Grant Did Grant win the Civil War?

I agree 100%. I also believe it was a genius plan, because it basically nullified Lee as a commander. All Grant had to do was keep hammering at any army in his front, and cut off their railroads, and it would have eventually forced a surrender due to attrition.

Lee, who was chained to Richmond by Davis' orders, was almost a non-factor in a way. Sure he lasted longer than any other general probably would have, but as long as he was chained to Richmond all he could do was sit there and take the siege.
Basically true, but, not really. Grant was chained to Washington as much Lee was to Richmond. It was up o the commanders of their country's biggest armies to square the circle of defending their Capital's while fighting an aggressive offensive waarfare.

Grant's paln was to field three armies a different points against Richmond. Lee could not defend against all of them, Something would have to give. But, Siegal in the Valley was routed and Butler allowed himself to be peenned up on Bermuda Hundred, leaving Grant to face the entire AMV/ Any other Union commander would have believed they would have to withdraw and rest and refit, instead he drove South and linked up with Butler and forced Lee to ground at Petersburg and accepted Lee's surrender of the ANV just a little less than a Year after he began the Overland Campaign.
 
Even 5 years after the US Civil War ended, the enormous loss of horses in the Confederate states was still apparent in the census count.
1622040864022.png

https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1870/wealth-industry/1870c-05.pdf p.75
This page is about horses. But the same page also displayed the decline in beef cattle. Another section shows the decline in sheep. (Though there is a typographical error in the numbers for Virginia.) Well before the Confederacy ran out of military manpower, it was going run out of workers, horses, mules and other livestock, and because of labor shortages, the inventory of locomotives owned by the railroads was going to depreciate and go out of service.
Battles, shooting and killing are just the tip of the economy that journalists can see. The people at home observe directly whether their economy is booming or expiring.
Grant knew by August of 1864 that the Confederate railroads were collapsing. He just hurried along the process.
 
Basically true, but, not really. Grant was chained to Washington as much Lee was to Richmond. It was up o the commanders of their country's biggest armies to square the circle of defending their Capital's while fighting an aggressive offensive waarfare.

Grant's paln was to field three armies a different points against Richmond. Lee could not defend against all of them, Something would have to give. But, Siegal in the Valley was routed and Butler allowed himself to be peenned up on Bermuda Hundred, leaving Grant to face the entire AMV/ Any other Union commander would have believed they would have to withdraw and rest and refit, instead he drove South and linked up with Butler and forced Lee to ground at Petersburg and accepted Lee's surrender of the ANV just a little less than a Year after he began the Overland Campaign.

Yes, but you're leaving out the attrition part. Once Grant crossed the James, he commenced a 9 month "siege" of attrition.

And yes, Grant had to defend Washington, but if Lee had been free to maneuver at will, he would have moved to joined Johnston much sooner. His first strategic decision on assuming command of all Confederate operations, independent of Davis, was to unite with Johnston further South.
 
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I remember somewhere Grant spoke of "crippling the enemy" so he could no longer fight. This was at the beginning of the Wilderness campaign I believe. Yes I agree the Petersburg Campaign was based on attrition, as Grant and Meade maneuvered to cut off supply and retreat.
Lubliner.

Thank you Lubliner, I knew you were good for something :bounce:
 
Yes, but you're leaving out the attrition part. Once Grant crossed the James, he commenced a 9 month "siege" of attrition.
The point is, the attrition of the Overland Campaign, was due to Lee's decision to fight for every inch of ground. Grant's plan included the possibility of attrition if necessity forced it. But attriition was at the bottom of his list of scenarios It was Lee's decision of fight a war of attrition and Grant accepted that decision. Grant fought Lee the way Lee wanted to fight.
 
The Northern army sometimes went after territories, it is true, and it is true that Grant went after Lee's army. That is why I think the body count had so much to do with it—Grant was wearing down Lee's Army to a nub.
The fact remains that regardless of Grant's written memoirs about his intentions during the Overland Campaign, every single movement he made from day 1 of The Wilderness to the final crossing of the James and even thereafter during his campaign against Petersburg was a flanking movement where he attempted to go around Lee and get between him and Richmond.

Now I and I presume no one on this forum knows what he would have done had he succeeded. Would he have continued on toward Richmond with most of his army while inhibiting Lee's pursuit with a smaller force. Or would he have found a suitable defensive position and dared Lee to attack him. While I am relatively sure that he would have done the former, I would not argue against the latter--either would have accomplished the same goal. You will remember that after the excruciatingly long Petersburg campaign, he launched a general attack against the entire line having stretched Lee's defenses to the breaking point and having broken through in one point broke through them all, and 30 days later the war is over.
 
