Worst Case Scenario?

Saphroneth

Lt. Colonel
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
Where could you have either a single battle or a set of close-together events going plausibly differently, to put one side or the other in a really difficult situation?


My offhand choices are, assuming no foreign intervention involved:

Union Worst Case Scenario

In June, approx. 15,000 troops PFD are moved from Mississippi via rail (and steamboat at Mobile) to Richmond. This additional force is placed to block the bridge on the southern side of White Oak Swamp during the Seven Days, thus preventing the Army of the Potomac from escaping and leading to the surrender of the main Union army in the west.

Lee now has a very large army available. Even if he has to send the 15,000 Western troops back to the West, if he gets his historical reinforcements then he'll be able to move north in mid-July with not far off 90,000 troops PFD (leaving Richmond somewhat covered) and no Union reinforcements are anything like ready to fight; for the Union to fight Lee's army on even numerical terms means calling in practically everything...

Confederate Worst Case Scenario

Rosecrans marches a corps below the Elk River during the Tullahoma movement (instead of merely the Duck), allowing him to cut off and capture Bragg's main army.

In the space of a bit less than a week, all three primary Confederate forces have taken a serious blow or actually been destroyed. Lee's force is bloodied by Gettysburg, and both Bragg and Pemberton have suffered capture; the CSA has Johnston's force and the Eastern Tennessee force as field armies, but apart from that Grant and Rosecrans can pretty much do whatever they want.
 
If the Union lost at Shiloh, Grant and possibly Sherman may have been lost within the Army or transfered to the West Coast? Imagine John Alexander McClernand, Lew Wallace or Henry Halleck commanding the Vicksburg Campaigan or the Overland Campaigan?
Regards
David
 
Let’s really go wild: after a big July 1862 pow-wow, Halleck, McClellan, and Pope convince Lincoln that a coordinated pincer move by the Armies of the Potomac and Virginia has a chance. Both armies are reinforced where they are, and...
That'd be pretty bad for the CSA, right enough! Though I think you'd have to convince Halleck first.

If the Union lost at Shiloh, Grant and possibly Sherman may have been lost within the Army or transfered to the West Coast? Imagine John Alexander McClernand, Lew Wallace or Henry Halleck commanding the Vicksburg Campaigan or the Overland Campaigan?
Regards
David
I'm not so sure about this one. It's a bit reductive to think that Grant was necessary for the Vicksburg or Overland campaign to succeed; in both cases Grant had a pretty hefty numerical advantage, and Halleck could certainly advance a large army towards an outnumbered enemy (albeit rather slowly).
It's quite easy to argue it would make things worse for the Union, but is it really the Union worst case?
 
Union.
1st Bull run.
Part of the csa army manage to stay in reserve and is ready and rested and able to march on Washington... and take the city in the chaos of the federal rout. And they capture Lincoln and part of congress.

After 2nd Bull Run.
McClellan not being anywhere near Washington and unable to rally the federal troops.
The panic spread to the troops in the Washington garrison and men start to flee out of the town.

Lee march directly to Washington and attack the town and take it...
 
Actually, speaking of 2nd Bull Run, it wouldn't be a Union worst case but it's not far off - Porter follows Pope's orders or Pope's orders on the 29th are non-discretionary. This would allow Longstreet to attack on the 29th instead of the 30th, which means that Pope's routed troops have to get clear to Annadale to reach succor (where the vanguard of the relief force was on the 29th) instead of merely having to get to the Cub Run (where on the 30th Franklin's line was).

With Stuart around and the Union line pretty much completely collapsed, there's one of the rare opportunities in the war for a driving, shattering pursuit.
 
Let’s really go wild
As long as we're really pushing the boundaries...Bragg, Kirby Smith and Van Dorn (including Sterling Price's Trans-Mississippi troops of course) join forces in the Fall of 1862 and drive to the Ohio River, crushing Buell's Army in Kentucky in the process...Situation for the Midwestern folk wouldn't be looking very good...
 
