Stonewall What is your opinion on Jackson's Generalship???

Lee in a letter to Jackson's widow said Jackson deserved all the credit for the flank attack at Chancellorsville, it was totally his idea.

After the war, Lee refused to discuss or write about his battles, even to correct obvious errors. This letter was the first of only two times he broke his silence. It was meant to comfort her by showing that newspaper criticism of her husband was unjustified.
The second was in response to an article by R. L. Dabney, The Life and Campaigns of Lieut. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, in Southern Review, claiming that the flank attack was solely Jackson's idea.
Lee disputed the writer's claim that Jackson's movements were, "independent of the general plan of operations and undertaken at his suggestion and on his responsibility." He continued, "I have the greatest reluctance to do anything that might be considered detracting from his [Jackson's] well-deserved fame.... Every movement of an army must be well considered and properly ordered, and everyone who knew General Jackson must know that he was too good a soldier to violate this fundamental principle." Lee took responsibility for the flank attack, saying, "There is no question as to who was responsible for the operation of the Confederates, or to whom any failure would have been charged."
For the full text of the letter see Armistead L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee (New York: J. M. Stoddart, 1886), pp. 253-254.
 
A minor quibble: I don't think the Shenandoah Valley can be rightly considered 'hard country.' Yes, it is hilly in parts but it also very fertile farmland and there is abundant fresh water. It was pretty well populated for the era, so there were good roads and small towns and sympathetic villagers to help support the troops. There was even rail service in the area to connect the battlefront to Richmond and the rest of the Confederacy.

It's paradise if you compare it to the hot swampy Peninsula or the scrublands around Fredericksburg and The Wilderness.

The only possible flaw with your assessment concerns the WEATHER during the time of the Valley Campaign - it was unusually rainy and wet, making all roads except the Valley Pike bottomless morasses. I always think of it as beautiful and verdant, but especially in the cold and raw of March and the floods of June the troops had many complaints about it.
 
....one has to wonder whether actually he just got lucky once (McDowell, his only victory against an equal force) ....
It was not an equal force. Sloppy accounting has led people to believe it was.
For example, the NPS describes it here: https://www.nps.gov/abpp/shenandoah/svs3-2.html

"Forces Engaged: [c] Johnson's brigade (six regts.) and Taliaferro's (3 regts.), about 6,000 engaged. Two brigades (Milroy and Schenck), about 6,500. Milroy attacked Sitlington's Hill with 2,250."

People conclude it was an equal force because "6,000 engaged" (Confederates) seems equal to "about 6,500" for the US. But 6,500 was the total force of the two US brigades and included both engaged and not engaged (and not even present). If we instead counted the total force of the Confederates (engaged + not engaged) it would be quite a bit higher -- Jackson had two more brigades not mentioned in the quote above. Or if we compared just engaged to engaged we would see that a smaller US force attacked a larger CS force, bloodied it, and walked away.
 
In round numbers, Jackson's original Stonewall Division was around 6000 before joining with Johnson's 3ooo or so. It was therefore possibly ironic that it was Johnson's command that suffered almost the entire 400+ casualties on the Confederate side, seeing as how they had been previously purposely avoiding combat! But they were in Jackson's advancing van and supported by overwhelming numbers, so they now had no reason to continue to avoid the fight.
 
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It was not an equal force. Sloppy accounting has led people to believe it was.
For example, the NPS describes it here: https://www.nps.gov/abpp/shenandoah/svs3-2.html

"Forces Engaged: [c] Johnson's brigade (six regts.) and Taliaferro's (3 regts.), about 6,000 engaged. Two brigades (Milroy and Schenck), about 6,500. Milroy attacked Sitlington's Hill with 2,250."

People conclude it was an equal force because "6,000 engaged" (Confederates) seems equal to "about 6,500" for the US. But 6,500 was the total force of the two US brigades and included both engaged and not engaged (and not even present). If we instead counted the total force of the Confederates (engaged + not engaged) it would be quite a bit higher -- Jackson had two more brigades not mentioned in the quote above. Or if we compared just engaged to engaged we would see that a smaller US force attacked a larger CS force, bloodied it, and walked away.

Thanks for this. It's not my area of normal study....
 
Jackson has to be ranked among the top American generals. I concur with the previous posters who noted Jackson's famed campaigns in the Valley, Second Manassas and Chancellorsville. Lee himself, speculated that the battle of Gettysburg could have turned out differently had Jackson been at his side. But he certainly had his flaws, chief among them being his obsessive demand for secrecy and obedience, which wronged a number of good men including Richard Garnett and AP Hill.
You mention that Lee "speculated that the battle of Gettysburg could have turned out differently had Jackson been at his side". Can you provide a source? My understanding is that Lee was silent on the causes of his defeat there and was not one to wonder 'what if'....
 
