Stonewall Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign: A Synopsis and Index to Threads

I read a book published in the 1860s by a Lt. Col. of a upper Mid-Western state that was part of Banks' Army of the Gulf during the Siege of Port Hudson. It was named "Among the Cotton Theives", an appropriate title IMO.
The writer was a Democrat, and by nature a descenter of Republican policy of the day, including all things Banks.
In his writings about the operations around New Orleans and his journey to from that city to the battlefield, he mentioned several times that the men were in constant anxiety about the rumored empending arrival of Stonewall Jackson and a 40,000 man army that would sack New Orleans, and then move on to capture Banks and the Grant.
What was at that time just a rumor among blue privates now sounds like the best plan I've ever heard of for reversing the course of the war in 1863. It seems to me to be very plausible.
Instead of sending Longstreet to Suffolk, detach Stonewall with 10,000 men from the 2nd Corps. Combine that force with some of the rabble Johnston was wrangling together in Canton. Now Jackson has 30,000 men in Hattiesburg, and he's moving on NOLA and Emory's garrison of 5,000 blue bellies.
After sacking NOLA, ferry Taylor's 6,000 men across the river, and move out to whip Banks.
Banks would be begging Grant for men, and forced to abandon his siege because He must now turn about face to meet Jackson (once again), who now has more men than he does. Banks would retreat in all likelihood, freeing up 5,000 effective from the Port Hudson Garrison to join in Jackson's army.
Now you'd see a showdown. The best part.... Banks had the highest rank out of any Union Major General in the South. Grant would be under his control once they combined, which is why they never did.
Fearful rumors of Jackson's impending arrival flew throughout the South and many northern areas until the day he died, from places he never reached--like DC and apparently New Orleans--to places he did get to but not very effectively, like the sites of the Seven Days. McClellan's fear of Jackson being "on the way" must have played some part in his abandoning his offensive..
 
Fearful rumors of Jackson's impending arrival flew throughout the South and many northern areas until the day he died, from places he never reached--like DC and apparently New Orleans--to places he did get to but not very effectively, like the sites of the Seven Days. McClellan's fear of Jackson being "on the way" must have played some part in his abandoning his offensive..
It's rather like a similar story that in Tennessee a Confederate raiding party untruthfully told a surrounded Union blockhouse garrison they were led by Nathan Bedford Forrest, resulting in their immediate surrender. One Reb involved was quoted as having written afterwards, "The very name of Forrest is a host unto itself."
 
It's rather like a similar story that in Tennessee a Confederate raiding party untruthfully told a surrounded Union blockhouse garrison they were led by Nathan Bedford Forrest, resulting in their immediate surrender. One Reb involved was quoted as having written afterwards, "The very name of Forrest is a host unto itself."
I think If Jackson had been sent to Louisiana, he would have found in Taylor second in command, with ample knowledge of the area. Brig Gen Tom Green would also have been a good tool, much like Ashby Turner.

Jackson had to mold that little Army of the Valley into an effective force. He relieved quite a few ineffectives, and that made the mediocre colonels and brigade commanders even better. Lets face it, Jackson's presence was very powerful. It scared the enemy and it hardened his own army. Ewell, Hill, Taliaferro, along with many others, never were as effective before or sense when they rode and fought with Jackson. The man was an enigma.

Taylor leaned heavily on his lessons learned from Jackson during his time in Louisiana, and with much success. Bragg mentioned Jackson to his underlings as an example of how they must proceed prior to his invasion of Kentucky, and was successful up until he lost his nerve and retreated. Hood tried to channel the spirit Jackson's & Lee's flank attacks and, to no avail, during the Atlanta Campaign. He had studied their successful maneuvers with awe and great vigor. He was certain that he could beat Sherman with the same tactics and determination, but victory eluded him.
 
if you'll remember from this thread part of Jackson's success in the Shenandoah Valley was his familiarity with the terrain.
How important was that to his success? How much of it was from his own knowledge as opposed to from other officers (Hotchkiss, Ashby, Ewell)
If he went west, he would work with officers local to that area -- Mouton, Taylor, etc, so I wont think it would be a problem.
 
