67th Tigers
Captain
- Joined
- Nov 10, 2006
Franklin started marching ca. 1730 on the 16th to join McClellan, and AP an hour later, in response to an order from Lee. Franklin could have reoccupied Harper's Ferry instead of reinforcing McClellan.
"One uncertainty remained. Would A. P. Hill’s division be up from Harpers Ferry in time? Lee would later recall that he “had hoped” Hill would arrive at Sharpsburg by the night of the 16th. 84 But, apparently, some confusion had developed along the chain of command. Since the bulk of the paroling was finished early on the 16th and the securing of captured property could have been completed by a small fraction of the division, there was no reason Hill could not have left during the afternoon. Moreover, since the firing along the Antietam was audible at Harpers Ferry, Hill had cause to hasten his departure. Yet, although Hill prepared his command for the march, there is no evidence he intended to leave before he had received orders to do so. Perhaps the continuing presence of a large Federal force (Franklin’s Sixth Corps) in Pleasant Valley reminded him that his division was the sole protection against an enemy turning movement and the disruption of the Confederate supply lines.
After a night of worry over the multiple threats along the Antietam, Lee was prepared to abandon the communications he had just opened. Between three and four— well before any Confederate intelligence could have reported Franklin’s 5: 30 departure to join McClellan— the Confederate commander dispatched a courier to Harpers Ferry with instructions for A. P. Hill to bring the Light Division to Sharpsburg. The summons would arrive at 6: 30 and within an hour Hill would be on the road. A long, hot march and an uncertain arrival time lay ahead. 85"
Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kindle Locations 7248-7260). Kent State University Press. Kindle Edition.
"One uncertainty remained. Would A. P. Hill’s division be up from Harpers Ferry in time? Lee would later recall that he “had hoped” Hill would arrive at Sharpsburg by the night of the 16th. 84 But, apparently, some confusion had developed along the chain of command. Since the bulk of the paroling was finished early on the 16th and the securing of captured property could have been completed by a small fraction of the division, there was no reason Hill could not have left during the afternoon. Moreover, since the firing along the Antietam was audible at Harpers Ferry, Hill had cause to hasten his departure. Yet, although Hill prepared his command for the march, there is no evidence he intended to leave before he had received orders to do so. Perhaps the continuing presence of a large Federal force (Franklin’s Sixth Corps) in Pleasant Valley reminded him that his division was the sole protection against an enemy turning movement and the disruption of the Confederate supply lines.
After a night of worry over the multiple threats along the Antietam, Lee was prepared to abandon the communications he had just opened. Between three and four— well before any Confederate intelligence could have reported Franklin’s 5: 30 departure to join McClellan— the Confederate commander dispatched a courier to Harpers Ferry with instructions for A. P. Hill to bring the Light Division to Sharpsburg. The summons would arrive at 6: 30 and within an hour Hill would be on the road. A long, hot march and an uncertain arrival time lay ahead. 85"
Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kindle Locations 7248-7260). Kent State University Press. Kindle Edition.