67th Tigers
Captain
- Joined
- Nov 10, 2006
Did Lincoln and Halleck Order McClellan to "Attack" After Antietam? The Conspiracy Theory That Wasn't and Why Lincoln Fired McClellan.
Introduction
This post was prompted by a post on an Antietam discussion group I am a member of. The post was about Halleck's 6th October telegram (received 7th October) directing McClellan to cross the Potomac and give battle. The noted author Steven Stotelmyer gave one thread of a response discussing McClellan's lack of supplies. This is true, but I think is only part of the answer. I gave another response, and this post contains my argument as to why McClellan didn't advance. The TL; DR is that McClellan was ordered not to advance in the same telegram that asked him to.
This of course sounds crazy. How can such contradictory orders be contained in a telegram? However, they were. What is more fascinating in my opinion is why commentators completely ignore the rest of the telegram apart from the opening part. This is likely done in an attempt to **** McClellan.
20th to 26th September: The Last Gasp of the Maryland Campaign
McClellan's movements post-Antietam bear some examination. It should be stated up-front that McClellan intended to maneouvre against Lee by crossing the Potomac and Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry, and cut Lee's escape route off. This, not Antietam, provided the opportunity to destroy the enemy army. He did not because Halleck forbade it, in the same manner he forbade McClellan's crossing of the James to attack Petersburg in July.
Lee crossed the Potomac on the night of the 18th through to the morning of the 19th. McClellan pursued at dawn. He dispatched the 6th Corps to head Lee off at Williamsport, and attacked Lee's rearguard at the Boteler Ford on the 19th and 20th. The result was disastrous, and neither side could make an opposed river crossing.
McClellan continued the campaign after Shepherdstown and Williamsport. The 12th Corps occupied the Maryland Heights at 1300 on the 20th, and for the next few days the army shifted to the Maryland Heights, with the 2nd and 1st Corps marching on the 22nd (see their marching orders). The 9th Corps marching on the 23rd (OR), along with the main body of the cavalry (OR). Thus by the 23rd, McClellan had shifted his main body to the Maryland Heights, leaving the 5th Corps watching the Shepherdstown Fords, and the 6th Corps the Williamsport Fords, both with a screen of cavalry.
On the 22nd, Sumner was ordered to throw a pontoon bridge over the Potomac, and occupy the far side. McClellan wrote to the President of the C&O Railroad to send construction teams to rebuild the rail bridge, and also to Halleck to have him authorise the expense. On the 23rd Halleck asked McClellan's intent, and on the 24th McClellan replied he was going to cross the Potomac and Shenandoah, and attack Winchester. McClellan noted the storm assisted them by making it impossible for Lee to cross the Potomac, whereas he could use the rebuilt bridges at Harper's Ferry. Halleck had also previously stated the 11th Corps would be released to McClellan, and on the 25th McClellan suggested the 11th Corps march to Knoxville (i.e. where the Potomac cut through South Mountain). On the same day, McClellan gave his plans to his wife; essentially he intended to let the Potomac rise (as it already was) to prevent Lee fording the river, then use the rebuilt bridges to attack Winchester. This is exactly what he told Halleck.
On the 26th, the hammer falls on the campaign. In one telegram, Halleck states he will not send any more troops until McClellan's plans are "agreed on", and that he believes there is a whole other rebel army waiting to strike Washington. In another, Halleck denies the requisition for the repair of the Harper's Ferry bridges until he agrees to McClellan's plans. This effectively ends the plans for immediate forward movement. Halleck has imposed control measures to stop McClellan from advancing.
On the other side, Lee was divined McClellan's intent by the 25th (when he writes to Jeff Davis), and believed McClellan was rebuilding the bridges. He never understood that Halleck had intervened. Lee withdrew hoping to rebuild his army to face the threat of a renewed offensive.
27th September - 6th October: Washington Forbids an Offensive
McClellan of course responded to Halleck's 26th September message forbidding further movements (or preparations for movements) by writing a fairly long reply recommending that he be allowed to rebuild the Harper's Ferry bridges. He notes that until the bridges are rebuilt, the army can't be supplied on the far side. He also plays down the idea of an advance, stating that he only intended to if the enemy made a mistake and great advantage could be gained. We should note that McClellan's intelligence at the time indicated that Lee was above him, and thus great advantage would be secured. Nothing is heard from Halleck. In the meantime, on the 28th intelligence reaches him that half the enemy force has fallen back to protect Winchester, and thus the period of advantage is lost. McClellan writes to his wife the next morning that he "will be able to arrange my troops more with a view to comfort" and that he will be able to ask for a leave to visit her.
