Was Hood's Attack at Franklin Rational or Irrational?

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Was Hood's Attack at Franklin Rational or Irrational?


One more Hood thread :D, John Bell Hood's decision to attack General Schofield's Army of the Ohio is a hotly debated topic. The reasoning behind Hood's attack and whether it was rational or irrationality. Here seem to be the two arguments, which do you lean more towards? Was Hood correct or incorrect to attack at Franklin?

Rational:
Hood had no feasible alternatives available to him. He could not allow Schofield's army to reach Nashville intact. If Schofield escaped unmolested he would link up with Thomas and Hood would be faced with overwhelming numbers. The Union defenders at Franklin had not been given enough time to significantly fortify their position so a speedy frontal assault was justified. The battle of Franklin though costly, was a victory for the Confederacy, since Schofield was forced to withdraw. Hood's decision to attack was rational and was the only real course of action available.

Irrational:
Hood was furious over the failed attempt to envelope Schofield's army at Spring Hill. He had his decision to attack at Franklin out of emotions. He may have even wanted to punish his army, in particular Cleburne and Cheatham for failure at the previous battle. Instead of a frontal assault against fortified positions over open ground without artillery support, Hood should have listened to reason and attempted a flanking maneuver. In the ensuing battle casualties were awful and Cleburne was killed, Hood destroyed his army out of anger for no meaningful gain. Hood's decision to attack was irrational and based on emotion and stupidity rather than logic.

Opinions?
 
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To say Hood was "irrational" denies Hood's history as a combat commander. In every battle I can think of Hood's brigade, division, or corps was ordered to aggressively contact the enemy--from the Peninsula Campaign to Franklin Hood attacked with a fury unmatched by any other Confederate or Union commander. It was his style.
Unfortunately he used up the Army of Tennessee after he took over command at Atlanta--effectively ruining that army as a formidable force.
All that said, something is different, very different about Franklin--in those two and half hours Hood suffered a 33% loss of his command, including the deaths of six general officers, the wounding of six more, and the capture of one other. I don't recall a Civil War battle that was deadly for general officers as Franklin became. It implies, to me, that Hood seriously underestimated his foe or even more seriously overestimated the ability of his force take the offensive against the enemy.
He was quoted as believing that the Army of Tennessee had become too used to fortification and defense under the leadership of Johnston and one has to wonder considering his unsuccessful but costly use of frontal charges at the battles of Atlanta and Jonesboro, if Hood had, in those battles, infused his army with a kind of fatalistic, almost suicidal attitude in the men and officers who served under his command.
Franklin, to me, stands out as a particularly vicious and unusual battle--Hood may not have been at all "irrational" at Franklin, but the officers and men who fought that battle for him certainly conducted themselves in a heroic but irrational manner, considering ultimate sacrifice they made for Hood and the South.
Hood's Soldiers certainly expected the worst & many knew Franklin would be their last battle. In preparation for their seemingly inevitable funerals, they dressed in their Best Uniforms and gave their jewellery,watches,photographs,letters,and other valuables to the Army Chaplain James M'Neilly, to be sent home to their families after the battle. How pragmatic but Sad was that!
 
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@gunny and @EricAJacobson, my error. It was thousands killed, rather than tens of thousands. Around six thousand died at Franklin. Is there a reliable record of the number killed at Nashville? One life is too many deaths, when it is your father, husband, son, or brother. So, gunny... tell me why Hood attacked the Union at Decatur, which was already razed except for a couple of buildings? This skirmish resulted in deaths, too.

No, 6,000 did not die. The number is no higher than 3,000 - something over 2,000 Confederates and perhaps 500 Federals.
 
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Could Hood have spent the time to invest Franklin, keeping enough mobile to intercept ,as needed, union movements between the two towns?

If Hood arrived early at Franklin he could have crossed upriver and moved to cut off the bridges the Union had to cross that night. There was a small fort defending the bridge though and some Union troops already across the river so it would not have a cakewalk.

Problem for Hood is he didn't arrive early; he arrived with daylight running out.
 
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If Hood arrived early at Franklin he could have crossed upriver and moved to cut off the bridges the Union had to cross that night. There was a small fort defending the bridge though and some Union troops already across the river so it would not have a cakewalk.

Problem for Hood is he didn't arrive early; he arrived with daylight running out.

December...days are very short
 
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No, 6,000 did not die. The number is no higher than 3,000 - something over 2,000 Confederates and perhaps 500 Federals.
Does that include soldiers who died in hospitals after the battle from their wounds?
 
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In all the Army of Tennessee lost 1,750 dead, 4,500 Wounded, and 702 taken Prisoner.
Yankee losses were 189 Killed, 1,030 Wounded and 1,104 Missing.

Those are the numbers that were reported. The AoT numbers are definitely low, especially in KIA and prisoners. I also think the wounded total is low, especially considering they were still 3,800 wounded in Franklin two weeks after the battle.

As for total Federal casualties, the overall total is pretty solid, but many of the missing were actually KIA.
 
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From the report of Surgeon A. J. Foard, Medical Director, Army of Tennessee:

"During the month of November: Killed, one thousand and eighty-nine [1,089]; wounded, three thousand one hundred and thirty-one [3,131] ; total, four thousand two hundred and twenty [4,220]. These casualties include the bloody battle of Franklin, Tennessee, fought November 30, 1864."

Southern Historical Society Papers , Volume XX (1892), p.131
 
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It's been noted previously in the thread that the federals were lucky that Opdycke had put his brigade in the right spot, without orders, to save the day at the critical moment.