As long as we're really pushing the boundaries...Bragg, Kirby Smith and Van Dorn (including Sterling Price's Trans-Mississippi troops of course) join forces in the Fall of 1862 and drive to the Ohio River, crushing Buell's Army in Kentucky in the process...Situation for the Midwestern folk wouldn't be looking very good...

Considering the seats the Republican party lost in the 1862 elections historically...
 
As long as we're really pushing the boundaries...Bragg, Kirby Smith and Van Dorn (including Sterling Price's Trans-Mississippi troops of course) join forces in the Fall of 1862 and drive to the Ohio River, crushing Buell's Army in Kentucky in the process...Situation for the Midwestern folk wouldn't be looking very good...
How's the force balance for that one? Buell's army was pretty big - the July 10 returns give the Dept. of the Ohio 65K AP, which is about the size of Bragg's Dept. no.2.

It looks doable, but it might mean the Confederacy crushes one army but has to give up Mississippi to get the force?
 
It looks doable, but it might mean the Confederacy crushes one army but has to give up Mississippi to get the force?
Possibly...but wasn't it Frederick the Great that said, "He who defends everything defends nothing." That would be a gamble on the Confederates part. If Buell's army is effectively destroyed, would Grant then counter punch by going directly after the few defenders left in Vicksburg and reopen the Mississippi, or would Lincoln call him back to protect Ohio from Bragg's invasion? Good question...
 
If Buell's army is effectively destroyed, would Grant then counter punch by going directly after the few defenders left in Vicksburg and reopen the Mississippi, or would Lincoln call him back to protect Ohio from Bragg's invasion?
Remember that in June 1862 (i.e. before the subsequent surge in recruitment as Lincoln called for 300,000 more) the size of Halleck's Department of the Mississippi was something like 215,000 AP. Buell's less than a third of that, so there's another 150K or more AP knocking about - specifically there's the armies of Sherman and Rosecrans, plus the force Pope had commanded beforehand.

With the extra troops swelling the departments over the next few months:
Dec 31, 1862, AP strengths:

Cumberland 75K
Missouri 59K
Ohio 70K
Tennessee 53K

That's an increase over the June 30 strength of something like 40K AP, even after all the casualties from Perryville, Iuka, Stones River etc. This means that if the CSA takes out Buell's entire army they're not much up on the relative strengths as of June 30 1862 - possibly behind.


It's certainly a major problem for the Union, but I'm not sure it's their worst case scenario. And don't forget when Vicksburg was first fortified - there weren't any defences there in May 1862 and Union gunboats steamed north clear to Fort Pillow. Vicksburg might not be a significant enough bastion to prevent the Union "scooping it up" if it's stripped to bulk up the Heartland Offensive.
 
I have a difficult time in seeing Halleck waging the Vicksburg Camaign effectively but even more so I wonder who would have successfully attacked Lee time after time till his army was decimated. I am sure that there would have been someone who could have defeated Lee but no name comes to mind at this time. There was a continually Union advantage in numbers as several generals failed to crush the AOP, however Grant had the gumption to hang on like a bulldog to Lee till he had to yield. Of course all of this is my personal opinion.
Regards
David
 
I have a difficult time in seeing Halleck waging the Vicksburg Camaign effectively but even more so I wonder who would have successfully attacked Lee time after time till his army was decimated. I am sure that there would have been someone who could have defeated Lee but no name comes to mind at this time. There was a continually Union advantage in numbers as several generals failed to crush the AOP, however Grant had the gumption to hang on like a bulldog to Lee till he had to yield. Of course all of this is my personal opinion.
As for the question about who might attack Lee over and over again and the continual Union advantage in numbers, I fear I should point out that Grant's numerical advantage was simply much larger than what anyone else had. 67th has analyzed the numbers of Union PFD in a consistent metric, and the force with which Grant crossed the Rappahanock was more than twice the size of the force which Lee had to face him with; subsequently Grant's reinforcements were such that he ultimately disposed of more than 200,000 PFD before reaching the James river (of which not more than 6,000 were removed from his army by reason of expiring enlistments over that time), while Lee had not more than 97,000 PFD over the same period of time.