The point is, the attrition of the Overland Campaign, was due to Lee's decision to fight for every inch of ground. Grant's plan included the possibility of attrition if necessity forced it. But attriition was at the bottom of his list of scenarios It was Lee's decision of fight a war of attrition and Grant accepted that decision. Grant fought Lee the way Lee wanted to fight.
Your description of the Overland Campaign demeans both Lee and Grant. Grant did not fight a war of attrition. He attempted a series of flanking movement attempting to put Lee in a disadvantageous position. Lee was desperately attempting to prevent this. Grant's crossing of the James was both a desperate gamble and a brilliant move. Lee's sending of Early to threaten DC was a brilliant stroke that came within minutes of succeeding brilliantly, but also an indication of his realization that once Grant was in a position to begin siege operations against Petersburg (and by extension also Richmond) the war was effectively over.
 
Your description of the Overland Campaign demeans both Lee and Grant. Grant did not fight a war of attrition. He attempted a series of flanking movement attempting to put Lee in a disadvantageous position. Lee was desperately attempting to prevent this. Grant's crossing of the James was both a desperate gamble and a brilliant move. Lee's sending of Early to threaten DC was a brilliant stroke that came within minutes of succeeding brilliantly, but also an indication of his realization that once Grant was in a position to begin siege operations against Petersburg (and by extension also Richmond) the war was effectively over.
Grant's crossing the James basically undetected by any CS forces was a brilliant move. However I believe once he got across the river, he committed one of the biggest blunders of the war. Grant could have walked into Petersburg after he got across as the city was barely defended. Had he stormed Petersburg the day after he got the bulk of his troops across the river, it is likely that the war in the east would have been over in 1864. My only guess as to why Grant and the AoP stalled and didn't attack was because of the carnage they had just suffered at Cold Harbor. I think they lost their nerve and became overly cautious thus prolonging the war for another year.
 
Grant could have walked into Petersburg after he got across as the city was barely defended. Had he stormed Petersburg the day after he got the bulk of his troops across the river, it is likely that the war in the east would have been over in 1864.
Agreed. It seems to me that the failure to seize Petersburg immediately after crossing the James, given the lack of defense in that city, was one of the biggest lost opportunities of the war. And yet, while there is a lot of attention given to battles like Gettysburg and Antietam, the relative minor attention given to the Petersburg assaults in June 1864 is very curious.
 
The fact remains that regardless of Grant's written memoirs about his intentions during the Overland Campaign, every single movement he made from day 1 of The Wilderness to the final crossing of the James and even thereafter during his campaign against Petersburg was a flanking movement where he attempted to go around Lee and get between him and Richmond.

Now I and I presume no one on this forum knows what he would have done had he succeeded. Would he have continued on toward Richmond with most of his army while inhibiting Lee's pursuit with a smaller force. Or would he have found a suitable defensive position and dared Lee to attack him. While I am relatively sure that he would have done the former, I would not argue against the latter--either would have accomplished the same goal. You will remember that after the excruciatingly long Petersburg campaign, he launched a general attack against the entire line having stretched Lee's defenses to the breaking point and having broken through in one point broke through them all, and 30 days later the war is over.

I tend to agree, but on one point of strategy disagree.

1.) Grant did not write in his memoirs that he wanted to fight a war of attrition. He wrote it in his official report as Lieutenant General.

2.) After crossing the James, Grant no longer tried to interpose between Lee and Richmond. He was trying and succeeding in cutting off Lee's connections to the railroads which were bringing Confederates their supplies.

So it is a slight change of strategy, but Grant nonetheless is maintaining the initiative and eventually driving Lee into surrender.
 
The point is, the attrition of the Overland Campaign, was due to Lee's decision to fight for every inch of ground. Grant's plan included the possibility of attrition if necessity forced it. But attriition was at the bottom of his list of scenarios It was Lee's decision of fight a war of attrition and Grant accepted that decision. Grant fought Lee the way Lee wanted to fight.

Of course Lee was to fight; that was his job.

But Grant, after losing, decided to turn and flank Lee, and resume the attack, rather than retreat as previous commanders had done.

So it was Grant advancing, and not falling back, that led to constant pressure. Add to this Grant's constant orders to his men that they dig in, and you have a recipe for Spottsylvania.

And I don't even consider the Overland Campaign much of attrition. When I say "attrition," I'm referring to the Siege of Petersburg, which is where Grant and Lee both dug in and fought a war of capturing railroads rather than of field engagements.
 
