Very Informative Article on How McClellan Outsmarted Lee at Antietam

Franklin started marching ca. 1730 on the 16th to join McClellan, and AP an hour later, in response to an order from Lee. Franklin could have reoccupied Harper's Ferry instead of reinforcing McClellan.

"One uncertainty remained. Would A. P. Hill’s division be up from Harpers Ferry in time? Lee would later recall that he “had hoped” Hill would arrive at Sharpsburg by the night of the 16th. 84 But, apparently, some confusion had developed along the chain of command. Since the bulk of the paroling was finished early on the 16th and the securing of captured property could have been completed by a small fraction of the division, there was no reason Hill could not have left during the afternoon. Moreover, since the firing along the Antietam was audible at Harpers Ferry, Hill had cause to hasten his departure. Yet, although Hill prepared his command for the march, there is no evidence he intended to leave before he had received orders to do so. Perhaps the continuing presence of a large Federal force (Franklin’s Sixth Corps) in Pleasant Valley reminded him that his division was the sole protection against an enemy turning movement and the disruption of the Confederate supply lines.

After a night of worry over the multiple threats along the Antietam, Lee was prepared to abandon the communications he had just opened. Between three and four— well before any Confederate intelligence could have reported Franklin’s 5: 30 departure to join McClellan— the Confederate commander dispatched a courier to Harpers Ferry with instructions for A. P. Hill to bring the Light Division to Sharpsburg. The summons would arrive at 6: 30 and within an hour Hill would be on the road. A long, hot march and an uncertain arrival time lay ahead. 85"

Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kindle Locations 7248-7260). Kent State University Press. Kindle Edition.
 
Okay, that's interesting. It suggests that there's the possibility of Franklin actually getting lucky and managing to turn the Army of Northern Virginia, and that both commanders independently decided they needed the troops in question on the Antietam.

Between three and four— well before any Confederate intelligence could have reported Franklin’s 5: 30 departure to join McClellan— the Confederate commander dispatched a courier to Harpers Ferry with instructions for A. P. Hill to bring the Light Division to Sharpsburg. The summons would arrive at 6: 30 and within an hour Hill would be on the road. A long, hot march and an uncertain arrival time lay ahead. 85"
This sounds to me like AP Hill set off at 0730 AM on the 17th? Setting off at 1930 on the 16th wouldn't be "after a night of worry". As it' about 12 miles walk by a fairly direct route from HF to Sharpsburg it looks like it's manageable for a division in the space of eight hours taking a somewhat longer route.

Of the two then McClellan needed the troops represented slightly more, because Franklin's three divisions were about 1/6 of his entire force as opposed to about 1/7 to 1/8 of Lee's force being represented by AP Hill.

I think that's an interesting AU:

McClellan does not order Franklin to the Antietam, instead ordering him to try and turn Lee.
0630 on the 17th: AP Hill ordered to Sharpsburg
0730: AP Hill is on the road, his column taking perhaps half an hour to leave.
0815: Franklin begins crossing the Potomac to Harpers Ferry.
0945: Crossing complete, Franklin leaves a brigade or two of Couch to hold Harpers Ferry and marches after AP Hill.

Back at Antietam, McClellan commits Morell's division to help shield the reforming right wing. With nothing at all left in reserve in the centre except a couple of batteries, he may well pull back across the Antietam in his centre - it's possible that he'd have sent all three brigades of Morell north and left the artillery reserve without close infantry support.

1400: AP Hill reaches Boteler's Ford.
1530: As Burnside's wing finally gets into motion, AP Hill arrives on schedule and drives them in.
1630: Franklin arrives south of Boteler's Ford in force, blocking Lee's retreat and probably capturing most of his trains (as they'd been crossing for the last couple of days).

I think at this point Lee's screwed, though the reason he's screwed depends on details McClellan couldn't reasonably have known in advance.
 
Yes alternate history always has interesting spins and here and at Gettysburg they are unlimited. What ever Lee did he was pretty much screwed. Sharpsburg was not a strong place to make a stand, had good roads coming from the north and west ,one way out, and as Jackson and Stuart would find out the Potomac was way closer on their left than they had thought, plus being outgunned, this would become "artillery hell" for his gunners. We now know all this. Night of the 15th ,Lee takes Boteler's Ford out,Jackson takes Harpers Ferry now have supplies,12'000 small arms and. 73 guns. Move up the valley, McCellan would have to follow. Lee's chances are much better now he has room to maneuver and they know the valley is their friend.
 
