Chancellorsville Chancellorsville, A Recipe For Disaster For The ANV!

It makes all the sense in the world. Going to Harrisburg meant the AotP had to come after him.

That would be true had he sent his Army to Philadelphia. Do we have credible evidence of General Meade's pre-meditated, diabolical plot to fight at Gettysburg? I don't think so.

It was an unanticipated accident, on both sides.
 
That would be true had he sent his Army to Philadelphia. Do we have credible evidence of General Meade's pre-meditated, diabolical plot to fight at Gettysburg? I don't think so.

It was an unanticipated accident, on both sides.

Who said anything about Meade? Stop using straw man arguments.
 
Who said anything about Meade? Stop using straw man arguments.

Are you conceding that General Lee dictated the terms of the Battle of Gettysburg? That General Meade had nothing to do with it? That's refreshing, but again, I don't think it's true.

The whole thing was an accident.

Dare we get back to the question in the OP?
 
I was just re-reading this passage:

Lee divided his much smaller army in the face of the enemy (at Chancellorsville) and took the offensive even though it was outnumbered more than two to one. He left only 13,000 men in place to hold the body of the Army of the Potomac while sending the bulk of his army off on a daring flank march. The success of this audacious plan set the stage for the debacle that befell the Army of Northern Virginia on July 3, 1863. http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=473
These are astoundingly lopsided numbers/odds. Was it a gamble, or did Lee know Hooker well enough to anticipate the results?
 
Are you conceding that General Lee dictated the terms of the Battle of Gettysburg? That General Meade had nothing to do with it? That's refreshing, but again, I don't think it's true.

The whole thing was an accident.

Dare we get back to the question in the OP?
I believe Lee wanted to draw the AOP into a fight. Where didn't matter. Without Stuart's Intel he was forced to wait and try to draw them out on his own. He was seriously holding out for word from Stuart who tried in vein to send it to Lee. ( the lost messages received in Richmond that never made there way to Lee)[/QUOTE]
 
I was just re-reading this passage:

Lee divided his much smaller army in the face of the enemy (at Chancellorsville) and took the offensive even though it was outnumbered more than two to one. He left only 13,000 men in place to hold the body of the Army of the Potomac while sending the bulk of his army off on a daring flank march. The success of this audacious plan set the stage for the debacle that befell the Army of Northern Virginia on July 3, 1863. http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=473
These are astoundingly lopsided numbers/odds. Was it a gamble, or did Lee know Hooker well enough to anticipate the results?
Once Jacksom told Lee his plan. Lee replied what will you leave me? Good stuff
 
I was just re-reading this passage:

Lee divided his much smaller army in the face of the enemy (at Chancellorsville) and took the offensive even though it was outnumbered more than two to one. He left only 13,000 men in place to hold the body of the Army of the Potomac while sending the bulk of his army off on a daring flank march. The success of this audacious plan set the stage for the debacle that befell the Army of Northern Virginia on July 3, 1863. http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=473
These are astoundingly lopsided numbers/odds. Was it a gamble, or did Lee know Hooker well enough to anticipate the results?

Both. You plays the cards you got. Lee and Jackson won this one, big.
 
Are you conceding that General Lee dictated the terms of the Battle of Gettysburg? That General Meade had nothing to do with it? That's refreshing, but again, I don't think it's true.

The whole thing was an accident.

Dare we get back to the question in the OP?

All I said was Lee predicted a battle at Gettysburg. I'm not conceding anything because I haven't argued anything else. Edited by Chellers, Moderator.
 
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According to my information there where no 2 year contracts signed in 61.

There where 87,588 9 month contracts signed from august 62 and they would be going home...

Several states recruited troops in 1861 with 2 year terms of service. For example, New York's first 38 infantry regiments were 2-year units and went home between May and June 1863. Combining that with the 9-month regiments mustered into service in the Autumn of 1862, the Army of the Potomac was losing an awful lot of veteran combat troops going into the Gettysburg Campaign.

