Chancellorsville Chancellorsville, A Recipe For Disaster For The ANV!

Good question. As I'm not one who knows or really studies battle details (pretty much accept the Cliff notes versions) I'll be interested to hear what those who do study such detail have to say. I will offer, though, that I think Lee, on a roll, might have let himself start to think he was invincible and that might have had something to do with his decision on the third day at Gettysburg (and maybe his decision to invade a second time).

Attrition was becoming a critical factor and I'd think Lee must have seen that and it might have pushed him to make the invasion gamble and not give it up when maybe he should have (i.e. win a big one on northern ground and hope they'd throw in the towel). I go back and forth on whether Lee should have invaded in the first place but can't get around the feeling that he should have disengaged at Gettysburg after day two and either tried to get Meade to attack him on more favorable ground or just retreated and worked on the next plan. But that's a different thread.
I don't think Picketts charge was initially a bad idea, he was counting on the artillery to weaken the federal line enough to break through and then possibly moving on Cemetery Hill. I believe if Lee had known that the artillery was so ineffective then he would have called off the assault. I have read somewhere that the fuses on the confederate artillery shells were defective causing them to not explode on target but to bounce behind enemy lines before detonating
 
I don't think Picketts charge was initially a bad idea, he was counting on the artillery to weaken the federal line enough to break through and then possibly moving on Cemetery Hill. I believe if Lee had known that the artillery was so ineffective then he would have called off the assault. I have read somewhere that the fuses on the confederate artillery shells were defective causing them to not explode on target but to bounce behind enemy lines before detonating

Yeah, I've read about the bad fuses too. Still seems like too big of a gamble to me. Since he couldn't determine if his artillery was effective, and effectiveness of the artillery was critical to success, then it was really a roll of the dice sort of thing. Given that it seems to me that once things got going Lee should have seen that his artillery wasn't effective and called off the attack rather than continuing to send those men across a mile of open terrain.

But I wasn't there and it's easy for me, knowing what happened, to pass judgment. I just wish Lee hadn't done it.
 
I don't think Picketts charge was initially a bad idea, he was counting on the artillery to weaken the federal line enough to break through and then possibly moving on Cemetery Hill. I believe if Lee had known that the artillery was so ineffective then he would have called off the assault. I have read somewhere that the fuses on the confederate artillery shells were defective causing them to not explode on target but to bounce behind enemy lines before detonating

It was initially a horrible idea
 
The problem with Pickett's Charge is that while an initial breach is possible, there was nothing to follow any possible success up. The three divisions committed to the attack were not going to be enough to both break the Union line and continue the offensive afterwards. They needed substantial reinforcements to do that. The Rebels had none to give. The Union had plenty close at hand. Lee's plan was deeply flawed in this way; there was no possible way for the men committed to the attack to fulfill its lofty goals. This, better than anything, illustrates what some people have labeled Lee's overconfidence in the aftermath of Chancellorsville.
 
The problem with Pickett's Charge is that while an initial breach is possible, there was nothing to follow any possible success up. The three divisions committed to the attack were not going to be enough to both break the Union line and continue the offensive afterwards. They needed substantial reinforcements to do that. The Rebels had none to give. The Union had plenty close at hand. Lee's plan was deeply flawed in this way; there was no possible way for the men committed to the attack to fulfill its lofty goals. This, better than anything, illustrates what some people have labeled Lee's overconfidence in the aftermath of Chancellorsville.

Unless, of course, there were other troops assigned to exploit a breakthrough.

 
The problem with Pickett's Charge is that while an initial breach is possible, there was nothing to follow any possible success up. The three divisions committed to the attack were not going to be enough to both break the Union line and continue the offensive afterwards.

This is one of those topics that I have looked at several times, and my conclusions keep changing each time -- a lot at first, and more fine tuning, lately. To actually walk the battlefield really helped to put things in perspective.
 
Yeah, I've read about the bad fuses too. Still seems like too big of a gamble to me. Since he couldn't determine if his artillery was effective, and effectiveness of the artillery was critical to success, then it was really a roll of the dice sort of thing. Given that it seems to me that once things got going Lee should have seen that his artillery wasn't effective and called off the attack rather than continuing to send those men across a mile of open terrain.

But I wasn't there and it's easy for me, knowing what happened, to pass judgment. I just wish Lee hadn't done it.

The thing is, it was rather effective in driving off a significant part of the Union batteries on Cemetery Ridge. But there were plenty of reserves to bring into action, so although effective it wasn't enough. Plus Union artillery chief Hunt kind of rope-a-doped the Confederates by having his guns slacken fire to conserve ammo for the expected attack.
 
