(part four in a series) During the early days of the Civil War, Dennis Hart Mahan’s teachings were implemented by the Union high command in particular. Gen. Winfield Scott vigorously resisted the incorporation of volunteer cavalry regiments into the Union armies, as he believed them to be unduly...
emergingcivilwar.com
There is a huge amount wrong with this section. I did consider writing a rebuttal, but it ended up being
a general piece of research on the development of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac.
However:
McClellan was biased against volunteer cavalry, and believed in late 1861 that “for all present duty of cavalry in the upper Potomac volunteers will suffice as they will have nothing to do but carry messages & act as videttes.” A week later, McClellan requested that no more volunteer cavalry regiments be raised throughout the North, since their role was unclear, and questions remained about the army’s ability to mount and arm the new recruits.
You state much the same in your "Union Cavalry Come of Age", and both times you're badly misquoting what actually happened.
The letter in question was written on 16th September. On the 15th September Banks had written a very impudent letter to Seward, and Seward had simply forwarded it to McClellan. McClellan explained clearly that he took the 4 companies of regulars from Banks and placed them in the cavalry reserve (i.e. Palmer's Cavalry Brigade), and that Banks didn't need them. A fuller quote would be:
"As to the regular Cavalry - I have directed that all of it be concentrated in one mass that the numbers in each company may be increased & that I may have a reliable & efficient body on which to depending on in battle. For all present duty of Cavalry in the upper Potomac[,] volunteers may suffice as they will have nothing to do but carry messages & act as videttes. Arms will be sent for them as soon as it is obtained. ... I think General that you forget that the present duty of your division is simply to support the division of Genl Stone in opposing any attempt of the enemy to cross the River & that if such an attempt bids fair to succeed I am ready to move up with my large reinforcements & assume command myself."
To be clear, McClellan was doing the exact opposite of what he is accused of; he was concentrating most of the cavalry he had (which was very little) into one body. Banks was left with Cole's Cavalry battalion of 4 coys, and part of the Van Alen Cavalry (later 3rd NY Cavalry). McClellan's instructions to Banks are perfectly reasonable; Banks doesn't need to have those 4 regular coys, as all the cavalry had to do at the time was watch the Potomac river.
Later in this article you approve of McClellan's actions centralising the cavalry into one body.
The "week later" was actually about two months later. On
7th November, with six unhorsed "cavalry" regiments arriving from New York and no horses to mount them all, McClellan requests no more cavalry regiments be accepted. With 5 fully unhorsed "cavalry" regiments to deal with, McClellan orders them to duty in the fortifications as infantry. If the cavalry can't be mounted, then it isn't really cavalry is it?
On the Peninsula, McClellan parsed out his volunteer cavalry regiments to specific infantry brigades, primarily using the horsemen as messengers and orderlies. This was a poor use for an expensive arm of the service like cavalry.
This isn't the least bit true is it?
We know what McClellan's proposed organisation was; each corps got a squadron for escort duty (exactly the scaling as under the 1863 Cavalry Corps) and the 4 Corps slated to move on Richmond each got a brigade of 2-3 regiments. The Cavalry Reserve remained organised as a division.
Of course, when McClellan advanced on Yorktown he had only the equivalent of 4 regiments landed. The 3rd Pennsylvania, 5th US, 6th US and the 1st&2nd US. The 3rd Pennsylvania and 5th US were attached as scouts/screens for the two columns and the 6th US were in reserve, with the 1st&2nd US ordered to catch up. McClellan's own escort hadn't even disembarked.