Ryan
 
Once Jacksom told Lee his plan. Lee replied what will you leave me? Good stuff

Yep, that's what the Ranger at Chancellorsville told us also. What made me say in my previous post that Lee merely more or less nodded approval. Sincerely (and said as a Lee fan), the term "Lee divided his army" of course is technically right, as he gave the order, but it gives Lee a bit too much credit, IMHO. The plan was not his idea. And frankly I think it needed a little pep talk from Jackson before Lee brought himself to let go of such a massive body of soldiers including his "right arm" Jackson... The plan went well (besides Lee eventually lost his "right arm" - which he could not know then, because at first everything looked like a timely recovery for Jackson after the amputation) but I cannot help me, I think Lee himself was a bit surprised how well it went. So he came to trust his luck and God's helping hand and thought at Gettysburg that things will turn out favorably in the end for him.
I believe Lee wanted to draw the AOP into a fight. Where didn't matter.
Hmm, I think "where" played a part also. Terrain did matter. But you are right, "where" was maybe less important than "when" and his reluctance to become greatly engaged with the enemy sure was due to his lack of intel from Stuart and it was also due to the fact that the ANV was spread out so much and had to be concentrated before becoming a real threat to the enemy. And maybe the shock about losing Jackson sat deep still and the uncertainties how the newly structured Second Corps would prove itself in battle sure did their share, too.
 
He made a major difference against Grant at the battle of the Wilderness prior to his wounding. His efforts at Suffolk were primarily a foraging expedition. Both his opportunities of independent command were hampered to say the least.

Longstreet was definitely hampered at Knoxville, to say the least. Had he been at Chattanooga, I think that battle may have been very different. And had he been a corps commander under Joe Johnston in front of Sherman's campaign against Atlanta, I think Sherman would have been delayed longer. Imagine a battle pitting Longstreet against George Thomas.
 
For informational purposes, these are the regiments that the Army of the Potomac lost between Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, including both 9-month and 2-year men:

Provost Guard (formerly in the First Corps): 3 regiments
First Corps: 10 regiments
Second Corps: 5 regiments
Third Corps: 4 regiments
Fifth Corps: 13 regiments
Sixth Corps: 11 regiments
Eleventh Corps: 1 regiment
Twelfth Corps: 4 regiments

I haven't done the math in regards to the numbers lost, but 51 regiments represents a huge manpower loss, particularly among veteran units.

Ryan
 
Longstreet was definitely hampered at Knoxville, to say the least. Had he been at Chattanooga, I think that battle may have been very different. And had he been a corps commander under Joe Johnston in front of Sherman's campaign against Atlanta, I think Sherman would have been delayed longer. Imagine a battle pitting Longstreet against George Thomas.
Longstreet was certainly performed better as a subordinate commander than an independent commander. Problem is, take him away permanently from the ANV, especially at Gettysburg, Lee would have been hard pressed for a replacement considering what he had to do to replace Jackson.
 
IMO, Lee used the victory at Chancellorsville to invade north for various reasons: He hoped the campaign would result in a political and ideally a strategic military victory, to alleviate war weary Virginia, and to garner much needed food and other supplies. Furthermore, Lee knew he needed to act or the AOP would return again and again.
 
Longstreet was certainly performed better as a subordinate commander than an independent commander. Problem is, take him away permanently from the ANV, especially at Gettysburg, Lee would have been hard pressed for a replacement considering what he had to do to replace Jackson.

If Lee also had to replace Longstreet, he may not have rolled the dice on an invasion. At least with Longstreet, he had an experienced officer to rely on but with three new corps commanders, that would be a very tough call.

Ryan
 
Fortune favors the bold. Boldness certainly played a role in the Confederate viçtory at Chancellorsville, but boldness also exacts a price. The loss of combat leadership and veteran troops in the ANV was severe. It must have had an impact on the chances for success at Gettysburg.
 
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Yep. I cover this in quite some depth in my award-winning biography of Extra Billy Smith. He was a very good politician and glad-hander. The same cannot be said of his martial/tactical prowess as a brigadier general.
I love it. It's nice to meet you sir! Please give us your reasoning why he should have been protected and allowed to hold such a rank in the ANV. I can't believe Lee would allow such a weak link to exist.
 
I love it. It's nice to meet you sir! Please give us your reasoning why he should have been protected and allowed to hold such a rank in the ANV. I can't believe Lee would allow such a weak link to exist.

He allowed John Brockenbrough to command a brigade and it doesn't get much worse than that. Although, old Billy does give him a run for his money.

Ryan
 
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