During this period Grant's army suffered more than 55,000 combat casualties, and Lee also suffered considerable combat casualties but was left with the ability to detach a significant force to threaten the north. At no point did Grant "hang on like a bulldog to Lee until he had to yield", because at no point did Lee yield the field to Grant; the most that one can say is that Lee was unable to prevent Grant moving by the flank, but on all occasions it was Grant who initiated the move away from the field.

Nobody else was ever provided with the forces to outnumber Lee more than 2:1 except for Hooker at Chancellorsville*, and oddly enough Hooker actually does marginally better in attrition terms.

One can certainly say that Grant forced the Rappahanock line (which had failed three times previously) and then made his way south to the James, at the cost of an enormous amount of bloodshed and with the use of so many reinforcements that Washington was placed under threat, but it's troublesome to say that few other commanders could have done the post-Rappahanock stage of the campaign. With Lee outnumbered 2:1 on average and with enough space for Grant to manoeuvre then Lee's only real hope is if Grant obliges him by making direct head-on attacks into defences that could be bypassed, and Grant duly does so on several occasions.
It's also troublesome to say that the move to the James had to be done overland, because the Union actually controlled the lower reaches of the James; Grant could theoretically have manoeuvred the main body of his army south to the James by ship at little to no cost.



*though if you count the forces Hooker had at Fredericksburg as his "reinforcements" in the same sense as Grant got "reinforcements" from Fredericksburg, then Grant had significantly more of an advantage both before and after reinforcement.
 
As for the question about who might attack Lee over and over again and the continual Union advantage in numbers, I fear I should point out that Grant's numerical advantage was simply much larger than what anyone else had. 67th has analyzed the numbers of Union PFD in a consistent metric, and the force with which Grant crossed the Rappahanock was more than twice the size of the force which Lee had to face him with; subsequently Grant's reinforcements were such that he ultimately disposed of more than 200,000 PFD before reaching the James river (of which not more than 6,000 were removed from his army by reason of expiring enlistments over that time), while Lee had not more than 97,000 PFD over the same period of time.

A very logical and factual rsponse which I certainly appreciate, however aside from the actual numbers envolved my point was it was Grant the man who made the difference. McClellan, Burnside, Hooker nor Meade showed the determination to keep attempting to flank Lee and maintaining the pressure without returning to their supply bases.

During this period Grant's army suffered more than 55,000 combat casualties, and Lee also suffered considerable combat casualties but was left with the ability to detach a significant force to threaten the north. At no point did Grant "hang on like a bulldog to Lee until he had to yield", because at no point did Lee yield the field to Grant; the most that one can say is that Lee was unable to prevent Grant moving by the flank, but on all occasions it was Grant who initiated the move away from the field.

My point was that Grant maintained the pressure and remained in the filed feeling to his left in an attempt to outflank Lee.

Nobody else was ever provided with the forces to outnumber Lee more than 2:1 except for Hooker at Chancellorsville*, and oddly enough Hooker actually does marginally better in attrition terms.

I agree with your point regarding the numbers disparity but Grant was the one who stayed on the move to the left during the Spring and Summer of 1864

One can certainly say that Grant forced the Rappahanock line (which had failed three times previously) and then made his way south to the James, at the cost of an enormous amount of bloodshed and with the use of so many reinforcements that Washington was placed under threat, but it's troublesome to say that few other commanders could have done the post-Rappahanock stage of the campaign. With Lee outnumbered 2:1 on average and with enough space for Grant to manoeuvre then Lee's only real hope is if Grant obliges him by making direct head-on attacks into defences that could be bypassed, and Grant duly does so on several occasions.
It's also troublesome to say that the move to the James had to be done overland, because the Union actually controlled the lower reaches of the James; Grant could theoretically have manoeuvred the main body of his army south to the James by ship at little to no cost.

