Kentucky Derby Cavalier.
First Sergeant
- Joined
- Oct 24, 2019
Thoughts?
Hmmmmm that's interesting. I always thought McClellan blew it, but I guess there is debate around that also?How? all his units with the exception of less than a division of infantry was committed and used in the attacks or to cover units was was completely disordered. He had no organized formation to be more aggressive with.
His army was really not that much stronger than Lee's.
Yes it was larger, but the units came from 3 different armies, a large portion of his men was completely green and some even untrained. Way fewer of his commanders was experienced at the level they held command.
(take a look here:should give you the part of experience.
And when I say larger, Iam not talking the 2-1 or even 3-1 you sometimes see claimed.
(jump to about 36:30 in the video for the part about the army strength)
McClellan had about 87.000 men... some days before the battle. According to himself. But he really had no idea how many men he actually had.
And that number include everyone with the army, including everyone doing none combat jobs, all officers, artillerymen and cavalry.
And that count is taken a few days before the battle so the actual number on the day would be smaller, since the federals was strangling just as Lee's men where.
Lee claim that he had 40.000 men at the battle.
That is not wrong, but in this number he is only counting men in the ranks with a musket.
It do not include officers, artillery or the men driving wagons and doing other none combat jobs. (Some being soldiers... others being slaves or free colored men)
The Lecture give a 7-4 advantage for McClellan.
I thought the same... until a few years ago.Hmmmmm that's interesting. I always thought McClellan blew it, but I guess there is debate around that also?
Well when you put it like that.The biggest missed opportunity was when Southern Leaders did not accept the results of the 1860 election, and plan for the eventual negotiated compensated gradual emancipation that they could have won (and gotten rich from, and gotten nobody killed).
A great many southerners did initially accept the '60 election results, and, found themselves fighting in a war just the same. It took more than the intractability of some to get a really good war going. It took a lot of pig headedness from a lot of people from a lot of places to get it done.The biggest missed opportunity was when Southern Leaders did not accept the results of the 1860 election, and plan for the eventual negotiated compensated gradual emancipation that they could have won (and gotten rich from, and gotten nobody killed).
As Thomas has noted, McClellan committed 75% of his infantry brigades to an actual assault all on the same day. This is a greater fraction of his army than most commanders ever did!Antietam - McClellan could have taken the Army of Northern Virginia off the Civil War map with a little more aggression rather than caution
Really? McClellan got the lost orders on the afternoon of the 13th, and was hitting D.H.Hill's troops about eighteen hours later. When you consider that South Mountain is thirteen miles from Frederick (which is more than ACW armies usually marched in a day) that's pretty quick reaction, especially since twelve of the eighteen hours are after dark and there's only one road from Frederick to Boonsboro.McClellan once he had the lost orders.
That's probably the best you can do to reshape Antietam as-fought. 67th has presented before the idea that Burnside basically screwed up by not properly conducting a combined arms effort to gain the bridge (i.e. putting artillery on the heights to help force enemy artillery off from where it was covering the bridge).After looking at some evidence my fellow members have brought to light, I must admit that McClellan did not have the overall manpower advantage that I believed he had before the battle. I do still wonder though what may have happened on the southern end of the battlefield if Burnside had been able to ford Antietam creek much earlier in the day instead of struggling and taking so much time to cross the bridge now named after him. On that end of the battlefield he had an advantage of at least two to one before A.P. Hill was able to arrive with the Light Division and after the fighting elsewhere, Confederate forces were exhausted and in no shape to reinforce their position there.
Burnside seemed to be confused about his objective. Securing a creek crossing needed to be his object.That's probably the best you can do to reshape Antietam as-fought. 67th has presented before the idea that Burnside basically screwed up by not properly conducting a combined arms effort to gain the bridge (i.e. putting artillery on the heights to help force enemy artillery off from where it was covering the bridge).
This might have led to Lee holding out, as he did have a reserve brigade he never committed, but he'd certainly have been in a tricky spot. I suppose you could have him compacting his lines to try and absorb McClellan's pressure and then hoping for AP Hill's arrival to break the Union left and open a way to get to Boteler's Ford?
The next best way to fight Antietam better is to wait and throw in all the main Union assaults on the 18th rather than the 17th, but that requires hindsight.
