Yet they are not. We know the strength of every rebel regiment. We only know the strength of 22 of the 38 Federal regiments.
Clearly the Federals are sketchier.
Wrongly explained.
Introduction
The operations against Forts Henry and Donelson etc. were undertake whilst McClellan was General-in-Chief. Indeed, they were ordered by McClellan as part of his grand strategy. I've learnt from discussing the matter that there is a myth that it was Grant alone who did everything, and McClellan, Halleck, Buell, CF Smith, Nelson etc. are whitewashed from the story. Myths of course are not true, but sometimes contain elements of truth, and this one is no exception.
McClellan Orders Halleck on a Cumberland Expedition
Halleck had taken over the Missouri Department at the end of November. He found it poorly organised, and wrote to McClellan that he could not go on the offensive:
Our army is utterly disorganized, clamorous for pay, but refusing to be regularly mustered in, in many places mutinous and disbanding. I will restore order if you give me time. We are not prepared for any important expedition out of the state, it would imperil the safety of Missouri. Wait until we are ready.
This, General, is no army, but rather a military rabble. I am almost destitute of regular officer. Your telegram indicates your intention to withdraw a portion of our troops from Missouri. This cannot be done safely at this time. We are destitute of arms, organization, and discipline.
This was informed by the reports of his subordinates. Such as the dire analysis of Grant, who wrote of his command to Halleck on 21st November:
There are now at Columbus forty-seven regiments of infantry and two companies of light artillery, and over one hundred pieces of heavy ordinance. In addition, there are at Camp Beauregard, on the road about half way between Mayfield and Union City, some 8,000 more, of all arms. A gunboat reached Columbus and another is expected in a few day. There is great deficiency in transportation. I have no ambulances. The clothing received is of inferior quality and lacking in quantity. The arms in the hands of the men are mostly the old flint lock. The Quartermaster's Department has been carried on with so little funds that Government credit have become exhausted.
There are several messages in the record showing that Grant was every bit as reluctant as Halleck to go on the offensive. We should note that Grant's estimate of enemy strength was wildly high. A month earlier Polk's entire command (including the brigade sent to Camp Beauregard) consisted of 21 infantry regiments, 8 batteries, 4 cavalry battalions and his end of January '62 state shows only 25 infantry regiments, plus odds and sods (ORA 7, 853-5). Grant has more than doubled the enemy force.
McClellan's reply to Halleck was sent on 10th December:
I am sorry to learn the very disorganized condition of the troops. I appreciate the difficulty of the task before you, and you may rest assured that I will support you to the full extent of my ability. Do not hesitate to use force with the refractory. Can you yet form any idea of the time necessary to prepare an expedition against Columbus or one up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, in connection with Buell’s movements? I shall send troops to Hunter, to enable him to move into the Indian Territory west of Arkansas and upon Northern Texas. That movement should relieve you very materially. It will require some little time to prepare Hunter, but when he moves you might act in concert with him.
Halleck and Grant were not alone in pleading weakness; Buell and Hunter were doing likewise. There was essentially no movement in the west. A month later, on 3rd January a frustrated McClellan finally ordered Halleck to advance up the Cumberland with two divisions:
It is very important that the rebel troops in west Kentucky be prevented from moving to the support of the force in front of Buell. To accomplish this an expedition should be sent up the Cumberland River to act in concert with Buell's command, of sufficient strength to defeat any force that might be brought against it. The gunboats should be supported by at least one and perhaps two divisions of your best infantry, taken from Paducah and other points from which they can be spared. At the same time such a demonstration should be made on Columbus as will prevent the removal of any troops from that place; and, if a sufficient number has already been moved, the place should be taken. It may be well to make a feint on the Tennessee River, with a command sufficient to prevent disaster under any circumstances
Thus was now have an order from McClellan to Halleck to take Grant's command and send it against Fort Donelson, the major fortification on the Cumberland. Everything that occurred flowed from this order, and as we shall see, McClellan did heavily reinforce Grant's column with forces from Buell.
Halleck's and Grant's Response to the Order
Halleck and Grant were not happy with the order, but began to execute it. On 6th January Halleck gave Grant an order to demonstrate against Columbus, but did not give the order to Grant to move on Fort Donelson, which McClellan stated should be simultaneous.
Make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray. Forces from Cairo and Paducah should meet at Mayfield and threaten Murray. Do not advance far enough to expose your flank and rear to an attack from Columbus and by all means avoid a serious engagement. The object is to prevent reinforcements from being sent to Bowling Green. Be very careful to avoid a battle, we are not ready for that.