Once again it was the man Grant who made the difference during this campaign

As always i enjoy your posts and learn so much and hope to learn more from you. I appreciate your views but occassionly disagree, usually to my cost.
Regards
David



*though if you count the forces Hooker had at Fredericksburg as his "reinforcements" in the same sense as Grant got "reinforcements" from Fredericksburg, then Grant had significantly more of an advantage both before and after reinforcement.
 
Your statements
The problem though is that nobody else got the opportunity to see if they would stay in the field to maintain the pressure.
McClellan was ordered off the Peninsula over his protests (and when fighting on the Peninsula had been given only about as many troops as Lee had, rather than twice as many).
Pope I would agree failed, but his failure was because of his disdain for considering lines of retreat and supply.
Then McClellan was sacked as he was approaching the Rappahanock.
Burnside's attempt to cross the Rappahanock was blocked by Lee.
Ditto for Hooker.
Ditto for Meade.

This is the difference - Grant is the only one who was simultaneously in possession of an army twice the size of Lee's, and who had the army over the Rappahanock.

Grant's achievement in getting his army over the Rappahanock is an achievement, but there's nothing that suggests that any of the other generals would avoid making the flanking movements because of concern over their supply lines had they made it over the river. It's not a difference in Grant being more willing to move on despite supply lines, because Grant's supply line was never under threat once he made contact with Fredericksburg and Port Royal - and because the idea of "get around the flank of a strong position" is US pre-war doctrine on the operational level, as per Scott's campaign against Mexico City.

(We can actually look at what happens when Grant feels his supply line is under threat, because it happened in the Vicksburg operations - he pulled back to secure his supply lines and try again later, just like any competent commander would do. At Vicksburg Grant was quite willing to spend months not keeping the pressure on and wait until the conditions were good, and the same is true of McClellan if you replace "months" with "a month".)


In other words, I'd agree with the statement that Grant getting over the Rappahanock was one of the key achievements that made the Overland campaign possible, but I'd also argue that getting over the Rappahanock isn't actually a necessary element in taking Richmond - you can also come at it from the south - and that if Grant had been replaced by any of the other commanders once over the Rappahanock then that other commander would also have been able (and willing) to approach Richmond moving by the flank. (They might however have also tried something like dividing their army to manoeuvre on an operational level.)
This is why I don't think "no Grant" is the Union worst case scenario, not by itself.



Now, there is one period in particular that's interesting in terms of a Confederate worst-case regarding crossing the Rappahanock, and it's the period of McClellan's firing. As of when McClellan was fired, Lee's army (which was no larger than the one he would fight Fredericksburg with) was split into two wings, one of them each side of the Blue Ridge mountains.
Jackson's wing was dispersed in the northern part of the Valley, and it's not entirely clear whether he was mobile at this time because he refused to move for weeks despite Lee repeatedly ordering him to do so; Longstreet's wing was largely at Culpeper. If Jackson was mobile he'd have to move down to the Swift Run Gap before joining with Lee, which is a long way and imposes a significant delay.

This is perhaps the only time in the war when there was a large Union force looking to cross the Rappahanock (the Federal force concentrating at Warrenton was actually somewhat larger than the force Burnside used at Fredericksburg, because it included elements of 3rd Corps) and the Confederate force able to stop it was outnumbered so drastically that Lee didn't even want to give it a fight.

The "worst case scenario" potential here is based on how it would take Lee a long time to haul the two halves of his army together; if Lee can't unite his forces anywhere north of the North Anna (and I'll remind you that that's what he thought he'd have to do before the delays at Fredericksburg) then he can't meaningfully resist the Federal army north of the North Anna. If Lee tries to defend Gordonsville with Longstreet's wing and gets pushed south out of the city, for example, then there's almost no Confederate troops between the Army of the Potomac and Richmond; if Lee doesn't defend Gordonsville and McClellan takes it, he's cut Jackson off from Longstreet; if Lee defends Gordonsville and McClellan doesn't go after it, then there aren't really any troops left that Lee can use to block McClellan north of Richmond.