Night of the 15th ,Lee takes Boteler's Ford out,Jackson takes Harpers Ferry now have supplies,12'000 small arms and. 73 guns. Move up the valley, McCellan would have to follow. Lee's chances are much better now he has room to maneuver and they know the valley is their friend.
You mean Lee retreating over the Potomac on the night of the 15th?

It's technically possible, but Lee would have to abandon almost his entire supply train. That's why he fought at Sharpsburg at all instead of falling back over the Potomac river - his trains were all on the northern side, and it took him days to cross them all.
Since it took the nights of the 15th, 16th and 17th (plus the days of the 16th, 17th and 18th) to move the trains out, that means that Lee crossing his fighting echelon on the night of the 15th would be abandoning essentially his entire wagon train.

In that situation I'm not entirely sure he could even march down the Valley safely - he'd either need to move slowly enough to allow the horses with his artillery to graze, or abandon the lot.
 
Well …… it seemed like a good idea until a moment ago
Don't worry, that often happens. It tends to be the details which trip things up, both at the planning stage and even in reality. A few examples include a non-regulation lock on the Baltimore and Ohio canal which nixed a planned campaign in February 1862, or the problem with bridging the Monocacy that 67th has mentioned (leading to McClellan being low on ammunition on the 18th September) or John Pope's contempt for bases and supply lines that led to his getting completely enveloped in late August.

Another example there is the bridging train needed to cross to Fredericksburg. Interestingly McClellan's relief probably helped stuff that one up - the switch from McClellan to Burnside meant that the staff lost track for a few days and didn't resend the request for the trains until about a week later, and then the bridging train needed to rest the horses for a few days in the storm. That request being sent a few days earlier would have meant the train missed the storm, so it'd arrive a week earlier, and that in turn would mean a crossing at Fredericksburg before Jackson arrived...
 
Dennis Frye, a former chief historian at the Harpers Ferry National Historical Park, has posted an informative, insightful article on how George McClellan outwitted Robert E. Lee at Antietam--actually, not just at Antietam but in the Maryland Campaign as a whole. Frye discusses some interesting little-known facts and addresses a few of the common myths about McClellan's performance at Antietam.

Face Facts: 'Little Mac' Outwitted Lee at Antietam
http://www.historynet.com/no-small-deed-face-facts-little-mac-outwitted-lee-antietam.htm

Here's an excerpt:

McClellan didn’t know Lee’s thinking, but as a strategist he certainly could surmise Lee’s intentions. McClellan had divined Pennsylvania to be a primary Confederate target since the invasion’s outset. He knew Lee was concentrating at Sharpsburg, and he could interpret this two ways: Either Lee expected to fight there, or the Confederate commander intended to move north from there. If McClellan were to capture the Sharpsburg–Hagerstown Turnpike and block Lee’s avenue northward, he could eliminate the “move” option, and produce an outstanding outcome—defeating the Rebel army’s invasion.​

The Union commander seized the occasion. By afternoon and evening of September 16, McClellan had moved nearly 23,000 soldiers from his 1st and 12th Corps—about one-third of his total force—around the Confederate left flank. And they took the road! Consider McClellan’s wise preemptive action. About two miles north of Sharpsburg, he had blocked Lee’s line of advance into Pennsylvania, and had done so without a battle, indeed barely firing a shot!​

McClellan’s prescient move on September 16 constituted the demise of Lee’s invasion strategy. The most famous Southern general of the war had been outsmarted, outflanked, and outmaneuvered by the most harshly criticized Union general of the war.​
 
The "victory" described in the excerpts sounds like McClellan. He was very good at moving troops around as long as there was no shooting going on.
It's a manoeuvre victory. Manoeuvre victories involve the movement of troops to constrain the options of the enemy and/or open up one's own.

Would you be so kind as to explain what you mean by "sounds like McClellan", with an example of where he failed to exploit an opportunity?
 
I am talking about McClellan's tendency to regard troop movements that resulted in Confederate retreats and/or abandonment of territory as bloodless victories. His definition of victory and Lincoln's definition of victory were quite different.
 
I am talking about McClellan's tendency to regard troop movements that resulted in Confederate retreats and/or abandonment of territory as bloodless victories. His definition of victory and Lincoln's definition of victory were quite different.
Well, they are a success, surely? It's better to compel the enemy to abandon Yorktown at a cost of a few hundred skirmishing casualties than to slog your way through it in a Fredericksburg rate of exchange or worse. Certainly when Grant attempted to slog his way into Vicksburg his assault was a total failure and he had to siege it out, and the only reason that wasn't just a Confederate retreat was that Vicksburg was surrounded; Yorktown was impossible to surround.