On 1st October, McClellan writes to Halleck that the permanent occupation of Harper's Ferry is "taken for granted" by him, and without reference to future operations, the bridges are needed, if only for the proper defence of the place. Halleck's reply is that he cannot authorise the expenditure, only the President can, and he is en route. He states that the delay caused by rebuilding the bridges would be unacceptable. Hence Halleck decides to delay more, by refusing to get the work started.
That afternoon, Lincoln showed up unannounced at Harper's Ferry, having traveled by train, but having to disembark early (at Monocacy), travel down to Harper's Ferry in a carriage and cross the rivers by the pontoon bridges, because the main bridges had still not yet been repaired. McClellan rode down to see him, and Lincoln spent four days with the army. The consultation on further actions occurred on the 4th October, and was during a ride to South Mountain. McClellan recorded an immediate impression that he had convinced Lincoln of the problems with advancing before preparations (i.e. the bridges) were complete, and Stotelmyer found two additional confirmatory accounts. This seems to be true, as the next day Halleck orders Cox's division removed from McClellan's army. Deliberately weakening McClellan's army would not be done if McClellan was intended to take the offensive by Washington.
Thus, as of ca. the sixth of October, the policy of Lincoln and Halleck was that McClellan should remain on the defensive.
7th October - 16th October: Washington Asks for a Plan for an Offensive, and then Rejects it.
On the morning of the 7th October, this apparent understanding is shattered. The following telegram from Halleck is received:
This telegram is often mis-quoted. Some parse it as an order for an immediate movement (even Lincoln, two years later, recalled that he'd issued a peremptory order, which he clearly hadn't). However, the bolded sentence reveals that it is not. Washington's control measures are still in place, and they wish to approve any action before it is undertaken. McClellan writes an immediate response, which is correct in every particular:
Essentially, McClellan rules out crossing east of the Blue Ridge because it does not fix the enemy. Lee would be free to cross the Potomac above Harper's Ferry and sever McClellan's supply lines. McClellan sees no great advantage in advancing down the Shenandoah Valley, except the enemy are there, and he wishes to fight them.
Halleck will not reply. Instead on the 16th October, ten days later, a letter is received from Lincoln, having taken three days to arrive:
This is highly revealing, and damning of Lincoln. Before examining the contents we should note that McClellan is in limbo until this letter is received. Washington has not approved his plans, and thus he has not been free to take the offensive.
Firstly (1), Lincoln starts with a bizarre statement that McClellan should act like Lee. Lee and Jackson, of course, have just almost destroyed their own army by detaching from their supply lines.
Secondly (2), Lincoln does not understand that the Shenandoah River is a river. Lee's river crossings (around Front Royal) are intact, and hence Lee's supplies can run up the macadamised Valley Pike. McClellan OTOH has been arguing to bridge the Shenandoah precisely because of this problem, and Halleck has been briefing Lincoln not to allow it.
The third paragraph (3) is rather amazing. Lincoln misuses a maxim or war and declares that if Lee was in McClellan's place, he'd break the rebel communications with Richmond within 24 hours. This of course is not physically possible, even if the rebels did nothing. Lincoln also heavily implies that McClellan should have let Lee invade Pennsylvania and then operate against Lee's communications, but also followed him and beaten him. These are contradictory, and it seems Lincoln believed that unless the rebel army was physically standing on a territory, then their wagons could not traverse it.
The instructive lesson is the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863, which proved that Lincoln was out of his depth, and did not have the courage of his convictions. We should note that as soon as it was known Lee was moving north, Hooker proposed ignoring Lee, and instead marching south and capturing Richmond, effectively ending the war. Halleck refused permission, and Lincoln wrote on the 10th June that Hooker, rather than operating offensively, should cover Washington instead.