Your description of the Overland Campaign demeans both Lee and Grant. Grant did not fight a war of attrition. He attempted a series of flanking movement attempting to put Lee in a disadvantageous position. Lee was desperately attempting to prevent this. Grant's crossing of the James was both a desperate gamble and a brilliant move. Lee's sending of Early to threaten DC was a brilliant stroke that came within minutes of succeeding brilliantly, but also an indication of his realization that once Grant was in a position to begin siege operations against Petersburg (and by extension also Richmond) the war was effectively over.
True enough, but, I am not sure my position on this particular thread demeans Grant. Your post is in agreement with mine in all the essentials,

Grant did not win his battles and campaigns, by the use of overwhelming numbers. He had a n advantage in numbers that he used effectively to match the tactics and strategies of his opponents.

According to Lincoln, the confederate Armies were to be Grant's objective. Where they went, Grant would go also. Initially, Grant wanted to get through the Wilderness as soon as possible, without a major engagement, where he could meet the ANV in open territory, where the AoP could be more easily maneuvered. But, Lee decided otherwise. and attacked in a desperate attempt to create as many casualties to the AoP as to discourage any further advance, no matter the cost to his own army, as it had done with previous AoP commanders.

To the extent there was a strategy of attrition involved in Grant strategy during the Overland Campaign, the evidence is cloudy as to whether it was Grant's or Lee's/
 
Of course Lee was to fight; that was his job.

But Grant, after losing, decided to turn and flank Lee, and resume the attack, rather than retreat as previous commanders had done.

So it was Grant advancing, and not falling back, that led to constant pressure. Add to this Grant's constant orders to his men that they dig in, and you have a recipe for Spottsylvania.

And I don't even consider the Overland Campaign much of attrition. When I say "attrition," I'm referring to the Siege of Petersburg, which is where Grant and Lee both dug in and fought a war of capturing railroads rather than of field engagements.
But, Lee was acutely aware that a siege, was a sentence of death to his army. It was the very kind of warmaking, that he had been determined to avoid at all cost, throughout his tenure as commander of the ANV. Yet he consigned his army to the slow death he foresaw from the beginning.
 
This is a bunch of non sense and red herrings. But yes, Grant used attrition, which he said he would do in his report, as a last resort. That is in Grant's memoirs. No need for paragraphs of explanation there.

Grant's first plan was to defeat Lee in open battle, which failed 3 times in the Overland Campaign, and they he resorted to his back-up plan, which was a war of attrition, as he stated he had planned to do, in his official report.

The "Siege of Petersburg" was attrition warfare, keeping up a perpetual fire, with small engagements, while destroying the enemy's supply lines. That is attrition, and that is what Grant did.

It was a noble course, because it won. But the idea that Grant won all these battles in the open field, and that there was no Siege or Petersburg or attrition warfare, is highly caustic at best.

Grant was pretty clear in what he wanted to do, and his actions bear out his words.

If you would have understood my post you would have caught the part when I said you and Mr. Dan were both correct. Nobody said that Grant won one "decisive" battle, you are taking it that way. Mr. Dan is correct when he said Grant engaged in a series of battles, and you are correct in what you stated. Both are methods of attrition and Grant used them both. Both are methods of attrition. Both are methods of Attrition. Both are methods of attrition. Hope you understand that you are partially correct?
 
True enough, but, I am not sure my position on this particular thread demeans Grant. Your post is in agreement with mine in all the essentials,

Grant did not win his battles and campaigns, by the use of overwhelming numbers. He had a n advantage in numbers that he used effectively to match the tactics and strategies of his opponents.

According to Lincoln, the confederate Armies were to be Grant's objective. Where they went, Grant would go also. Initially, Grant wanted to get through the Wilderness as soon as possible, without a major engagement, where he could meet the ANV in open territory, where the AoP could be more easily maneuvered. But, Lee decided otherwise. and attacked in a desperate attempt to create as many casualties to the AoP as to discourage any further advance, no matter the cost to his own army, as it had done with previous AoP commanders.

To the extent there was a strategy of attrition involved in Grant strategy during the Overland Campaign, the evidence is cloudy as to whether it was Grant's or Lee's/
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This post is 100% correct. Grant utilized his numbers correctly to counter a fortified army with all the advantages for tactical success in a ground war.

I think the writing on the wall that Lee was finished but kept on going regardless. Grant did what he had to do to win. My question is what else could have Grant have done? He didn't have modern technology advancements to end the war any quicker.
 
