Saphroneth
Lt. Colonel
- Joined
- Feb 18, 2017
I thought it might be useful to get the various evidence and analysis I've used in the past about McClellan into one place... and of course open them up for discussion, to check how solidly presented they all are.
I'll go through largely in chronological order, though I intend to skip some of the earliest stuff because I've got less information about it (and because in cases I'd mostly just be copying out some analysis 67th has done). I'll also go back and fill some areas out in more detail later.
Pre war
Basically the main things to note here are that McClellan's experiences shaped his toolkit when he went to war. He had military officer's training, and he saw combat in the Mexican-American War (where the relative capabilities of new volunteers and long-service regulars made an impression against the volunteers) and observed the aftermath of the Sevastopol siege. He also spent time working for a railroad, so had an understanding of rail logistics.
Western Virginia
McClellan's Western Virginia campaign is analyzed here:
On taking command of the Army of the Potomac
McClellan's initial concern was the defence of Washington. For these purposes, he had to work out what he was likely to be facing, and his assessment was that the thing that would produce the greatest risk to Washington was a general Rebel concentration - to reinforce their Bull Run army and cross the Potomac in an offensive against Washington.
I plan to address this one later, because there's a lot to look at, but it will suffice for now to note that by the end of September the Pinkerton picture of how many troops there were in Virginia (and their locations) was pretty much accurate. From this point onwards McClellan's intel picture is fairly accurate.
The lack of offensive movements in 1861 and the Strategy of Overwhelming
Partly this is due to the need to train troops and organize divisions, but there's also a question of what the best strategy is. In a memo in August, McClellan constructs the Strategy of Overwhelming, which is his plan to raise a very large army and focus the main part of that army on Richmond.
Richmond is the best target on the board, for a number of reasons:
- It is relatively vulnerable, being close to the Virginia rivers which allow for easy supply, and not very far from the front line as of August 1861.
- It is a rail junction which effectively controls most of Virginia, and whoever holds it has largely free movement throughout Virginia while whoever does not hold it is restricted (especially if they do not have the alternative of seaborne logistics).
- It is industrially critical, producing more in the way of industrial output than several Confederate states, and produces the lion's share of Confederate domestic rifles, artillery and other industrial goods. It is also the home (in 1861 and early 1862) of the only steam hammer in the Confederacy.
- It is politically critical, being the Confederate capital.
- Since it controls Virginia, it is essential to Confederate control of the resources of Virginia both in terms of the agricultural output of the Shenandoah Valley and the manpower that can be raised and sustained from the state as a whole.
- It is essential to the only realistic Confederate prospects of victory - whether intending to last until the Union is exhausted, or gain foreign intervention, or capture Washington themselves, Richmond must remain in Confederate control for any of them.
The Strategy of Overwhelming memo does not however suggest that Richmond should be the only target. Scott's "Anaconda" plan of a few months previously had held that an expedition down the Mississippi by about 60,000 to 80,000 men was the only offensive movement required to defeat the Confederacy aside from blockade, and was already obsolete - 1st Bull Run resulted from a Union rejection of the Anaconda plan.
McClellan’s memo started by arguing that the results of the Battle of First Bull Run meant that it would be necessary not merely to defeat the Confederate army in the field but to defeat the whole Confederacy, and also to demonstrate to the whole Confederacy – particularly those in the upper, governing class – that defeat was the inevitable outcome. (The exact language used was “the utter impossibility of resistance”).
McClellan also argued that this overwhelming force should be combined with a conciliatory attitude, but he was mostly focused on the need to defeat the enemy.
Virginia was described as being the site of the “first great struggle”, as the result of how the Rebels had chosen it, but McClellan also advocated using forces elsewhere to “diminish the resistance there offered us, by movements on other points both by land and water”.
McClellan argued that (1) a strong movement should be made on the Mississippi (though he did not go into details, this seems to be the Mississippi movement of Scott’s plan) and (2) the Rebels should be driven out of Missouri.
He went on to mention that as soon as the situation in Kentucky was resolved (the language of the letter makes it clear that he was hoping for Kentucky to reaffirm its position in the Union) (3) a movement from Kentucky into Unionist Eastern Tennessee would be a good idea – particularly targeting the rail lines.
