Lee's Heart Attack.

I am not familiar on the Hill situation, whether this was refering to when Lee first took command or after Antietam. If it was the former, it sound more because there wasn't a rank between Major General and full General at the time, so there wasn't a reasonable rank to give A. P. to put him over D. H.
Nope, this is just after Antietam. Davis asks Lee who he wants as LGs, Lee replies with "Longstreet, Jackson, AP Hill", we don't have Davis' response but Lee then replies "Just Longstreet and Jackson then".

(quotes are paraphrases).

I suspect the rules got relaxed at some point to do the Stewart example you're talking about*, but the most recent test of whether it was permissible to promote someone as described had met with Lee being refused the chance to promote AP Hill to Lt. Gen - even though he'd just saved the AoNV within the last week or two.

It is theoretically possible that they would have ignored the seniority rules which then seem to have held in order to put Jackson in command of the AoNV by promotion, but I don't think it's actually likely because:
- Longstreet is the senior commander as things stand.
- Lee's first choice of Lt. Gen had been Longstreet.
- Longstreet is not someone known as an eccentric.

Would they have overruled all those objections? Possibly - but I don't think it's the most likely course of events, not when there's a commander to take over under normal rules who had not "embarrassed himself".


* which was explicitly a temporary rank, something that may have been a work-around?
 
I had a look through the list of generalships, and it seems as though the concept of "temporary" promotions to general rank was a new thing as of May 31 1864. Before that date no CS generals are given temporary promotions, after that date they start happening quite often.

The evidence seems to suggest that "temporary" rank was a new legal construct to get around seniority rules, and therefore did not exist in 1863.
 
Nope, this is just after Antietam. Davis asks Lee who he wants as LGs, Lee replies with "Longstreet, Jackson, AP Hill", we don't have Davis' response but Lee then replies "Just Longstreet and Jackson then".

(quotes are paraphrases).

I suspect the rules got relaxed at some point to do the Stewart example you're talking about*, but the most recent test of whether it was permissible to promote someone as described had met with Lee being refused the chance to promote AP Hill to Lt. Gen - even though he'd just saved the AoNV within the last week or two.

It is theoretically possible that they would have ignored the seniority rules which then seem to have held in order to put Jackson in command of the AoNV by promotion, but I don't think it's actually likely because:
- Longstreet is the senior commander as things stand.
- Lee's first choice of Lt. Gen had been Longstreet.
- Longstreet is not someone known as an eccentric.

Would they have overruled all those objections? Possibly - but I don't think it's the most likely course of events, not when there's a commander to take over under normal rules who had not "embarrassed himself".


* which was explicitly a temporary rank, something that may have been a work-around?
Certainly have a point there.
I was going to bring up an argument made earlier regarding the promotion of Bragg over Hardee, but it seems in that case, Bragg was the senior of the commanders (admittantly junior to Polk, but considering his incompetence, I can understand why Davis chose Bragg)
 
It would've gone to Longstreet for several reasons:

He is senior to Jackson.
Lee, if he has any sway with Davis, would recommend Longstreet over Jackson at that point.
Longstreet is more in contact with political folks in the Confederate Congress. Jackson never played that game.
 
I would believe it would have been Jackson cause the men have respect for him and would fight til there is nothing left in their souls. If it was any other person I dont think that it would have the same effect. The only reason why the men fought the way that they did cause they had respect for Lee.
Although I agree with some of what your saying... just because a soldier is respected by the rank and file, doesn't mean he bypasses others within the chain of command. It would most likely go to Longstreet because of his seniority. Jackson may have been more popular with the infantryman, but Longstreet was also a solid tactician. Plus Lee held Longstreet in high regard. And if you want anyone in your corner in the CSA in 1863... it's R.E. Lee.
 
In March of 1863, Lee suffered a heart attack, which many medical experts suggest may have affected his judgement at Gettysburg.

I've always thought if this was accurate? Or is this an excuse for R.E Lee's errors and miscalculations at Gettysburg. Instead of saying he committed the biggest mistake by a general on either side... they say he wasn't feeling well. Sometimes you have to wonder.
 
I've always thought if this was accurate? Or is this an excuse for R.E Lee's errors and miscalculations at Gettysburg. Instead of saying he committed the biggest mistake by a general on either side... they say he wasn't feeling well. Sometimes you have to wonder.


He also wrote letters to his wife after this that he had been quite ill during the spring.
 

He also wrote letters to his wife after this that he had been quite ill during the spring.
I absolutely understand he had a heart attack in 1863. But did it really contribute to his decision making at the battle of Gettysburg.
 