IMO he was an able corps commander, the second best one the rebellion had, the best being Longstreet.
Jackson has long been my favorite Civil War General. For years- thanks to the 'Lost Cause' propaganda- I had a low opinion of Longstreet. The more I have studied, though, the more supportive I have become of Longstreet.
Certainly Longstreet and Jackson were the two best. Which was better? I can't criticize anyone for choosing either one....
 
Jackson has long been my favorite Civil War General. For years- thanks to the 'Lost Cause' propaganda- I had a low opinion of Longstreet. The more I have studied, though, the more supportive I have become of Longstreet.
Certainly Longstreet and Jackson were the two best. Which was better? I can't criticize anyone for choosing either one....

I used to think it strange that Lee tended to travel with Longstreet on campaigns like Second Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg and later Gettysburg and wondered if he for some reason preferred Longstreet's company? But I now think it more likely he felt he could trust Jackson to be off on his own without supervision. Maybe he was on to something, because when Longstreet was left entirely to his own devices, the results were the Suffolk and Knoxville Campaigns, both of dubious value and questionable handling. On his own, it seems Longstreet didn't really get along with his own subordinates (Lafayette McLaws and Evander Law) than Jackson did!
 
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I used to think it strange that Lee tended to travel with Longstreet on campaigns like Second Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg and later Gettysburg and wondered if he for some reason preferred Longstreet's company? But I now think it more likely he felt he could trust Jackson to be off on his own without supervision. Maybe he was on to something, because when Longstreet was left entirely to his own devices, the results were the Suffolk and Knoxville Campaigns, both of dubious value and questionable handling. On his own, it seems Longstreet didn't really get along with his own subordinates (Lafayette McLaws and Evander Law) than Jackson did!

At no time during the war was Longstreet "left entirely to his own devices". During the Suffolk Campaign, he was detached from the ANV but still under Lee's command; during the Knoxville Campaign, he was- unfortunately- under the command of Bragg.
In terms of Lee's objectives, the Suffolk Campaign was a great success. With very little loss, Longstreet kept the Union forces 'penned up' in Norfolk, while the army was able to replenish supplies from the area's agricultural resources.
The Knoxville Campaign was initiated by Bragg, with little chance for success while exposing Chattanooga to Union attack. Bragg was dividing his forces just as arrival of significant Union forces was imminent; Longstreet would himself be outnumbered by an entrenched enemy. To make matters worse, Bragg sent along his Chief Engineer, General Leadbetter, whose 'expert' revisions to Longstreet's plans took away whatever chance there was of the assault being successful.
From what I have read, Longstreet had a very good relationship with his subordinates and was revered by his men. There seem to be just two exceptions.
His relationship with McLaws (who he had recommended to replace Jackson) ruptured when he was relieved for failing to take Fort Sanders. It is worth noting that, after Davis reinstated McLaws, Lee refused to accept him back into the ANV.
Longstreet's relationship with Law seems to have been caused by friction between Law and Jenkins over the command of Hood's Division. Longstreet brought Law up on charges, which should have been decided by a military court, but instead Davis interfered. In the end Lee again sided with Longstreet, command of the Division was given Field (who quickly got control over what had become a dysfunctional unit) and the case was quietly dropped.
Lee kept his personal opinions to himself. It is clear, however that he had great respect for the ability of both Jackson and Longstreet.
There can be no doubt that Lee, Jackson and Longstreet were among the best military leaders the United States has produced.
 
