can block them before they establish supply south of the Rapidan

Then Lee would be able to hold Northern VA against anything the Union could send against him, without Longstreet (in 1863), assuming he gets lucky and Hooker errs in the historical ways at Chancellorsville.

In real life, the decision on sending Longstreet West was made ===after=== the battle of Chancellorsville. There is no need to speculate on luck and Hooker erring the same way at Chancellorsville. That is already in the past
But he doesn't have those guarantees.
No commander ever does.
 
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In real life, the decision on sending Longstreet West was made ===after=== the battle of Chancellorsville. There is no need to speculate on luck and Hooker erring the same way at Chancellorsville. That is already in the past
I know that was when the decision was made in real life, but at times such as here:
P.S. have you answered my question concerning the viability of sending Longstreet's corps, fully equipped, to Chattanooga by Rail to Knoxville, rather than foraging in Southern Va., even as Lee easily defeated Hooker.
OpnCoronet was saying that he was envisaging Longstreet being sent West before Chancellorsville. So I need to include it in my assessment.

Similarly if the idea is to prevent the fall of Vicksburg then Longstreet needs to be sent west before (or at absolute latest during) Chancellorsville.


No commander ever does.
Sort of my point. Lee can only be confident in holding in the East in summer 1863 to the extent he feels the Union will go along with the specified conditions; if he thinks they will and he's wrong, he's lost Richmond, most of Virginia, probably at least one major battle, the Confederacy's hopes for intervention or threatening Washington, and in general any realistic chance of a route to victory.


After the historical Gettysburg, the Union has suffered heavy attrition to their army (both from muster-outs and casualties) and so the risk of a Peninsula Rerun is much less. I do note though that Pickett went to Richmond, not West.



After a historical Chancellorsville but before a historical Gettysburg the cost-benefit is related to the Union army being in a vulnerable position (defeated twice in a row, lots of casualties and musters-out). That's the strategic calculus.
 
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...
but I am suspecting that he was not so sure what the Union was exactly planning in the East -

1) could it be that sending Longstreet south of the James was more a question of being prepared against an eventual threat in that region (than to forage - something I generally never found convincing was that he should have used one of the best corps of the ANV just for foraging operations...)

2) Could it be that he actually was not so sure that he could hold the line without Longstreet (as 120.000 is quite an impressive host...) - and sending him away would deprive him of his services for quite a long time....

3) Could it be that he generally mistrusted Bragg and his abilities - the worrisome situation in the AoT he should have been aware of...
The ANV had very real supply problems over the Winter of 1862-63. It may seem surprising that they would have such difficulties supporting an army only 50 miles from Richmond by RR, but they did.

Longstreet did a thorough job of sweeping up resources down there -- but he was supposed to keep his force ready for a rapid return to Lee at all times. In that, he did a bad job. As a result, he is passing through Richmond on his way back after the battle. He stops to check in with Davis (just being thorough? playing politics for a more independent role?) as the discussions over what to do in the West are going on (Grant is across the Mississippi; Rosecrans and Bragg are staring at one another in Middle Tennessee). He proposes sending part of his his Corps to the West and heads on back to Lee and the ANV.

When he gets there, Lee fills him in on the Pennsylvania invasion plan. Lee had been working on that with Jackson since February, but this is the first Longstreet hears of it. Lee convinces Longstreet. Longstreet returns to Richmond as Lee's emissary to argue for the Pennsylvania plan. Davis approves.

Lee expressed little interest in going West himself or sending his troops to the West. In May there is little reason to look at 1861-62-63 Confederate actions in the West and feel confident about success out there. A. S. Johnston died, Bragg and Beauregard failed, Joe Johnston was a friend, but had been badly wounded and seemed not ready for field duty.

IMHO, Lee had his own plan (really an improved version of the 1862 invasion). He'd been working on it with Jackson (his mapmaker and Jackson's were preparing for it from February on). Like any commander, he wanted to keep his own troops and run his own operation. I am sure he had doubts about success in the West.
 
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Longstreet did a thorough job of sweeping up resources down there -- but he was supposed to keep his force ready for a rapid return to Lee at all times. In that, he did a bad job. As a result, he is passing through Richmond on his way back after the battle.
I think it's interesting to think about this specifically, which is how quickly Longstreet should have been able to get back to Lee. Depending on what could be expected, what Lee wanted and how well Longstreet did it could indicate either Lee or Longstreet dropped the ball on what can be considered a strategic matter.
 
