Grant Was Grant's Overland Campaign a Failure?

Yes, this was a defeat. The interesting part is what Grant did following this try at Lee? He followed Lee ,he bleed Lee of men he did not have to lose. He did not give the Confederate army any breathing space as McClellan or others had done. He had more men and military supplies than Lee, The destruction of the ANV was his objective. As he stated that it would come to an end if he pressed Lee, Lincoln ordered him to Press. All generals previous had allowed Lee an opportunity to rest and prepare his army. Grant shortened the war by his continuous actions of remaining in Lee's front or side . With Mc/ the gates of Richmond was the Confedercery .To Grant it was the army of Lee that was the Confederacy. Between his actions against Lee and Sherman against the heartland of the South .,the Confedercery would not last and the war was shorten with less losses on both sides. Jefferson Davis could have kept Richmond but with no army it would meant nothing Remember that after every victory of Grant's there was only one surrender ,unconditional/total capitulation.

Yes, Grant was able to convince Lee to a conditional surrender, after Lee had defied him against 4-1 odds, and barely enough horses to carry some wagons and cannon, and scarcely any food.

Grant was fortunate he had such a big war machine to back him up.

Other than that I tend to agree with your post.
 

Was Grant's Overland Campaign a Failure?​



Questions like these can only be answered in light of the pre-operation expectations.

Did he force the opposing army to leave their entrenchments and maneuver against him? YES
Did his army fight their way to Richmond? NO

What we have is a mixed bag of success and failure. However, as the campaign took different turns he realized success in a bloody exchange of casualties. While his army was maintained by a steady reinforcement his opponents was gradually dwindled by lack of the same. He finally pinned the Confederate army into a position that even their commander knew would spell the end. So by constantly adapting to new circumstances Grant placed his army in position to achieve the only real strategic objective of any war...VICTORY.

So yes this campaign was successful.

Grant could have just went up the Peninsula like McClellan did, and skip the whole Overland phase, which was a failure.

Or if Lincoln insisted on an overland route, it was still a failure, until he got down to McClellan's old position, almost identically.
 
Grant could have just went up the Peninsula like McClellan did, and skip the whole Overland phase, which was a failure.

Or if Lincoln insisted on an overland route, it was still a failure, until he got down to McClellan's old position, almost identically.
I think the experience with the failed 1862 Peninsula Campaign spooked Lincoln and the administration into discounting that pathway. But it is an interesting question as to whether Grant and the AotP could have turned the ANV by the waterborne route, which as you say, is where he ended up anyway after the Overland Campaign played itself out.
 
I think the experience with the failed 1862 Peninsula Campaign spooked Lincoln and the administration into discounting that pathway. But it is an interesting question as to whether Grant and the AotP could have turned the ANV by the waterborne route, which as you say, is where he ended up anyway after the Overland Campaign played itself out.

The problem would have been Lee striking for Washington or invading the North while Grant was en route, which may have been Lincoln's biggest fear.

Grant had another plan for opening a campaign at Suffolk, essentially the water-route, but from Suffolk to Weldon, rather than from Fort Monroe to Richmond. I'm not sure if it was overruled or Grant ended up changing his mind, but he ultimately went with the Overland route.

It's a hypothetical where really we don't know what would have happened, because we don't know what Lee would have done.

But as far as criticizing the Overland Campaign as a failure, it certainly was, when you consider that the whole phase was a series of failed attempts by Grant to bring his plans to fruition, until he got down to one of the alternative routes, i.e. the Peninsula.
 
Lincoln constantly feared for the safety of Washington, so the land route became the default position. Aside from the Suffolk route, federal forces in coastal North Carolina never really broke out of their beachhead to launch a possible incursion to the underbelly of the Petersburg/Richmond area. Another interesting scenario that didn't happen.
 
The other consideration is that the Peninsula was on this wrong sighted focus that Richmond was the focus, not the ANV. Grant comes in and realizes the focus has been wrong all along. Richmond is secondary, the main target has to be the fighting force of the enemy. You can take whatever city or piece of geography you want as you please if the opposing army is defeated or beat down to such a level that they cannot stop you. Grant's version of the Peninusla was going to be on the south side of the James and approaching Richmond from the south.
 
Grant could have just went up the Peninsula like McClellan did, and skip the whole Overland phase, which was a failure.

Or if Lincoln insisted on an overland route, it was still a failure, until he got down to McClellan's old position, almost identically.
The objective for Meade was not Richmond as in '62. Meade's objective was Lee's army.
 
Lincoln constantly feared for the safety of Washington, so the land route became the default position. Aside from the Suffolk route, federal forces in coastal North Carolina never really broke out of their beachhead to launch a possible incursion to the underbelly of the Petersburg/Richmond area. Another interesting scenario that didn't happen.

