67th Tigers
Captain
- Joined
- Nov 10, 2006
I'd like to thank DanSBHawk for giving me the motivation to research this, and Saphroneth for finding some of the data used here. This is now up.
The Strength of the Federal Army in the Overland Campaign
Introduction
Alfred C. Young III has done a wonderful job collating the Confederate Service Records (CSRs) and estimating the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia during the Overland Campaign in his book. His results are broadly similar to Newton's book, but by a different methodology. The methodology Young employed was similar to two studies carried out under the supervision of Joseph Harsh that found that the ANV in 1862 was much higher than generally credited (quoted in his Confederate Tide Rising). Generally, Young's work on Confederate strength should be applauded.
However, in his general conclusions is this statement are extremely questionable:
1. The Army of the Potomac
The problem with Army of the Potomac returns in 1863-5 is that they were not made as per the regulation. However, at the War Department they were recorded as per the regulations. The main difference is that the AoP didn't count those on "extra duty", i.e. the logistics train, medical corps etc. in the "present for duty" column, as regulations required. This can be seen in the 30th April return in the OR as a large difference between those "for duty" (102,869) and present (127,471). The category "present for duty, equipped" is simply the PFD excluding the staff, engineers, and (as best we can tell) dismounted cavalrymen.
However, in the final report of the war, the Secretary of War reported at that time the commencement of the Overland Campaign the AoP had 120,384 PFD, exclusive of 9th Corps. Humphreys, the AoP Chief-of-Staff, in his 1883 account disputed this figure and in an appendix the then adjutant-general (Drum) wrote explaining that this was the regulation strength according to the April monthly report, which was made out on 18th July 1864. Drum then wrote that the consolidated morning report for 30th April was on file, which was a document compiled at the time, not months later, and it said:
2. Ninth Army Corps
The OR strength is as per regulation, but the 9th Corps received some reinforcement between 30th April and 5th May. For example, the 58th Massachusetts. It appears the final report included these, as it listed 20,780 PFD at the start of the campaign.
3. Reinforcements Forwarded
The 7th June statement is incomplete, as it does not cover the entire period in question. On 10th June all further reinforcements were ordered to the Bermuda Hundred, and a statement enumerates that 42,469 troops had been sent to Grant in the field or via Fredericksburg (excluding troops sent to Washington or the Bermuda Hundred). This excludes a number of batteries forwarded etc., and thus should be regarded as a low estimate.
4. Smith
There are no official sources for the strength of the forces Smith brought to Grant. Smith's forces consisted of the HQ of 18th Corps, 4 from the Army of the James' 6 divisions (2 each from 10th and 18th), Smith's HQ cavalry squadron and 4 batteries of 4 guns. Mostly his communication to Halleck is quoted:
The monthly return is missing the two 10th Corps divisions transferred to Smith. It lists Smith's two 18th Corps divisions that moved to Grant as 8,357 PFD (apparently excluding extra duty). Thus with two other (weaker) divisions, and a small cavalry squadron, 16,000 is a conservative figure, but reasonable.
5. Losses by Discharge
It must be questioned why discharges should not be counted. The better accounting method is to count them, but include them in non-battle casualties.
In the winter of 63-4 it was reported that the AoP stood to loose upto just over 20,000 troops by discharge prior to 31st August 1864. This assumed no casualties and no reenlistments (kudos to Saphroneth for finding it)
The 2nd Corps reported all discharges in May and June, as per a general order. They total 2,137 over this period. However, this period is longer than the period in question. Of the regiments listed, the 4th Maine, 42nd NY, 70th NY, 72nd NY, 74th NY, 26th Pennsylvania, 8th Ohio, 1st Delaware and Bty A, 1st RI mustered out after crossing the James. These total 857, leaving the total loss by discharge for 2nd Corps north of the James at 1,280.
The 6th Corps also reported their discharges, and helpfully placed dates on the table. They lost 998 north of the James.
No table for the 5th Corps has been located. The regiments lost by discharge during this period were (those in brackets continued to serve as units after discharging those who didn't re-enlist):
It is immediately clear that the 20,000 figure is completely fallacious. The 2nd, 6th and 9th Corps lost 2,295 by expiration of enlistment north of the James. To reach 20,000 then the 5th Corps must have discharged 17,705 - a ridiculous figure.