(I'm interested in hearing what Lee should have done in that scenario, by the way... if Jackson can't move until the date he historically moved, I'm pretty sure Lee is totally screwed.)
 
@Saphroneth as always I reading your posts as they are informative and courteous. I fear that I am failing in expressing my views, which in and of itself is not unusal. My point is simply that Grant himself is what made the campaign successful.
In the battle between HMS Serapis and the USS Bonhomme Richard, the winning factor was the commander, John Paul Jones not the ship. It was the man, just as with Grant, that brought victory.
Regards
David
 
My point is simply that Grant himself is what made the campaign successful.
Yes, I understand the point you're making; however, I don't happen to agree with it.

In the battle between HMS Serapis and the USS Bonhomme Richard, the winning factor was the commander, John Paul Jones not the ship. It was the man, just as with Grant, that brought victory.
And perhaps this analogy illustrates it. You see, the Serapis (50 guns) was more heavily armed than the Bonhomme Richard (42 guns), but the clash between the two was ultimately decided by the intervention of an entirely different third ship (the Alliance, 40 guns).


Grant's force was twice the size of Lee's, rather than about the same or slightly smaller in size. In ignoring this one might argue you're doing much the same as with the case of the Serapis and the Bonhomme Richard, because you're ignoring the contribution of the Alliance (i.e. the reinforcements). With no information about the commanders of the ships, we should expect that in a duel between two fundamentally evenly matched vessels of similar size then the victor's laurels should go to the one who gets reinforced by a second vessel.

The analogy is, of course, imperfect. But it's interesting.



Now, one could argue that Grant's one of the relative handful of Union commanders able to successfully manoeuvre a force of such great size. But he's not completely alone in that, and one could argue that there were several Union commanders who might have succeeded if given Grant's advantages or that Grant might have failed if not given his advantages - certainly if Grant had merely had a force about the size of Hooker at Chancellorsville then he might have been kept above the Wilderness Run, and so it's more or less a replay of Chancellorsville in those circumstances.

In fact, I'd say that if you gave just about any Union commander a total force of more than 200,000 men PFD and Lee a force of less than 97,000 men PFD then that Union commander could have given Lee a bad time - even if all they did was just post a hundred thousand men along the Rappahanock and move the other hundred thousand men straight to the James by sea.


Speaking of which, that might be the true Confederate worst case - Lincoln commits to the idea that the true line of operations of the Army of the Potomac is the tidewater rivers in Virginia.
 
Virginia's boiler explodes while she's trying to unground herself on March 9, 1862. Monitor is undisputed winner.

Alternately, one of Monitor's XI-inch shot finds the weakly-armored band at Virginia's waterline; with little reserve bouyancy, Viriginia quickly settles to the bottom of Hampton Roads. Same result.

Or... Monitor actually sinks in the gale on March 7-8, 1862. Virginia is undisputed queen of Hampton Roads.
 
Hmm, interesting.
I actually wonder if Virginia having her ram still in place (or, heck, not having expended most of her solid shot) might have led to a victory in that battle.

But I think the worst-case for the Confederates might well be the loss of the Virginia - or at least the worst case in early 1862. Without the threat of the Virginia, the combined ops against the Warwick Line can go ahead as originally devised and the Union can turn the line on either flank.
This leads to a combined land-naval movement up the James in April 1862, no Drury's Bluff to halt it, and a Union army unloading as close to Richmond as they desire...
 
Hmm, interesting.
I actually wonder if Virginia having her ram still in place (or, heck, not having expended most of her solid shot) might have led to a victory in that battle.

Probably not in the case of the ram. Monitor was able to avoid being rammed fairly handily, and she didn't know that the ram was in fact still embedded in Cumberland.

Solid shot might be a different story, at least with the Brooke rifles. I really doubt solid shot from the Dahlgren IX-inchers would have done much more damage than historically, but a solid bolt from a Brooke rifle might have been another story.
 
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