I've always thought if this was accurate? Or is this an excuse for R.E Lee's errors and miscalculations at Gettysburg. Instead of saying he committed the biggest mistake by a general on either side... they say he wasn't feeling well. Sometimes you have to wonder.
Oh, there's a lot of bigger mistakes. In fact, Lee's decisions at Gettysburg are quite reasonable within the scope of the information he had.
 
It is a good point. I can see how Jackson would make a rather problematic Army commander, with his style of command going counter to Lee's looser style, this would probably cause friction to commanders like Longstreet and his subordinates who have not served under Jackson before and would not get along well with.
Longstreet's main issues as a commander stem mostly from ego and politicing (not as bad as certain Western commanders, certainly more professional, but the attitude is noted), which I imagine would be softened once he's given command of the army.

Might Jackson have turned out like Hood, one of those men who was successful at lower levels but failed as army commander?

Lee with Jackson as his "right arm" was an excellent combination.
 
Might Jackson have turned out like Hood, one of those men who was successful at lower levels but failed as army commander?
He already had a couple of tendencies to problems when he was acting semi-independently. Three examples come to mind:

- The screwup in the Seven Days, which may not have had a critical effect (hard to say, Porter might have seen him coming and pulled back sooner) but definitely made Lee angry.
- The thing at Harpers Ferry where he ignored Lee's order to abandon the siege; of course his success excused that, but if he hadn't got "lucky" with Harpers Ferry surrendering when it did that could have completely wrecked Lee's efforts to salvage the Maryland campaign.
- Not moving when repeatedly ordered by Lee during the Loudoun Valley period. This could have had disastrous consequences had the Union army not stalled for a week at Warrenton and then spent days at Fredericksburg waiting for the pontoons to arrive.

The second one indicates that Jackson could get sort of "focused in" on what he was currently doing, while the first and third perhaps indicate that if a situation was not under Jackson's eye he could fail to appreciate the urgency. For this reason I suspect that if he did rise to AoNV commander he may have ended up as one of those commanders who was very good with the part of his army he was actually with and poor at remembering to coordinate the other part of his army.

This is not an uncommon problem. It takes mental discipline to be able to step back from the thing currently consuming your attention. Especially if you're used to commanding at the lower level, so division command or corps command feels "right".


An example of this is Meade on Day Two at Gettysburg - at first he's paying all his attention to the right and centre, and not sparing any time to address Sickles' concerns on his left; when Sickles actually gets hit, Meade comes over and focuses entirely on placing brigades on his left while ignoring Lee's wider tactical scope.

The fact I've used Meade illustrates that this focus thing is not actually the sort of thing that must make a commander lose, but it can result in them losing. It's a problem which Lee did not have, since Lee is generally manoeuvering his army as an army of multiple units (i.e. he does not get focused in on a problem).
 
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Oh, there's a lot of bigger mistakes. In fact, Lee's decisions at Gettysburg are quite reasonable within the scope of the information he had.
When referring to Gettysburg, the big mistake is well known: Pickett's Charge. I wouldn't call Pickett's charge reasonable. Could you make that argument for July 1st and 2nd, yes. But he knew what awaited him across that mile of open ground on July 3rd. I don't have to get into details because we all know what happened, but that charge is constantly debated because of the loss and the circumstances behind the man who ordered it.
 
When referring to Gettysburg, the big mistake is well known: Pickett's Charge. I wouldn't call Pickett's charge reasonable. Could you make that argument for July 1st and 2nd, yes. But he knew what awaited him across that mile of open ground on July 3rd. I don't have to get into details because we all know what happened, but that charge is constantly debated because of the loss and the circumstances behind the man who ordered it.
Oh, I can absolutely defend it in terms of what Lee knew at the time.

So on the first day, Lee had mauled two corps of the Army of the Potomac (thanks to the circumstances of the encounter battle). This is something that is known as far as Lee is concerned - he's badly damaged the numerical superiority the AotP has over him, and in some respects it is now an even battle.

On the second day, Lee attempts an enveloping attack which turns into an attack en echelon, which in turn collapses because two division commanders go down. This is good Napoleonic set-piece work - the hard part of the process (the first bit of the echelon attack) works because Longstreet does great in his sector and draws in all the Union reserves, but the easy part (the bit where the angle around Cemetery Hill is hit by a converging attack at 2:1 odds, and it happens to be about to fall on the weak 11th Corps) doesn't go through because of an error.
Regardless, during this battle the data Lee has seems to suggest that the Army of the Potomac is in a weakened state. On both flanks he does good damage, more damage than he takes despite attacking, and in the 11th Corps sector he drives back Union brigades while along the line of Cemetery Ridge one of his brigades gets quite far before being repulsed.