Moving on to West Virginia, McClellan argued that (4) Western Virginia should be held mostly in a defensive way and that local West Virginia troops should be organized so that the troops there could become available for other areas.
McClellan then continues on the theme of garrisons, pointing to (5) the Baltimore and Ohio railway, (6) Baltimore itself, (7) Fort Monroe and (8) Washington, and then says that everything else should be put into (9) the “main army of operations” - i.e. the army to fight in Virginia.
After laying out this set of priorities (three offensive movements – one in Kentucky and Eastern Tennessee, one down the Mississippi, and one to fight in Virginia) McClellan began trying to put numbers onto them.
(1) The strength of the Mississippi expedition is not addressed, but McClellan presumed that the commander of that expedition – and the President – would decide how many troops would be needed. The largest number that Scott gave when he contemplated it is 80,000, though which category this was in (Aggregate Present, Grand Aggregate etc.) is not clear, and it would be possible for some of the troops used in this operation to be the same ones used to secure Missouri once Missouri was secure.
(2) McClellan’s numbers for Missouri are not specific, but he said “it is probable that no very large additions to the troops now in Missouri will be necessary to secure that State”. On September 15 about a month later John C. Frémont, then in command of the area, broke down his strength (including the Missouri Home Guard) as totalling to 54,923 in named positions and 55,693 as the “total of present and absent on detailed duty”.
Given that this includes the Home Guard, it seems reasonable to assume that 60,000 Volunteers (Aggregate Present) would be the planning figure at this point.
(3) McClellan’s numbers for the movement in Kentucky and East Tennessee were “not more than 20,000” plus troops raised in Kentucky and East Tennessee itself, assuming as he did that things went as hoped-for in Kentucky.
(4) For West Virginia the numbers are calculated similarly - “not more than five to ten thousand from Ohio and Indiana” plus the troops raised in West Virginia.
(5) The figure given for the force to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, plus the Potomac, was 10,000.
(6) The number for Baltimore was 5,000.
(7) The number for Fort Monroe was 3,000.
(8) The number for Washington was “not more than 20,000”. This probably reflects the construction of the capital forts, which was taking place at the time; McClellan’s memo makes it clear that the garrisons from (5) onwards are “when we have re-organized our main army here”.
(9) Finally there is the Army of Operations, which is broken down into categories:
250 regiments of infantry, at 225,000 men. (900 men per regiment.)
100 batteries of artillery, at 15,000 men and 6 guns each. (150 per battery.)
28 regiments of cavalry, at 25,500 men. (910 men per regiment – I suspect that the planning number McClellan used was 900 men per regiment and he rounded up instead of down.)
5 regiments of engineer troops, at 7,500 men (1,500 men per regiment)
For a total of 273,000 men.
While it is easy to focus on the very large number for the army of operations and decry it as impossible, we should first add up the total number of troops assigned here.
Using the largest estimates, except in so far as to assume that some of the Missouri troops can be “reused” on the Mississippi expedition:
(1) 60,000.
(2) 60,000.
(3) 20,000.
(4) 10,000.
(5) 10,000.
(6) 5,000.
(7) 3,000.
(8) 20,000.
(9) 273,000.
Total: 461,000
As of the end of December 1861 the Union army had 477,000 men Aggregate Present, and while this total does include some departments (Dept. of the Pacific, for one) which McClellan does not consider – and possibly a somewhat inconsistent definition of Aggregate Present – it nevertheless seems to be the case that the total apportionment of resources is not impossible. Indeed, when compared to Scott’s plan the thing which stands out about McClellan’s plan is that it involves a Union army of the “right size” to fight the Civil War. (In fact, if the total is at 900 men per regiment then it comes to a little over 500 regiments, and New York and Pennsylvania raised over 500 regiments of infantry between them over the course of the Civil War.)
This plan was largely not adopted, for a number of reasons (mostly relating to wanting a greater focus on the West) and by early 1862 McClellan had shaped a different plan. This is the Urbanna plan, which I'll go into next.
If there's any questions about the period covered here, do feel free to raise them; I'd rather not range over the whole war just yet, though, so it'd be best to keep to 1861.