Grant extracted the orders to CF Smith on 8th January. McClernand started shuffling his forces to the Kentucky bank (Fort Jefferson) on the 10th. Both forces reported ready on the 14th, and both marched out on the 15th. On the 16th they came to within a march of each other near the site of Camp Beauregard, but it was abandoned. Both turned away. Obeying direct orders from Halleck, CF Smith moved east to the Tennessee river, to examine the roads. Whilst resupplying his force from boats on the 22nd, Smith went down on the
Lexington to recce Forts Heiman and Henry. He reported:
I think two iron-clad gunboats would make short work of Fort Henry. There is no masked battery at the foot of the island, as was supposed, or, if so, it is now under water. Two stern-wheel steamers were at the fort, but moved away rapidly at our first gun.
Map: Approximate Routes of the Expeditions
View attachment 318802
Halleck had written on 20th January to McClellan suggesting that McClellan allow him to attack Fort Donelson (Dover):
The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam is, in my opinion, impracticable, or at least premature. It is not a proper line of operations, at least now. A much more feasible plan is to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee, making Nashville the first objective point. This would turn Columbus and force the abandonment of Bowling Green, Columbus cannot be taken without an immense siege train and a terrible loss of life. I have thoroughly studied its defenses; they are very strong. But it can be turned, paralyzed, and forced to surrender. This line of the Cumberland or Tennessee is the great central line of the Western theater of war, with the Ohio below the mouth of Green River as the base and two good navigable rivers extending far into the interior of the theater of operations. But the plan should not be attempted without a large force, not less than 60,000 effective men. ...
I have not designated any particular line or lines of movement. That must be a matter of farther study if the general idea should be approved. Perhaps the main column should move from Smithland, between the rivers, by Dover, &c. Perhaps the line east of the Cumberland or that west of the Tennessee would be preferable. These questions, however, are matters easily determinable.
McClellan replied on the 29th January (ORA 7, 930-1):
I like your views as to the future. They fully agree with my own ideas from the beginning, which has ever been against a movement in force down the Mississippi itself.
Halleck received McClellan's approval, and issued orders to Grant for the Fort Henry operation on the 30th. He informed Buell:
I have ordered an advance of our troops on Fort Henry and Dover. It will be made immediately.
It should be noted that Grant hasn't kicked CF Smith's information upstairs yet, as he sent it on the 31st. However, Halleck's correspondence shows he had seen it already.
Halleck wrote McClellan on the 30th:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI, Saint Louis, January 30, 1862.
Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, General-in-Chief of the Army, Washington:
GENERAL: I inclose herewith a copy of instructions sent this day to General Grant in relation to the expedition up the Tennessee River against Fort Henry. As Fort Henry, Dover [Fort Donelson], &c., are in Tennessee, I respectfully suggest that that State be added to this department.
General Grant has already been re-enforced with eight regiments of infantry, and several others, with three batteries of artillery, are under orders to join him. I will send down every man I can spare. Information is received to-day that Brigadier-General Price, son of the major-general, is again organizing insurgents in Howard and Chariton Counties, and that the rebels are becoming more bold since our troops have been sent south. I therefore think it unsafe to withdraw many more until the State militia can take their place. The militia dare not or will not organize in counties not occupied by our troops. To facilitate this organization it becomes necessary to scatter the volunteers over a very large tract of country. This is unfortunate, but unavoidable.
Fort Henry has a garrison of about 6,000, and is pretty strongly fortified. Possibly re-enforcements may be sent from Columbus as soon as we move. If we can reach the railroad this may be prevented, as the country roads are almost impassable.
The troops from Rolla are advancing in the direction of Springfield, but necessarily move very slowly. Greenville, south of Ironton, is occupied by our cavalry, and an infantry regiment is ordered to re-enforce them. This movement is necessary to break up the rebel organizations in the counties of Wayne and Butler.
The roads south of the Tennessee River are almost impassable. General Smith reported on his recent reconnaissance up that river that the road was horrible, and new tracks had to be cut through the woods. It took an entire day for-one brigade to move 3 miles.”
Permanent crews for the gunboats are being rapidly organized. The mortar boats cannot be used in the Tennessee or Cumberland, and I doubt if they will ever be of much use in the Mississippi. Neither navy nor army officers have much faith in them.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.
With McClellan's endorsement, Halleck thus began operations against Fort Henry.