At no time during the war was Longstreet "left entirely to his own devices". During the Suffolk Campaign, he was detached from the ANV but still under Lee's command; during the Knoxville Campaign, he was- unfortunately- under the command of Bragg.
In terms of Lee's objectives, the Suffolk Campaign was a great success. With very little loss, Longstreet kept the Union forces 'penned up' in Norfolk, while the army was able to replenish supplies from the area's agricultural resources.
The Knoxville Campaign was initiated by Bragg, with little chance for success while exposing Chattanooga to Union attack. Bragg was dividing his forces just as arrival of significant Union forces was imminent; Longstreet would himself be outnumbered by an entrenched enemy. To make matters worse, Bragg sent along his Chief Engineer, General Leadbetter, whose 'expert' revisions to Longstreet's plans took away whatever chance there was of the assault being successful.
From what I have read, Longstreet had a very good relationship with his subordinates and was revered by his men. There seem to be just two exceptions.
His relationship with McLaws (who he had recommended to replace Jackson) ruptured when he was relieved for failing to take Fort Sanders. It is worth noting that, after Davis reinstated McLaws, Lee refused to accept him back into the ANV.
Longstreet's relationship with Law seems to have been caused by friction between Law and Jenkins over the command of Hood's Division. Longstreet brought Law up on charges, which should have been decided by a military court, but instead Davis interfered. In the end Lee again sided with Longstreet, command of the Division was given Field (who quickly got control over what had become a dysfunctional unit) and the case was quietly dropped.
Lee kept his personal opinions to himself. It is clear, however that he had great respect for the ability of both Jackson and Longstreet.
There can be no doubt that Lee, Jackson and Longstreet were among the best military leaders the United States has produced.

Under their commands, certainly; but totally lacking any direct supervision. Even Jackson while in the Shenandoah Valley was under the command of Joe Johnston, but was largely left to conduct his campaign as he saw fit under his general directions. Of course the primary yet unstated motive in Bragg's dispatch of Longstreet to Knoxville in the first place was to remove that particular thorn (Longstreet) from his side, though having done so he proceeded to compound the error by reinforcing him and almost losing the service of arguably his best division and division commander Pat Cleburne in the process just as the Battle of Missionary Ridge was getting underway. Law appears to have thought Longstreet was showing unfair favoritism to Jenkins and whether true or not it colored his thinking.
 
I think Lee rode with Longstreet because they had built more of a bond and had long conversations that were enjoyable. Stonewall wasn't a big talker.
 
Just a tad off subject but we were talking about Longstreet...and Jackson.
I do feel Longstreet wasn't a very good independent commander as Jackson was. I refer to Longstreet being left to decide as to what was needed to gain the advantage wherever he was. In Knoxville, Longstreet pressed and pressed for more men from Bragg. Longstreet was not all confident in being left alone and always thought he was outmanned. Being this was late 63, I'm sure he was but not near as much as Longstreet pressed to Bragg about.
One thing that have always questioned about the Lee/Longstreet relationship is, why didn't Lee push to have Longstreet to command the AoT? Davis surly didn't want either Johnston or Beauguard to command it?
If Lee really thought that highly of Longstreet, I am sure Davis would have jumped at moving him there. Plus he was already somewhat accustomed to the army being he was there for the battle of Chickamauga and then moved to Knoxville.
I guess the question I pose is, why Lee didn’t recommend Longstreet for command. I guess this could be moved to another section but I have wondered this.
I think both were good generals, both proved their worth but both also had their different strengths and weaknesses.
 
You mention that Lee "speculated that the battle of Gettysburg could have turned out differently had Jackson been at his side". Can you provide a source? My understanding is that Lee was silent on the causes of his defeat there and was not one to wonder 'what if'....

I wish I could remember where that came from so I cannot provide a specific source. I can only say that Jackson had an uncanny ability to understand and aggressively execute Lee's plans without the need for detailed written orders. In contrast, General Ewell did not act with similar initiative when given the discretionary authority by Lee to take Cemetery and Culp's Hill at Gettysburg.
 
I wish I could remember where that came from so I cannot provide a specific source. I can only say that Jackson had an uncanny ability to understand and aggressively execute Lee's plans without the need for detailed written orders. In contrast, General Ewell did not act with similar initiative when given the discretionary authority by Lee to take Cemetery and Culp's Hill at Gettysburg.

Based on the conflicting orders bring sent by Lee and his knowledge on the ground, I'm not sure that Jackson would have done anything differently than Ewell did.

Ryan
 
Based on the conflicting orders bring sent by Lee and his knowledge on the ground, I'm not sure that Jackson would have done anything differently than Ewell did.

Ryan
A what if senerio here, but the thing with Jackson and Lee was they work very well together without orders being sent back and forth as much as Lee properly had to do with Ewell. I think Lee would have allowed Jackson to determine what was needed without issuing orders to him.
I personal think, Jackson would have done better than Ewell, just for the simple reasons of I think, 1-Jackson was a better commander than Ewell. 2- Lee would have let Jackson control the flow of battle. 3- The troops under Jackson felt invincible and fought with that attitude that Ewell would not accomplish.
 
