Very interesting article. But I think that the actual facts spelled out in the analysis belie the overall conclusion that Lee "blundered" or made a "mistake" in ordering the charge. I say that because the plan of attack as described in the analysis was in fact, brilliant, and could very well have succeeded had all the moving parts fallen into line. In other words, this was not an irrational throw of the dice by Lee that lacked any thoughtful consideration and preparation. As described, Lee would throw a fresh division (Pickett) against a weakened Union center, while committing other forces to simultaneous flank attacks by Ewell and part of Longstreet's corps, a force (Hill) to support any breakthrough, a preliminary artillery barrage, and a mobile cavalry force (Stuart) to create havoc in the Union rear. So the plan was good, even though it relied on precise coordination and clockwork. Lee certainly believed his troops had the wherewithal to carry it out. But the failure was in the execution by the senior command; Stuart, AP Hill, Longstreet, Ewell all contributed their own parts in causing the charge to fail. Whether the plan was too complicated for success is certainly possible, but that doesn't negate the fact that Lee put considerable care into developing the attack plan.