The fourth thought sixth paragraphs (4-6) again has Lincoln being ignorant of the geography. He suggests McClellan should move directly at Richmond on the "inside track", ignoring all the rivers in the way, such as the Potomac, Rappahanock and Rapidan, the North Anna, and several other smaller rivers. Meanwhile, Lee is actually roughly the same distance from Richmond as McClellan, and would only need to go "round the arc", meaning ascending the Shenandoah Valley and going through Swift Run Gap if McClellan had stolen a march. This distance is 192 miles for Longstreet, and 167 for Jackson. For McClellan, if he ignored all concerns about his flank security and simply marched fairly directly at Richmond, the distance would be 159 miles for his main body, and 178 miles for the 6th Corps. If both armies move at the same pace (10 miles/ day was average for both), then McClellan only has a 1-2 marches shorter route, but unlike Lee he must bridge the Potomac at Berlin (now Brunswick), the Rappahanock at Fredericksburg, and the Chickahominy. The North Anna can likely be forded. If everything works perfectly, and the pontoons arrive on time, at each of these three rivers the Federal Army will face a delay of several days. Lee will beat McClellan, even on the "outside track".
Of course, Lee historically used Chester Gap, which at 173 miles for Longstreet and 149 miles for Jackson, cuts off two marches and means Lee is actually closer to Richmond than McClellan, despite the "outside track", which really isn't. Indeed, if McClellan moved towards Fredericksburg directly, Longstreet has a 113 mile march and Jackson has an 89 mile march to get there, and McClellan's main body a 93 mile march. McClellan doesn't have much, if any, distance advantage and it evaporates in the real world. This is especially true once you consider McClellan would need to be occupying the Blue Ridge gaps, as he historically did in November '62, and Meade did in July '63.
Finally, the bolded sentences are crass statements by Lincoln, especially calling it "unmanly" to suggest that the Federals couldn't move as fast as the Confederates, despite the geographical problems.
This letter is highly instructive of Lincoln. It is obvious that he is a victim of the Dunning-Kruger Effect. Essentially, Lincoln has learnt a little bit about warfare, how armies move etc., and has complete confidence in himself and his abilities to direct armies. However, in this dangerous state of half-knowledge, he simply can't comprehend what he doesn't understand. Thus since he believes himself competent, when presented with facts he can't comprehend properly, he falls back on believing that that facts must be wrong, and his ideas right. Sadly, there is an argument to be made that this lengthened the Civil War by about 2.5 years, and if Lincoln had simply let the generals fight the war then it would have been resolved by Christmas '62. A lot of the blame for this rests with Bates, and though I've never written it up here, the argument I have made on this board here.
Lincoln would soon thereafter condone and defend the slaughter of the Army of the Potomac at Maryes Heights. In 1864 he'd defend Grant's futile assaults in the like manner. This is what Lincoln wanted.
Introduction
This post was prompted by a post on an Antietam discussion group I am a member of. The post was about Halleck's 6th October telegram (received 7th October) directing McClellan to cross the Potomac and give battle. The noted author Steven Stotelmyer gave one thread of a response discussing McClellan's lack of supplies. This is true, but I think is only part of the answer. I gave another response, and this post contains my argument as to why McClellan didn't advance. The TL; DR is that McClellan was ordered not to advance in the same telegram that asked him to.
This of course sounds crazy. How can such contradictory orders be contained in a telegram? However, they were. What is more fascinating in my opinion is why commentators completely ignore the rest of the telegram apart from the opening part. This is likely done in an attempt to **** McClellan.
20th to 26th September: The Last Gasp of the Maryland Campaign
McClellan's movements post-Antietam bear some examination. It should be stated up-front that McClellan intended to maneouvre against Lee by crossing the Potomac and Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry, and cut Lee's escape route off. This, not Antietam, provided the opportunity to destroy the enemy army. He did not because Halleck forbade it, in the same manner he forbade McClellan's crossing of the James to attack Petersburg in July.
Lee crossed the Potomac on the night of the 18th through to the morning of the 19th. McClellan pursued at dawn. He dispatched the 6th Corps to head Lee off at Williamsport, and attacked Lee's rearguard at the Boteler Ford on the 19th and 20th. The result was disastrous, and neither side could make an opposed river crossing.