How important was that to his success? How much of it was from his own knowledge as opposed to from other officers (Hotchkiss, Ashby, Ewell)
If he went west, he would work with officers local to that area -- Mouton, Taylor, etc, so I wont think it would be a problem.
I like what you're saying here. Jackson didn't know the lower valley any better than the next guy who had passed thru that region a time or two. He did, however have time to get familiar with it.

His knowledge of the terrain in Louisiana & Mississippi would be at least on-par with the Yankees. The Yanks got their info from runaway slaves and loyalist, both of which were not trained or seasoned military men (for the most part) with an eye for advantageous ground. Jackson's sources would include a few West Point trained men with vast knowledge of the landscape. He would definatley have to learn to rely on them more than usual, which would have been out of character for the man.
 
I tend to think Jackson's success might not have been quite as great in Louisiana and the west (midwest) as it was in Virginia. Jackson made considerable use of mountains, particularly in the Valley campaign but also in the Maryland campaign,to disguise his movements, and mountains are in short supply in Louisiana.

Also his health problems, imagined and real, may have played a part. Little attention has been given to the fever he suffered during the Seven Days (possibly a malaria attack) and his health might have really suffered in Louisiana. It;s actually hard to imagine Stonewall Jackson being entirely effective in swampland.
 
I think If Jackson had been sent to Louisiana, he would have found in Taylor second in command, with ample knowledge of the area. Brig Gen Tom Green would also have been a good tool, much like Ashby Turner...

By that time you propose E. Kirby Smith was already commanding the Trans-Mississippi with Taylor HIS subordinate. Jackson could probably have been wedged in between them as a field commander, but his position would've been similar to Longstreet's under Bragg a few months later. No question about the usefulness of men like Taylor and Green, but I suspect Stonewall would've found Green's Texans as unruly as Ashby's Virginians, with whom he had numerous clashes!

I like what you're saying here. Jackson didn't know the lower valley any better than the next guy who had passed thru that region a time or two. He did, however have time to get familiar with it...

In fact he had almost an entire year to "get familiar with it", from assuming command at Harpers Ferry in Spring, 1861, and even more after his return to Winchester following Bull Run to take command of the Valley District. He continued to learn through the terrible Romney Campaign that winter, up until his forced exit from Winchester in the face of Banks' superior numbers.

I tend to think Jackson's success might not have been quite as great in Louisiana and the west (midwest) as it was in Virginia. Jackson made considerable use of mountains, particularly in the Valley campaign but also in the Maryland campaign,to disguise his movements, and mountains are in short supply in Louisiana.

Also his health problems, imagined and real, may have played a part. Little attention has been given to the fever he suffered during the Seven Days (possibly a malaria attack) and his health might have really suffered in Louisiana. It;s actually hard to imagine Stonewall Jackson being entirely effective in swampland.

Another thing to remember about Jackson is that he very much considered himself to be fighting in defense of his homeland, Western Virginia, where he was born, reared, and made his home; at the time there was no political division and he considered himself as much a "mountaineer" as his sister and other Unionists from the counties that became West Virginia. As for his problems in "swampland", one has only to recall the Peninsula which has already been referred to.
 
Since today is the anniversary of the effective end of Jackson's Valley Campaign, here's a *BUMP* for the occasion!
 
Part I - February - March, 1862
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Artist Charles Hoffbauer's epic mural Spring, one of the Four Seasons of the Confederacy, in the Virginia Historical Society's Richmond headquarters known as the Battle Abbey depicts Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson and his hard-marching Foot Cavalry. This three-part thread is intended to be both a synopsis of Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign of Spring, 1862, plus an index to my past threads on the subject with links embedded in appropriate places.


The Shenandoah Valley of Virginia
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The Blue Ridge Mountain chain, today Shenandoah National Park, borders the Valley on the east separating it from the Virginia Tidewater. http://civilwartalk.com/threads/shenandoah-national-park-virginia.83215/#post-628026

The broad valley watered by the Shenandoah River was during the Civil War the scene of several memorable individual battles and at least two stirring campaigns. The area's importance lay in its agricultural abundance, vital to the war effort of the struggling Confederacy, plus its unique geographical position relative to the Seat of War farther to the east. It was separated from the latter by the mountain range known as the Blue Ridge, penetrated by only a few widely-spaced passes known in Virginia as gaps. Both North and South vied for control of the region which was at first under Confederate control dating from the secession of Virginia and seizure of the U. S. Arsenal at Harpers Ferry, which was soon placed under the command of a stern former professor from the Virginia Military Institute, Thomas Jonathan Jackson.

