The problem with the AoP cavalry was that most of it was deployed as convoy guards & the like.
I read somewhere, I don't remember where, the interesting notion that northerners familiar with horses (and there must have been more people familiar with horses in the North than in the South) preferred being infantry because, well, who wants the hassles of looking after a horse? With no social status involved Yankee practicality won out.
I don't know if it's true but it's worth a thought.
I find this topic interesting because when Rosecrans took over the 24th Corps in Nashville Oct 2862, the cavalry could not have been more pathetic. A regiment of Philadelphia blue bloods had appointed themselves as Rosecrans’ H Q guard. When they were ordered to fight, they mutinied. It is quite a tale. Most of the 14th Corps cavalry had no weapons or horses. Seven months later, they were knocking the snot out of Wheeler’s Corps. That is quite a story, too.
As far as dismissing Warren in favor of Griffin, it was probably technically wrong, but it worked. The US won the Five Forks battle and the war in Virginia ended 8 days later, saving many lives and enormous expenses.
I think General Grant concluded the Vth corp division commanders were professionally competent and they did not need Warren's personal supervision. What Grant wrote about Warren was that Warren did not seem to realize that the division commanders were capable of following instructions. Warren was a superb engineer and could set a defensive line, when he could see the ground he was working on. General Warren had limits in expediting movement, and perhaps could not realize that the maps of the time were often wrong and could not be relied upon. At any rate, Grant admitted that delegating Warren's fate to Sheridan was improper and Grant should have reassigned Warren before the final campaign.I'm not so sure that the battle was not already won by the time that Sheridan relieved Warren. One of the criticisms leveled against Warren was that he didn't "lead from the front" and that his corps was not timely in maneuvering into position. But those charges had more to do with Sheridan's personal dislike and personality differences with Warren than with an objective assessment of Warren's leadership of V Corps.
I think General Grant concluded the Vth corp division commanders were professionally competent and they did not need Warren's personal supervision. What Grant wrote about Warren was that Warren did not seem to realize that the division commanders were capable of following instructions. Warren was a superb engineer and could set a defensive line, when he could see the ground he was working on. General Warren had limits in expediting movement, and perhaps could not realize that the maps of the time were often wrong and could not be relied upon. At any rate, Grant admitted that delegating Warren's fate to Sheridan was improper and Grant should have reassigned Warren before the final campaign.
The point is that whatever the situation when Warren was relieved, the Battle was going to be waged to the bitter end with Sheridan in command.I'm not so sure that the battle was not already won by the time that Sheridan relieved Warren. One of the criticisms leveled against Warren was that he didn't "lead from the front" and that his corps was not timely in maneuvering into position. But those charges had more to do with Sheridan's personal dislike and personality differences with Warren than with an objective assessment of Warren's leadership of V Corps.
The vast majority of mules came from Missouri & Kentucky. Slaves would deliberately work horses to death. For that reason Southern plantations worked mules rather than horses. Of course, that meant that they were dependent on the supply from up river to meet their need for draft animals.It's also worth noting that 2 of the top horse breeding states were both southern, Kentucky and Virginia (the fact that Kentucky remained loyal doesn't take away from the fact that horsemanship was more greatly ingrained in the south.
Grant was meticulous in his resupply arrangements.
It was really the only route to take to get to Chattanooga, and he was the sort of commander who wanted to see things for himself. He was also on crutches and considerable pain from having a horse fall on him in New Orleans. He was the quietly determined type of soldier.Grant did not have to theorize about the effect overwork had on mules. He rode the 60 mile long mountainous route that the AoC’s wagons had to make to supply the army in Chattanooga. It is not much of an exaggeration to state that dead mules lay nose to tail along the entire route. It says a lot about Grant that he made the trek to see first hand what the situation was.
As soon as Grant cleared the Wilderness area, he sent Sheridan and the cavalry off on a raid, so they start eating and wrecking the available forage in Virginia. The events that General Lee had worked so hard to avoid in 1863 were about to take place, if he could not expel the US army from Virginia.
He also sent back a large section of the artillery, and its horse teams, back to Washington, where they could sit at the end of the US railroad network, or be mustered out.
Both efforts were designed to do the same thing. Reduced the US demand for oats and hay, so that roads would not be jammed with wagons carrying horse food.
As @Rhea Cole points out, Grant not only decreased the mass of the horse herd supported by the army, but was working hard to control the points from which supplies had to be freighted, to Fredericksburg, White House, and City Point.
Sherman also pointed out in his memoirs that as the distance the horses and mules have to work increases, the forage demand increases at a more than linear rate, and eventually the army can do nothing but haul forage.
The II corps was truly Grant's right arm all the way up to the initial attack on Petersburg. They always were at the point of the spear from the Wilderness through there, and the casualty numbers and battle fatigue took its toll.