I think you should reassess what I previously said in my initial post. Wellington's movements in 1815 were most definitely a redeployment and justified. He recognized what was happening and wanted better ground. Not a retreat. Just a redeployment of his troops, the vast majority of which weren't even British, to better ground which he deemed fit to fight a pitched battled. Clearly, he didn't choose wrong.I think then that that's the problem; it defines it so narrowly that there are many things I would label as retreats which don't count. In particular there are several occasions on which soldiers - including great generals - describe movements as retreats which are not associated with defeat, such as in Wellington's dispatches where his report of casualties describes his movement from Quatre Bras to Waterloo as "retreat".
If a general describes his own movement as "retreat" but your definition doesn't include it, then you should at least consider that your definition has been too narrow.
I'd love for you to give an example of when Wellington was defeated (and thus had to retreat to "save the remainder of his force") in 1811! I can't think of a single battle he was in for the whole year which qualifies, though he was certainly put in situations in which he had to retreat to avoid a defeat, and in 2nd Badajoz he didn't capture the fort but what compelled him to retreat was the approach of a relieving force; that would have been the same if he hadn't attacked in the first place.
This is what I mean when I say you're giving the word negative connotations which it does not actually possess, by defining it so narrowly.
For example Wellington had not been defeated at Quatre Bras, and retreated (his word) not because he had been defeated but because by a retrograde movement (i.e. moving away from the enemy and towards his own rear) he could fight on better terms.
To shift back to Grant, after the attack on his supply base at Holly Springs Grant moved back north. This would qualify as a retreat as far as I'm concerned, because before the attack Grant was clearly "advancing" and he then reversed course and went back to the start; it even comes after a battle (or rather a large raid) though Grant's main body didn't fight in it.
Does it then qualify as a retreat?
If Grant had fought a skirmish with a single regiment just before the news had come in, would it suddenly count as a retreat because it came after a battle?
I think this definition causes too many problems.
One possible definition is this - there are three kinds of movement in the military sense when manoeuvering on the same scale at which you possess an enemy, those being "advance", "oblique" and "retreat".
An "advance" is moving away from your base and/or towards the enemy or your objective.
A "retreat" is the opposite, moving towards your base and/or away from the enemy or your objective.
And an "oblique" is when you are moving roughly perpendicular to your base and/or the enemy.
On the small scale, of battle lines etc., it's fairly clear which of these something falls into, and it's relative to their unit. If there is an enemy to the south behind the north-facing friendly battle-line and a unit re-orients to oppose them, they are not retreating if they march south closer to the enemy, and they're not advancing if they're pushed north again.
But expanding that out should produce much the same conclusion. It's relative to the unit, their base or bases of supply, and their enemy or enemies.
Oh, I did read what you said, which is why I pointed out that Wellington called it a retreat.I think you should reassess what I previously said in my initial post. Wellington's movements in 1815 were most definitely a redeployment and justified. He recognized what was happening and wanted better ground. Not a retreat. Just a redeployment of his troops, the vast majority of which weren't even British, to better ground which he deemed fit to fight a pitched battled. Clearly, he didn't choose wrong.
I think it's at least plausible you genuinely haven't been involved in a retreat, by my definition, but that's because you were in a situation where you had such a vast total superiority of firepower.Now, from my personal experience regarding a "retreat". I have never been involved in a "retreat"
In Afghanistan or Iraq we would attack or "move to contact" with an enemy force. That would be much like an offensive into Pennsylvania like Lee and the ANV on a smaller scale. Once we made contact, that is what it is. USUALLY we would gain fire superiority and the Taliban or insurgents would "retreat" once we gained fire superiority or they heard rotary wing aircraft coming (at that point they knew they couldn't win). We regarded that as them "breaking contact" but I suppose that could be regarded as a retreat as well. That's why I say until we have a definitive definition. It's hard to say what is and what isn't. That's what I was getting at it in the first place and you said it, its such a narrow definition, hard to distinguish.
Redinha?So far as the Peninsular War, look at some actions in March 1811. As to "save his force" maybe a wrong choice of words but he definitely withdrew his forces from actions at Pombal, Pelariga, and Redinha.
In that specific engagement, Wellington was defeated I would say, but yes it was part of a much larger rearguard action in which the army he was pursuing was retreating. He then broke contact, took a few days, regrouped and continued his pursuit. As I said though, getting away from the point here. Maybe if this was NapoleonicWarsTalk.com we could expand out.I think it's at least plausible you genuinely haven't been involved in a retreat, by my definition, but that's because you were in a situation where you had such a vast total superiority of firepower.
The problem though is that you've defined "retreat" so narrowly that we have hard evidence field marshals disagree with you on it.