View attachment 99615
Map by Hal Jesperson, www.cwmaps

There are several significant facts concerning the terrain in the valley, as can be seen on the campaign map above. For one thing, the Shenandoah River flows north, meaning that to travel south one is going up the valley towards its watershed; conversely north is down the valley. The Shenandoah River proper is formed of two principal branches, the North Shenandoah and the South Shenandoah which meet at Front Royal. Between them is a forty-mile-long ridge known as the Massanutten Mountain which has a single gap at New Market leading to the town of Luray; to the west of the Massanutten lies the twenty-mile-wide main valley, while east of it is the narrow Luray Valley. The principal road was the Valley Turnpike, a wide, straight, hard-surfaced road that remained passable in all seasons. There were other lesser turnpikes, such as the Parkersburg-to-Staunton Turnpike in the south; most other roads became bottomless morasses in inclement weather like that during which the campaign occurred. Railroads connected Winchester with Harpers Ferry in the north and Staunton with Charlottesville and on to Richmond in the south, while another central route led from Strasburg through Front Royal and on to Manassas.

The Campaign Opens, February 26, 1862

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The town of Harpers Ferry, Virginia, now West Virginia, nestled in the gap created by the confluence of the Shenandoah and Potomac Rivers. http://civilwartalk.com/threads/the-battle-of-harpers-ferry-jacksons-greatest-victory.104193/

Several different Federal expeditions attempted to wrest control of the Valley beginning in early 1862 when Union Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks crossed the Potomac River at Harpers Ferry. It was only a short march from there to the headquarters at Winchester of the commander of the Valley District, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, now styled Stonewall after his performance at the battle of Manassas the previous year. http://civilwartalk.com/threads/jackson-at-first-manassas.87115/#post-683290

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Jackson's Winchester headquarters , now preserved as a museum. http://civilwartalk.com/threads/stonewalls-winchester-va.91319/#post-740316

Jackson was in a quandary as how best to respond to this threat, alerting his force on hand which consisted only of his own small division and the 7th Virginia Cavalry led by Col. Turner Ashby. After some indecision involving the movements of his men he determined to attack Banks north of Winchester, but was thwarted when his supply train moved farther to the south than he intended. Outnumbered seriously, he was forced to withdraw up the Valley all the way to Mount Jackson.

The Battle of Kernstown, March 23, 1862
dsc03493-jpg.jpg

The Pritchard House on the slope of Pritchards Hill stands at the center of the Kernstown battlefield park. http://civilwartalk.com/threads/jacksons-valley-campaign-begins-the-battle-of-kernstown.122430/

Soon, however, Jackson received intelligence supplied by his cavalry chief Ashby that having captured Winchester Banks was now abandoning the town leaving only a small garrison there. Jackson decided to strike what he believed was only a small brigade of four regiments under Col. Nathan Kimball so moved his division by forced march to Kernstown, a hamlet only a few miles south of Winchester. Meanwhile, on March 22nd Ashby's troopers skirmished with Kimball's men, wounding division commander Brig. Gen. James Shields in the process but failing to discover the important fact that instead of a single brigade of Federals Shields' entire division was present. The following day Jackson brought up his command but outnumbered by Kimball was forced to abandon the field at the end of the day, retreating by night back up the valley the way he had come. Kernstown was the only outright defeat suffered by Jackson during the Valley Campaign but nevertheless served his overreaching purpose to keep as many Federals as possible in the Shenandoah and away from the main theater of operations east of the Blue Ridge when Banks entire corps was directed to remain in the Valley.

