Help me find a Point of Divergence

OldReliable1862

First Sergeant
Joined
Jul 2, 2017
Location
Georgia
As I look at the Western theater of the war, I've noted a few interesting Points of Divergence (PODs), and I wanted to see which one those here would find most interesting:

September 1861: Both Grant and Polk were planning to invade Kentucky, but what if Fremont had ordered Grant to occupy Paducah before Polk and Pillow made their move? I don't consider it beyond the realm of possibility for this to sway many more Kentuckians to the pro-Southern stance, especially if Fremont extends his emancipation order to Kentucky.

December 1861: Braxton Bragg was offered command of the Trans-Mississippi Department by Davis in December of 1861, but he declined, with the command then offered to Henry Heth before Earl Van Dorn finally accepted it. While Bragg had several significant drawbacks as a commander, he was a superb organizer, and I can't see him making the same mistakes that Van Dorn did at Elkhorn Tavern.

December 1862: As mentioned in @Generic Username's thread on the battle, John Wharton's cavalry had reached the Nashville Pike during Murfreesboro, and could have held it had Wheeler supported him. What happens in the main part of the battle, as McCook's troops begin running dangerously low on ammunition?

May 1863: As is likely well-known to this site's numerous Longstreet enthusiasts, from 11-13 May he held discussions with Lee about taking two of his divisions to middle Tennessee to join Bragg, combining with Johnston's forces, and attacking Rosecrans. It was hoped that a victory here would force Grant to divert his attention from Vicksburg, relieving the pressure there. While I am intrigued by this, I don't know if Longstreet could get his men to Tennessee and defeat Rosecrans before Grant wins at Champion Hill and the Big Black, dooming Vicksburg's defenders.

September 1863: My favorite moment from my favorite battle - D. H. Hill's delayed attack at Chickamauga. Bragg had intended Hill to strike the Union left at sunrise, but a serious of errors led to him attacking five hours late, after the defenders had constructed breastworks. Could a attack launched on time have had any real effect on the battle?
 
The one where I can speak to it the most is probably May 1863. Historically five of Longstreet's brigades arrived in time for Chickamauga (September 20 specifically) after being detached on September 5. We can thus assume that a minimum transit time for Longstreet would be two weeks.

In order for Longstreet to be able to attack and for that to provoke a response before Big Black River Bridge (May 18), Longstreet would have to be moving by May 4. This is actually during the Chancellorsville fighting (which Longstreet was absent for).

I don't think it's feasible, unless you have the Confederate high command actively confident in being able to win Chancellorsville (despite being outnumbered 2:1) and deciding to send Longstreet straight to the Chattanooga area.
 
I thought I left a comment but guess I didn't..weird.
On the Kentucky Divergence: from what I've read, there wasn't really a chance for Kentucky to fully go Confederate. I've read in places that Polk's preemptive invasion didnt really affect much, that the troops the Confederates got were what they would get even if Grant moved first. Hell, Camp Robinson is already a thing in the state by this point.
As for Bragg in the transmississippi, I imagine he'd certainly have better tactical and operational planning than Van Dorn. Hell, given his performance at Shiloh, I imagine he'd still be in his Charismatic phase at whatever equivalent of Pea Ridge he fights. Plus, I imagine the forces there would be much better organized and trained. However, sending the irritable Bragg to command over McCulloch and Price sounds like a recipe for command dysfunction.
 
I think the biggest impact in Kentucky might be if the forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland get sited differently, but I'm not sure the impact would be major. The flood which flooded out Fort Henry is often cited as an error of siting, but I suspect that it was actually an anomalously high flood as a result of the generally terrible weather that winter and spring.
 
As I look at the Western theater of the war, I've noted a few interesting Points of Divergence (PODs), and I wanted to see which one those here would find most interesting:

September 1861: Both Grant and Polk were planning to invade Kentucky, but what if Fremont had ordered Grant to occupy Paducah before Polk and Pillow made their move? I don't consider it beyond the realm of possibility for this to sway many more Kentuckians to the pro-Southern stance, especially if Fremont extends his emancipation order to Kentucky.

December 1861: Braxton Bragg was offered command of the Trans-Mississippi Department by Davis in December of 1861, but he declined, with the command then offered to Henry Heth before Earl Van Dorn finally accepted it. While Bragg had several significant drawbacks as a commander, he was a superb organizer, and I can't see him making the same mistakes that Van Dorn did at Elkhorn Tavern.

December 1862: As mentioned in @Generic Username's thread on the battle, John Wharton's cavalry had reached the Nashville Pike during Murfreesboro, and could have held it had Wheeler supported him. What happens in the main part of the battle, as McCook's troops begin running dangerously low on ammunition?

May 1863: As is likely well-known to this site's numerous Longstreet enthusiasts, from 11-13 May he held discussions with Lee about taking two of his divisions to middle Tennessee to join Bragg, combining with Johnston's forces, and attacking Rosecrans. It was hoped that a victory here would force Grant to divert his attention from Vicksburg, relieving the pressure there. While I am intrigued by this, I don't know if Longstreet could get his men to Tennessee and defeat Rosecrans before Grant wins at Champion Hill and the Big Black, dooming Vicksburg's defenders.