Bit surprising to be honest, given how many times he was given such an order - at one point he complained that he'd got the same order so many times!Burnside seemed to be confused about his objective. Securing a creek crossing needed to be his object.
I'm not so sure - more than one brigade got lost or spent ages trying to find a suitable ford. Once guns were set up to command the bridge it didn't take long to push the defenders off (ca. 30 minutes) - nothing would have stopped Burnsie getting over before 9AM if he'd been ready to go (assuming the "go" order was 8am).The creek was too deep to ford efficiently, but it could be easily bridged, possibly with wagons. There was ample manpower to attempt crossings at multiple points, including the stone bridge.
Ethan Rafuse discusses this in "McClellans War." He suggests that if McClellan had concentrated on the confederate right rather than the left, it would have been riskier but it may have cut off Lee's escape route.After looking at some evidence my fellow members have brought to light, I must admit that McClellan did not have the overall manpower advantage that I believed he had before the battle. I do still wonder though what may have happened on the southern end of the battlefield if Burnside had been able to ford Antietam creek much earlier in the day instead of struggling and taking so much time to cross the bridge now named after him. On that end of the battlefield he had an advantage of at least two to one before A.P. Hill was able to arrive with the Light Division and after the fighting elsewhere, Confederate forces were exhausted and in no shape to reinforce their position there.
While it is true A.P. Hill's division would still have arrived on the Union flank on the southern end of the battlefield form Harper's Ferry after a long march, would they have been in time to prevent possible disaster for the Confederates who were fighting there?
Professional soldiers should not have allowed a creek to stop them from crossing. If volunteers could not find fords, then they should have had orders to use the wagons and timbers they had to effect a crossing, but they didn't seem to have the orders or wagons...Burnside may have been in a snit that day.I'm not so sure - more than one brigade got lost or spent ages trying to find a suitable ford. Once guns were set up to command the bridge it didn't take long to push the defenders off (ca. 30 minutes) - nothing would have stopped Burnsie getting over before 9AM if he'd been ready to go (assuming the "go" order was 8am).
Well, there's a reason why creeks are a military obstacle; it's much easier to cross a fence, after all, but a defended fence or stone wall can be a fearsome obstacle.Professional soldiers should not have allowed a creek to stop them from crossing. If volunteers could not find fords, then they should have had orders to use the wagons and timbers they had to effect a crossing, but they didn't seem to have the orders or wagons...Burnside may have been in a snit that day.
If you can get the troops over the river then perhaps, but the problem was getting the troops over the river in the first place. There were always going to be some Union troops on the Confederate left to block Lee from being able to get away to the north; in both cases there's a defile preventing troops from crossing the Antietam, but to the north the troops crossing are doing so via a road towards a bridge that's not under enemy control.Ethan Rafuse discusses this in "McClellans War." He suggests that if McClellan had concentrated on the confederate right rather than the left, it would have been riskier but it may have cut off Lee's escape route.
This was basically because of the pursuit from South Mountain, because corps arrived when they arrived. I agree Burnside was probably annoyed by it and saw it as a demotion that he was now only commanding one corps instead of two, but it's a little hard to see how McClellan could have kept Burnside's wing together given the details of the arrival at the field.If I correctly recall the Burnside Corp have been cut in half by orders of McClellan. The other half was on the opposite end of the entire Federal Battle line. This could easily have upset Burnside as he suppose he had a once close relations to McClellan. He took it as an insult maybe? In response Burnside starts slowing things down as somewhat of a protest. Am wondering if he was also demanding his other half back during the assault or some of it?
i wonder what would have happen if the Confederates were to go after Baltimore and surround Washington DC. i know that they were all around it
I think my point was missed. The troops were not given orders to bridge the creek. If two brigades assault the stone bridge while two other brigades throw timbers over the creek at two different points, the Confederates could not defend.. One or two crossings might be stopped, but not all three.Well, there's a reason why creeks are a military obstacle; it's much easier to cross a fence, after all, but a defended fence or stone wall can be a fearsome obstacle.
It's much harder to bridge under fire and often requires professional engineers. And it may be worth considering that not all that many of the soldiers in the ACW were "professional" as such but were volunteers with training that may not have entirely prepared them for the situation.