The 5th Corps had the weak Pennsylvania Reserve Division reorganise into a strong brigade, with (according to the history) ca. 1,200 mustering out.
The 9th Massachusetts history has the muster list lists 383 on the list discharged on 21st June, 1864. The history of the 83rd NY has 92 leaving the field. The roster of the 1st Maryland has 62 discharged on 23rd May, 1864. The roster of the 14th NYSM lists 132 discharged on 6th June, 1864. The 2nd Wisconsin had 215 mustered out. The 11th Pennsylvania converted to a veteran regiment in January 1864, and hence lost little to none.
This gives a maximum of 2,084 mustering out. Unfortunately for most regiments only roster data (i.e. aggregate present and absent) is available, and the actual loss to the army would be less. However, if you accept it then the grand total that mustered out north of the James is 4,379. This figure is less than a quarter of what Young claimed.
6. Campaign Strength and Discussion
The total of the starting strength of the AoP, 9th Corps, reinforcements and Smith's command is 201,213.
At most only 4,379 were discharged in this period, making it a much less minor manpower drain than claimed. Almost all of these discharges were south of the North Anna. It is not appropriate to remove them from the strength, except as another category of casualties. Otherwise we'd have to consider that Breckinridges' and Early's commands were detached to the Shenandoah, and Hoke's to the James before Grant crossed the James, and no-one would except the argument that they should be counted.
Young's argument is clearly flawed. He has gone to great lengths to boost the rebel numbers, finding 66,140 with Lee on the 5th May, and adding 25,495 in units that joined Lee and an estimate of 4,565 in returning convalescents etc. to total 96,200. However, he then does not act with the same zeal in locating Federal units, and to be fair that was not what his study was about. In fact, he is sloppy and undercounts the Federal strength be several means. We can state with a reasonable degree of certainty that Young has managed to exclude nearly 40,000 men from the Federal count. The true force ratios are roughly 201,213 : 96,200 north of the James, or 2.1 : 1.
Of course, none of Lee's reinforcements arrived until after Spotsylvania, whereas many of Grant's did. Grant received 33,255 prior to withdrawing from Spotsylvania, giving a campaign strength to that point of 175,999 vs Lee's 66,140, or a ratio of 2.7 : 1 for the Wilderness-Spotsylvania fighting. Arguments that Grant thus had an overwhelming numerical superiority, especially in the first two weeks of the fighting, are thus on very shaky ground.
7. Conclusions
Whilst we should acknowledge the brilliant work of Young on the rebel strength, we must ignore his claims on the Federal strength and the strength ratios as ill-founded. He engaged in only cursory research and hence massively overconcluded. His arguments regarding the discharge of troops are particularly ill-researched, with him more than quadrupling the number discharged, and failing to note that such an adjustment is utterly inappropriate.
The campaign strength of the Federal forces upto the end of Spotsylvania was 175,999, and upto crossing the James was 201,213. This is far higher than Young reckoned. Thus his argument trying to minimise the crushing numerical superiority of the Federal forces cannot stand. Grant did have nearly a 3:1 manpower advantage, as the numerologists of the Lost Cause later articulated, although they also tried to minimise rebel numbers.
The Strength of the Federal Army in the Overland Campaign
Introduction
Alfred C. Young III has done a wonderful job collating the Confederate Service Records (CSRs) and estimating the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia during the Overland Campaign in his book. His results are broadly similar to Newton's book, but by a different methodology. The methodology Young employed was similar to two studies carried out under the supervision of Joseph Harsh that found that the ANV in 1862 was much higher than generally credited (quoted in his Confederate Tide Rising). Generally, Young's work on Confederate strength should be applauded.
However, in his general conclusions is this statement are extremely questionable:
A comparison of Lee’s and Grant’s strengths and losses is instructive. As documented in the Official Records, the Army of the Potomac started the campaign with an effective strength of about 118,000 men, from which, if we are to compare the like with like, should be deducted the 3,400 men of the provost guard and engineers. Based upon other figures provided in the same source, Grant’s army received about 48,000 reinforcements during the Overland Campaign.1 These principally consisted of units drawn from the Washington defenses, others returning from furlough, and new recruits. According to the report of Maj. Gen. William F. Smith, he brought about 16,000 men in the XVIII Corps to Grant at Cold Harbor. At the same time, it should be recognized that the army lost about 20,000 men whose terms of enlistment expired. This represented a serious loss, for these were all veteran soldiers. Grant’s net increase is then about 44,000 men, or a maximum total of 162,000 men. The initial disparity in numbers between the Federal and Confederate armies decreased as the campaign progressed, especially in June.