Now, your point about Lincoln's definition of victory is probably correct, but it's not a favourable one to Lincoln. Lincoln expressed a belief that Fredericksburg was better than a manoeuvre victory, certainly, and he insisted on an Overland strategy whenever he could even though that would necessarily mean slugging it out with Confederate troops in the defensible terrain of northern Virginia.

Ultimately the problem however is that Lincoln never actually gave McClellan the manpower advantage that would permit a "slugging it out" offensive victory to work. (If you disagree, do provide an example.)


ED: as a clarification, can you provide both:
- the time McClellan had this advantage
- the time someone else actually did win "Lincoln's type of victory" with this advantage
 
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Don't worry, that often happens. It tends to be the details which trip things up, both at the planning stage and even in reality. A few examples include a non-regulation lock on the Baltimore and Ohio canal which nixed a planned campaign in February 1862, or the problem with bridging the Monocacy that 67th has mentioned (leading to McClellan being low on ammunition on the 18th September) or John Pope's contempt for bases and supply lines that led to his getting completely enveloped in late August.

Another example there is the bridging train needed to cross to Fredericksburg. Interestingly McClellan's relief probably helped stuff that one up - the switch from McClellan to Burnside meant that the staff lost track for a few days and didn't resend the request for the trains until about a week later, and then the bridging train needed to rest the horses for a few days in the storm. That request being sent a few days earlier would have meant the train missed the storm, so it'd arrive a week earlier, and that in turn would mean a crossing at Fredericksburg before Jackson arrived...
Thank's Some of our members are pretty hard on you when you make a mistake
 
Thank's Some of our members are pretty hard on you when you make a mistake
I think what I tend to be annoyed about is when people assert someone had a better option without stating it. If you make your basis explicit (as you did there) then it's open for people to look at.

Interestingly Lee's post-Antietam plan was actually to move further north and west after crossing the Potomac, and recross even further north at Williamsport. If McClellan hadn't had 6th Corps available and relatively fresh to block that move (as happened historically) then Lee would have made it across, and at that point you're looking at basically a kind of cut-price Gettysburg Campaign.
 
I think there's a definite argument that Lincoln didn't really understand military strategy or operations, yes - and, perhaps worse, that he thought he did understand it by applying simple principles without thinking them through or knowing the flaws in them.

So for example Lincoln stated about Fredericksburg:


"...if the same battle were to be fought over again, every day, through a week of days, with the same relative results, the army under Lee would be wiped out to the last man, the Army of the Potomac would still be a mighty host, the war would be over, the Confederacy gone, and peace would be won at a smaller cost of life than it will be if the week of lost battles must be dragged out through yet another year of camps and marches, and of deaths in hospitals rather than upon the field."



The principle here that Lincoln is asserting is that attrition would kill the Army of Northern Virginia if Fredericksburg was fought over and over until one army was destroyed, and that this would involve fewer casualties from the conditions of campaigning. In so far as a quick end to the war is desireable he's correct, but Fredericksburg is not the battle to say it about - Fredericksburg saw a 3:1 casualty ratio. Fight it seven times over with the same relative results, and you end up with over 86,000 Union casualties to about 30,000 Confederate. By that point Burnside's Army of the Potomac is actually smaller than Lee's AoNV, and another three goes at it would see the AotP wiped out as a fighting force to the last man with Lee still possessing a significant force (a little under half what he started with).
That's assuming the Union army would have the same offensive spirit at Seventh Fredericksburg as it did at the historical (first) Fredericksburg. In fact we know from the Overland what would happen, and it's that the Federal army would rapidly go downhill in motivation as they decide for themselves that their commanders are out to slaughter them. Human beings simply can't keep up an offensive spirit for that many bloody assaults in a row, even successful ones, and post-hoc statistical analysis has shown a general tendency for Federal troops to recover their abilities post-battle somewhat slower than Confederate ones.

Functionally I think if a commander did try to Fredericksburg over and over again they'd be facing mutiny by about the third or fourth assault, at which point 1/3 of the army had been killed or wounded...


In this Lincoln's way of thinking is actually worryingly reminiscent of the stereotypical WW1 general.
 