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I know that was when the decision was made in real life, but at times such as here:

OpnCoronet was saying that he was envisaging Longstreet being sent West before Chancellorsville. So I need to include it in my assessment.

Similarly if the idea is to prevent the fall of Vicksburg then Longstreet needs to be sent west before (or at absolute latest during) Chancellorsville.
  • Longstreet's Suffolk campaign runs from April 11 to May 4. Longstreet gets his troops up to Lee by May 9.
  • Chancellorsville is April 30-May 6, with Union preliminaries starting April 27.
  • Preliminary movements for the Vicksburg Campaign start on April 16 and Grant's first attempt to cross the river is repulsed at Grand Gulf on April 29 with Snyder's Bluff and Port Gibson running to May 1.
Based on that, you would have little reason to make a decision to send Longstreet to "prevent the fall of Vicksburg" before Chancellorsville. In early April Pemberton was still looking like a hero, and Longstreet is moving down to launch the Suffolk campaign. On April 11, Longstreet has already crossed the Nansemond River.

If you want to make a decision "during Chancellorsville", that seems unlikely. It would involve telling Lee, in the middle of a ferocious battle, that you won't even send him his own troops. With the situation very uncertain, Lee might be defeated and Richmond lost before Longstreet's men could get to Tennessee or Mississippi.

If you want to make a decision to send Longstreet West before Chancellorsville, there'd really be no reason to send them to Mississippi before Grant moves, probably not before Grant crosses the Mississippi.

If you want to make a decision to send Longstreet to Tennessee, you'd be aiming at an immediate offensive to beat Rosecrans and take Nashville, most likely. You'd have to be making it in about mid-to-late March, which means you'd be cancelling the Suffolk Campaign. That would make the situation in Virginia look pretty critical, and you will have just removed the only available large mobile force.

Without a firm commitment from Bragg and Joe Johnston to act quickly (and a logistical plan that made sense), it is hard to see a way to make that work.
 
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I think it's interesting to think about this specifically, which is how quickly Longstreet should have been able to get back to Lee. Depending on what could be expected, what Lee wanted and how well Longstreet did it could indicate either Lee or Longstreet dropped the ball on what can be considered a strategic matter.
There are some instructions to Longstreet in the OR, IIRR.
 
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I was quite puzzled to read yesterday that confederate generals had written Vicksburg off quite early - most of them didn‘t believe it worth a bigger investment (Beauregard said it eg bluntly as early as 1862...).
This might have influenced Lee‘s decision also - if Vicksburg was not to be reinforced further then it might suffice to send everyone that could be freed elsewhere (with the exception of ANV-troops) to Bragg - and IIRC this they did....

But some other people had problems with their strategical vision obviously: why send Pemberton with 30000 to Vicksburg if they already wrote the town off. 20000 of these 30000 could have made a difference in the West or even in Va.....
 
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Based on that, you would have little reason to make a decision to send Longstreet to "prevent the fall of Vicksburg" before Chancellorsville. In early April Pemberton was still looking like a hero, and Longstreet is moving down to launch the Suffolk campaign. On April 11, Longstreet has already crossed the Nansemond River.

If you want to make a decision "during Chancellorsville", that seems unlikely. It would involve telling Lee, in the middle of a ferocious battle, that you won't even send him his own troops. With the situation very uncertain, Lee might be defeated and Richmond lost before Longstreet's men could get to Tennessee or Mississippi.

If you want to make a decision to send Longstreet West before Chancellorsville, there'd really be no reason to send them to Mississippi before Grant moves, probably not before Grant crosses the Mississippi.
What I actually did was count backwards based on how long it took Longstreet to arrive at Chickamauga and fight there. I concluded that for Longstreet to be affecting events by May 18 (Big Black River Bridge which is when the Vicksburg garrison is cut off) you'd need Longstreet to set off no later than May 4 (which is, as noted, during Chancellorsville).

Which means things don't line up for it. You need to send Longstreet before/during Chancellorsville or it's too late to prevent Vicksburg being cut off.
 
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I was quite puzzled to read yesterday that confederate generals had written Vicksburg off quite early - most of them didn‘t believe it worth a bigger investment (Beauregard said it eg bluntly as early as 1862...).
This might have influenced Lee‘s decision also - if Vicksburg was not to be reinforced further then it might suffice to send everyone that could be freed elsewhere (with the exception of ANV-troops) to Bragg - and IIRC this they did....

