Union vs CSA Guerrilla

Ummmm because Mobile didn't fall until April 12th 1865 after the battles of Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely. There is correspondence between Grant and Sherman, A J Smiths division would have launched a mobile campaign after Atlanta if it hadn't been diverted to Missouri in response to Prices Raid
Once the Lower Bay of Mobile is captured Mobile
Ummmm because Mobile didn't fall until April 12th 1865 after the battles of Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely. There is correspondence between Grant and Sherman, A J Smiths division would have launched a mobile campaign after Atlanta if it hadn't been diverted to Missouri in response to Prices Raid
The fall of Mobile in 1865 wasn't that important. Per battlefields.org once the battle of Mobile Bay concluded in August of 1864 with the destruction of the Confederate fleet and the capture of Confederate ports the port of Mobile was effectively blockaded.
Price's Raid accomplished nothing useful for the Confederacy. Price's Raid did help the Union cause by causing the death of many Confederate soldiers and guerrillas at the cost of no lost territory for the Union.
Leftyhunter
 
Once the Lower Bay of Mobile is captured Mobile

The fall of Mobile in 1865 wasn't that important. Per battlefields.org once the battle of Mobile Bay concluded in August of 1864 with the destruction of the Confederate fleet and the capture of Confederate ports the port of Mobile was effectively blockaded.
Price's Raid accomplished nothing useful for the Confederacy. Price's Raid did help the Union cause by causing the death of many Confederate soldiers and guerrillas at the cost of no lost territory for the Union.
Leftyhunter
your opinion is noted, however actual generals at the time noted the delay of the Mobile campaign as a consequence, thats fact.

It was a raid to create a distraction, it distracted AJ Smiths division which did effect operations elsewhere. It was a limited effect, but what did you expect of a raid? They were expected to do something, when there was little they could do, so they did a raid at least trying to fulfill doing something. I'm not aware of any alternative they could even do.
 
Last edited:
Collection; Combat Studies Institute (CSI)
Title; Third War irregular warfare on the western border 1861-1865.
Author; Martin, James B.

Abstract; Foreword by Roderick M. Cox: In 1979, the Combat Studies Institute published the first of the Leavenworth Papers. The series afforded the CGSC Faculty the opportunity to present their scholarship to the professional military community seeking to learn about contemporary and doctrinal issues from historical events. After an eight year hiatus I am excited to bring back the Leavenworth Papers series to once again contribute to our Army’s education and leader development. That first publication of the Leavenworth Papers examined the evolution of US Army tactical doctrine since World War II. The research offered historical insights to senior leaders and doctrine writers charged with refocusing the Army toward a possible conventional conflict with Warsaw Pact military forces. In the 25 years that followed, the Leavenworth Papers series grew to include 22 studies that addressed historical cases that were likewise of tactical, doctrinal, and organizational interest to the Army. The subjects of these studies varied but the authors were intent on making history relevant to military professionals engaged in thinking about current and future challenges. This latest publication of the Leavenworth Papers marks the continuation of this storied series. Third War offers a lucid and well-researched analysis of irregular warfare during the American Civil War. Dr. Martin’s focus on insurgent operations in the western border region brings fresh insights to this area of study. Moreover, the history of insurgency in these western states offers a greater understanding of irregular warfare to those who may be tasked with mounting counterinsurgency operations in the not so distant future. CSI – The Past is Prologue!

Series; Leavenworth Papers
Publisher[ Fort Leavenworth, KS : Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center,
Date, Original; 2012
Date, Digital; 2012
Release Statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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  • Third War irregular warfare on the western border 1861-1865.pdf
    1.2 MB · Views: 36
Collection; Combat Studies Institute (CSI)
Title; Third War irregular warfare on the western border 1861-1865.
Author; Martin, James B.

