Kentucky Derby Cavalier.
First Sergeant
- Joined
- Oct 24, 2019
Thoughts?
Sorry for any confusion, but I am referring to the battle of Jackson, on May 14, 1863. The stubborn fight put up by Gregg two days prior at the battle of Raymond convinced Grant he needed to deal with Johnston and destroy Jackson before turning his attention back to Pemberton and his Vicksburg army. Had Johnston defended Jackson and held the rail center, Confederate reinforcements would have been able to arrive, disembark and quickly reinforce Johnston's growing "Army of Relief." By abandoning Jackson, he made it impossible to quickly gather his reinforcements into a threatening strike force to the east of Grant, allowing Grant's forces to then turn and deal with Pemberton at Champion Hill on May 16.I might not be following. How exactly does Johnston relieve the siege of Vicksburg by standing and waiting for Grant to attack him?
Ah, I see the source of the confusion.Sorry for any confusion, but I am referring to the battle of Jackson, on May 14, 1863. The stubborn fight put up by Gregg two days prior at the battle of Raymond convinced Grant he needed to deal with Johnston and destroy Jackson before turning his attention back to Pemberton and his Vicksburg army. Had Johnston defended Jackson and held the rail center, Confederate reinforcements would have been able to arrive, disembark and quickly reinforce Johnston's growing "Army of Relief."
That was May 14th. By May 16th Ector's and McNair's veterans would be expected to arrive giving Johnston an additional 3,000 or so troops to the 7,500 already concentrated there. Johnston had substantial artillery available to stiffen his defensive position. With Pemberton threatening to maneuver his Vicksburg troops against Grant's rear during this same time period, I don't believe Grant would have committed his total force (7:1 or whatever the odds) against the 7500 Confederates then holding Jackson. He might have, in which case your scenario would be correct (Johnston's force would have been crushed), but given the precarious position of Grant's army and the state of the intelligence available to both sides (both sides were woefully short of cavalry), would he take that gamble? I just can't see it painted quite as "black and white" as yourself. I think had Johnston been just a bit more of a gambler, he had a chance to hold Jackson against any initial assaults Grant might have thrown at him and perhaps turned the tide of the whole Vicksburg campaign at that point. Not very good odds still...but a distinct possibility at least.On May 14 Johnston's force at Jackson was only about 7,500 strong, and Grant's force that had already crossed the river outnumbered him about 7:1 - if Johnston stands and fights he'll be crushed.
What kind of odds do you require to overmatch someone enough to defeat them easily? Let's say for the moment it requires a 3:1 advantage.That was May 14th. By May 16th Ector's and McNair's veterans would be expected to arrive giving Johnston an additional 3,000 or so troops to the 7,500 already concentrated there. Johnston had substantial artillery available to stiffen his defensive position. With Pemberton threatening to maneuver his Vicksburg troops against Grant's rear during this same time period, I don't believe Grant would have committed his total force (7:1 or whatever the odds) against the 7500 Confederates then holding Jackson. He might have, in which case your scenario would be correct (Johnston's force would have been crushed), but given the precarious position of Grant's army and the state of the intelligence available to both sides (both sides were woefully short of cavalry), would he take that gamble? I just can't see it painted quite as "black and white" as yourself.
Not convinced...sorry. But thanks for your detailed reply!So on the 14th (with fighting beginning around 10AM on that day, as historically) Johnston could have 7,500 in Jackson and be attacked by 24,200 PFD - more than 3:1 odds. If he's able to hold out against that for two days for Ector and McNair to arrive, then 13th Corps alone could hold out against Pemberton for two days even if Pemberton had more than 50,000 troops - and whichever one 2nd Div 15th Corps was in makes things worse.
Why not? Is it that you feel that 24,200 isn't a sufficiently overwhelming force to overcome 7,500 defending Jackson?Not convinced...sorry. But thanks for your detailed reply!
1. Jonston not sending Jackson and his command to closely follow the routed Union Army straight into Washington D. C.; reorganize as quickly as possible his army and follow Jackson, ASAP.
Ooh, another chance for a numbers argument where I know the numbers.2. McClellan not blowing through the thin defenses of Yorktown line with forces at hand.
And a third one!3. Little Mac not attacking Lee 24 hrs earlier at Antietam.
Five lost opportunities? Neat question. I'll probably forget something really important, but here is a quick list:Thoughts?
Since no date has been forthcoming, I'll just have a look at the issue of the "thin defences".2. McClellan not blowing through the thin defenses of Yorktown line with forces at hand.
Five lost opportunities? Neat question. I'll probably forget something really important, but here is a quick list:
1. First Bull Run. The US Army was a mass of confusion due to the loss of many officers who defected to the Confederacy, but the Confederate Army was still in its formative stage. The Army that pre-existed the war really should have won the fight. A convincing victory for the Union might have dashed the hopes of the rebelling states. This was a missed chance to crush the rebellion.
2. Gettysburg. Lee's failures here are well-known, but the original idea about trying to force a political decision to end the war through putting a scare into the northern populace was a gamble worth taking at that stage. It didn't work, but it was a missed chance for the Confeds.
3. The weeks prior to Chickamauga. The federals had Bragg's Confeds on the run but Rosecrans allowed his army to extend itself too far while giving chase and he got caught. A better job of chasing the Confederates without over-extending his own forces might have allowed Rosecrans to drive Bragg deep into Georgia months earlier than Sherman eventually did. This could have shortened the war.
4. Ford's Theater. Had someone been around to give an effective defense of the President, Lincoln might not have been killed. A full second term for Lincoln would not have shortened the war but it might have made for a more effective Reconstruction. The mis-management of the effort by presidents Johnson and Grant did as much damage to the nation at large as did the war itself.
Best I could do!
How's the force balance? Remember that the fewer Union troops on the field the less catastrophic a defeat is.1) First day at Gettysburg. Jackson on the left would not have hesitated a second, the Union forces would gave been swept off of Cenerary Ridge and the whole affair could have forced Washington to sue for peace.
1- Jackson was not there, so no missed opportunity. Had Jackson been there, he would have had no better guidance from army HQ than Ewell.Too easy. There were a great many missed oppotunities but only two that might have ended the war.
1) First day at Gettysburg. Jackson on the left would not have hesitated a second, the Union forces would gave been swept off of Cenerary Ridge and the whole affair could have forced Washington to sue for peace.
2) Gordon being prevented from attacking the naked Federal right at the Wilderness until it was too late in the day. Might have sent the entire army running
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It is worth considering whether the Federal corps in question were able to fight their full potential - a lot of 11th Corps for example was probably not up to much further fighting on Day One, in particular, because those men had been in two engagements so far and broken in a rout at both of them.1- Jackson was not there, so no missed opportunity. Had Jackson been there, he would have had no better guidance from army HQ than Ewell.
Understand Lee was asking 2 divisions to push 2 Federal Corps off ridges that had required 4 CSA divisions to run up on the ridges.
i doubt there were 10,000 Federal infantry formed on the ridges. My concern was the artillery that the Confederates could not answer.It is worth considering whether the Federal corps in question were able to fight their full potential - a lot of 11th Corps for example was probably not up to much further fighting on Day One, in particular, because those men had been in two engagements so far and broken in a rout at both of them.
Counting by brigade to see how many brigades had merely withdrawn rather than broken would be an interesting project.