I think the confederates also experienced some luck as well, with Wagner blundering by leaving his other two brigades out in front too long. If Wagner had followed orders, he would have had those two brigades plus Opdycke's, all in reserve behind the union center. It would have been less likely that the confederates would have broken through, and likely they would have suffered even higher casualties during the approach.
 
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It's been noted previously in the thread that the federals were lucky that Opdycke had put his brigade in the right spot, without orders, to save the day at the critical moment.

I think the confederates also experienced some luck as well, with Wagner blundering by leaving his other two brigades out in front too long. If Wagner had followed orders, he would have had those two brigades plus Opdycke's, all in reserve behind the union center. It would have been less likely that the confederates would have broken through, and likely they would have suffered even higher casualties during the approach.
I think that Hood was banking on the idea that he could approach the advance and rout them before they withdrew. That may be one of the reasons he decided to attack the way he did. I would hope he never would have attempted it without that being the case, but who knows.
 
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@gunny and @EricAJacobson, my error. It was thousands killed, rather than tens of thousands. Around six thousand died at Franklin. Is there a reliable record of the number killed at Nashville? One life is too many deaths, when it is your father, husband, son, or brother. So, gunny... tell me why Hood attacked the Union at Decatur, which was already razed except for a couple of buildings? This skirmish resulted in deaths, too.
Confederate killed at Nashville (December 15-16) probably didn't amount to more than a few hundred at most. Wounded would be in the thousands, maybe three. Captured was the greatest loss for the Rebels at Nashville which numbered several thousand.

Hood never actually attacked at Decatur. It was a demonstration to prevent the Federals from coming out of their works and harassing or slowing the passage of the army to Tuscumbia. You can't just walk past an enemy force and expect to not be harassed. Portions of Stewart's corps were distributed along the southern environs of the city, and any actual offensive actions would not have been ordered by Hood, but by lower level subordinates. There is no indication in Hood's report or others that truly imply any intent to cross at Decatur. At least nothing solid officially that I am aware of. It was just an obstacle that the army had to pass to get where they were going.
 
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It's been noted previously in the thread that the federals were lucky that Opdycke had put his brigade in the right spot, without orders, to save the day at the critical moment.

I think the confederates also experienced some luck as well, with Wagner blundering by leaving his other two brigades out in front too long. If Wagner had followed orders, he would have had those two brigades plus Opdycke's, all in reserve behind the union center. It would have been less likely that the confederates would have broken through, and likely they would have suffered even higher casualties during the approach.

Not to get into technicalities here, but I would argue that the 175th Ohio and 44th Missouri, along with the 12th and 16th Kentucky, saved the day, if you will, along with Opdycke. Opdycke did not do it alone. The 175th and 44th along had over 250 casualties at Franklin and bought a few precious moments along with the Kentucky guys for Opdycke to work his way into the fray. Even the 183rd Ohio was in the mix and absorbed nearly another 100 casualties. In my book Baptism of Fire I put forth the case, based on the available evidence, that there is no way Opdycke could have plugged the Confederate breach by himself. But Opdycke was a grand promoter...of himself.
 
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Not to get into technicalities here, but I would argue that the 175th Ohio and 44th Missouri, along with the 12th and 16th Kentucky, saved the day, if you will, along with Opdycke. Opdycke did not do it alone. The 175th and 44th along had over 250 casualties at Franklin and bought a few precious moments along with the Kentucky guys for Opdycke to work his way into the fray. Even the 183rd Ohio was in the mix and absorbed nearly another 100 casualties. In my book Baptism of Fire I put forth the case, based on the available evidence, that there is no way Opdycke could have plugged the Confederate breach by himself. But Opdycke was a grand promoter...of himself.
There were a lot of self promoters after the war.
 
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Not to get into technicalities here, but I would argue that the 175th Ohio and 44th Missouri, along with the 12th and 16th Kentucky, saved the day, if you will, along with Opdycke. Opdycke did not do it alone. The 175th and 44th along had over 250 casualties at Franklin and bought a few precious moments along with the Kentucky guys for Opdycke to work his way into the fray. Even the 183rd Ohio was in the mix and absorbed nearly another 100 casualties. In my book Baptism of Fire I put forth the case, based on the available evidence, that there is no way Opdycke could have plugged the Confederate breach by himself. But Opdycke was a grand promoter...of himself.
Yes, I got that impression too from reading a book of his letters "To Battle for God and the Right." Very opinionated and very conscious of making a name for himself.
 
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Let me add here that this topic has been discussed in many CWT threads,but I have thoroughly enjoyed this thread. I thoroughly enjoy the attention that Spring Hill/Franklin/Nashville gets too.
It is also one of my favorite areas of study of the ACW.
You will always find the AoT.interesting.
 
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After Hoover's Gap, in June 1863, there were not many battles in the western theater that were won by the Confederates.
The few that were Confederate victories involved ghastly casualties.
The fire power of the Army of the Cumberland, the speed at which United States soldiers took cover, and the degree to which they had lost their inhibitions in killing their fellow man, showed that Franklin was only slightly different than what been happening since Chickamauga.
And what happened next? Wilson's troopers crashed the left flank of Hood's army at Nashville.
 
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What happened to Early in the Shenandoah? What happened to Pickett at Five Forks? What happened to the Army of Virginia at Sailors Creek?
The gig was up. The Spencers and Henrys were pouring into the United States' army.
What Hood did was already 19 months out of date by the end of 1864.
 
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