Abstract; Foreword by Roderick M. Cox: In 1979, the Combat Studies Institute published the first of the Leavenworth Papers. The series afforded the CGSC Faculty the opportunity to present their scholarship to the professional military community seeking to learn about contemporary and doctrinal issues from historical events. After an eight year hiatus I am excited to bring back the Leavenworth Papers series to once again contribute to our Army’s education and leader development. That first publication of the Leavenworth Papers examined the evolution of US Army tactical doctrine since World War II. The research offered historical insights to senior leaders and doctrine writers charged with refocusing the Army toward a possible conventional conflict with Warsaw Pact military forces. In the 25 years that followed, the Leavenworth Papers series grew to include 22 studies that addressed historical cases that were likewise of tactical, doctrinal, and organizational interest to the Army. The subjects of these studies varied but the authors were intent on making history relevant to military professionals engaged in thinking about current and future challenges. This latest publication of the Leavenworth Papers marks the continuation of this storied series. Third War offers a lucid and well-researched analysis of irregular warfare during the American Civil War. Dr. Martin’s focus on insurgent operations in the western border region brings fresh insights to this area of study. Moreover, the history of insurgency in these western states offers a greater understanding of irregular warfare to those who may be tasked with mounting counterinsurgency operations in the not so distant future. CSI – The Past is Prologue!

Series; Leavenworth Papers
Publisher[ Fort Leavenworth, KS : Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center,
Date, Original; 2012
Date, Digital; 2012
Release Statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Thanks for this excellent link. I have downloaded the PDF.
 
If you're interested check out this link starting with "CHAPTER XII. War Times and Afterwards." Also search the book for "James (Jim) Hartley, Kirk, and Blalock, for even more insight. It will give you an excellent look into the subject from first hand accounts of people who lived it. As I've stated before. This area of NC was a hornets nest during that time in history due to the situation in TN, Eastern NC, and the fact that every other person here had loyalties to one side or the other and by 64 the Unionist, deserted Union and Confederate guerrilla's had become very brave due to the Northern army gaining the upper hand in the war by that time and Burnside's occupation of Knoxville TN, along with the fact that other than a few homeguard, Vances soldiers were the only regular Confederate unit ordered to this area between central TN and central NC.

https://archive.org/stream/historyofwataug00arth/historyofwataug00arth_djvu.txt
@Scott1967 ,
This thread has twenty four pages and discuues the overall Guerrilla Warfare situation in the ACW but some posts deal with North Carolina.
Leftyhunter
 
Has we know both sides actively used guerrilla warfare during the CW. There are differences how ever.
For the purpose of discussion a guerrilla does not wear a uniform or has was often the case in Mo wore captured enemy uniforms. Therefore cavalry raiders such has Morgan, Marmaduke and Shelpy do not count has guerrillas has long has they are in uniform.
Arguably the CSA had the most guerrillas vs the Union mostly in but by no means limited to Mo. I have not read any figure that gives a round number estimate of X amount of CSA guerrillas vs Y amount of Union troops and militia. Has a general rule it has been argued that it takes ten conventional troops to counter one guerrilla.
Based on the number of Union cavalry and a few Infantry regiments that where assigned to Mo (although often rotated out of Mo) plus the 10k men of the Mo State Militia (the only Union militia that was full time and paid for by the federal govt and fought mostly but not always in Mo) there where quite a few CSA guerrillas or has often referred to has"bushwackers".

Both sides used guerrillas to cooperate with conventional troops. For example Quantril provided an escort for recruiting commands in Mo and in AL Unionist guerrillas from time to time would fight alongside convention Union troops.
The Union could supply at least some guerrillas on a regular basis for example Gen. Dodge in Al could supply Unionist guerrillas and the US Navy supplied Unionist guerrillas in Fl and Ga and even sent an officer to form and lead the 2nd Fl cavalry USV.
Unionist guerrillas where arguably more successful in that by the late summer of 1864 they could sieze and hold areas of the CSA vs CSA guerrillas who could not.
Many guerrillas on both sides became guerrillas due to resentment of being drafted or conscripted by the other side.
Questions.
1. What side really had the most?
2. Which side more effectively supported their guerrillas?
2. Which sides guerrillas ultimately achieved the most good for their side?
Leftyhunter
@Reconstructed Rebel ,
It's a long thread but it got a lot of participation. Guerrlla warfare is nothing new the first written or at least on of the first written accounts of guerrlla warfare is the Book of Macabbes where Jewish guerrllas over 2k years ago defeated the Hellenic Syrians.
Americans have been engaged in guerrilla or counterinsurgency warfare against the Indians well before the American Revolution and of course during and after the ACW. Both the Colonial Rebels and the British used guerrlla warfare during the ARW.
I have other threads but this is a good start any questions let me know.
Leftyhunter
 