Unless, of course, there were other troops assigned to exploit a breakthrough.

Thank you for the information. I was not aware that the plans for reinforcing the attack if successful were so extensive. Still, I think the Union would have been able to use their advantage of interior lines to rush reinforcements to the breach faster than the Rebels could have taken advantage of it.
 
When you look at a commanders decisions you have to look at situation through his eyes not your own. Based on what Lee knew at the time he felt it was very likely he could break the Union line. We're also forgetting that Lee had planned on Jeb Stuart getting into the Federal Rear which alone would have made it difficult for Union artillery reserve's to be brought up
 
We're also forgetting that Lee had planned on Jeb Stuart getting into the Federal Rear which alone would have made it difficult for Union artillery reserve's to be brought up

Really? What's your evidence for this claim?

I have studied this issue for 20+ years, have read and seen every known legitimate source--not that steaming pile of science fiction by Carhart--and have never seen a single shred of evidence that says that this was the case.

If you know of some legitimate source of tangible evidence other than Carhart and wishful thinking by Union veterans, I would like to know what it is.

And please don't cite Carhart to me. That book is nothing but academic fraud. Tucker's recent book on Pickett's Charge repeats Carhart's fraud, so please don't give me that other steaming pile as a source either. Neither is a legitimate source.
 
Really? What's your evidence for this claim?

I have studied this issue for 20+ years, have read and seen every known legitimate source--not that steaming pile of science fiction by Carhart--and have never seen a single shred of evidence that says that this was the case.

If you know of some legitimate source of tangible evidence other than Carhart and wishful thinking by Union veterans, I would like to know what it is.

And please don't cite Carhart to me. That book is nothing but academic fraud. Tucker's recent book on Pickett's Charge repeats Carhart's fraud, so please don't give me that other steaming pile as a source either. Neither is a legitimate source.
I just remember reading it a few years back but I don't remember the book. I'll do some searching after I get off work. But if not to get into the Union rear then what was Stuart doing so far east? From what I understand it was to cut off any avenues of escape and to act on any sucesses that Pickett's charge created
 
I just remember reading it a few years back but I don't remember the book. I'll do some searching after I get off work. But if not to get into the Union rear then what was Stuart doing so far east? From what I understand it was to cut off any avenues of escape and to act on any sucesses that Pickett's charge created

According to Stuart, he was out there to guard the left flank of the Army. Neither he nor Lee ever mentioned him being part of a greater plan for Pickett's Charge.

Ryan
 
According to Stuart, he was out there to guard the left flank of the Army. Neither he nor Lee ever mentioned him being part of a greater plan for Pickett's Charge.

Ryan
I stand corrected then. I still feel like he would have had orders to block any retreat though. Lee used a lot of Napoleon's tactics during the war, Pickett's Charge being one of them. Wasn't it common for Napoleon to use his cavalry to cut off retreat and chase down fleeing enemies? I understand that not having proof of it makes it just a theory but at least it's a plausible theory.
 
I stand corrected then. I still feel like he would have had orders to block any retreat though. Lee used a lot of Napoleon's tactics during the war, Pickett's Charge being one of them. Wasn't it common for Napoleon to use his cavalry to cut off retreat and chase down fleeing enemies? I understand that not having proof of it makes it just a theory but at least it's a plausible theory.

If he had such orders, no one ever mentioned them. The biggest issue with him over on the Hanover Road to cut off retreat is that that is not the direction the Union army would retreat. They'd be heading south and southeast, not east and northeast.

Ryan
 
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I just remember reading it a few years back but I don't remember the book. I'll do some searching after I get off work. But if not to get into the Union rear then what was Stuart doing so far east? From what I understand it was to cut off any avenues of escape and to act on any sucesses that Pickett's charge created

He was there to cover that flank. On the afternoon of July 2, between Brinkerhoff's Ridge and Hunterstown, four full brigades of Union cavalry--fully half of the AoP Cavalry Corps--was operating either on Lee's flank (in the case of Brinkerhoff's Ridge) or beyond it (at Hunterstown). Given that fact, is it any real surprise that Lee would send Stuart with a very large force of cavalry out there to guard that flank? Or that Lee called Imboden's brigade to the battlefield on the morning of July 3 and placed it behind his center so he would have a force to react if that Yankee cavalry got around his flank and into his rear?

That was Stuart's primary mission. IF the opportunity presented itself to make some mischief in the Union rear, fine. But that was not his primary mission. Read Stuart's report. Read Lee's. And adopt Occam's Razor when thinking about this: the simplest explanation is the most likely one. Nothing else makes any sense.
 
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