Were imported arms purchased by state gov't or by the confederate gov't?
Both
The shortage of arms at the start of the war limited greatly the number of Tennessee troops mustered into Confederate service.
In the initial stages of the war, this was true of both sides. Neither side could arm its troops without major imports of arms from Europe.
Was cartridge paper imported?
Extensively by the Confederates. Cartridge paper produced in the Confederacy was of extremely poor quality.
Any Prussian needle guns used by CS forces?
"I have seen references here and there to Confederate troops using Austrian-made cannon. Would that be the same as the Prussian needle gun?"
The Prussian needle gun was a breech loading, shoulder fired, rifle. None were imported by either the Federals or the Confederates for issue to troops. The Federals may have obtained some for foreign materiel intelligence exploitation.
Regarding the Confederacy's inability to manufacture ammunition for captured Federal breechloaders: General Robert E. Lee observed to Captain Justus Scheibert, a Prussian Army observer with the Army of Northern Virginia, that he had armed a brigade with breechloaders as a trial. But, that “In an hour and a half the men had already exhausted their ammunition. Back they came from the front. We cannot manufacture so much [ammunition], nor transport it, unless we get results. I strive to cut [the use of ammunition] to the least. We need a weapon that demands time to load, so the man knows he must value the shot – not fire before he directs it to a consequence.” The problem of ammunition supply verses ammunition expenditure was a universal problem, one which militated against the adoption of breech loading and then repeating arms for infantry in the Federal Army, as well. (Scheibert (
A Prussian Observes the American Civil War), p. 58)
Regarding the Conferacy's own wastage of imported arms: After Major General J. E. B. Stuart complained regarding the “deficiency of good arms” in the cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee, responded that after the Battle of Brandy Station and before the beginning of the Gettysburg Campaign, 2,000 Austrian rifles had been sent to Culpepper Court House, Virginia, to arm Stuart’s troopers. The arms had either been returned or thrown away by the troops. The troopers had also refused to accept 600 Enfield and Mississippi rifles. The cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia apparently regarded itself as knights arrant, for whom the only proper weapons were the revolver and the saber, with the use of infantry long arms being beneth them. This prejudice was not shared by the troops of Generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Bell Hood in the west. After the war, Hood said that “our cavalry were not cavalrymen proper, but were mounted riflemen, trained to dismount and hold in check or delay the advance of the enemy.” After their inauspicious start, the Federal cavalrymen learned the same lesson as Forrest and Hood. They ultimately became classic dragoons, trained to fight mounted with pistol and saber, as well as dismounted with the carbine, using the horse primarily as a battle taxi. Having learned that lesson, the Federal cavalry of the Army of Potomac consistently whipped Stuart’s cavalry for the remainder of the war. Things like this must have driven Gorgas absolutely nuts, given the problems of running arms into the Confederacy through the blockade. (O.R., Ser. I, Vol. 29, Part 2, p. 648; McWhiney and Jamieson, p. 134)
Then, there was the utter incompetence of much of the Federal an Confederate ordnance staff. For example, the Confederate ordnance laboratories were required to send monthly samples of their production to Richmond for testing. Dean S. Thomas in
Confederate Arsenals, Laboratories, and Ordnance Depots cites repeated letters from Brigadier General Gorgas chiding the ordnance facilities for loading small arms annumition with weights of black powder which differed from the Ordnance Department’s standard weight. But, the Confederate laboratories were loading cartridges with powder manufactured at Augusta, with powder manufactured at other Confederate facilities, and with powder imported through the blockade from various European sources. Whether we are discussing black powder made 150 years ago or modern smokeless powder made yesterday, the strength of powder will vary from manufacturing lot to lot. Competent ammunition manufacturers test each lot of powder, and will vary the weight of the load of powder used in cartridges made from that lot of powder based upon their tests to achieve the appropriate standard velocity for the cartridge being loaded. In his 27 August 1862
Rules to be observed in the Laboratories of C.S. Arsenals and Ordnance Depots, Lieutenant Colonel Mallet stated that “Eprouvettes will soon be furnished to the arsenals, when the force of each lot of powder can be determined and marked upon the barrels.” An eprouvette was a contemporary device which was used to test the strength of lots of black powder. So, it should have been expected that the amount of black powder put into cartridges would vary from lot to lot of black powder as the ammunition laboratories in Confederate arsenals and depots tested their lots of powder and loaded cartridges to achieve the appropriate standard velocity. If the laboratories were testing their powder with their eprouvettes the weights of powder charges in cartridges
should have varied somewhat from the Ordnance Departement’s standard. Am I questioning Gorgas' competence as a professional ordnance officer? Yes. And he was the man in charge of Confederate ordnance. (Thomas (
Confederate Arsenals, Laboratories, and Ordnance Depots) passim)
Regards,
Don Dixon