@Reconstructed Rebel ,
It's a long thread but it got a lot of participation. Guerrlla warfare is nothing new the first written or at least on of the first written accounts of guerrlla warfare is the Book of Macabbes where Jewish guerrllas over 2k years ago defeated the Hellenic Syrians.
Americans have been engaged in guerrilla or counterinsurgency warfare against the Indians well before the American Revolution and of course during and after the ACW. Both the Colonial Rebels and the British used guerrlla warfare during the ARW.
I have other threads but this is a good start any questions let me know.
Leftyhunter
Really excellent info!
 
Really excellent info!
I have other threads as do some other posters on guerrlla warfare. ACW era guerrlla warfare has been written about since Samual Hildebrand wrote his autobiography not to long after the ACW but much more attention has been given to the subject over the last 35 years or so. Unionist guerrillas were more or less ignored until fairly recently although there was a 1950s era movie based very loosly on Unionist guerrillas in Jones County , Mississippi.
While many troops were involved with guerrlla warfare plus of course quite a few milita/homeguards the subject or field manual of how to actually fight guerrllas wouldn't be published until the 1928 counterinsurgency warfare USMC " Small Wars Manual". Some the ACW era counterinsurgency techniques are still used today. The US Army didn't really review it's ACW era Counterinsurgency until the conflict in Iraq and not sure how well those lessons were incoporated.
Leftyhunter
 
I have other threads as do some other posters on guerrlla warfare. ACW era guerrlla warfare has been written about since Samual Hildebrand wrote his autobiography not to long after the ACW but much more attention has been given to the subject over the last 35 years or so. Unionist guerrillas were more or less ignored until fairly recently although there was a 1950s era movie based very loosly on Unionist guerrillas in Jones County , Mississippi.
While many troops were involved with guerrlla warfare plus of course quite a few milita/homeguards the subject or field manual of how to actually fight guerrllas wouldn't be published until the 1928 counterinsurgency warfare USMC " Small Wars Manual". Some the ACW era counterinsurgency techniques are still used today. The US Army didn't really review it's ACW era Counterinsurgency until the conflict in Iraq and not sure how well those lessons were incoporated.
Leftyhunter
One more time. The Small Wars Manual was written post Latin and Caribbean interventions it was published in 1940 and is still required in the syllabus of many USMC advanced courses. It had very,very little to do with ACW counterinsurgency, because in the ACW there was no counterinsurgency doctorine.
 
Really excellent info!
I have other threads as do some other posters on guerrlla warfare. ACW era guerrlla warfare has been written about since Samual Hildebrand wrote his autobiography not to long after the ACW but much more attention has been given to the subject over the last 35 years or so. Unionist guerrillas were more or less ignored until fairly recently although there was a 1950s era movie based very loosly on Unionist guerrillas in Jones County , Mississippi.
While many troops were involved with guerrlla warfare plus of course quite a few milita/homeguards the subject or field manual of how to actually fight guerrllas wouldn't be published until the 1928 counterinsurgency warfare USMC " Small Wars Manual". Some the ACW era counterinsurgency techniques are still used today. The US Army didn't really review it's ACW era Counterinsurgency until the conflict in Iraq and not sure how well those lessons were incoporated
One more time. The Small Wars Manual was written post Latin and Caribbean interventions it was published in 1940 and is still required in the syllabus of many USMC advanced courses. It had very,very little to do with ACW counterinsurgency, because in the ACW there was no counterinsurgency doctorine.
True I got the date wrong it was 1940 and yes it was not based on the ACW especially because the USMC was not employed in ACW era Counterinsurgency so my apologies to @Reconstructed Rebel however my point is the US military did not teach counterinsurgency until 1940 and only to the USMC the smallest Branch of the US military so in that I am correct.
There certainly was a counterinsurgency doctrine by the US Army that today would be called " hard counterinsurgency" vs the more modern " hearts and minds" which came about from USAF Colonel Lansdale in the late 1940s. The US Army in the ACW basically used the same techniques as the Romans although the use of US troops disquising themselves as guerrllas to gage popular support for the guerrllas such as the 2nd Colorado Cavalry in Missouri was used quite a bit in post WWII Africa.
Leftyhunter
 
