- Joined
- Aug 17, 2011
- Location
- Birmingham, Alabama
The Generalship of Robert E. Lee, Part Seven
7th in an informative series. This one I like because it emphasis Lee's understanding of the political dimension of War. In a nutshell, the South can lose a lot of things, but not hope of victory.
7th in an informative series. This one I like because it emphasis Lee's understanding of the political dimension of War. In a nutshell, the South can lose a lot of things, but not hope of victory.
In concluding his essay, Professor Gallagher tells us, “Contrary to what critics such as John Keegan say, Lee was not a man of ‘limited imagination’ whose ‘essentially conventional outlook’ helped undo the Confederacy. He formulated a national strategy predicated on the probability of success in Virginia and the value of battlefield victories. The ultimate failure of his strategy neither proves that it was wrongheaded nor diminishes Lee’s pivotal part in keeping Confederate resistance alive through four brutally destructive years. That continued resistance held the key to potential victory–Southern armies almost certainly lacked the capacity to defeat decisively their Northern counterparts, but a protracted conflict marked by periodic Confederate successes on the battlefield more than once threatened to destroy the North’s will ton continue the war. Indeed, the greatest single obstacle to Northern victory after June 1862 was R. E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia.. Without Lee and that famous field command, the Confederate experiment in rebellion almost certainly would have ended much sooner.” [p. 286] For sure, if given a choice between John Keegan and Gary Gallagher, I’ll go with Gary Gallagher’s view of Civil War history every time.
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