McClellan continued the campaign after Shepherdstown and Williamsport. The 12th Corps occupied the Maryland Heights at 1300 on the 20th, and for the next few days the army shifted to the Maryland Heights, with the 2nd and 1st Corps marching on the 22nd (see their marching orders). The 9th Corps marching on the 23rd (OR), along with the main body of the cavalry (OR). Thus by the 23rd, McClellan had shifted his main body to the Maryland Heights, leaving the 5th Corps watching the Shepherdstown Fords, and the 6th Corps the Williamsport Fords, both with a screen of cavalry.
On the 22nd, Sumner was ordered to throw a pontoon bridge over the Potomac, and occupy the far side. McClellan wrote to the President of the C&O Railroad to send construction teams to rebuild the rail bridge, and also to Halleck to have him authorise the expense. On the 23rd Halleck asked McClellan's intent, and on the 24th McClellan replied he was going to cross the Potomac and Shenandoah, and attack Winchester. McClellan noted the storm assisted them by making it impossible for Lee to cross the Potomac, whereas he could use the rebuilt bridges at Harper's Ferry. Halleck had also previously stated the 11th Corps would be released to McClellan, and on the 25th McClellan suggested the 11th Corps march to Knoxville (i.e. where the Potomac cut through South Mountain). On the same day, McClellan gave his plans to his wife; essentially he intended to let the Potomac rise (as it already was) to prevent Lee fording the river, then use the rebuilt bridges to attack Winchester. This is exactly what he told Halleck.
On the 26th, the hammer falls on the campaign. In one telegram, Halleck states he will not send any more troops until McClellan's plans are "agreed on", and that he believes there is a whole other rebel army waiting to strike Washington. In another, Halleck denies the requisition for the repair of the Harper's Ferry bridges until he agrees to McClellan's plans. This effectively ends the plans for immediate forward movement. Halleck has imposed control measures to stop McClellan from advancing.
On the other side, Lee was divined McClellan's intent by the 25th (when he writes to Jeff Davis), and believed McClellan was rebuilding the bridges. He never understood that Halleck had intervened. Lee withdrew hoping to rebuild his army to face the threat of a renewed offensive.
27th September - 6th October: Washington Forbids an Offensive
McClellan of course responded to Halleck's 26th September message forbidding further movements (or preparations for movements) by writing a fairly long reply recommending that he be allowed to rebuild the Harper's Ferry bridges. He notes that until the bridges are rebuilt, the army can't be supplied on the far side. He also plays down the idea of an advance, stating that he only intended to if the enemy made a mistake and great advantage could be gained. We should note that McClellan's intelligence at the time indicated that Lee was above him, and thus great advantage would be secured. Nothing is heard from Halleck. In the meantime, on the 28th intelligence reaches him that half the enemy force has fallen back to protect Winchester, and thus the period of advantage is lost. McClellan writes to his wife the next morning that he "will be able to arrange my troops more with a view to comfort" and that he will be able to ask for a leave to visit her.
On 1st October, McClellan writes to Halleck that the permanent occupation of Harper's Ferry is "taken for granted" by him, and without reference to future operations, the bridges are needed, if only for the proper defence of the place. Halleck's reply is that he cannot authorise the expenditure, only the President can, and he is en route. He states that the delay caused by rebuilding the bridges would be unacceptable. Hence Halleck decides to delay more, by refusing to get the work started.
That afternoon, Lincoln showed up unannounced at Harper's Ferry, having traveled by train, but having to disembark early (at Monocacy), travel down to Harper's Ferry in a carriage and cross the rivers by the pontoon bridges, because the main bridges had still not yet been repaired. McClellan rode down to see him, and Lincoln spent four days with the army. The consultation on further actions occurred on the 4th October, and was during a ride to South Mountain. McClellan recorded an immediate impression that he had convinced Lincoln of the problems with advancing before preparations (i.e. the bridges) were complete, and Stotelmyer found two additional confirmatory accounts. This seems to be true, as the next day Halleck orders Cox's division removed from McClellan's army. Deliberately weakening McClellan's army would not be done if McClellan was intended to take the offensive by Washington.
Thus, as of ca. the sixth of October, the policy of Lincoln and Halleck was that McClellan should remain on the defensive.
7th October - 16th October: Washington Asks for a Plan for an Offensive, and then Rejects it.
On the morning of the 7th October, this apparent understanding is shattered. The following telegram from Halleck is received:
"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be re-enforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the Valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river; also to what point the re-enforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads.