I think Lee rode with Longstreet because they had built more of a bond and had long conversations that were enjoyable. Stonewall wasn't a big talker.
I wish I could remember where that came from so I cannot provide a specific source. I can only say that Jackson had an uncanny ability to understand and aggressively execute Lee's plans without the need for detailed written orders. In contrast, General Ewell did not act with similar initiative when given the discretionary authority by Lee to take Cemetery and Culp's Hill at Gettysburg.
I wish I could remember where that came from so I cannot provide a specific source. I can only say that Jackson had an uncanny ability to understand and aggressively execute Lee's plans without the need for detailed written orders. In contrast, General Ewell did not act with similar initiative when given the discretionary authority by Lee to take Cemetery and Culp's Hill at Gettysburg.

Certainly Ewell- a good military leader- was not Jackson. Still, Ewell was there: his troops had a long, rough day. Given the same circumstances, would Jackson have pushed the Union forces off Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863?
It is all too easy for 'Monday morning quarterbacks' to second guess Ewell's actions.
 
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A what if senerio here, but the thing with Jackson and Lee was they work very well together without orders being sent back and forth as much as Lee properly had to do with Ewell. I think Lee would have allowed Jackson to determine what was needed without issuing orders to him.
I personal think, Jackson would have done better than Ewell, just for the simple reasons of I think, 1-Jackson was a better commander than Ewell. 2- Lee would have let Jackson control the flow of battle. 3- The troops under Jackson felt invincible and fought with that attitude that Ewell would not accomplish.

Lee was very concerned about fighting while his army was scattered and had been issuing orders all day warning his commanders not to bring on a general engagement. Even Lee's order to Ewell about attacking Cemetery Hill had an addition about not bringing on a general engagement. Replacing Ewell with Jackson is not going to change those concerns.

Additionally, Jackson would have to consider with which troops to make an attack. Early's Division was in moderate shape but had fought much of the afternoon and was scattered within the town and east of Gettysburg. Rodes' Division was in worse shape and wasn't in position to make an attack. Not to mention that there wasn't much room to form for the attack and would have to be done under the muzzles of the artillery and infantry on the hill.

Lastly, the Union position on Cemetery Hill was awfully formidable. Forty plus guns were facing north and west with solid lines formed behind stone walls. Plus, there is no intelligence about who is on the hill. Is it the remnants of the two corps which fought that morning only? Had they been reinforced? By whom and how much?

All that said, and with Lee's admonishments to avoid starting a major fight, Jackson would be hard-pressed to make such an attack. IMO, based on what was known at the time, Ewell made the right call.

Ryan
 
I can only say that Jackson had an uncanny ability to understand and aggressively execute Lee's plans without the need for detailed written orders.
Like the way he failed to show up at the battle of Beaver Dam Creek;
showed up late to Battle of Gaines Mill;
and took a nap at White Oak Swamp Creek
 
Just a tad off subject but we were talking about Longstreet...and Jackson.
I do feel Longstreet wasn't a very good independent commander as Jackson was. I refer to Longstreet being left to decide as to what was needed to gain the advantage wherever he was. In Knoxville, Longstreet pressed and pressed for more men from Bragg. Longstreet was not all confident in being left alone and always thought he was outmanned. Being this was late 63, I'm sure he was but not near as much as Longstreet pressed to Bragg about.
One thing that have always questioned about the Lee/Longstreet relationship is, why didn't Lee push to have Longstreet to command the AoT? Davis surly didn't want either Johnston or Beauguard to command it?
If Lee really thought that highly of Longstreet, I am sure Davis would have jumped at moving him there. Plus he was already somewhat accustomed to the army being he was there for the battle of Chickamauga and then moved to Knoxville.
I guess the question I pose is, why Lee didn’t recommend Longstreet for command. I guess this could be moved to another section but I have wondered this.
I think both were good generals, both proved their worth but both also had their different strengths and weaknesses.
Perhaps we are drifting off subject. I'll just say that Longstreet certainly was concerned about dividing the Confederate force and trying to take Knoxville while defending Chattanooga, This is a contrast with Jackson, who confidently agreed with Lee's decision to divide his force and allow him to take Harper's Ferry.
Of course, Jackson's confidence was buoyed by his familiarity with Harper's Ferry.
Was the capture of Harper's Ferry- or Knoxville- vital to the Confederate war effort? Some suggest Harper's Ferry had to be taken in order to remove a threat against Lee as he moved into Maryland, yet he made no effort to remove that threat during the Gettysburg Campaign.
Where does Harper's Ferry rank in 'Jackson's greatest victories'?
Thoughts?
 
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