But some other people had problems with their strategical vision obviously: why send Pemberton with 30000 to Vicksburg if they already wrote the town off. 20000 of these 30000 could have made a difference in the West or even in Va.....
I think the overall thinking was that Vicksburg was keeping the Union busy - look at the months of faffing around in the delta. In this case then the errors were twofold:

1) The errors (on the part of Pemberton's subordinates) which meant that Grant could safely cross north to Grand Gulf
2) Not pulling the garrison out once Grant was firmly established on the eastern side of the Mississippi.
 
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What I actually did was count backwards based on how long it took Longstreet to arrive at Chickamauga and fight there. I concluded that for Longstreet to be affecting events by May 18 (Big Black River Bridge which is when the Vicksburg garrison is cut off) you'd need Longstreet to set off no later than May 4 (which is, as noted, during Chancellorsville).

Which means things don't line up for it. You need to send Longstreet before/during Chancellorsville or it's too late to prevent Vicksburg being cut off.
I think you are probably being optimistic on the Longstreet to Jackson/Vicksburg calculation.

If you sent Longstreet with 2 divisions (the Chickamauga scenario), you could get them to Chattanooga/Atlanta faster because they can use the RR down the Great Valley through Knoxville (which is unavailable in September due to Burnside's advance). No matter which way you go from there, the RR connection is not continuous. Another example to look at might be Bragg's transfer of troops from Mississippi to Chattanooga that preceded the Invasion of Kentucky in August of 1862 (some of those troops went by RR down to Mobile, then back up to Chattanooga; the rest marched across with the trains).

For Chickamauga, Longstreet's troops were shipped without trains and, IIRR, with a limited amount of artillery. Once they get to Mississippi, they will be able to fight, but limited in their mobility. They were dependent on other units for supplies, ammo and trains to support movement in the actions that followed. If sent to Mississippi in April/May 1863 instead of the September transfer, they will have the same limitations (or they will need more RR lift capacity to bring trains/etc. with them).

IRL on May 4, 1863 Longstreet's troops are still in contact with Peck's Yankees at Suffolk. Any scenario that moves Longstreet West before or during Chancellorsville needs to abort the Suffolk campaign either before it starts or while it is on-going. That places the decision point back in April, most likely in early April. That places it before Grant has even started moving, and certainly before he has crossed the Mississippi.
 
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I think you are probably being optimistic on the Longstreet to Jackson/Vicksburg calculation.
Well, yes, I was. I was arguing a fortiori.

I considered the minimum required for disrupting the Vicksburg timeline was getting Longstreet engaged in the West somewhere before Big Black River Bridge, and assumed two weeks (when it took him fifteen days to get engaged at Chickamauga). That's basically Longstreet going directly to join Bragg and launching on his battle almost before he's finished detraining.

It still turned out not to work unless Longstreet was sent before/during Chancellorsville.
 
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Lee defended the South with a smaller total army than the North. However, in order to force the Union army away from Richmond in the Seven Days he needed a larger army around Richmond than the Union had around Richmond.

The way Lee was able to prevent that happening again was by presenting a threat to Washington.


As it happens, the problem in agreeing was Lincoln, because he could not properly understand McClellan's returns. Lincoln had a bad habit of reading the number of men who were in the organizations that had gone into McClellan's army (the Present and Absent) and assuming that that equated to the number of men who should be with the army, and then essentially asking why it is that McClellan's Present For Duty wasn't the same as his Present and Absent.



Do you think Lee's army at Second Manassas was smaller than I've indicated?

How many men do you think he had at Fredericksburg? How many casualties in the Maryland campaign?

Lee's army started large and he suffered casualties over time that made it smaller. This doesn't seem controversial.



But what is the long term result of that?

That is what I am trying to get at.

If Bragg's invasion succeeds, then does it mean:

- that Kentucky is now permanently in the Confederacy?
If so, it will need to be defended long-term or the Union will just take it away again. This will absorb troops for a long time.
- that Kentucky is in the Confederacy until it can be retaken by the Union?
If so, then this means that the invasion of Kentucky is delaying the point at which the Union can move on to their next objective (i.e. Chattanooga etc).
- that taking control of Kentucky is intended to force a peace?
If so, by what mechanism?


This is because the strategic benefits (actual and possible) of Lee invading the North are related to doing damage to the Union, advancing the possibility of a peace favourable to the Confederates, and effectively tying up the 1863 summer campaign season in something other than another Union offensive.
You seem to be assuming Lee had the larger army and you make no reference to Union casualties in all those battles and you are assuming in any case, the Union did not suffer heavier casualties ? If so I am assuming you are incorrect.

