Official Military Atlas of the Civil War plate XXX
This map tells a lot about what the Battle of Stones River was actually all about. Because of the topography of Middle Tenneseee, the Nashville, Readyville, Murfreesboro, Franklin triangle was all but unassailable from the south. The high limestone bluffs of Stones River guard the eastern leg of the triangle. The good road leading from Readyville to Franklin was the base of the triangle. The Harpeth River serves to set the western side of triangle Running across the apex of the triangle, the Cumberland River effectively blocks any route to out flank Nashville. The four rail roads that converge on Nashville link the city to the outside world. Internal lines of communication within the triangle link all areas together & provide jumping off points for a movement southward. Defending Murfreesboro against a movement from Nashville was a very different proposition.
As you can see, Murfreesboro was easily flanked east & west. As Braxton Bragg's engineers had told him, there simply are no defensible positions between Nashville & Murfreesboro that could not be easily flanked. The six square blocks of the town & the evenly divided 2,000 population represented nothing strategic that either side had to have. When both the U.S. 14th Army Corps & the CSA Army of Tennessee stumbled into Nashville & Murfreesboro from Perryville KY in the late fall of 1862, both were exhausted. Bragg & the newly appointed Rosecrans arrived at their respective HQ's at about the same time at the end of October. At that point two very different things happened.
Bragg, as was his habit, created a vision of what he wanted the situation to be & proceeded to act from that premise. Due to the incompetence of General Wheeler, the commander of the A or TN's cavalry, no reports crossed Bragg's desk that contradicted his preconceived construct. He believed his cavalry raider's claims of having cut Nashville off from its supply line via the L&NRR from Louisville KY. The garrison was on the verge of starvation & would give up the city in a Napoleonic retreat. Bragg literally was not sure that Rosecrans still held Nashville in strength. He ordered Nathan Bedford Forrest to make an armed reconnaissance to ascertain whether the 14th Army Corps was still holding Nashville. A 40 mile wide picket line of cavalry vedettes was the trip wire in case Rosecrans did order a probe toward Murfreesboro.
The string of vedettes ran from Franklin through Nolensville to Old Jefferson. What is not obvious on this map is that the terrain is a series of roughly parallel ridges, much like the fingers of a hand with outstretched fingers. Communication across the knuckles tips was not easy. It was not until the civilian telegraph operator at Stewartsburg, ten mile from Murfreesboro, notified Bragg's HQ in Murfreesboro that he could hear heavy cannonading that he knew that Rosecrans had left Nashville & was advancing. Rationally, of course, one would expect Bragg's HQ to send out orders to subordinate commanders something to the effect that they should execute Plan A. That could not happen for the simple reason that there was no plan of any kind in place that spelled out how Breckeknridge, Hardee & Polk were to act. General Hardee, for one, was at a party that did not break up until nearly dawn. For lack of a better idea, Bragg's army was ordered to break winter camp & concentrate at Murfreesboro.
In contrast to Bragg's obliviousness, Rosecrans has timely detailed intel on the A of TN. He knew that President Davis had sent Carter Stephen's fine division to Vicksburg. He knew that 2/3rds of Bragg's cavalry would be crossing the Cumberland River & like Stephen's infantry were too far away to rejoin in time to affect the upcoming battle. Far from starving, the 14th Army Corps had ample supplies built up in Nashville & was free to make the 30 mile advance toward Murfreesboro. Rosecrans knew with great certainty where Bragg's army was in winter quarters. What he could not know, for the simple reason that nobody knew, was where Bragg intended to fight.
Bragg’s Map
Rosecrans’ Map
Detail of Bragg’s Map
Detail of Rosecrans’ Map
Take a look at the maps above. Each of them is the map that the respective commanders included with their reports on the Battle of Stones River. In each the detail maps, look for the Widow Smith's house, roughly on the right center. Everything that happened on the first day of Stones River is explained by the position of Ms Smith's place.
Rosecran's map very accurately marks the position of his forces at just before dawn on Dec 31, 1862. Bragg's map shows where, even after the battle, he THOUGHT Rosecran's flank was. The flank attack that takes up all the bandwidth in the story of the battle was a profound tactical blunder. Cleburne was almost immediately hit with enfilading fire that did great damage. Regiments on the left of the line advanced off to the west into a void & did not participate further in the battle. It is no wonder that the Union line was flanked flanked for the simple reason that Rosecrans' flank was not where Bragg thought it was.
Ask yourself, what, if anything, was there in that void that Cleburne advanced into that was vital for either army? That be your void for a reason. All those little green blobs are cedar breaks, all but impassible obstacles for men on foot, let alone artillery. The actual end of the Union line was almost three miles from the only thing that mattered on that battle line, the point where both the Nashville Pike & N&C RR crossed Stones River. Cleburne was almost as far away from that point or the parallel Pike & RR crossed Overall Creek, the next choke point as it was possible to post him. In very real terms, the famous flank attack at Stones River was a fiasco from the very start.
What passed for a plan on Bragg's part was an ad hoc set of orders to attack in the morning. Neither Bragg nor his subordinates in Hardee's Corps knew where Rosecrans' forces really were. Because of that profound ignorance, the attackers took punishing losses almost from the first shot that was fired. Indeed, quite by accident, Rosecrans' right was lapped & collapsed into the cedar breaks. It was an unintended, unsupportable tactical victory. Just look at the maps, no wonder Cleburne's men were absolutely physically & mentally exhausted by 4:00 when their attack on Rosecran's Nashville Pike position collapsed into a howling retreat?
In contrast, the Union forces that had been fighting against Cleburne's advance were able to concentrate along the Nashville Pike & N&CRR line. To use a football analogy, from their point of view it was a bend don't break defense that held on the 10 yard line. Nothing they had left in their wake was of any significance. Their definition of victory was the deny Cleburne his goal of crossing the Pike & the RR. That is exactly what they did. Holding Cleburne short was a strategic victory that made the tactical victories of earlier in the day costly & without substance. Hardee's Corps was fought out.
So to directly answer the question posed for this thread, the Battle of Stones River was a Union victory. The only tactical success achieved by Bragg's army was a fiasco without strategic success. Taking Murfreesboro solidified a triangle that protected Nashville & made it possible to take all of Middle Tennessee in July. That is the essence of a strategic victory.
Why did Grant not consider Stones River a success? In Grant's terms, it was the third time that Rosecrans had let a dispirited, broken CSA force retreat without molestation. At Iuka, Corinth & Stones River, the retreating CSA forces were disorganized & vulnerable to destruction if pursued closely. In every case, Rosecrans paused to rest his force & did not press his advantage. Rosecrans simply did not understand the principle of tempo in successful advances. Those were Grant's orders to Rosecrans in Mississippi & what he thought should have been done in Middle Tennessee. Bragg had retreated south of the Shelbyville line, the last tenable position north of Monteagle Mountain. Even a token force that maintained contact could have forced Bragg to concentrate far to the south of where he did. The brilliant Tullahoma Campaign won back territory that was there for the taking in January 1863. Unlike almost any other CW general, Grant's idea of victory did not include merely driving off CSA attackers.