After the storm of the 6th-10th abated, the 6th Pennsylvania, 8th Pennsylvania, 3rd Bn, 6th NY and McClellan's escort cavalry disembark. Of all the mounted cavalry on the Peninsula, only the 3rd Bn, 6th NY and the 3rd Pa Cav were not part of the Cavalry Reserve. The poor 3rd Pa Cav had to perform the entire duty of escorts etc. for the whole army until the 6th NY battalion joined in the middle of the month, whereupon that battalion assumed responsibility as the escorts to the 2nd and 4th Corps. The 3rd Pa Cav in fact camped with the Cavalry Reserve, and only provided a detachment to the 3rd Corps. Aside from these three squadrons, and small detachments to GHQ and the Provost, the entire Cavalry was concentrated in one body ready to pursue.
The 8th Illinois disembarked on the 1st May, and their Colonel reported to McClellan the next day. On the 4th, the whole of the available cavalry, that is the Cavalry Reserve and the 3rd Pennsylvania and 8th Illinois, took to the field in pursuit. The whole of the cavalry acted as a single unified force, less a few squadrons attached as escorts and the 1st NY Cav.
Advancing from Yorktown, the cavalry remained a unified body under Stoneman's command, scouting the advance and screening the main body whilst racing to link up with Franklin's (later Sumner's) river column, who had the 1st NY Cavalry with them (disembarked at Shipping Point 27th April, and reembarked to go upriver).
The cavalry continued to act as a single body. On 27th May almost the entire cavalry took to the field in two major bodies to attack Hanover Courthouse. Only the 3rd and 8th Pennsylvania (now acting as a brigade) were left to screen at Fair Oaks with the following with Porter's attack force:
Vanguard (Emory, a detachment of Stoneman's command)
5th US Cavalry
6th US Cavalry
6th Pennsylvania Cavalry
1st US Sharpshooters
Bty M, 2nd US Arty
Main Body (Stoneman)
8th Illinois Cavalry
1st New York Cavalry (minus squadron, attached to 5th Corps as the escort)
1st US Cavalry
98th Pennsylvania Infantry (attached)
2nd Rhode Island Infantry (attached)
Bty A, 2nd US Arty
Bty B&L, 2nd US Arty
This organisation persisted largely intact until the Seven Days (although a battalion of the 1st NY was detached to reserve). Stoneman's main body was at Hanover Court House, with the 8th Illinois Cavalry pushed forward on piquet. Averill's with 3 regiments watched the left flank of the army and patrolled in front of Richmond. A detachment of the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry were at White House Landing. The 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry reached WHL just as the Seven Days started, and withdrew with Casey. Stoneman led a large detachment of his division (with Emory) to oppose Jackson, and withdrew back on White House Landing. Cooke commanded the residue.
Stoneman's command
Went on expedition to block Jackson and retired to White House Landing with Stoneman in personal command
wing, 5th US Cav
6th US Cav
2 sqns, 6th Pa Cav
17th NY Inf (attached)
18th Mass Inf (attached)
(Bty C&G, 3rd Arty) (camped south of Chickahominy and joined Stoneman)
On Piquet duty to the right of McCall's division
8th Illinois
At Hanover Courthouse under Cooke
1st US (2 sqns)
wing, 5th US
3 sqns, 6th Pa
Sqn, 4th Pa (joined on 26th)
(Bty A, 2nd Arty) (camped south of Chickahominy and joined Cooke )
(Bty B&L, 2nd Arty) (camped south of Chickahominy and joined Cooke)
South of the Chickahominy
1st NY - one sqn detached as 5th Corps HQ escort. Remaining 5 sqns screening at Fair Oaks. 2 sqns accompanied Slocum.
3rd Pa - whole regt
8th Pa - whole regt
2nd US & McClellan Dragoons - went south of the White Oak and protected the engineers who opened the crossings. Retired with the army
Bty M, 2nd Arty
After the Seven Days, the Cavalry Reserve was disbanded, and the cavalry organised into a division of two brigades; the first under Averill (later expanded to 2nd Division, Cavalry Corps) and the second under Gregg who was replaced by Pleasanton (later expanded to 1st Division, Cavalry Corps). The 6th Pennsylvania became a dedicated regiment of guides. Stoneman continued to command the division.