In actual fact, the most important long-term result of Bragg's invasion of Ky. was the delaying of the North's inasion of the Confederate heartland for a year, which extended the war in the West by a year. In other words , the war in the West would have been effectively over with the surrender of Vicksburg, in 1863, allowing the Union to bring all available forces to bear on Va.

Historically, Bragg was in a position to interdict Buell's retreating army in Ky, and force him to surrender or attack him to attack Bragg's army on its own ground. But Bragg turned away to instead seat a pro confederate governor and administration to govern Ky. which of course collapsed when Bragg lost his battle to maintain it. But, Again, that does not deny the fact that the loss of Ky in 1862 , could have changed the war in the West, nor its ramification in the halls of various European Foreign Offices, than one more dreary battle in Pa. and Lee in the end back on the Rappahannock.

Even though Bragg's invasion failed, does not change the fact that it was a bold strategic move to retrieve Southern fortunes in the West. He tried and failed, but, in concept, planning and execution, even in failure it compares more favorably than anything Lee attempted, or even, I suggest, thought of.
 
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You seem to be assuming Lee had the larger army and you make no reference to Union casualties in all those battles and you are assuming in any case, the Union did not suffer heavier casualties ? If so I am assuming you are incorrect.
I'm not assuming Lee had the larger army (in the Seven Days). I'm looking at all the possible ways of getting the strength of Lee's army, and comparing them to the same strength metrics of the Union army.
Lee's army comes out larger. It has more men AP, more effectives (it has more effectives in those units after 20,000 casualties in the Seven Days than the Union force had in those units after 15,000 casualties in the Seven Days), more regiments (it has 215 regiments, the Union force had 175 regiments) and more officers.

In actual fact, the most important long-term result of Bragg's invasion of Ky. was the delaying of the North's inasion of the Confederate heartland for a year, which extended the war in the West by a year. In other words , the war in the West would have been effectively over with the surrender of Vicksburg, in 1863, allowing the Union to bring all available forces to bear on Va.
So the 1862 invasion (conducted without assets from the East) has a delaying effect.

But that is not what we are discussing here; we are discussing the alternative options for what to do with Longstreet's corps in 1863. Are you proposing an 1863 invasion could have the same delaying effect again?



Again, that does not deny the fact that the loss of Ky in 1862 , could have changed the war in the West, nor its ramification in the halls of various European Foreign Offices, than one more dreary battle in Pa. and Lee in the end back on the Rappahannock.

Even though Bragg's invasion failed, does not change the fact that it was a bold strategic move to retrieve Southern fortunes in the West. He tried and failed, but, in concept, planning and execution, even in failure it compares more favorably than anything Lee attempted, or even, I suggest, thought of.
But you're talking about the possible outcome of a success for Bragg (in 1862) versus the outcome of Lee not succeeding (in 1863).
If Lee had succeeded in 1863 in a battle in PA (not "one more dreary battle in PA" but the only major battle in PA in the entire war) to the extent that was plausible given the actual events - the same metric by which you are judging Bragg's "could have changed the war" - then that would be Lee defeating the Army of the Potomac and crippling it*, rendering it unable to effectively take the field against him and making him master of PA for weeks. Even if he doesn't then have the chance to follow up and destroy the Army of the Potomac, he has the ability to strip Pennsylvania of forage, compel massive Union redeployment out of the West and to the East, wreck Union communications around Baltimore, and force Harpers Ferry to surrender.


Delay
This has massively delayed all Union offensive plans, including in the West. Troops are needed to rebuild the strategic situation around Washington.
Even once rebuilt the Army of the Potomac is missing most of the veterans, and if it's rebuilt with Western veterans then those veterans aren't in the West.
Domestic war opposition
This kind of thing happening in PA is going to be bad for the re-election chances of the PA governor. The Army of the Potomac is also going to need rebuilding, which means more recruitment; given the situation in late 1863 and into 1864 that means conscription, which was unpopular. It's also trivially true that suffering massive defeats is bad for the popularity of a government and a war.
Foreign intervention possibility
A significant defeat like that makes foreign intervention more likely. The spikes and declines in foreign intervention being discussed overseas were related directly to events in the East first and foremost.

And, of course, Lee can then send troops west and have Chickamauga happen "on schedule", or at least not have it not happen.


* the requirement for this to happen is fairly minor, as Gettysburg was a very close battle; a properly done echelon attack on Day Two would do nicely.
 
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