Perhaps it's a US army thing. Try "Tactical retrograde".
Redinha?
Redinha, as in, the battle where Ney set up a rearguard position and successfully checked Wellington's pursuit, but was forced to pull back over the bridge?
I hadn't even seriously looked at the events of Ney's retreat from Portugal (which Wellington by the way labelled as a retreat by the enemy) as an example of Wellington being forced to retreat by your definition, because it's obvious that after every battle in that sequence it was Ney who then kept retreating from Portugal; if you consider what happened to Wellington in those actions a "retreat" then Port Gibson counts for Grant - he fought the enemy, the enemy pushed him back, then the enemy withdrew.
I think the issue is that your definition of retreat is so tightly defined that you're disagreeing with outright field marshals (specifically on the issue of whether Wellington retreated after Quatre-Bras). It also seems like your definition of retreat is extremely narrow - so narrow in fact that things you label as examples of retreats then get relabelled as "not retreats" once you look more closely at them.In that specific engagement, Wellington was defeated I would say, but yes it was part of a much larger rearguard action in which the army he was pursuing was retreating. He then broke contact, took a few days, regrouped and continued his pursuit. As I said though, getting away from the point here. Maybe if this was NapoleonicWarsTalk.com we could expand out.
If you want to say he retreated from Quatre-Bras I can see where you could say it was one even based off of his dispatches. I do agree that retreat is often associated with defeat and therefore has a ring of negativity around it but that's not always the case as you said. I'm only speaking on this particular battle when discussing the term retreat.I think the issue is that your definition of retreat is so tightly defined that you're disagreeing with outright field marshals (specifically on the issue of whether Wellington retreated after Quatre-Bras). It also seems like your definition of retreat is extremely narrow - so narrow in fact that things you label as examples of retreats then get relabelled as "not retreats" once you look more closely at them.
What this implies to me is that your definition of "retreat" is so narrow as to be an unhelpful term, and that the twisting of the definition is done in such a way as to avoid the use of the word - when it's not a word to be avoided, and it's not a word to be ashamed of. If the situation is appropriate then a retreat is the only sensible option, and there's a reason why "Not A Step Back" orders which disallow retreat tend to be viewed very poorly by commanders.
More to the point, if you define retreat so narrowly, you end up having to use circumlocutions to refer to what a more sensible use of the word "retreat" would helpfully apply. If someone outflanks your advanced line and you pull back to an interior line without a vulnerable flank, you can refer to that as a "retreat", but if that word isn't available you have to use the clumsier "retrograde movement" or "withdrawal". What it isn't however is any kind of mistake.
But if making a movement, being opposed by superior forces and forced to abandon the campaign entirely (Belmont) still doesn't qualify as a "retreat", then almost nothing does.
The thing that I'm getting at is that your definition for retreat should probably include the movement on 17 June because Wellington called it one; this suggests that it's, well, a retreat.If you want to say he retreated from Quatre-Bras I can see where you could say it was one even based off of his dispatches. I do agree that retreat is often associated with defeat and therefore has a ring of negativity around it but that's not always the case as you said. I'm only speaking on this particular battle when discussing the term retreat.
Okay, so pulling back in the face of superior numbers to seek a place to fight at an advantage is a retreat?If we want to bring this back to the Civil War I think an equivalent would be Confederate forces during Sherman's Atlanta campaign. After the Battle of Resaca, Johnston could not stop the advance of Sherman and he was forced to retreat in face of superior numbers and was tactically at a disadvantage.
An Advance to Contact and an Attack are different phases of combat. If the contact is of a smaller force (i.e. less than a third of your size) you might put in a hasty attack. What you describe is the typical "let them attack you so you can expose them to heavy supporting fires" that was adopted by the British in NW Europe (successfully), the US in Vietnam (very unsuccessfully) and by the allies in the sandpit (with mixed results). It heavily depends upon the ability of the artillery and air to hit the targets, which is typically environmental.In Afghanistan or Iraq we would attack or "move to contact" with an enemy force.
In a war, the best measure of "effective" is victory. So both McClellan and Lee came up short.McClellan and Lee both employed this very effectively, but Grant was literally ignorant of it. He would obligingly throw troops into the enemy killing areas and in 1864 he was clearly losing the attritional race. If he wasn't provided more than ca. 200,000 troops to spend, then he would have been defeated.
It's not though, is it? The Foreign Legion at Camaron were defeated completely, but held for ten hours against fifty to one odds; this is the Foreign Legion fighting out of all proportion to their numbers. We wouldn't say they were "ineffective".In a war, the best measure of "effective" is victory. So both McClellan and Lee came up short.