I have other threads as do some other posters on guerrlla warfare. ACW era guerrlla warfare has been written about since Samual Hildebrand wrote his autobiography not to long after the ACW but much more attention has been given to the subject over the last 35 years or so. Unionist guerrillas were more or less ignored until fairly recently although there was a 1950s era movie based very loosly on Unionist guerrillas in Jones County , Mississippi.
While many troops were involved with guerrlla warfare plus of course quite a few milita/homeguards the subject or field manual of how to actually fight guerrllas wouldn't be published until the 1928 counterinsurgency warfare USMC " Small Wars Manual". Some the ACW era counterinsurgency techniques are still used today. The US Army didn't really review it's ACW era Counterinsurgency until the conflict in Iraq and not sure how well those lessons were incoporated

True I got the date wrong it was 1940 and yes it was not based on the ACW especially because the USMC was not employed in ACW era Counterinsurgency so my apologies to @Reconstructed Rebel however my point is the US military did not teach counterinsurgency until 1940 and only to the USMC the smallest Branch of the US military so in that I am correct.
There certainly was a counterinsurgency doctrine by the US Army that today would be called " hard counterinsurgency" vs the more modern " hearts and minds" which came about from USAF Colonel Lansdale in the late 1940s. The US Army in the ACW basically used the same techniques as the Romans although the use of US troops disquising themselves as guerrllas to gage popular support for the guerrllas such as the 2nd Colorado Cavalry in Missouri was used quite a bit in post WWII Africa.
Leftyhunter
Lansdale dealt with the Huk inserection
In the Philippines and attempted some clandestine counter insurgency but his Forte was Phsy-ops which he conducted mainly by using indigenous personnel. Alot of his work in the area of SEA early in the conflict ( Kennedy Era) didn't deliver as promised.
 
Lansdale dealt with the Huk inserection
In the Philippines and attempted some clandestine counter insurgency but his Forte was Phsy-ops which he conducted mainly by using indigenous personnel. Alot of his work in the area of SEA early in the conflict ( Kennedy Era) didn't deliver as promised.
Very true and my point to @Reconstructed Rebel was the nature or politcal goals of counterinsurgency changed over time. In the ACW both the Union and Confedrate Army practiced " hard counterinsurgency" or all stick no carrot.
The concept of placing friendly armed civilans in Northern Arkansas in " armed communes" by Col Harrison of the 1s Arkansas Union was later modified by the British forty odd years later in to " concentration camps" where hostle Afrikanner civilans were seperated from their menfolk was then used in other conflicts. The US Army practiced something similar with Indian Reservations by keeping an eye on Indian woman and kids and seperate them from their menfolk fighting the Army.
I don't know if Colonel Lansdale studied counterinsurgency in the ACW but it's certainly possible.
Leftyhunter
 
@Reconstructed Rebel ,
It's a long thread but it got a lot of participation. Guerrlla warfare is nothing new the first written or at least on of the first written accounts of guerrlla warfare is the Book of Macabbes where Jewish guerrllas over 2k years ago defeated the Hellenic Syrians.
Americans have been engaged in guerrilla or counterinsurgency warfare against the Indians well before the American Revolution and of course during and after the ACW. Both the Colonial Rebels and the British used guerrlla warfare during the ARW.
I have other threads but this is a good start any questions let me know.
Leftyhunter
This has been a great thread. James Martin and Third War irregular warfare on the western border 1861-1865. covered the little corner of central Kentucky where I grew up and all the stories the old folks told now make a lot more sense. The only part of Martin's statements I would question is his opinion that Henry Magruder, as a recognized Confederate soldier, should have been treated as a regular prisoner of war and not a guerrilla. Magruder may have started out on the right side of the law but he certainly slid into criminal behavior. They did give him a trial before they hung him, so I think justice was served.
 