I don't see the question, but I was asked about times McClellan had a numerical advantage:


History.com

Peninsula Campaign of 1862


Lincoln preferred an overland campaign toward Richmond, but McClellan proposed an amphibious maneuver in which the Union Army would land on the Virginia Peninsula, effectively circumventing the rebels under General Joseph E. Johnston.

McClellan put his Peninsula Campaign into action in March 1862, landing over 120,000 men on the coast and proceeding east toward the Confederate capital. The Confederates withdrew toward Richmond, and McClellan’s troops fought their way to within only a few miles of the city.

Despite his strong position, McClellan failed to capitalize on his tactical advantage, once again believing that he might be outnumbered. When General Robert E. Lee took control of Confederate forces on June 1, he launched a series of bold offensives that culminated in the Seven Days Battles.


By Eric M. Weiss July 12, 2002 The Washington Post

Quaker guns often worked surprisingly well. The fake guns were used first and most effectively in Northern Virginia, where the logs -- and real guns -- discouraged Gen. George B. McClellan and Union forces from attacking deep into Virginia and threatening the key railroad junction at Manassas. And when Union troops did attack across Bull Run in July 1861, they approached from the northwest, around the dozen earthen forts in what is now Manassas.

"One can hardly believe," a Northern newspaper reporter said in 1862 after visiting the then Union-controlled area, "that this here is the monster Manassas, which for eight months has been the fright and bugbear of the country."

Quaker guns also were discovered in Centreville and at high points closer to Washington. The earliest and most prominent was found on Munson's Hill, near Merrifield in present-day Fairfax County. The wooden discovery tarnished McClellan's reputation.

When other Union commanders discovered they had been fooled by fake cannon, the embarrassing arsenals were often disposed of as firewood, said Melinda Herzog, director of the Manassas Museum, which operates Mayfield Fort.

"It was just one of the tactics used to confuse McClellan about how many guns or troops there were," said Robert K. Sutton, superintendent of Manassas National Battlefield Park. Strategic deception was a potent weapon in the Confederate arsenal and one used expertly by Southern generals, he said.

"They would do lots of things, like march troops back and forth as if they had twice as many as they had," Sutton said. "With McClellan, it worked. He had these wild ideas that the Confederate Army was always two to three times larger than it was."
 
I don't see the question, but I was asked about times McClellan had a numerical advantage:

As I wrote in my latest blog post:

Now, the Quaker Guns on Munson's Hill. During the rebels early siegework at Washington after Manassas a force was placed on Munson's Hill. Rosser's Battery was assigned there and dug a 6 gun emplacement, but only 4 guns had been issued. Hence they placed logs in the other two to fill them. It didn't fool anyone.

At Centreville, in January '62 Johnston sent part of his artillery to Dumfries for the "blockade of the Potomac", and replaced the heaviest guns, but they were soon detected and duly reported. McClellan was not fooled.
 
I think there's a definite argument that Lincoln didn't really understand military strategy or operations, yes - and, perhaps worse, that he thought he did understand it by applying simple principles without thinking them through or knowing the flaws in them.

So for example Lincoln stated about Fredericksburg:


"...if the same battle were to be fought over again, every day, through a week of days, with the same relative results, the army under Lee would be wiped out to the last man, the Army of the Potomac would still be a mighty host, the war would be over, the Confederacy gone, and peace would be won at a smaller cost of life than it will be if the week of lost battles must be dragged out through yet another year of camps and marches, and of deaths in hospitals rather than upon the field."



The principle here that Lincoln is asserting is that attrition would kill the Army of Northern Virginia if Fredericksburg was fought over and over until one army was destroyed, and that this would involve fewer casualties from the conditions of campaigning. In so far as a quick end to the war is desireable he's correct, but Fredericksburg is not the battle to say it about - Fredericksburg saw a 3:1 casualty ratio. Fight it seven times over with the same relative results, and you end up with over 86,000 Union casualties to about 30,000 Confederate. By that point Burnside's Army of the Potomac is actually smaller than Lee's AoNV, and another three goes at it would see the AotP wiped out as a fighting force to the last man with Lee still possessing a significant force (a little under half what he started with).
That's assuming the Union army would have the same offensive spirit at Seventh Fredericksburg as it did at the historical (first) Fredericksburg. In fact we know from the Overland what would happen, and it's that the Federal army would rapidly go downhill in motivation as they decide for themselves that their commanders are out to slaughter them. Human beings simply can't keep up an offensive spirit for that many bloody assaults in a row, even successful ones, and post-hoc statistical analysis has shown a general tendency for Federal troops to recover their abilities post-battle somewhat slower than Confederate ones.