I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.''
This telegram is often mis-quoted. Some parse it as an order for an immediate movement (even Lincoln, two years later, recalled that he'd issued a peremptory order, which he clearly hadn't). However, the bolded sentence reveals that it is not. Washington's control measures are still in place, and they wish to approve any action before it is undertaken. McClellan writes an immediate response, which is correct in every particular:
After a full consultation with the corps commanders in my vicinity, I have determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah for immediate operations against the enemy, now near Winchester. On no other line north of Washington can the army be supplied, nor can it on any other cover Maryland and Pennsylvania. Were we to cross the river below the mouth of the Shenandoah, we would leave it in the power of the enemy to recross into Maryland, and thus check the movements. In the same case we would voluntarily give him the advantage of the strong line of the Shenandoah, no point of which could be reached by us in advance of him. I see no objective point of strategical value to be gained or sought for by a movement between the Shenandoah and Washington. I wish to state distinctly that I do not regard the line of the Shenandoah Valley as important for ulterior objects. It is important only so long as the enemy remains near Winchester, and we cannot follow that line far beyond that, simply because the country is destitute of supplies, and we have not sufficient means of transportation to enable us to advance more than 20 or 25 miles beyond a railway or canal terminus. If the enemy abandon Winchester and fall back upon Stanton, it will be impossible for us to pursue him by that route, and we must then take a new line of operations, based upon water or railway communication. The only possible object to be gained by an advance from this vicinity is to fight the enemy near Winchester. If they retreat we have nothing to gain by pursuing them-in fact, cannot do so to any great distance. The object I propose to myself are to fight the enemy if they remain near Winchester, or, failing in that, to force them to abandon the Valley of the Shenandoah; then to adopt a new and decisive line of operations which shall strike at the heart of the rebellion.
I have taken all possible measures to insure the most prompt equipment of the troops, but from all that I can learn it will be at least three days before the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps are in condition to move from their present camps. They need shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter-tents, &c. I beg to assure you that not an hour shall be lost in carrying your instructions into effect. Please send the re-enforcements to Harper's Ferry. I would prefer that the new regiments be sent as regiments, not brigade, unless already done so with old troops. I would again ask for Peck's division, and, if possible, Heintzelman's corps. If the enemy gives fight near Winchester it will be a desperate affair, requiring all our resources. I hope that no time will be lost in sending forward the re-enforcements, that I may get them in hand as soon as possible.
Essentially, McClellan rules out crossing east of the Blue Ridge because it does not fix the enemy. Lee would be free to cross the Potomac above Harper's Ferry and sever McClellan's supply lines. McClellan sees no great advantage in advancing down the Shenandoah Valley, except the enemy are there, and he wishes to fight them.
Halleck will not reply. Instead on the 16th October, ten days later, a letter is received from Lincoln, having taken three days to arrive:
(1) You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?
(2) As I understand, you telegraph Gen. Halleck that you can not subsist your army at Winchester unless the Railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpepper C.H. which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the Railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you; and, in fact ignores the question of time, which can not, and must not be ignored.
(3) Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is "to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own.'' You seem to act as if this applies against you, but can not apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow, and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon, and beat what is left behind all the easier.
(4) Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can, and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march. His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his.
(5) You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below, instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemies' communications, which I would seize if he would permit. If he should move Northward I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move towards Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and, at least, try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say "try''; if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither North or South, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we can not beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us, than far away. If we can not beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the entrenchments of Richmond.
(Paragraph no.s are my insertions)(6) Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable---as it were, by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub towards the rim---and this whether you move directly by the chord, or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Hay-Market, and Fredericksburg; and you see how turn-pikes, railroads, and finally, the Potomac by Acquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, towit: Vestal's five miles; Gregorie's, thirteen, Snicker's eighteen, Ashby's, twenty-eight, Mannassas, thirty-eight, Chester fortyfive, and Thornton's fiftythree. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together, for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way, you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length, running for Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way; if he does so, turn and attack him in rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy; and it is unmanly to say they can not do it.
This letter is in no sense an order. Yours truly A. LINCOLN.
This is highly revealing, and damning of Lincoln. Before examining the contents we should note that McClellan is in limbo until this letter is received. Washington has not approved his plans, and thus he has not been free to take the offensive.
