Hostilities Commence in the Charleston Harbor

Beowulf

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Virginia
CHAPTER TEN:
Hostilities Commence in the Charleston Harbor

How Lincoln Manipulated Public Opinion

Such was Lincoln's dilemma: On the one hand, he was being pressured by the industrial and banking interests of the New England and Midwestern States, who were clamoring for the removal of the South as a viable competitor in the international and domestic markets. In addition to these were the Republican politicians who saw war against the South as the surest means to secure their newly obtained control of the Government. However, on the other hand, Lincoln was faced with an overwhelmingly popular anti-war sentiment among the Northern citizens. According to the 1 January 1861 edition of the Boston Daily Advertiser: "The people desire no war; no attack upon South Carolina; nor do they wish to see her needlessly supplied with any pretext for the beginning of hostilities."(1) The mood of the people throughout the North was so strong in favor of allowing the Southern States to depart in peace that if the Government were to make any aggressive move at all at Fort Sumter, upon which all eyes were focused, Lincoln would be denounced by "a thousand northern presses... as a provoker of war."(2) Most of the people in the North were not fooled by the conciliatory tone of Lincoln's Inaugural Address of 4 March 1861. Only a few days after the speech had been delivered, the Democratic editors of the New York Herald stated:
The possession of Forts Sumter and Pickens is the avowed intention of President Davis and his Cabinet. But when the nation turns to Washington to look for information as to the design of the military and naval preparations of the Northern government, it is met either with mysterious silence, or conflicting stories, or ambiguous utterances, like the responses of the Delphic oracles.
Now, the effect of all this mystery, so foreign to the genius of a republican government, is most disastrous to the whole country. As to the North, with its idle capitalists, surplus breadstuffs and its enterprising spirit chafing for employment, the policy of the administration is most ruinous to it. All the operations of trade and commerce and manufactures are paralyzed and fettered by uncertainty, which is more fatal to business interests than the worst reality. Merchants cannot make their calculations, and dare not invest till they have some idea of what is before them. If it be war, they will know what to do. If it be peace, they will promptly act accordingly. But suspense is death to all enterprise. So destructive to the public welfare is the conduct of the administration that the people of the North will not stand it much longer...

... This we have no doubt is what Mr. Lincoln wants, for it would give him the opportunity of throwing upon the Southern confederacy the responsibility of commencing hostilities. But the country and posterity will hold him just as responsible as if he struck the first blow. The provocation to assault is often more culpable than the assault itself.(3)

From present appearances we know what we may expect in the future. We see that all the professions of peace uttered by Mr. Lincoln and others were mere idle talk, or else made to lull the country into a state of false security till the administration concluded its loans and was ready to strike a blow. Fort Pickens, on its lonely sandbar, may, in its ruins in years hereafter, tell of the bloody battle of Pensacola which commenced the civil war that desolated the United States in the year of our Lord 1861...

Similar sentiments likewise appeared in the Baltimore Sun around the same time:

The Inaugural, as a whole, breathes the spirit of mischief. It has only a conditional conservatism — that is, the lack of ability or some inexpediency to do what it would. It assumes despotic authority, and intimates the design to exercise that authority to any extent of war and bloodshed, qualified only by the withholding of the requisite means to the end by the American people. The argumentation of the address is puerile. Indeed, it has no quality entitled to the dignity of an argument. It is a shaky specimen of special pleading, by way of justifying the unrighteous character and deeds of the fanaticism which, lifted into power, may be guilty, as it is capable, of any atrocities. There is no Union spirit in the address, it is sectional and mischievous, and studiously withholds any sign of recognition of that equality of the States upon which the Union can alone be maintained. If it means what it says, it is the knell and requiem of the Union, and the death of hope.(5)
Lincoln's former political opponent, Illinois Democrat Stephen Douglas, had also warned the American people a month earlier that the Republican leaders who put Lincoln into office "are striving to break up the Union under the pretense of preserving it," and that "they are struggling to overthrow the Constitution while professing undying attachment to it, and a willingness to make any sacrifice to maintain it... [and] are trying to plunge the country into a cruel war as the surest means of destroying the Union upon the plea of enforcing the laws and protecting public property."(6) Such warnings were resounding throughout the North and the South. In fact, before the fall of Fort Sumter, an estimated two-thirds of the newspapers in the North “were the virtual allies of the Secessionists, their apologists, their champions.”(7)
Lincoln's plan to shift these circumstances in his favor, and to put "the rebellion... in 'the wrong,'"(8) was an exercise of the treacherous ingenuity of a would-be despot. In its resolution of 15 February 1861, the Confederate Congress authorized the C.S. President to appoint "a commission of three persons" to be "sent to the Government of the United States of America, for the purpose of negotiating friendly relations between that Government and the Confederate States of America, and for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the two Governments, upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith."(9) Lincoln, however, refused to see these Peace Commissioners upon their arrival at Washington, as also did William Seward, who reasoned that he could do nothing that could be interpreted as a recognition of the Confederate States as an independent power.(10) However, Seward agreed to meet with intermediary John A. Campbell of the U.S. Supreme Court, through whom he assured the Peace Commissioners, on or around 15 March 1861, that "the order for the evacuation of Sumter had been made."(11) Five days later, when questioned why no action had been taken by the occupants of the fort to evacuate as promised, Seward "spoke of his ability to carry through his policy with confidence," and "he accounted for the delay as accidental, and not involving the integrity of his assurance that the evacuation would take place."(12) On the first day of April 1861, Seward again declared that "the President may desire to supply Sumter, but will not do so," and that there was "no design to reinforce Fort Sumter" [emphasis in original].(13) When rumors began to circulate about the preparation of a secret expedition to the Pensacola and the Charleston harbors, Campbell expressed his "anxiety and concern" in a letter to Seward dated the seventh of April.(14) Seward's response was as follows: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see."(15) Oddly, Seward's written response was omitted from the records compiled by the War Department in 1880.
Judge Campbell's personal testimony, given later that same year, sheds further light on these events:

... "Mr. Seward authorised me to communicate the fact of the evacuation to Mr. Davis, and the precise object was to induce him to render his commissioners inactive. I did not anticipate having any other interview with Mr. Seward. I supposed that Sumter would be evacuated in the course of a very few days, and without any other action on my part. When upon the second and third interviews with him I found there was to be delay, I conversed with Judge Nelson as to the delicacy of my position, and it was at his suggestion and by his counsel that I agreed to be the "intermediary" until Sumter was evacuated. Neither of us doubted that the fort was to be surrendered or abandoned.... I asked Governor Seward about the evacuation of the fort. Without any verbal reply, he wrote: "The President may desire to supply Sumter, but will not do so without giving notice to Governor [Francis] Pickens." Upon reading this, I asked if the President had any design to attempt to supply Sumter. His reply contained an observation of the President. That I pass. But he said he did not believe any attempt would be made to supply Sumter, and there was no design to reinforce it. I told him if that were the case, I should not employ this language, that it would be interpreted as a design to attempt a supply, and that, if such a thing were believed in Charleston, they would bombard the fort, that they did not regard the surrender of Sumter as open to question, and when they did, they would proceed to extremities. He left the State Department, I remaining there till his return; and, on his return, he wrote these words: "I am satisfied that the Government will not undertake to supply Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens." This excluded the matter of desire, and with what had taken place, left the impression that if any attempt were made it would be an open, declared, and peaceful offer to supply the fort, which, being resisted by the Carolinians, the fort would be abandoned as a military necessity and to spare the effusion of blood — the odium of resistance and of the evacuation being thrown upon the late Administration and the Confederate States. Had these counsels prevailed — had the policy been marked with candour and moderation — I am not sure that even before this the fruit might have been seen ripening among the States in renewed relations of kindness and goodwill, to be followed ere long by a suitable political and civil union, adequate to the security of both sections at home and abroad. The ideas of union and a common country, as applied to all the States, are now simply obsolete [emphasis in original].(16)
 