Functionally I think if a commander did try to Fredericksburg over and over again they'd be facing mutiny by about the third or fourth assault, at which point 1/3 of the army had been killed or wounded...


In this Lincoln's way of thinking is actually worryingly reminiscent of the stereotypical WW1 general.
Two historical examples to support your point.
1. The failure of Union forces to sieze Petersburg when they first approached despite the fact that the Union Army had a large intial manpower advantage.
2. The French Army mutiny of 1916.
Leftyhunter
 
So this is a bit more general of a McClellan thought than about Antietam specifically, but it occurred to me that a lot of McClellan's actions and strategy makes sense if he grasped the Union's principal strategic advantages almost straight away.

Those are:
- Naval. The Union started the war with most of the prewar navy and a greater shipbuilding capacity, plus the prewar merchant marine.
- Numerical. The Union had a much larger population and the tax base to (theoretically) support a much larger army.
- Industrial. The Union has a greater ability to construct heavy artillery, especially rifled.

He also identified the primary Confederate advantage, which was geographical - such as the river lines in Virginia, especially the line of the Rappahanock, which stymied attempts to overcome it twice before ultimately being taken in 1864.

He also seems to have identified the primary risk to the Union, which is an early decision in the war in favour of the Confederates. A long war means Confederate defeat, but a Union defeat could result from a short war and so could European intervention.

This actually explains a lot about McClellan's actions in the Peninsular campaign. In particular, it explains why he wanted an amphibious move in the first place (it outflanked the river lines like the Rappahanock that the CSA could defend with an economy of manpower) and it also explains why he was so insistent on having reinforcements (because, quite simply, to not give a Union commander a significant numerical advantage was squandering that major Union advantage). It also provides an explanation for his preference on getting close to a major Confederate position, moving up heavy artillery, and blasting through it - because this is something the Confederates can't fight with their own artillery, so they have to fight it instead by coming out of their fortifications and launching attacks on prepared positions.

Thus it is possible to argue that the key decision which most impaired McClellan's Peninsular campaign was the decision to cease recruitment in early 1862 - this meant that the CSA, which was ruthlessly prioritizing and instituting a draft, could come within shouting distance of Union manpower across the continent and actually focus superior manpower on McClellan at the point of decision in June.
The lack of reinforcements in the pipeline made it easier to justify holding back on reinforcing McClellan even when everyone agreed that he had insufficient forces, as the defence of the capital was a more immediate matter to Lincoln et al.


The main relevance this has to Antietam, I think, is that destruction of the Confederate army is both hard (it's very rare in the ACW) and not necessary. McClellan certainly gave it a try (it's not called America's bloodiest day for nothing) but overall time is on the side of the Union because they've opened recruitment again.
Indeed, when McClellan moved south less than two months after Antietam he's concentrating a force of about 115,000 PFD at Warrenton when he's relieved. This is his largest ever field force (his force just before the Seven Days was about 104,000 PFD) and it still left 106,000 troops along the line of the Potomac or otherwise defending Washington - thus rendering Washington more safe than it had been. By May 1863, despite the heavy casualties of Fredericksburg, this army has grown further to almost 135,000.

The difference with the Seven Days is striking, as at that time Lee had 112,000 PFD in and around Richmond which was his largest ever field force. Since Lee's PFD around November 10 1862 is around 70,000, the events of June-November 1862 (the fighting and especially all that Union recruitment) have shifted the force ratio between the field armies from 1:1.07 Union:Confederate to 1.64:1 Union:Confederate.
I think based off what was said and written in July 1861-January 1862 (between Bull Run/Manassas I and the Trent Affair) and in summer to fall pre-Antietam 1862, and post-Fredericksburg 1862-January 1863 Mud March none of what is said above ever mattered to those Union soldiers, civilians, and enthusiastic supporters of the war living at the time who did not think they were going to win given the string of events and actions that took place in those periods unlike some on CWT who really don't have a grasp of what contemporaries knew what was going on and they did not make what they had to be a big deal even when they acknowledged it as shown in article "Position of the Union Cause" by The New York Times it was not one of confidence.

I would agree that an early war would end in a Union defeat since the Confederates have suffered the least amount of damage to their resources and European intervention from Britain and France coming to the Rebels.
 
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