Young's sources for these figures thus:from Young III, Alfred C.. Lee's Army during the Overland Campaign: A Numerical Study (Kindle Locations 4693-4701). LSU Press. Kindle Edition.
- ORA 36(1), 1,036. The 30th April return for the AoP.
- ORA 36(1), 1,045. The 30th April return for the 9th Corps
- ORA 36(3), 665-6. A 7th July '64 statement by Halleck of 48,265 troops forwarded to Grant.
- A unreferenced statement that Smith brought 16,000 troops to Grant (which may be slightly lowballed, but not hugely given the last return, Smith estimated he had ca. 16,000 infantry, 100 cavalry and 16 guns)
- An unreferenced statement that 20,000 troops mustered out in this period, and should not be counted (which is both inappropriate, and unreasonable).
1. The Army of the Potomac
The problem with Army of the Potomac returns in 1863-5 is that they were not made as per the regulation. However, at the War Department they were recorded as per the regulations. The main difference is that the AoP didn't count those on "extra duty", i.e. the logistics train, medical corps etc. in the "present for duty" column, as regulations required. This can be seen in the 30th April return in the OR as a large difference between those "for duty" (102,869) and present (127,471). The category "present for duty, equipped" is simply the PFD excluding the staff, engineers, and (as best we can tell) dismounted cavalrymen.
However, in the final report of the war, the Secretary of War reported at that time the commencement of the Overland Campaign the AoP had 120,384 PFD, exclusive of 9th Corps. Humphreys, the AoP Chief-of-Staff, in his 1883 account disputed this figure and in an appendix the then adjutant-general (Drum) wrote explaining that this was the regulation strength according to the April monthly report, which was made out on 18th July 1864. Drum then wrote that the consolidated morning report for 30th April was on file, which was a document compiled at the time, not months later, and it said:
- Present for Duty: 102,869
- Present and on special, extra or daily duty: 19,095
- Sick: 4,756
- In arrest or confinement: 931
- Total Present: 127,471
2. Ninth Army Corps
The OR strength is as per regulation, but the 9th Corps received some reinforcement between 30th April and 5th May. For example, the 58th Massachusetts. It appears the final report included these, as it listed 20,780 PFD at the start of the campaign.
3. Reinforcements Forwarded
The 7th June statement is incomplete, as it does not cover the entire period in question. On 10th June all further reinforcements were ordered to the Bermuda Hundred, and a statement enumerates that 42,469 troops had been sent to Grant in the field or via Fredericksburg (excluding troops sent to Washington or the Bermuda Hundred). This excludes a number of batteries forwarded etc., and thus should be regarded as a low estimate.
4. Smith
There are no official sources for the strength of the forces Smith brought to Grant. Smith's forces consisted of the HQ of 18th Corps, 4 from the Army of the James' 6 divisions (2 each from 10th and 18th), Smith's HQ cavalry squadron and 4 batteries of 4 guns. Mostly his communication to Halleck is quoted:
My command consisted very nearly of 16,000 infantry, sixteen pieces of artillery, and one squadron of cavalry of about 100 men.
The monthly return is missing the two 10th Corps divisions transferred to Smith. It lists Smith's two 18th Corps divisions that moved to Grant as 8,357 PFD (apparently excluding extra duty). Thus with two other (weaker) divisions, and a small cavalry squadron, 16,000 is a conservative figure, but reasonable.
5. Losses by Discharge
It must be questioned why discharges should not be counted. The better accounting method is to count them, but include them in non-battle casualties.
In the winter of 63-4 it was reported that the AoP stood to loose upto just over 20,000 troops by discharge prior to 31st August 1864. This assumed no casualties and no reenlistments (kudos to Saphroneth for finding it)
The 2nd Corps reported all discharges in May and June, as per a general order. They total 2,137 over this period. However, this period is longer than the period in question. Of the regiments listed, the 4th Maine, 42nd NY, 70th NY, 72nd NY, 74th NY, 26th Pennsylvania, 8th Ohio, 1st Delaware and Bty A, 1st RI mustered out after crossing the James. These total 857, leaving the total loss by discharge for 2nd Corps north of the James at 1,280.
