Tommy,
Found an interesting read on the above. From the book, Allegiance, Fort Sumter, Charleston, and The Beginning of The Civil War, by David Detzer.
Chapter 15, entitled, That Little Bridge.
"Once across that little bridge the whole issue is with the sword."-- Julius Ceasar, contemplating crossing the Rebicon.
For days Jefferson Davis had been debiliated by blinding headaches. Never a jovial sort, he now looked especially grave. The dispatch he received from Beauregard on April 8 did not surprise him: "Authorized messenger from Lincoln (Robert Chew) just informed Governor Pickens and myself that provisions would be sent to Sumter peaceably, otherwise by force." Davis ordered him to prevent Sumter from getting those provisions. The fort, he said, "must be completely isolated.
The following evening Davis met with his cabinet for some time to consider what to do at long last about Fort Sumter. He spoke wistfully, fondly, of his friend Robert Anderson. But on the issue of Fort Sumter the Confederate president was coldly determined. The meeting grew emotional, even stormy. Robert Toombs of Georgia found himself unable to sit down and so strode about the room. He had arrived late and found the others talking of sending Anderson an ultimatum. Toombs strongly disagreed (at least according to his own recollections--though Toombs would seldom be reluctant to embellish a tale). He said that such an ultimatum would result in a terrible civil war. Taking such a rigid position, he warned, would place them in a position of being aggressors, just the opposite of the stand they had been pursuing. If Lincoln chose "coercion," the Confederacy would appear the innocent victims. This would appeal to the Border States, and it would gain them important sympathy in the North. Worst of all, Toombs told those in the room, being rigid now "was unnecessary." But the majority of them agreed with Davis.
Early the next morning, the 10th, Leroy P. Walker, secretary of war, wired Beauregard: If the general was convinced Lincoln's messengers were not bogus, he must immediately demand Fort Sumter's evacuation. If Anderson refused this demand, "proceed, in such manner as you may determine, to reduce it."
Now, what was the content of Lincoln's letter delivered by State Department clerk, Robert Chew, to Gov. Pickens, before all the above?
Again, from the book, Allegiance, chapter 14 entitled The Yellow Brick Road, page 249.
He (Chew) bowed to Governor Pickens, took the president's note from his pocket, read it aloud, his voice trembling slightly, then handed it to the governor. It was not a typical government message, no flowery introduction, no effusive, insincere closing remarks, not even a signature. But it was definitely clear. Lincoln hereby informed Francis Pickens that Washington was sending supplies to Fort Sumter. They would arrive soon. If there was no attempt at stopping them by anyone--South Carolina, the so-called Confederacy (the letter did not choose to dignify either one by name) --Washington would not send in reinforcements.
Another source on the above is from the book, Lincoln, by David Herbert Donald. In chapter 10 entitled, An Accidental Instrument, page 292, it states:
On April 4, Lincoln decided to send Fox's expedition to Fort Sumter, and he notified Anderson that the fleet would attempt to provision the garrison and, in case it met resistance, to reinforce it. He had taken a decisive step, but not yet an irrevocable one. Since the fleet did not actually leave New York until four or five days later, he had a little more time for maneuver. That was drastically short on April 6, when he learned as he feared, that his order to reinforce Fort Pickens had not been carried out. Meig's expedition could not possibly reach Fort Pickens before Fort Sumter must be reinforced or surrendered.
By this time Seward was almost reconciled to the inevitable, but he made one more attempt to avert hostilities. Because he had given his word to the Confederate commissioners that Sumter would not be reinforced without notice, he wrung from the President a promise to warn South Carolina officials before sending a relief expedition. On April 6, Lincoln sent Robert S. Chew, a clerk in the State Department, to Charleston with orders to inform Governor Francis Pickens that "an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only; and that, <u>if such attempt be not resisted</u>, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, will be made, without further notice." Intended to avoid provoking South Carolina authorities, this message destroyed the slight possibility that Anderson could be secretly reinforced.
The President had little hope of results from Chew's mission: he knew from Hurlbut's report that the South Carolinians would attack any ship, even one known to contain only provisions. But, in addition to giving Seward's schemes a last chance, he was building a historical record to prove his peaceable intent throughout the crisis. By this point he was fairly sure that the Sumter expedition would lead to bloodshed."
I would submit to those on this board that Lincoln did not lie or decive anyone about supplying the fort or that he would reinforce it with troops if he met interference. So lets toss that one out of the mix, shall we?
Now, as to the Fox letter that some would like to see as a sort of 'smoking gun' that Lincoln provoked the South into firing first at Fort Sumter, let's read a bit further in the same chapter above to page 293.
When Gustavus Fox, bitter over the failure of his expedition to relieve Fort Sumter, asked for endorsement from his commander-in-chief, Lincoln responded, "You and I both anticipated the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter, even if it should fail; and it is no small consolation now to feel that our anticipation is justified by the result."
These cryptic utterances did not mean that Lincoln sought to provoke war. His repeated efforts to avoid collision in the months between his inauguration and the firing on Fort Sumter showed that he adhered to his vow not to be the first to shed fraternal blood. But he had also vowed not to surrender the forts. That, he was convinced, would lead to the "actual, and immediate dissolution" of the Union. The only resolution of these contradictory positions was for the Confederates to fire the first shot.
I am of the opinion that those in the Confederate government were not fools or idiots. I am also of the opinion that these men could read between the lines of any act by the Federal Government and President Lincoln. How they could be 'tricked', 'led', 'coereced', 'forced', or any other action verb you can think of, into firing the first shot of the Civil War is beyond me. BOTH sides wanted the other to fire first at the start of any conflict. This is a known, historical fact. For reasons deemed by the officals of the Southern government, the other historical fact is the South fired first.
And Tommy, where do you get the idea that Seward was bent upon having a war with the South when he was doing everything he could to NOT reinforce Pickens and Sumter and instead, start a war with Spain, Europe or anyone else for that matter?
YMOS,
Unionblue
(Message edited by Unionblue on January 23, 2004)
(Message edited by Unionblue on January 23, 2004)