Grant's crossing the James basically undetected by any CS forces was a brilliant move. However I believe once he got across the river, he committed one of the biggest blunders of the war. Grant could have walked into Petersburg after he got across as the city was barely defended. Had he stormed Petersburg the day after he got the bulk of his troops across the river, it is likely that the war in the east would have been over in 1864. My only guess as to why Grant and the AoP stalled and didn't attack was because of the carnage they had just suffered at Cold Harbor. I think they lost their nerve and became overly cautious thus prolonging the war for another year.
IIRC, it was Butler's Army of the James that flubbed the first attack on June 9th, and then again on the 14th/15th as Grant was clearing the James. While Hancock personally arrived on the scene on the evening of the 15th, he didnt have orders to take over until the 16th (after Grant learned the attack hadn't been pressed home), but Beauregard was able to enforce the entrenchments by then.
 
But, Lee was acutely aware that a siege, was a sentence of death to his army. It was the very kind of warmaking, that he had been determined to avoid at all cost, throughout his tenure as commander of the ANV. Yet he consigned his army to the slow death he foresaw from the beginning.

He did not "consign" his army to a slow death. He was under orders from Davis to defend Richmond, so that is the main reason he was there. Second, he fought with all his might to avoid a siege, and came close to lifting it with Early's invasion of the North. So far from "consigning" his army to death, he did everything in his power, while under Davis' orders, to avoid a siege. He failed in that, that is all.

As to Davis' orders, it should be noted that once Lee was given carte blanche over all Confederate forces, with the ability to determine strategy independent of Davis, his first strategic decision was to abandon Petersburg and Richmond, and unite with Johnston in the South. That says something about his strategic thinking and how he was "chained," as it were, to Richmond by Davis' orders.
 
'
This post is 100% correct. Grant utilized his numbers correctly to counter a fortified army with all the advantages for tactical success in a ground war.

I think the writing on the wall that Lee was finished but kept on going regardless. Grant did what he had to do to win. My question is what else could have Grant have done? He didn't have modern technology advancements to end the war any quicker.
I agree, it takes two to tango. The amount of blood letting was, IMO, due as much to Lee and his determination as that of Grant, if not more so.
 
He did not "consign" his army to a slow death. He was under orders from Davis to defend Richmond, so that is the main reason he was there. Second, he fought with all his might to avoid a siege, and came close to lifting it with Early's invasion of the North. So far from "consigning" his army to death, he did everything in his power, while under Davis' orders, to avoid a siege. He failed in that, that is all.

As to Davis' orders, it should be noted that once Lee was given carte blanche over all Confederate forces, with the ability to determine strategy independent of Davis, his first strategic decision was to abandon Petersburg and Richmond, and unite with Johnston in the South. That says something about his strategic thinking and how he was "chained," as it were, to Richmond by Davis' orders.

He did not "consign" his army to a slow death. He was under orders from Davis to defend Richmond, so that is the main reason he was there. Second, he fought with all his might to avoid a siege, and came close to lifting it with Early's invasion of the North. So far from "consigning" his army to death, he did everything in his power, while under Davis' orders, to avoid a siege. He failed in that, that is all.

As to Davis' orders, it should be noted that once Lee was given carte blanche over all Confederate forces, with the ability to determine strategy independent of Davis, his first strategic decision was to abandon Petersburg and Richmond, and unite with Johnston in the South. That says something about his strategic thinking and how he was "chained," as it were, to Richmond by Davis' orders.
So the old 'I was only following orders' defense? Did Lee try to talk Davis out of consigning the ANV to certain immolation?

I think Lee's first strategic move was to reappoint Retreaten' Joe Johnston to active command of the South's remaining army. Lee pulled out of Petersburg and Richmond when he did, because Grant made him, not because he wanted to. Sheridan had turned Lee's flank at Five Forks, forcing Lee to retreat immediately, rather than later as he planned.
 
So the old 'I was only following orders' defense? Did Lee try to talk Davis out of consigning the ANV to certain immolation?

I think Lee's first strategic move was to reappoint Retreaten' Joe Johnston to active command of the South's remaining army. Lee pulled out of Petersburg and Richmond when he did, because Grant made him, not because he wanted to. Sheridan had turned Lee's flank at Five Forks, forcing Lee to retreat immediately, rather than later as he planned.
Well stated, OppnCoronet. I would add the following points:

1. Lee was appointed General in Chief on February 6, 1865 - he was still holding Richmond/Petersburg almost two months later when, as you note, he was forced out as a result of Five Forks.

2. The record does not support the argument that Lee "came close to lifting" the siege as a result of Early's operation. Grant did view the situation as being "grave", transferring the 6th Corps and redirecting the 19th Corps from LA (not in front of Richmond), BUT there is no indication that Grant ever considered abandoning the siege, not any indication Lee considered abandoning Richmond to join him. To the contrary, Lee advised Davis and Seddon that the sending Early to the Valley etc was hazardous to his position in front of Grant.
 
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