The 6th Corps also reported their discharges, and helpfully placed dates on the table. They lost 998 north of the James.
No table for the 5th Corps has been located. The regiments lost by discharge during this period were (those in brackets continued to serve as units after discharging those who didn't re-enlist):
- 1st Division: 9th Massachusetts
- 2nd Division: (11th Pennsylvania - went Veteran in January), 83rd NY, (1st Maryland)
- 3rd Division: (Pennsylvania Reserves, reorganised as brigade)
- 4th Division: 14th NYSM, (2nd Wisconsin, veterans formed 2 coy bn)
It is immediately clear that the 20,000 figure is completely fallacious. The 2nd, 6th and 9th Corps lost 2,295 by expiration of enlistment north of the James. To reach 20,000 then the 5th Corps must have discharged 17,705 - a ridiculous figure.
The 5th Corps had the weak Pennsylvania Reserve Division reorganise into a strong brigade, with (according to the history) ca. 1,200 mustering out.
The 9th Massachusetts history has the muster list lists 383 on the list discharged on 21st June, 1864. The history of the 83rd NY has 92 leaving the field. The roster of the 1st Maryland has 62 discharged on 23rd May, 1864. The roster of the 14th NYSM lists 132 discharged on 6th June, 1864. The 2nd Wisconsin had 215 mustered out. The 11th Pennsylvania converted to a veteran regiment in January 1864, and hence lost little to none.
This gives a maximum of 2,084 mustering out. Unfortunately for most regiments only roster data (i.e. aggregate present and absent) is available, and the actual loss to the army would be less. However, if you accept it then the grand total that mustered out north of the James is 4,379. This figure is less than a quarter of what Young claimed.
6. Campaign Strength and Discussion
The total of the starting strength of the AoP, 9th Corps, reinforcements and Smith's command is 201,213.
At most only 4,379 were discharged in this period, making it a much less minor manpower drain than claimed. Almost all of these discharges were south of the North Anna. It is not appropriate to remove them from the strength, except as another category of casualties. Otherwise we'd have to consider that Breckinridges' and Early's commands were detached to the Shenandoah, and Hoke's to the James before Grant crossed the James, and no-one would except the argument that they should be counted.
Young's argument is clearly flawed. He has gone to great lengths to boost the rebel numbers, finding 66,140 with Lee on the 5th May, and adding 25,495 in units that joined Lee and an estimate of 4,565 in returning convalescents etc. to total 96,200. However, he then does not act with the same zeal in locating Federal units, and to be fair that was not what his study was about. In fact, he is sloppy and undercounts the Federal strength be several means. We can state with a reasonable degree of certainty that Young has managed to exclude nearly 40,000 men from the Federal count. The true force ratios are roughly 201,213 : 96,200 north of the James, or 2.1 : 1.
Of course, none of Lee's reinforcements arrived until after Spotsylvania, whereas many of Grant's did. Grant received 33,255 prior to withdrawing from Spotsylvania, giving a campaign strength to that point of 175,999 vs Lee's 66,140, or a ratio of 2.7 : 1 for the Wilderness-Spotsylvania fighting. Arguments that Grant thus had an overwhelming numerical superiority, especially in the first two weeks of the fighting, are thus on very shaky ground.
7. Conclusions
Whilst we should acknowledge the brilliant work of Young on the rebel strength, we must ignore his claims on the Federal strength and the strength ratios as ill-founded. He engaged in only cursory research and hence massively overconcluded. His arguments regarding the discharge of troops are particularly ill-researched, with him more than quadrupling the number discharged, and failing to note that such an adjustment is utterly inappropriate.
The campaign strength of the Federal forces upto the end of Spotsylvania was 175,999, and upto crossing the James was 201,213. This is far higher than Young reckoned. Thus his argument trying to minimise the crushing numerical superiority of the Federal forces cannot stand. Grant did have nearly a 3:1 manpower advantage, as the numerologists of the Lost Cause later articulated, although they also tried to minimise rebel numbers.
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