The overland route was not exclusively necessary, as Grant may have left half or some part of his army to guard Washington, while he took the rest to Suffolk. That would cover the capital and allow for an advance from Suffolk to Weldon.

I'm not sure why this route was passed over. Perhaps Lincoln was adamant that Grant keep his army in front of Washington, or maybe Grant didn't want to leave half of it in D.C. while he took the other half to Suffolk. I don't know.
 
The other consideration is that the Peninsula was on this wrong sighted focus that Richmond was the focus, not the ANV. Grant comes in and realizes the focus has been wrong all along. Richmond is secondary, the main target has to be the fighting force of the enemy. You can take whatever city or piece of geography you want as you please if the opposing army is defeated or beat down to such a level that they cannot stop you. Grant's version of the Peninusla was going to be on the south side of the James and approaching Richmond from the south.

Grant's initial considerations were logistical, i.e. starting from Suffolk, capturing Weldon, and this severing Lee's ties with the Deep South.

For some reason, I don't know why, this campaign was shelved, and Grant took the Overland route. But even here, his consideration was only initially Lee's army. After experiencing a setback in the Wilderness, he marched to put his army between Lee's and Richmond.

It was a series of objectives that Grant changed as circumstances enforced.
 
Grant's initial considerations were logistical, i.e. starting from Suffolk, capturing Weldon, and this severing Lee's ties with the Deep South.

For some reason, I don't know why, this campaign was shelved, and Grant took the Overland route. But even here, his consideration was only initially Lee's army. After experiencing a setback in the Wilderness, he marched to put his army between Lee's and Richmond.

It was a series of objectives that Grant changed as circumstances enforced.

From what I recall Lincoln talked him out of the move but someone may have a better recollection than I do.
 
The objective for Meade was not Richmond as in '62. Meade's objective was Lee's army.
That was how Lincoln put it and Grant refused to criticize Lincoln and adhered to that commitment. But by August 1864, the strategy shifted toward dismantling what remained of the Confederate economy.
What Grant never wrote about, but was likely going on, was that his intelligence sources were focusing in on the remaining Confederate railroads. Strike after strike was directed at those railroads, causing temporary or permanent disruption.
If the railroads go, the horses and mules starve first. The armies retreat to the remaining rail stations, but the mobility declines steadily.
 
If the railroads go, the horses and mules starve first. The armies retreat to the remaining rail stations, but the mobility declines steadily.

Which was exactly what happened. During the Siege of Petersburg, Lee's army became immobilized. It is a striking testament to the fidelity, valor, and strength of the ANV that they out-marched the AoP so fast, that Grant had to outstrip them with the cavalry corps, after they (ANV) had been marching several days straight with no food.
 
It was Meade's objective for about 2-3 days, until he got beat in the Wilderness. From then on it became Richmond, and then Petersburg, and then Lee's army again.
Can't totally agree with this. I believe the shift from Lee to a place (Petersburg) took place after Cold Harbor, but moving out of the Wilderness was just to get Lee to come fight in a different place. Every movement by Grant during the Overland was to try to put himself in the optimal position to fight Lee again. Once he quit beating his head against the wall at Cold Harbor, he realized he needed to find a strategic target and that became Petersburg.
 
Grant's original plan did not work. He never got Lee into a fight outside of entrenchments or the heavy cover of the Wilderness. Lee had changed tactics, and was never going to try to defeat US artillery again. Grant realized this and sent some of the artillery back to Washington.
But Grant changed plans. The detached armies of the Confederates in the Shannondoah Valley and in Georgia were much vulnerable.
Sheridan and Wright did the chance to defeat Early in the Valley and the Confederacy did not have the resources to stand a siege in Atlanta while Richmond/Petersburg were also besieged.
 
Grant's original plan did not work. He never got Lee into a fight outside of entrenchments or the heavy cover of the Wilderness. Lee had changed tactics, and was never going to try to defeat US artillery again. Grant realized this and sent some of the artillery back to Washington.
But Grant changed plans. The detached armies of the Confederates in the Shannondoah Valley and in Georgia were much vulnerable.
Sheridan and Wright did the chance to defeat Early in the Valley and the Confederacy did not have the resources to stand a siege in Atlanta while Richmond/Petersburg were also besieged.

Agree Grant was moving to get Lee into an open field fight after the Wilderness, but Lee would dig as soon as they stopped moving. That does not mean Grant's focus changed, but it made no sense to continue to butt head long into established positions at Spotsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor and bleed your own army out.
 
And as noted before, the 55,000 is casualties for the entire campaign, while the number for Lee's army for the entire campaign is 96,000. So Randall's statement is hyperbole.
The Wilderness to Cold Harbor is actually the Overland Campaign, minus the minor affair at White Oak Swamp. The next major action is part of the Siege of Petersburg.

Randall was never one to indulge in hyperbole, and is not here.
 
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