The fantasy that Jackson could not move does not need to be addressed,
In our
last thread on this matter, you withdrew when faced with the evidence of continual messages from Lee to Jackson to move, and Jackson not moving.
You might regard this as "fantasy", but it clear that this is what actually happened.
OTL Lee responded on the 18th by sending Fitz Lee's Cavalry brigade to recce Fredericksburg, supported by McLaws' division to a sent to Chancellorsville, and ordered Ransom's division to march from Madison Ct Hse to Hanover Junction via Orange Ct Hse. The orders for the other divisions aren't in the OR, but diaries etc. show that the other divisions marched SSW from Culpeper to Orange Ct Hse with orders to proceed to Hanover Junction. At 1630 that afternoon orders are sent to McLaws to continue on to Fredericksburg, and to Ransom to divert to Guinea Station (14 miles S of Fredericksburg). Warning orders are apparently issued to the other three division commanders, as the orders of the next day refer to them; Anderson, Hood and then Pickett would march to Fredericksburg. Anderson should start immediately, then Hood. Pickett was instructed to march on the 20th.
As to Jackson, despite repeated
pleas, he didn't start marching until 21st November, and the divisions arrived near Fredericksburg between the 1st and 3rd December. On the 5th Burnside seems to have authorised the crossing Sumner had proposed on the 17th November, but DH Hill's division now commanded the ford.
but the idea that McClellan would easily march to Richmond is heavily suspect. Lee intended to fight at the North Anna if Burnside beat him across the Rappahannock,
Lee intended to withdraw behind the North Anna, but fight? That's a question. He was withdrawing there to cover Richmond. The orders to Jackson were to entrain for Richmond via Lynchburg.
and even being supremely generous to McClellan and suggesting he will move rapidly across the Rapidan moving both south and north of Fredericksburg after hypothetically marching on Culpeper and then switching routes to Fredericksburg, the idea that he beats Lee to the North Anna is ludicrous.
Who is suggesting that? I'm noting that Lee can't block McClellan on the North Anna, as one days march away is White House Landing, and it is impossible for Lee to stop McClellan there. That's the strategic geography of the situation. Once McClellan reaches WHL the same geography that made it impossible for Joe Johnston to oppose McClellan to further than the Richmond entrenchments kicks in.
How? In this supposed situation Lee would be moving from Gordonsville either having united with Jackson or the two commands moving separately.
The head of Jackson's command isn't at Gordonsville until 27th November.
Jackson's HQ movements were:
21st: troops started leaving Winchester
22nd: Jackson and his HQ marched and went to Old Stone House
23rd: Mount Jackson
24th: Hawksbill
25th: through Fisher's Gap to Madison Court House
26th: having gotten ahead of the troops, near Madison Court House
27th: Gordonsville, redirected to Fredericksburg
28th: Orange Ct Hse
29th: Rode ahead of troops to Lee's HQ on the Mine Run Rd
30th: recce'd the area his divisions were assigned to
1st: Met the lead division at Massaponax Church
That is a shorter march than McClellan by far. Uniting with Jackson Lee will have roughly 75,000 men, potentially more if he calls men from Richmond. He will have time to fortify his position, and McClellan can, at best, attack in early December. Lee can rapidly place himself along McClellan's line of march along the roads from Fredericksburg and the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac RR which McClellan
needs to use if he is going overland to Richmond.
Even assuming he moves all his troops and leaves no one behind to watch for Jackson, as he did not know where Jackson was,
You asserted this previously, and you were
wrong. McClellan knew exactly where Jackson was, and anyone that can read a map can see that Jackson poses no threat.
at best he is bringing 115,000 men to battle. About as many as Grant had at North Anna in '64, and Grant was stalemated.
Refresh my memory. Did Grant get over the North Anna? Ah yes, he simply went around and crossed lower down the river.
You also misread the 1864 North Anna action. Lee did not block the North Anna crossings because it is basically impossible with the ca. 50,000 men (41,420 infantry effectives) he had, and the geography didn't allow it. Generally, along North Anna the left bank is higher than the right, meaning the crossings can't be disputed (except at Ox Ford, which is why Lee anchored his V there). With ca. 31,000 effective infantry (30,802) in 1862 it is impossible, you can only form one of the two sides of the 1864 V properly.
Lee will have had more time to prepare, won't be indisposed due to illness, and if he raids Richmond can maybe put 80-85,000 in the field, 30,000 more than at North Anna from 64. It's nowhere near a lopsided fight.
Lee has ca. 31,000 effective infantry. The troops at Richmond, exclusive of the fixed garrisons, amount to a couple of brigades.
McClellan also did not expect Lee to fight before he reached Richmond, anything beyond a skirmish would surprise him and so he would be arriving/probing Lee's line piecemeal for at least 2 days before committing to an assault. McClellan's movements were hardly breathtaking at Antietam, and so running right into a situation where Lee can once again use his better interior lines to shuffle a reserve around to blunt McClellan's attacks hardly sets things up for a winning situation.
Again, you think the only option is "hey, diddle diddle, straight up the middle" against Ox Ford. McClellan could easily turn the North Anna position, either locally or a wide turning movement. McClellan could cross one wing at Jericho Ford, and another at Chesterfield Bridge and both wings would be twice Lee's strength.
Let us sum up, if McClellan reaches the North Anna with 118,128 effective infantry (AoP 10th December return, deducting Potomac defences and 12th Corps, but including 3rd Corps), he is faced with 30,802 effective infantry. i.e. a genuine ca. 4:1 numerical advantage.
Grant on approaching the North Anna is of unknown strength, but Grimsley's calculation of 67,000 effectives may well be accurate, and a straight reading of the monthly return would place strength around 80,000 (and casualties and reinforcements would need to be accounted for). Grant is between 6:5 and 8:5 in effective strength, and far lower ratio than McClellan would have achieved.
Drawing conclusions from Grant, and extrapolating to McClellan ignores the much more favourable situation for McClellan you've hypothesised. Longstreet can literally be destroyed if he stands at the North Anna.
If McClellan is repulsed, he will retreat to winter quarters. He's sacked, cue General Hooker.
A lot of supposition. If McClellan has survived it is because the Republicans did well in the mid-terms, and the Radicals don't hold the whip hand over Lincoln.