Lansdale dealt with the Huk inserection
In the Philippines and attempted some clandestine counter insurgency but his Forte was Phsy-ops which he conducted mainly by using indigenous personnel. Alot of his work in the area of SEA early in the conflict ( Kennedy Era) didn't deliver as promised.
Very true and my point to @Reconstructed Rebel was the nature or politcal goals of counterinsurgency changed over time. In the ACW both the Union and Confedrate Army practiced " hard counterinsurgency" or all stick no carrot.
The concept of placing friendly armed civilans in Northern Arkansas in " armed communes" by Col Harrison of the 1s Arkansas Union was later modified by the British forty odd years later in to " concentration camps" where hostle Afrikanner civilans were seperated from their menfolk was then used in other conflicts. The US Army practiced something similar with Indian Reservations by keeping an eye on Indian woman and kids and seperate them from their menfolk fighting the Army.
I don't know if Colonel Lansdale studied counterinsurgency in the ACW but it's certainly possible.
Leftyhunter
This has been a great thread. James Martin and Third War irregular warfare on the western border 1861-1865. covered the little corner of central Kentucky where I grew up and all the stories the old folks told now make a lot more sense. The only part of Martin's statements I would question is his opinion that Henry Magruder, as a recognized Confederate soldier, should have been treated as a regular prisoner of war and not a guerrilla. Magruder may have started out on the right side of the law but he certainly slid into criminal behavior. They did give him a trial before they hung him, so I think justice was served.
Per the Leiber Code aka General Order #100
The basic difference between a guerrlla/bandit vs a soldier is whether or not the captured prisoner is in a recognizable uniform or not. If not the prisoner may be shot on sight. Of course in warfare and the ACW is no exception to the rule captured soldiers in a uniform are sometimes executed on the spot anyway and this tradition extended well past the ACW.
Yes there are rules but rules are as the old saying goes rules are meant to be broken.
Not sure if ACW counterinsurgency was studied overseas but definitely some of the ACW techniques were certainly used.
Leftyhunter
 
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Masters Theses
The Graduate School
Spring 2014

"Young bloods of the South:" The Confederate use and efficacy of irregular warfare in the American Civil War
Lucas Allamon
James Madison University

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]

Abstract
During the American Civil War, a number of southern irregulars operated behind Union lines. Though often neglected by historians, many of these irregulars proved effective. This study evaluates the different types of irregular combatant found in the South, including guerrillas, partisan rangers, and cavalry raiders, who varied in their identity, legality, and operations. The effectiveness of these fighters is analyzed in terms of their propaganda value, their ability to divert enemy troops, and the defeat of offensives by attacking supply lines. Though the Union attempted to counter these irregular forces, the greatest impediment towards the Confederate irregular war effort was the decisions of the Confederate government itself. The West Point-trained leaders of the South were afraid of losing control of the independent irregulars. As a result, they never implemented policies that would systematically encourage a greater irregular war effort. In doing so, the South neglected to fully pursue a strategy that had great potential to alter the course of the war.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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  • Young bloods of the South_ The Confederate use and efficacy of.pdf
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James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Masters Theses
The Graduate School
Spring 2014

"Young bloods of the South:" The Confederate use and efficacy of irregular warfare in the American Civil War
Lucas Allamon
James Madison University

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]

Abstract
During the American Civil War, a number of southern irregulars operated behind Union lines. Though often neglected by historians, many of these irregulars proved effective. This study evaluates the different types of irregular combatant found in the South, including guerrillas, partisan rangers, and cavalry raiders, who varied in their identity, legality, and operations. The effectiveness of these fighters is analyzed in terms of their propaganda value, their ability to divert enemy troops, and the defeat of offensives by attacking supply lines. Though the Union attempted to counter these irregular forces, the greatest impediment towards the Confederate irregular war effort was the decisions of the Confederate government itself. The West Point-trained leaders of the South were afraid of losing control of the independent irregulars. As a result, they never implemented policies that would systematically encourage a greater irregular war effort. In doing so, the South neglected to fully pursue a strategy that had great potential to alter the course of the war.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Thanks for posting the link. I'll be reading it later today. The guerrilla war, particularly here in Missouri, has been my main interest in the Civil War for the last few years, so your link is of interest to me.
 