September 1863: My favorite moment from my favorite battle - D. H. Hill's delayed attack at Chickamauga. Bragg had intended Hill to strike the Union left at sunrise, but a serious of errors led to him attacking five hours late, after the defenders had constructed breastworks. Could a attack launched on time have had any real effect on the battle?
Sorry for not answering early. I would May of 1863 with Longstreet going to Bragg and fighting Rosecrans or moving the two divisions to Jackson, Mississippi. Also if Bragg did take command of the Trans-Mississippi Department then I do believe that Elkhorn Tavern would be a CSA victory.
 
April 1862: On the first day at Shiloh, a cannonball came within ten feet of taking Grant's head off. This was the POD of my timeline.

September 1863: Another one I like, a more beefed up Chickamauga where the Confederates lay siege to Chattanooga.

July 1864: Johnston not being removed at Atlanta, but we got a book series out of that one. LOL!
 
What if Halleck, once has has consolidated Grant, Buell, and Pope's forces into 1 army, decides to go after Beauregard's army instead of simply seizing Corinth? He had him well outnumbered and could've done serious damage to the South's main fighting force in the west.
 
What if Halleck, once has has consolidated Grant, Buell, and Pope's forces into 1 army, decides to go after Beauregard's army instead of simply seizing Corinth? He had him well outnumbered and could've done serious damage to the South's main fighting force in the west.
How might one achieve this? Unless I'm missing something, you need to take Corinth to get at Beauregard's army, and when Corinth is about to be taken Beauregard can simply evacuate as he did historically (and evade Halleck).
 
Well you keep chasing him. The more Beauregard retreats he is opening up strategic areas for you to take over as you pursuit, and with an army that is 2 to 3 times larger, you can still do that. Halleck doesn't pursuit him, Bragg takes over and next thing you know he's in Kentucky.
 
Well you keep chasing him. The more Beauregard retreats he is opening up strategic areas for you to take over as you pursuit, and with an army that is 2 to 3 times larger, you can still do that. Halleck doesn't pursuit him, Bragg takes over and next thing you know he's in Kentucky.
You can only pursue as far and as fast as you can lay railway track down, which you must also now guard.
 
Well you keep chasing him. The more Beauregard retreats he is opening up strategic areas for you to take over as you pursuit, and with an army that is 2 to 3 times larger, you can still do that. Halleck doesn't pursuit him, Bragg takes over and next thing you know he's in Kentucky.
Okay, so after Corinth is taken then the Union follows up on where Beauregard went, which is in the later half of June 1862 (taking into account the time required to consolidate after taking Corinth).

Three possible problems: first, Lincoln wants East Tennessee taken. If Beauregard hasn't gone in that direction then that's an issue, as Lincoln wants something to be the priority.
Second, the Confederate bases of supply are not the same as the Union ones. Buildup is required to support campaigns in certain areas.
Third, the concentration of most of the Western armies has left possible vulnerabilities. You obviously need to garrison Corinth if you're using it as a springboard, but that costs men and cuts down on your fighting strength.

For example, after Corinth Beauregard historically moved south to Tupelo. This is a distance of about fifty miles, but there's multiple alternative routes by which Confederate forces could move in and threaten Corinth if it's left ungarrisoned; Halleck would need to leave troops behind to garrison Corinth and the rail line forming his supply route, and the move would take on the order of a week to reach the outskirts of Tupelo.
The same amount of time (ca. a week) is enough for Beauregard to rail a division or so to Grand Junction.. but if he's going for it then he might move half his army (it'd take ca. 10 days), and so you need enough men at Corinth and guarding the rail line to ensure that half Beauregard's army can't cut the line. If they do cut it then the whole primary Western Union army is suddenly in enormous trouble.
 
I should probably add these two:

Pre-1861: George H. Thomas joining the CSA. It's hard to say how realistic this is. If Thomas does not meet his wife or is widowed before the war, this may cause him to rely more heavily on his family in Virginia, or it may no real difference. Some authors hold that Thomas may have considered resigning even in OTL, and at least one letter seems to support this.

1862: Mississippi and Louisiana are completed by early 1862. I don't know if Farragut would be willing to risk taking on two large ironclads before he has monitors of his own.

January 1862: In his diary, Josiah Gorgas of the Confederate ordnance department complained that Davis had not sent Bragg and the Gulf troops to Tennessee to prevent the fall of Fort Donelson. Would Bragg and his troops be of more use at Donelson, or with Johnston and his army? Could Bragg turn Donelson into a Vicksburg?

April 1862: Johnston sticks with his original plan for Shiloh. The Rebels are still very green, and they'll most likely still become disordered in the woods, but it may not be quite as bad if the corps are arranged side-by-side instead of stacked.
 
April 1862: Johnston sticks with his original plan for Shiloh. The Rebels are still very green, and they'll most likely still become disordered in the woods, but it may not be quite as bad if the corps are arranged side-by-side instead of stacked.
Given that Johnston also wanted to weight his right, wheel left and cut the Federals off from Pittsburg Landing, rather than compress them towards it, this might work quite well in wrecking much of Grant's army on the first day (given how far they got historically with all the disadvantages going on).
 
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