If Grant had merely 120,000 or 140,000 troops, instead of 200,000, he could never have fought the campaign he did. Thus, "if he wasn't provided more than ca. 200,000 troops" holds.And as Gordon Rhea's books have documented, it was never just about attrition. There have been numerous threads discussing and refuting the "butcher" label.
I stand by what I wrote, and 200,000 is an exaggeration as discussed in other threads.It's not though, is it? The Foreign Legion at Camaron were defeated completely, but held for ten hours against fifty to one odds; this is the Foreign Legion fighting out of all proportion to their numbers. We wouldn't say they were "ineffective".
If Grant had merely 120,000 or 140,000 troops, instead of 200,000, he could never have fought the campaign he did. Thus, "if he wasn't provided more than ca. 200,000 troops" holds.
It's not, though. It's:I stand by what I wrote, and 200,000 is an exaggeration as discussed in other threads.
It is. And it's been discussed on other threads. Overland campaign strengths for US vs CS armies is closer to 160,000 vs 95,000 respectively. See Alfred C Young's writing.It's not, though. It's:
122,000 in the Army of the Potomac in regulation PFD https://archive.org/stream/virginiacampaig00humpgoog#page/n432/mode/2up/search/recruits (regulation PFD includes special/extra/daily duty, and is AP - sick/arrested)
21,000 in 9th Corps in regulation PFD https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924077699811&view=1up&seq=1063
42,000 forwarded to Grant by 10th June https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo1.ark:/13960/t4kk9w68r&view=1up&seq=744
16,000 in the part of the Army of the James forwarded to join Grant for Cold Harbor https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/067/0998
Plus the rest of the Army of the James that stayed on the western bank of the James.
In case you're not aware, it's Young's very estimate which 67th looked into and found was significantly flawed. For example his estimate of 20,000 mustered out is not supported by the evidence, or to be precise it's based off a piece of evidence from the wrong point in time.It is. And it's been discussed on other threads. Overland campaign strengths for US vs CS armies is closer to 160,000 vs 95,000 respectively. See Alfred C Young's writing.
Sorry, but I know how you and 67 play with the numbers. We'll just have to disagree. I find Young to be more credible.In case you're not aware, it's Young's very estimate which 67th looked into and found was significantly flawed. For example his estimate of 20,000 mustered out is not supported by the evidence, or to be precise it's based off a piece of evidence from the wrong point in time.
If you count according to the same metrics, you get about a 2:1 ratio for the whole campaign; to get 160,000 versus 95,000, what you have to do is to count Union Effectives versus Confederate Regulation PFD, which is the opposite of the normal Lost Cause trick but is just as wrong.
When you quote Young, it prompted me to look into it. Young's assertion was not properly researched, which rather undercut his superb work verifying Steven Newton's numbers for the rebels.It is. And it's been discussed on other threads. Overland campaign strengths for US vs CS armies is closer to 160,000 vs 95,000 respectively. See Alfred C Young's writing.
As I wrote above, I know how you two play with the numbers. I'll stick with the credible historians, such as Young. US 160,000. CS 95,000.When you quote Young, it prompted me to look into it. Young's assertion was not properly researched, which rather undercut his superb work verifying Steven Newton's numbers for the rebels.
Grant used over 200,000 north of the James, and quite a bit more if you include the initial attempt at Petersburg, thus:
Army of the Potomac, April 1864 Monthly Return = 121,964 PFD
9th Corps = 20,780 PFD (after 58th Mass joined)
Reinforcements upto 15th June = 55,178
Army of the James, May monthly return = 32,825 PFD (excluding elements in Md and NC)
Return battle casualties, AoJ during May = 4,765
Total used = 235,512
This should be compared to Lee's force:
ANV (start) = 66,140
Reinforcements = 25,495
Remaining at Petersburg = 8,528 (effectives)
Total = 100,163
Or approximately 2.35:1 as a ratio. As Saph notes, the categories don't mean the same thing, but we use them because we compare ratios to other campaigns. Correcting the Federals to effectives it is about 200,000 Federals vs 100,000 Rebels.
What you mean here by "play with the numbers" is to actually look closely at where Young got his numbers - because Young didn't go to the same level of analysis he did with the Confederates, and that's because his analysis was looking at the Confederates (and so by comparison the numbers for the Federals were "thrown together"). Young's analysis was of the Confederates, not of the Union, and while he spent most of his book on the Confederates it baffles me to see his offhand numbers for the Union given the same weight.As I wrote above, I know how you two play with the numbers. I'll stick with the credible historians, such as Young. US 160,000. CS 95,000.
| PFD O | PFD M | PFD total | Present | PFD as fraction of AP |
9th Corps | 842 | 18408 | 19250 | 21357 | 90.13% |
AoP | 4609 | 98260 | 102869 | 127471 | 80.70% |