Chancellorsville Chancellorsville, A Recipe For Disaster For The ANV!

Regarding the fuses?
No, regarding the decision to make the charge where it was made. It exposed the charge to enfilade fire from artillery batteries positioned at the Round Tops. Alexander felt the wiser choice for the charge was at the bend in the fishhook. He felt that was much better ground and offered the Union no opportunity of enfilade fire.
 
Lee's supply of soldiers was growing thin and replacements were slim. The Union seemed to have an unlimited supply of replacements. Yes, I think Lee "bit off" more than he could chew when he went on to Gettysburg.
 
Once again: I did a random search for "East Cavalry Field" and once again, I run into our old friend @Eric Wittenberg who comments on this topic here: http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=3045

When analyzing all of these factors, and given Stuart’s dispositions and deployments on what became East Cavalry Field, it seems quite obvious to me that Stuart’s primary mission was to guard the flank. He deployed in an ambush formation, intended to draw David M. Gregg’s troopers in and engage them, thereby keeping them tied up and unable to make that dash around the flank. Stuart, always the opportunist, was looking for opportunities, and should he be able to defeat and scatter Gregg’s troopers, then, and ONLY then, would he attempt to make his own dash down the Low Dutch Road and into the rear of the Army of the Potomac’s position.

Finally, neither Lee nor Stuart EVER said anything about Stuart’s activities that day being somehow coordinated with the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble assault on the Union center. That, to me, is proof positive that neither officer contemplated anything other than what they both said in the official reports.​
 
Once again: I did a random search for "East Cavalry Field" and once again, I run into our old friend @Eric Wittenberg who comments on this topic here: http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=3045

When analyzing all of these factors, and given Stuart’s dispositions and deployments on what became East Cavalry Field, it seems quite obvious to me that Stuart’s primary mission was to guard the flank. He deployed in an ambush formation, intended to draw David M. Gregg’s troopers in and engage them, thereby keeping them tied up and unable to make that dash around the flank. Stuart, always the opportunist, was looking for opportunities, and should he be able to defeat and scatter Gregg’s troopers, then, and ONLY then, would he attempt to make his own dash down the Low Dutch Road and into the rear of the Army of the Potomac’s position.

Finally, neither Lee nor Stuart EVER said anything about Stuart’s activities that day being somehow coordinated with the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble assault on the Union center. That, to me, is proof positive that neither officer contemplated anything other than what they both said in the official reports.​
When his reconnaissance by fire was successful Stuart set a perfect ambush for Gregg at the Rummel farm. Only problem was Gregg didn't charge.
 
No, regarding the decision to make the charge where it was made. It exposed the charge to enfilade fire from artillery batteries positioned at the Round Tops. Alexander felt the wiser choice for the charge was at the bend in the fishhook. He felt that was much better ground and offered the Union no opportunity of enfilade fire.

Where's the bend in the fish hook? Cemetery Hill, and the town of Gettysburg. In other words, the town would be the same obstacle to a charge it was for Ewell on July 1.
 
Where's the bend in the fish hook? Cemetery Hill, and the town of Gettysburg. In other words, the town would be the same obstacle to a charge it was for Ewell on July 1.
That's exactly what I thought when I read it. He must have meant from the same approach as you tour. Charging directly from the area of the school straight up Cemetery Hill. That's the only feasible location.
 
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Lee's supply of soldiers was growing thin and replacements were slim. The Union seemed to have an unlimited supply of replacements.
The Union did not have an unlimited supply of men.
There was clearly a limit to how much the northern voters would take. This limited supply was just bigger than the limited supply Lee had.
 
Where's the bend in the fish hook? Cemetery Hill, and the town of Gettysburg. In other words, the town would be the same obstacle to a charge it was for Ewell on July 1.
Oh and lets not forget. Alexander was an artillerist not a commander. His thoughts only clearly show he was not in favor of making the charge from where it was actually made. He deemed it an error.
 
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That's exactly what I thought when I read it. He must have meant from the same approach as you tour. Charging directly from the area of the school straight up Cemetery Ridge. That's the only feasible location.

There were two feasible approaches. One was the approach taken by the Louisiana Tigers, which called for forming on the eastern end of town and charging across that open field. The Tigers came close to succeeding, but it's an open question if another assault would have.

The second was across the field from Seminary Ridge. Sound familiar? :smile:
 
I would think that Cushing would argue that they did concentrate their fire and that it was effective. :wink:

Ryan
And I would disagree. The ANV fired so many rounds that simply by random they had to hit something. Most likely the ANV artillery directly opposite Cushing caused the damage inflicted on him. According to Hunt there was no concentration of fire by the ANV.

(Perhaps this is too much of a deviation from the OP. Apologies to War Horse.)
 
And I would disagree. The ANV fired so many rounds that simply by random they had to hit something. Most likely the ANV artillery directly opposite Cushing caused the damage inflicted on him. According to Hunt there was no concentration of fire by the ANV.

(Perhaps this is too much of a deviation from the OP. Apologies to War Horse.)

I was being rather tongue in cheek since Cushing's battery took a severe pounding.

R
 
Severe is an understatement.

Indeed. And several other batteries along the ridge took a beating during the bombardment. While Hunt is correct that the Confederates did not concentrate their fire on a single point but rather fired at the batteries along the ridge, that also assumes that there was a fixed point as the focal point for the attack, and I'm not sure that there was. For the most part, the Confederates did drive off a handful of guns but they were replaced by fresh batteries before the attack kicked off. It's difficult to foresee that without detailed knowledge of the enemy's strength and dispositions.

Ryan
 
The ANV guns were firing at a linear target with no depth that ran parallel to their own gun line. You can see and understand why the fuse issue and visibility were so critical. Tough nut to crack.
 
Are you conceding that General Lee dictated the terms of the Battle of Gettysburg? That General Meade had nothing to do with it? That's refreshing, but again, I don't think it's true.

The whole thing was an accident.

Dare we get back to the question in the OP?
No accident. Meade chased Lee down....intentionally.
 
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