So on the third day Lee has the opportunity to try and finish the job (i.e. win the battle) or go home without using his reserves. If there is even a 20% chance of finishing the job then it is a good idea to try, because the Army of the Potomac is in many important respects weaker now than it will ever be again.*
Lee has already tried an echelon attack, but there are other tricks in the Napoleonic playbook - the manoeuvre sur les derrieres and the breakthrough of the centre. The manoeuvre sur les derrieres (effectively a flanking manoeuvre) is not really an option because Lee's army is already quite widely stretched, but he has unfought reserves in the form of Pickett's troops, newly arrived to the battlefield.

What Lee does on the third day is therefore (and quite clearly) an attempt at a Napoleonic push through the centre. He engages Meade on both flanks (and Meade duly engages 6th Corps, breaking up his reserves into small penny-packets which are no longer able to oppose Lee's movement). Then Lee mounts a grand-battery bombardment before launching a strong force in two waves to reach and break through the enemy centre.

Yes, that last sentence isn't what actually happened, but it's what Lee's orders were. In concept this is good Napoleonic stuff, if risky, but - well, if there was a 20% chance of victory it was worth it, and with both waves going in to make the attack stronger in mass I think it might well have that high a chance. The fact that it is in keeping with good Napoleonic battle management (of the sort which doesn't apply on every battle in the Civil War!) and that Meade made pretty much the wrong move in terms of countering it means that it was a sound option to try - even if it didn't work.



* routed corps, low numbers, the whole army hasn't won a victory since last September, and it's only got two lines of retreat where one is insufficient to handle the entire army; if Lee can force the Army of the Potomac to retreat then it's in a bad shape.
 
I think that this conversation has come to a concensus on who is Lee's most likely replacement: Longstreet. That conversation has been wonderful and insightful, and I am certain there's plenty more arguments to be had.
But I want to shift attention to the other questions which arise from this scenario. With Longstreet in command, how does the Chancellorsville Campaign unfold? Does the Pennsylvania offensive happen, or does Longstreet, now in overall charge of the army, decide to go with his plan and send a division or two to the west?
 
So Chancellorsville is just one of several attempts by the Union to cross the Rappahanock, most of which came to grief (and Wilderness nearly so). If Longstreet comes back without his divisions and he's not got them back with the AoNV by the time the campaign opens, it's quite possible that he fails to keep Hooker north of the Rappahanock; if he's arrived back with his divisions I think the odds are heavily in favour of his being able to force Hooker back north of the Rappahanock. (It's basically because of where the CS divisions are cantoned, they can "block" effectively - unlike in 1864 - and the extra troops is kind of hedging on my part.)

After that, if there's no Pennsylvania campaign I think sending troops west would be a pretty big risk (though Hooker's about to lose lots of troops from expired enlistments, so maybe after that happens it'd be feasible). If Longstreet would go north is tricky, because it's the risky play...
 
Longstreet would have gotten command in VA. Meade would have ended up in the trenches at Richmond 3 months sooner than Grant did.
Send Jackson out west with Forrest as his #2 and he would have ended up getting shot 9 months later somewhere in Ohio.
 
So Chancellorsville is just one of several attempts by the Union to cross the Rappahanock, most of which came to grief (and Wilderness nearly so). If Longstreet comes back without his divisions and he's not got them back with the AoNV by the time the campaign opens, it's quite possible that he fails to keep Hooker north of the Rappahanock; if he's arrived back with his divisions I think the odds are heavily in favour of his being able to force Hooker back north of the Rappahanock. (It's basically because of where the CS divisions are cantoned, they can "block" effectively - unlike in 1864 - and the extra troops is kind of hedging on my part.)

After that, if there's no Pennsylvania campaign I think sending troops west would be a pretty big risk (though Hooker's about to lose lots of troops from expired enlistments, so maybe after that happens it'd be feasible). If Longstreet would go north is tricky, because it's the risky play...

Is that something Longstreet would know? Or are you assuming that he acts anyway and this helps make that the [possibly] right decision without him knowing? Basically a stroke of luck that comes out for him?
 
Is that something Longstreet would know? Or are you assuming that he acts anyway and this helps make that the [possibly] right decision without him knowing? Basically a stroke of luck that comes out for him?
I'm assuming that Longstreet might notice after it's happened, not that he'd predict it before it happened - if the AotP has shrunk in size by something like 25-30% then that's something Longstreet might notice.
 
Send Jackson out west with Forrest as his #2 and he would have ended up getting shot 9 months later somewhere in Ohio.
thats the problem
WHen Bragg lost at Murfressboro and his subordinates were calling for his removal, Davis asked Jackson if he would take a promotion to General and transfer to command the Army of Tennessee. Jackson declined, because he wanted to continue operating in his home state of Virginia. Transferring him, willingly, is off the cards.
 
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