Firstly (1), Lincoln starts with a bizarre statement that McClellan should act like Lee. Lee and Jackson, of course, have just almost destroyed their own army by detaching from their supply lines.
Secondly (2), Lincoln does not understand that the Shenandoah River is a river. Lee's river crossings (around Front Royal) are intact, and hence Lee's supplies can run up the macadamised Valley Pike. McClellan OTOH has been arguing to bridge the Shenandoah precisely because of this problem, and Halleck has been briefing Lincoln not to allow it.
The third paragraph (3) is rather amazing. Lincoln misuses a maxim or war and declares that if Lee was in McClellan's place, he'd break the rebel communications with Richmond within 24 hours. This of course is not physically possible, even if the rebels did nothing. Lincoln also heavily implies that McClellan should have let Lee invade Pennsylvania and then operate against Lee's communications, but also followed him and beaten him. These are contradictory, and it seems Lincoln believed that unless the rebel army was physically standing on a territory, then their wagons could not traverse it.
The instructive lesson is the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863, which proved that Lincoln was out of his depth, and did not have the courage of his convictions. We should note that as soon as it was known Lee was moving north, Hooker proposed ignoring Lee, and instead marching south and capturing Richmond, effectively ending the war. Halleck refused permission, and Lincoln wrote on the 10th June that Hooker, rather than operating offensively, should cover Washington instead.
The fourth thought sixth paragraphs (4-6) again has Lincoln being ignorant of the geography. He suggests McClellan should move directly at Richmond on the "inside track", ignoring all the rivers in the way, such as the Potomac, Rappahanock and Rapidan, the North Anna, and several other smaller rivers. Meanwhile, Lee is actually roughly the same distance from Richmond as McClellan, and would only need to go "round the arc", meaning ascending the Shenandoah Valley and going through Swift Run Gap if McClellan had stolen a march. This distance is 192 miles for Longstreet, and 167 for Jackson. For McClellan, if he ignored all concerns about his flank security and simply marched fairly directly at Richmond, the distance would be 159 miles for his main body, and 178 miles for the 6th Corps. If both armies move at the same pace (10 miles/ day was average for both), then McClellan only has a 1-2 marches shorter route, but unlike Lee he must bridge the Potomac at Berlin (now Brunswick), the Rappahanock at Fredericksburg, and the Chickahominy. The North Anna can likely be forded. If everything works perfectly, and the pontoons arrive on time, at each of these three rivers the Federal Army will face a delay of several days. Lee will beat McClellan, even on the "outside track".
Of course, Lee historically used Chester Gap, which at 173 miles for Longstreet and 149 miles for Jackson, cuts off two marches and means Lee is actually closer to Richmond than McClellan, despite the "outside track", which really isn't. Indeed, if McClellan moved towards Fredericksburg directly, Longstreet has a 113 mile march and Jackson has an 89 mile march to get there, and McClellan's main body a 93 mile march. McClellan doesn't have much, if any, distance advantage and it evaporates in the real world. This is especially true once you consider McClellan would need to be occupying the Blue Ridge gaps, as he historically did in November '62, and Meade did in July '63.
Finally, the bolded sentences are crass statements by Lincoln, especially calling it "unmanly" to suggest that the Federals couldn't move as fast as the Confederates, despite the geographical problems.
This letter is highly instructive of Lincoln. It is obvious that he is a victim of the Dunning-Kruger Effect. Essentially, Lincoln has learnt a little bit about warfare, how armies move etc., and has complete confidence in himself and his abilities to direct armies. However, in this dangerous state of half-knowledge, he simply can't comprehend what he doesn't understand. Thus since he believes himself competent, when presented with facts he can't comprehend properly, he falls back on believing that that facts must be wrong, and his ideas right. Sadly, there is an argument to be made that this lengthened the Civil War by about 2.5 years, and if Lincoln had simply let the generals fight the war then it would have been resolved by Christmas '62. A lot of the blame for this rests with Bates, and though I've never written it up here, the argument I have made on this board here.
Lincoln would soon thereafter condone and defend the slaughter of the Army of the Potomac at Maryes Heights. In 1864 he'd defend Grant's futile assaults in the like manner. This is what Lincoln wanted.