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Masters Theses
The Graduate School
Spring 2014

"Young bloods of the South:" The Confederate use and efficacy of irregular warfare in the American Civil War
Lucas Allamon
James Madison University

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]

Abstract
During the American Civil War, a number of southern irregulars operated behind Union lines. Though often neglected by historians, many of these irregulars proved effective. This study evaluates the different types of irregular combatant found in the South, including guerrillas, partisan rangers, and cavalry raiders, who varied in their identity, legality, and operations. The effectiveness of these fighters is analyzed in terms of their propaganda value, their ability to divert enemy troops, and the defeat of offensives by attacking supply lines. Though the Union attempted to counter these irregular forces, the greatest impediment towards the Confederate irregular war effort was the decisions of the Confederate government itself. The West Point-trained leaders of the South were afraid of losing control of the independent irregulars. As a result, they never implemented policies that would systematically encourage a greater irregular war effort. In doing so, the South neglected to fully pursue a strategy that had great potential to alter the course of the war.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
I have quickly scanned the thesis and will be back to read it more carefully. Thank you for the link.
 
Thanks for posting the link. I'll be reading it later today. The guerrilla war, particularly here in Missouri, has been my main interest in the Civil War for the last few years, so your link is of interest to me.
Well, I read his thesis and thought he did an overall good job. I paid particular attention to his section on the Missouri Guerrillas as that's my major interest in Civil War matters. I did notice he made a few mistakes. With regards to William Quantrill, the author said that Quantrill started the war as a Jayhawker and then changed sides. This isn't correct. Quantrill did some Jayhawking prior to the war, but was definitely pro-south by the time of the wars' outbreak. Actually, he was helping a Missouri slave owner move his family and slaves to Texas when the war broke out.

The author also said that Union authorities jailed 5 women who were related to guerrillas and they were killed in a jail collapse. Actually, Union authorities held a great number of women who were suspected of helping guerrillas. More that 20 women where held in a building that did collapse and 5 were killed and many others were gravely injuried. These women were all directly related to guerrillas who rode with Quantrill and the raid on Lawrence, KS was in retaliation for their deaths. (a real cause and effect example).

If I had been one of the people who reviewed his thesis, I would have grilled him pretty hard on these two points, but I also would give him great credit for efforts in explaining how the guerrilla war changed by the summer of 1864 in being much more vicious.

My biggest area of criticism is the lack of pointing out Union atrocities, which often produced a payback in kind by the guerrillas. I don't recall any mention of the jayhawking or redleg raids into Missouri, the burning of towns or farms or deaths at the hand of Union authorities. Without noting these events, his thesis has a pro-Union tone.
 
Well, I read his thesis and thought he did an overall good job. I paid particular attention to his section on the Missouri Guerrillas as that's my major interest in Civil War matters. I did notice he made a few mistakes. With regards to William Quantrill, the author said that Quantrill started the war as a Jayhawker and then changed sides. This isn't correct. Quantrill did some Jayhawking prior to the war, but was definitely pro-south by the time of the wars' outbreak. Actually, he was helping a Missouri slave owner move his family and slaves to Texas when the war broke out.

The author also said that Union authorities jailed 5 women who were related to guerrillas and they were killed in a jail collapse. Actually, Union authorities held a great number of women who were suspected of helping guerrillas. More that 20 women where held in a building that did collapse and 5 were killed and many others were gravely injuried. These women were all directly related to guerrillas who rode with Quantrill and the raid on Lawrence, KS was in retaliation for their deaths. (a real cause and effect example).

If I had been one of the people who reviewed his thesis, I would have grilled him pretty hard on these two points, but I also would give him great credit for efforts in explaining how the guerrilla war changed by the summer of 1864 in being much more vicious.

My biggest area of criticism is the lack of pointing out Union atrocities, which often produced a payback in kind by the guerrillas. I don't recall any mention of the jayhawking or redleg raids into Missouri, the burning of towns or farms or deaths at the hand of Union authorities. Without noting these events, his thesis has a pro-Union tone.
His labeling of the three groups struck me odd, would be interesting to talk to him to elaborate, as many that he seemingly seems to refer to as guerrillas were actually partisan rangers, and would he have considered regular army officers sent behind lined to recruit as cavalry raiders or guerrillas?

Also I find his claim of guerrillas losing support curious, as it certainly doesn't fit with the Union view and reports who increasingly viewed the civilian populace as hostile or disloyal.
 
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