First Bull Run Pope's biggest shortcoming

MikeyB

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Sep 13, 2018
What was the Union cavalry doing during Second Manassas? For all of Pope's shortcomings, was this arguably his BIGGEST? If he had mastery of the cavalry corps, shouldn't even just competent execution have discovered Jackson marching past his rear, and perhaps avoided the embarrassing loss of his supply dump? And more importantly, shouldn't any competent cavalry execution have substantiated Porter's belief that Longstreet was sitting there on the flank ready to strike?

For all of Pope's flaws, was this what cost him the campaign?
 
1st New Jersey was guarding Throughfare Gap, after Jackson had passed thru it. Ricketts Brigade was to their rear

So these units reported it and Pope misinterpreted the intent as heading back into the valley, is that right?

Goes back to cavalry failure. If one wing of Lee's army is reported on the move, shouldn't you be tracking them with your cavalry?
 
As I recall, John Buford was "guarding" or somehow engaged in the vicinity of Thoroughfare Gap and was either recalled or uncharacteristically fumbled the job. I believe he sent a warning to Pope but was cloudy on the details and failed to stress the importance of the situation. The Second Manassas Campaign was arguably Stuart's finest job doing what cavalry was intended for.
 
As I recall, John Buford was "guarding" or somehow engaged in the vicinity of Thoroughfare Gap and was either recalled or uncharacteristically fumbled the job. I believe he sent a warning to Pope but was cloudy on the details and failed to stress the importance of the situation. The Second Manassas Campaign was arguably Stuart's finest job doing what cavalry was intended for.

Would competent cavalry also have been able to figure out what Longstreet was up to (and perhaps saved Porter from being cashiered)? It seems like Pope's problems were based on bad intelligence, which sounds like could have been solved by utilizing his cavalry arm. Who was even commander of AoV cavalry corps?
 
Pope did quite well here in Missouri at besieging New Madrid and exercising combined arms actions with the Navy at Island #10 just upstream in early 1862. While overshadowed by Ft. Donelson and Shiloh which were right before and after these actions, Pope received great acclaim and his success was hailed as an important victory. Indeed, it opened up the Mississippi to Memphis. Unfortunately, he was given too much to handle when he went East and was a miserable failure.
 
Would competent cavalry also have been able to figure out what Longstreet was up to (and perhaps saved Porter from being cashiered)? It seems like Pope's problems were based on bad intelligence, which sounds like could have been solved by utilizing his cavalry arm. Who was even commander of AoV cavalry corps?
Unfortunately, at this time there was NO Union Cavalry Corps - brigades like Buford's were scattered about, willy-nilly often doing courier and escort duty. Lee also had no Cavalry Corps but DID have Stuart as his chief of cavalry, the next best thing. Lee's cavalry were organized into brigades and Stuart led what was then termed the cavalry division but he had oversight and knowledge of what was going on with the mounted arm. Union cavalry had no overall commander until Hooker instituted the Cavalry Corps under Stoneman prior to Chancellorsville in Spring, 1863. Pope could've done the same thing, combining his cavalry into a cohesive command but did not, to his misfortune.
 
Pondering something, and picked this old thread to express it.

Refreshing my memory about Battle of Cedar Mountain and I came across a statement that:
"General Banks was neither ordered nor expected to attack the enemy," says General Pope.
"I was both ordered and expected to attack the enemy," replies General Banks.
There is an order from Pope's staff to Banks indicating an expectation that he would attack if the enemy advanced toward him. Pope did not recollect sending this order. [Edited to fix this sentance]

I also came across an incident from the month before where Pope's Chief of Staff sent orders Banks to take position between Sperryville and Warrenton with his left close to Warrenton and then 3 days later Pope's Chief of Staff wrote Banks and said he was in the wrong place -- he was supposed to have his right close to Sperryville (its about 25 miles between them, so he cant be both close to Warrenton and close to Sperryville). Banks pointed out what the first order actually said and Pope's Chief of Staff responded that Banks was correct about how the order was written but it was a mistake and the carelessness was due to hurry and confusion at HQ.

Perhaps Pope's biggest failure was staff management.

Note: edited to fix my typo
 
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Would competent cavalry also have been able to figure out what Longstreet was up to (and perhaps saved Porter from being cashiered)? It seems like Pope's problems were based on bad intelligence, which sounds like could have been solved by utilizing his cavalry arm. Who was even commander of AoV cavalry corps?
As James said Buford was indeed near Thoroughfare Gap on the Western side, and had been engaged with parts of Longstreets Corps. He made sure McDowell knew about too. McDowell makes plans to divide his troops and orders them to Haymarket and Gainsville in supporting distance of each other. Unfortunately it didn't happen, as Pope orders McDowell to Manassas Junction
 
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Pondering something, and picked this old thread to express it.

Refreshing my memory about Battle of Cedar Mountain and I came across a statement that:
"General Banks was neither ordered nor expected to attack the enemy," says General Pope.
"I was both ordered and expected to attack the enemy," replies General Banks.
There is an order from Poep's staff to Banks indicating an expectation that he would attack if the enemy advanced toward him. Pope recollect sending this order.

I also came across an incident from the month before where Pope's Chief of Staff sent orders Banks to take position between Sperryville and Warrenton with his left close to Warrenton and then 3 days later Pope's Chief of Staff wrote Banks and said he was in the wrong place -- he was supposed to have his right close to Sperryville (its about 25 miles between them, so he cant be both close to Warrenton and close to Sperryville). Banks pointed out what the first order actually said and Pope's Chief of Staff responded that Banks was correct about how the order was written but it was a mistake and the carelessness was due to hurry and confusion at HQ.

Perhaps Pope's biggest failure was staff management.
Pope didn't make any friends with the staff or anybody there with his first words: "I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies."
Should may be expected from a General who didn't know the difference between his Head Quarters and Hind Quarters.:biggrin:
 
I just finished Hennessy's Return to Bull Run this morning, my first real effort to learn about 2nd Manassas.

I'd argue that for all of Pope's failings (and they are many), his biggest fault was not accepting reality. Yes, he used his cavalry poorly. But there are many indications that even if he was well informed, there's no reason to think he would have listened to it anyway.

For example, despite everything that went poorly for Pope during the campaign, he still had a superior force in front of Jackson on August 29. Yes, Longstreet was closing fast, but if all of the various single-brigade efforts against the RR Cut had been made as a consolidated effort, Jackson's line may have been punched through and damaged before Longstreet's command could have stabilized the situation. But Pope didn't believe that Longstreet was approaching (or had arrived), that Porter had a clear means of attacking, that Jackson was retreating, etc.

Also, I've only read one book on the battle. Was Buford screening Thoroughfare Gap after Ricketts was pushed back or just screening to the west of the AoV?
 
I also just finished Hennessy's Return to Bull Run, and another point he made was that after Buford reported the arrival of Longstreet's Corps, McDowell stuck the message in his pocket instead of forwarding it to Pope.

Another thing that stuck out to me was that Pope labored under the expectation that Porter was going to attack Jackson's right flank at any moment although his actual orders to Porter didn't include anything about making such an attack.

It's like Jeff from Syracuse said, Pope's grasp on reality was so weak it is hard to say if better intelligence would have mattered.

Highly recommend the book, very well written, and available cheap.
 
Well, at least old Pope took his downfall in good grace; rather than sulking and complaining he went to Minnesota and did an able job suppressing the Great Sioux Rebellion and subsequently was a good department commander out on the Plains, including during the Red River War of 1874-75 which put paid to the hostile Comanche, Kiowa and Southern Cheyenne.
 
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