Ive been reading Chastel's Decision in the West. He points out how Davis and Bragg were pressuring Johnston into launching an offensive into Middle Tennessee, but Johnston delayed heavily due to want of supplies for his beleaguered troops. He definitely didnt have the numbers to move against Nashville in a successful operation. And if the goal was to distract Sherman, we see with Hood's Nashville Campaign that Sherman is not one to be baited away so easily.I'm not suggesting this is the best course of action, and certainly not the likeliest, but how about an offensive into Tennessee in the direction of Nashville*? The problem with this is that the Union has enough men to defend Nashville and move into Georgia at the same time, and the Confederacy really doesn't have the men or supplies to have a good chance at doing either.
I think Uncle Joe was actually quite good as commander of the AoT, if for no other reason than he did wonders for their morale. However, I still wonder if my boy Hardee would have done a good job.
*Yes, I did mostly steal this from Stonewall Goes West.
Hood managed to get much closer to Nashville than he had should have with his bloodied army only just coming off the battles of Atlanta. The AoT likely wasn't ready for a major offensive in April 1864, but it certainly wasn't in September. Johnston may have been able to do better than Hood, considering the cirmcumstances.Ive been reading Chastel's Decision in the West. He points out how Davis and Bragg were pressuring Johnston into launching an offensive into Middle Tennessee, but Johnston delayed heavily due to want of supplies for his beleaguered troops. He definitely didnt have the numbers to move against Nashville in a successful operation. And if the goal was to distract Sherman, we see with Hood's Nashville Campaign that Sherman is not one to be baited away so easily.
Could an effective campaign against Sherman's supply lines by the forces of Forrest and Wheeler been made? Maybe; Sherman needed his supplies from Nashville to Chattanooga and Knoxville kept open, for East Tennessee was utterly barren after the campaigning of the previous year.
Another alternative (and this one is a huge stretch) would be to enact Cleburne's memorandum and recruit black troops. This is highly unlikely, as the Confederates still believed they could gain a victory at this point in the war, so sacrificing something so essential to their society would be an appalling proposition
Hood only faced 2 1/2 Corps during his invasion. Sherman had 7-8, plus cavalry and garrison troops. Thats a much taller order for Johnston to face off against.Hood managed to get much closer to Nashville than he had should have with his bloodied army only just coming off the battles of Atlanta. The AoT likely wasn't ready for a major offensive in April 1864, but it certainly wasn't in September. Johnston may have been able to do better than Hood, considering the cirmcumstances.
I'd like to see how Francis Shoup and Franklin Gardner (assuming he's exchanged earlier) could do to fortify Atlanta, and hopefully force Sherman into a siege. If Johnston leaves two divisions under Gardner in Atlanta, he still has about 60,000 men (including the cavalry) to go into Tennessee with, and Gardner will have the Georgia militia. Black troops could help fill out the ranks (especially in the Atlanta defenses), but even having blacks fill as many non-combatant roles as they can would be helpful.
You answered your own question - Despite Sturgis' overwhelming defeat and rout losing most of his supply and artillery, and the standoff/defeat at the hands of Smith (who subsequently retreated though inflicting heavier losses on the Confederates) these sideshows were enough to thwart Forrest's attempts until it was too late.Didn't Forrest try to wreck Sherman's supply lines? Sherman sent forces to attempt to destroy Forrest's movements in successive attempts at Brice's Cross Roads and Tupelo.
As you pointed out before, Sherman would not be easily distracted. However, Sherman could become overconfident in this scenario, as all the Confederate defenders are holed up in Atlanta. He could suffer some grievous losses attacking the fortifications before he settles down for a siege.Hood only faced 2 1/2 Corps during his invasion. Sherman had 7-8, plus cavalry and garrison troops. Thats a much taller order for Johnston to face off against.
The second scenario, leaving 2 divsions plus militia in Atlanta and operate against Sherman's rear, that MIGHT have been feasible.
Having decided to replace Johnston, was there a better choice?They would have had a better chance without General Hood leading the charge.
You answered your own question - Despite Sturgis' overwhelming defeat and rout losing most of his supply and artillery, and the standoff/defeat at the hands of Smith (who subsequently retreated though inflicting heavier losses on the Confederates) these sideshows were enough to thwart Forrest's attempts until it was too late.
To me, the confederates had very few opportunities to turn the tide on Sherman. A continued defense would only result in Sherman circumventing Confederate defenses. Was there a particular point when the Confederates could have turned the tide? At Reseca? Cassville? New Hope? Kennesaw? The 3 Atlanta battles? Jonesboro?
Forrest showed what he could have done if he'd been turned loose sooner at Johnsonville. Wheeler's troopers were not up to the hard work it takes to really disrupt a railroad. But Forrest could have done it. Too bad they didn't let him.I am not sure about turning the tide in the West, but, the Atlanta campaign could have been fought better, of course it require Davis and Johnston, to work together for the common good.
Sherman's campaign was dependent upon a single RR line running back to the Ohio. Davis needed to release Bedford Forrest to Johnston's command. to keep the RR line under constant siege and destruction.
Meanwhile, Johnston needed to realize that it was the mountainous terrain of Northern Ga. was more defensible than the flatter land around Atlanta. Which, of course, would require Johnston to be much less passive in his defensive operations. Sherman did not have a sure hand in tactical operations and tended, I think, in overcommitting too many forces in his flanking moves and tried to not send too far from support. More activity on his front or flanks, would keep Sherman thinking of his defenses rather than his offensives.