Union Commanders in the Valley Campaign
View attachment 99554

Jackson's principal opponents during the campaign, left-to-right: Nathaniel Prentiss Banks, former congressman and governor of Massachusetts had no military background whatsoever but was made Major General of Volunteers in 1861 by President Lincoln for his early support of the war effort; Irish immigrant Brig. Gen. James Shields was another political general who had been an Illinois congressman and friend of the new president; and Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont, famous as The Pathfinder of the American West, a leader in the movement for California's independence from Mexico and statehood, and the first Republican candidate for President in 1856. Although a military man by reputation, the fact was that Fremont was a topographical engineer, explorer, and map maker but had only led very small expeditions and had no experience commanding large bodies of troops. Of the three, although Shields had had some previous military experience, he never personally faced Jackson in battle though it was troops under his command that fought the first and last battles of the campaign; Shields himself was wounded by a shell splinter during a skirmish with Ashby's cavalry the day before Kernstown but liked to boast that it was he who had beaten Stonewall in his only defeat!
Great idea, James N. Saves a lot of backing and forthing.
 
I wonder if the map that his chief topographical engineer Jedediah Hotchkiss made of the Valley really stretched 8 and a half feet
 
Although it was not part of Jackson's campaign in the Valley, I have visited the New Market Battlefield and Museum where John C. Breckinridge and the Corps of Cadets from VMI routed Franz Siegel's army
 
By that time you propose E. Kirby Smith was already commanding the Trans-Mississippi with Taylor HIS subordinate. Jackson could probably have been wedged in between them as a field commander, but his position would've been similar to Longstreet's under Bragg a few months later. No question about the usefulness of men like Taylor and Green, but I suspect Stonewall would've found Green's Texans as unruly as Ashby's Virginians, with whom he had numerous clashes!



In fact he had almost an entire year to "get familiar with it", from assuming command at Harpers Ferry in Spring, 1861, and even more after his return to Winchester following Bull Run to take command of the Valley District. He continued to learn through the terrible Romney Campaign that winter, up until his forced exit from Winchester in the face of Banks' superior numbers.



Another thing to remember about Jackson is that he very much considered himself to be fighting in defense of his homeland, Western Virginia, where he was born, reared, and made his home; at the time there was no political division and he considered himself as much a "mountaineer" as his sister and other Unionists from the counties that became West Virginia. As for his problems in "swampland", one has only to recall the Peninsula which has already been referred to.
That's why he had his chief topographical engineer and mapmaker Jedediah Hotchkiss make a map of the valley for him
 
My mother was born and raised in Port Republic, just a few doors down from the Kemper House where Ashby's body was laid out. 2 of my Great Uncles served with Ashby's 7th Virginia Cavalry, and 2 of the same family served in the 12th Virginia Cavalry, which was formed after Ashby's death from volunteers.
 
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That's why he had his chief topographical engineer and mapmaker Jedediah Hotchkiss make a map of the valley for him
I wonder if the map that his chief topographical engineer Jedediah Hotchkiss made of the Valley really stretched 8 and a half feet
Unfortunately, as I understand it, the map was still unfinished at the time of Jackson's death; perhaps Jubal Early was able to put it to use in 1864.

Although it was not part of Jackson's campaign in the Valley, I have visited the New Market Battlefield and Museum where John C. Breckinridge and the Corps of Cadets from VMI routed Franz Siegel's army
I remember that back in the 1970's and into the 1980's the museum there showed two different films, one naturally about the Battle of new market and thew charge of the VMI Corps of Cadets; the other called Stonewall's Valley about the 1862 Valley Campaign. Unfortunately, the last time I visited there in 2015 there was NO sign of the latter.
 
Unfortunately, as I understand it, the map was still unfinished at the time of Jackson's death; perhaps Jubal Early was able to put it to use in 1864.


I remember that back in the 1970's and into the 1980's the museum there showed two different films, one naturally about the Battle of new market and thew charge of the VMI Corps of Cadets; the other called Stonewall's Valley about the 1862 Valley Campaign. Unfortunately, the last time I visited there in 2015 there was NO sign of the latter.
I may be wrong, but I believe that Lee had asked Jackson to have a map of the Valley made for the purposes of an invasion. I think he asked for it after Antietam. The map was not finished before Jackson died, and Ewell ended up with it. Lee planned the 2nd invasion with it, and Ewell carried it with him on his way to Gettysburg, where he was spectacular right up until the evening of July 1st.
 
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