I'll go through largely in chronological order, though I intend to skip some of the earliest stuff because I've got less information about it (and because in cases I'd mostly just be copying out some analysis 67th has done). I'll also go back and fill some areas out in more detail later.
Pre war
Basically the main things to note here are that McClellan's experiences shaped his toolkit when he went to war. He had military officer's training, and he saw combat in the Mexican-American War (where the relative capabilities of new volunteers and long-service regulars made an impression against the volunteers) and observed the aftermath of the Sevastopol siege. He also spent time working for a railroad, so had an understanding of rail logistics.
Western Virginia
McClellan's Western Virginia campaign is analyzed here:
McClellan's Western Virginia Campaign
Introduction The following is a narrative mainly for myself, checking that I've got the WV campaign and the Battle of Rich Mountain stra...
67thtigers.blogspot.com
On taking command of the Army of the Potomac
McClellan's initial concern was the defence of Washington. For these purposes, he had to work out what he was likely to be facing, and his assessment was that the thing that would produce the greatest risk to Washington was a general Rebel concentration - to reinforce their Bull Run army and cross the Potomac in an offensive against Washington.
I plan to address this one later, because there's a lot to look at, but it will suffice for now to note that by the end of September the Pinkerton picture of how many troops there were in Virginia (and their locations) was pretty much accurate. From this point onwards McClellan's intel picture is fairly accurate.
The lack of offensive movements in 1861 and the Strategy of Overwhelming
Partly this is due to the need to train troops and organize divisions, but there's also a question of what the best strategy is. In a memo in August, McClellan constructs the Strategy of Overwhelming, which is his plan to raise a very large army and focus the main part of that army on Richmond.
Richmond is the best target on the board, for a number of reasons:
- It is relatively vulnerable, being close to the Virginia rivers which allow for easy supply, and not very far from the front line as of August 1861.
- It is a rail junction which effectively controls most of Virginia, and whoever holds it has largely free movement throughout Virginia while whoever does not hold it is restricted (especially if they do not have the alternative of seaborne logistics).
- It is industrially critical, producing more in the way of industrial output than several Confederate states, and produces the lion's share of Confederate domestic rifles, artillery and other industrial goods. It is also the home (in 1861 and early 1862) of the only steam hammer in the Confederacy.
- It is politically critical, being the Confederate capital.
- Since it controls Virginia, it is essential to Confederate control of the resources of Virginia both in terms of the agricultural output of the Shenandoah Valley and the manpower that can be raised and sustained from the state as a whole.
- It is essential to the only realistic Confederate prospects of victory - whether intending to last until the Union is exhausted, or gain foreign intervention, or capture Washington themselves, Richmond must remain in Confederate control for any of them.
The Strategy of Overwhelming memo does not however suggest that Richmond should be the only target. Scott's "Anaconda" plan of a few months previously had held that an expedition down the Mississippi by about 60,000 to 80,000 men was the only offensive movement required to defeat the Confederacy aside from blockade, and was already obsolete - 1st Bull Run resulted from a Union rejection of the Anaconda plan.
McClellan’s memo started by arguing that the results of the Battle of First Bull Run meant that it would be necessary not merely to defeat the Confederate army in the field but to defeat the whole Confederacy, and also to demonstrate to the whole Confederacy – particularly those in the upper, governing class – that defeat was the inevitable outcome. (The exact language used was “the utter impossibility of resistance”).
McClellan also argued that this overwhelming force should be combined with a conciliatory attitude, but he was mostly focused on the need to defeat the enemy.
Virginia was described as being the site of the “first great struggle”, as the result of how the Rebels had chosen it, but McClellan also advocated using forces elsewhere to “diminish the resistance there offered us, by movements on other points both by land and water”.
McClellan argued that (1) a strong movement should be made on the Mississippi (though he did not go into details, this seems to be the Mississippi movement of Scott’s plan) and (2) the Rebels should be driven out of Missouri.
He went on to mention that as soon as the situation in Kentucky was resolved (the language of the letter makes it clear that he was hoping for Kentucky to reaffirm its position in the Union) (3) a movement from Kentucky into Unionist Eastern Tennessee would be a good idea – particularly targeting the rail lines.
Moving on to West Virginia, McClellan argued that (4) Western Virginia should be held mostly in a defensive way and that local West Virginia troops should be organized so that the troops there could become available for other areas.
McClellan then continues on the theme of garrisons, pointing to (5) the Baltimore and Ohio railway, (6) Baltimore itself, (7) Fort Monroe and (8) Washington, and then says that everything else should be put into (9) the “main army of operations” - i.e. the army to fight in Virginia.
After laying out this set of priorities (three offensive movements – one in Kentucky and Eastern Tennessee, one down the Mississippi, and one to fight in Virginia) McClellan began trying to put numbers onto them.
(1) The strength of the Mississippi expedition is not addressed, but McClellan presumed that the commander of that expedition – and the President – would decide how many troops would be needed. The largest number that Scott gave when he contemplated it is 80,000, though which category this was in (Aggregate Present, Grand Aggregate etc.) is not clear, and it would be possible for some of the troops used in this operation to be the same ones used to secure Missouri once Missouri was secure.
(2) McClellan’s numbers for Missouri are not specific, but he said “it is probable that no very large additions to the troops now in Missouri will be necessary to secure that State”. On September 15 about a month later John C. Frémont, then in command of the area, broke down his strength (including the Missouri Home Guard) as totalling to 54,923 in named positions and 55,693 as the “total of present and absent on detailed duty”.
Given that this includes the Home Guard, it seems reasonable to assume that 60,000 Volunteers (Aggregate Present) would be the planning figure at this point.
(3) McClellan’s numbers for the movement in Kentucky and East Tennessee were “not more than 20,000” plus troops raised in Kentucky and East Tennessee itself, assuming as he did that things went as hoped-for in Kentucky.
(4) For West Virginia the numbers are calculated similarly - “not more than five to ten thousand from Ohio and Indiana” plus the troops raised in West Virginia.
(5) The figure given for the force to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, plus the Potomac, was 10,000.
(6) The number for Baltimore was 5,000.
(7) The number for Fort Monroe was 3,000.
(8) The number for Washington was “not more than 20,000”. This probably reflects the construction of the capital forts, which was taking place at the time; McClellan’s memo makes it clear that the garrisons from (5) onwards are “when we have re-organized our main army here”.
(9) Finally there is the Army of Operations, which is broken down into categories:
250 regiments of infantry, at 225,000 men. (900 men per regiment.)
100 batteries of artillery, at 15,000 men and 6 guns each. (150 per battery.)
28 regiments of cavalry, at 25,500 men. (910 men per regiment – I suspect that the planning number McClellan used was 900 men per regiment and he rounded up instead of down.)
5 regiments of engineer troops, at 7,500 men (1,500 men per regiment)
For a total of 273,000 men.
While it is easy to focus on the very large number for the army of operations and decry it as impossible, we should first add up the total number of troops assigned here.
Using the largest estimates, except in so far as to assume that some of the Missouri troops can be “reused” on the Mississippi expedition:
(1) 60,000.
(2) 60,000.
(3) 20,000.
(4) 10,000.
(5) 10,000.
(6) 5,000.
(7) 3,000.
(8) 20,000.
(9) 273,000.
Total: 461,000
As of the end of December 1861 the Union army had 477,000 men Aggregate Present, and while this total does include some departments (Dept. of the Pacific, for one) which McClellan does not consider – and possibly a somewhat inconsistent definition of Aggregate Present – it nevertheless seems to be the case that the total apportionment of resources is not impossible. Indeed, when compared to Scott’s plan the thing which stands out about McClellan’s plan is that it involves a Union army of the “right size” to fight the Civil War. (In fact, if the total is at 900 men per regiment then it comes to a little over 500 regiments, and New York and Pennsylvania raised over 500 regiments of infantry between them over the course of the Civil War.)
This plan was largely not adopted, for a number of reasons (mostly relating to wanting a greater focus on the West) and by early 1862 McClellan had shaped a different plan. This is the Urbanna plan, which I'll go into next.
If there's any questions about the period covered here, do feel free to raise them; I'd rather not range over the whole war just yet, though, so it'd be best to keep to 1861.