Part Two - Hostilities Commence in the Charleston Harbor

It is often claimed by modern historians that this gross display of bad faith was not the fault of Lincoln, for Seward is alleged to have spoken on his own authority without the knowledge of his superior. However, Jefferson Davis dispelled such a claim in the following:
The absurdity of any such attempt to disassociate the action of the President from that of his Secretary, and to relieve the former of responsibility for the conduct of the latter, is too evident to require argument or comment. It is impossible to believe that, during this whole period of nearly a month, Mr. Lincoln was ignorant of the communications that were passing between the Confederate Commissioners and Mr. Seward, through the distinguished member of the Supreme Court — still holding his seat as such — who was acting as intermediary. On one occasion, Judge Campbell informs us that the Secretary, in the midst of an important interview, excused himself for the purpose of conferring with the President before giving a final answer, and left his visitor for some time, awaiting his return from that conference, when the answer was given, avowedly and directly proceeding from the President.
If, however, it were possible to suppose that Mr. Seward was acting on his own responsibility, and practicing a deception upon his own chief, as well as upon the Confederate authorities, in the pledges which he made to the latter, it is nevertheless certain that the principal facts were brought to light within a few days after the close of the efforts at negotiation. Yet the Secretary of State was not impeached and brought to trial for the grave offense of undertaking to conduct the most momentous and vital transactions that had been or could be brought before the Government of the United States, without the knowledge and in opposition to the will of the President, and for having involved the Government in dishonor, if not in disaster. He was not even dismissed from office, but continued to be the chief officer of the Cabinet and confidential adviser of the President, as he was afterward of the ensuing Administration, occupying that station during two consecutive terms. No disavowal of his action, no apology nor explanation, was ever made. Politically and legally, the President is unquestionably responsible in all cases for the action of any member of his Cabinet, and in this case it is as preposterous to attempt to dissever from him the moral, as it would be impossible to relieve him of the legal, responsibility that rests upon the Government of the United States for the systematic series of frauds perpetrated by its authority.(17)
On the fourth of April, Seward made the following statement to London Times correspondent, William Howard Russell: "It would not become the spirit of the American Government, or of the Federal system, to use armed force in subjugating the Southern States against the will of the majority of the people."(18) Six days later, Seward officially wrote to Minister to England Charles Francis Adams:
[The President] would not be disposed to reject a cardinal dogma of theirs, namely, that the Federal Government could not reduce the seceding States to obedience by conquest, even although he were disposed to question that proposition. But in fact the President willingly accepts it as true. Only an imperial or despotic government could subjugate thoroughly disaffected and insurrectionary members of the State. This Federal Republican system of ours is, of all forms of government, the very one most unfitted for such a labour.(19)

On the eighth of April, Robert S. Chew delivered the following message to South Carolina Governor Francis W. Pickens: "I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only; and that if such attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms or ammunition, will be made, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the Fort."(20) The Northern press picked up on the "provisions only" clause in Lincoln's message and widely circulated the story that the President merely wished to transport food to a helpless garrison of American soldiers "who were starving under the folds of the Stars and Stripes."(21)
At the same time all these public and private assurances of peace were being made, Lincoln was already secretly preparing to reinforce Fort Sumter. On the twenty-ninth of March, he had ordered that three ships — the Pocahontas, the Pawnee, and the Harriet Lane — together with three hundred men and provisions be made ready to sail for the Charleston harbor.(22) These orders were all marked private. On the first of April, he sent a message to Commandant Andrew H. Foote at Navy Yard in Brooklyn, New York to "fit out the Powhatan to go to sea at the earliest possible moment under sealed orders."(23) These instructions were confirmed with another telegram which contained these words: "You will fit out the Powhatan without delay. Lieutenant Porter will relieve Captain Mercer in command of her. She is bound on secret service; and you will under no circumstances communicate to the Navy Department the fact that she is fitting out."(24) In all, the so-called "Relief Squadron" consisted of eight warships, carrying twenty-six guns and one thousand, four hundred men(25) — hardly "provisions only."

Upon learning of Lincoln's treachery, the Confederate Government at Montgomery authorized General Beauregard in Charleston to demand the surrender of Fort Sumter. The official dispatch to Major Anderson read as follows:
Headquarters Provisional Army, C.S.A.
Charleston, S.C., April 11, 1861, 2 P.M.

Sir: The Government of the Confederate States has hitherto forborne from any hostile demonstration against Fort Sumter, in the hope that the Government of the United States, with a view to the amicable adjustment of all questions between the two Governments, and to avert the calamities of war, would voluntarily evacuate it. There was reason at one time to believe that such would be the course pursued by the Government of the United States; and, under that impression, my Government has refrained from making any demand for the surrender of the fort.
But the Confederate States can no longer delay assuming actual possession of a fortification commanding the entrance of one of their harbors, and necessary to its defense and security.
I am ordered by the Government of the Confederate States to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter. My aides, Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee, are authorized to make such demand of you. All proper facilities will be afforded for the removal of yourself and command, together with company arms and property, and all private property, to any post in the United States which you may elect. The flag which you have upheld so long and with so much fortitude, under the most trying circumstances, may be saluted by you on taking it down.
Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee will, for a reasonable time, await your answer.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G.T. Beauregard
Brigadier-General commanding.(27)

After realizing that he had been used by the Lincoln Administration to lull the Confederate Commissioners into a false sense of security, Judge Campbell wrote the following words to Seward on the thirteenth of April:

I think no candid man will read over what I have written, and consider for a moment what is going on at Sumter, but will agree that the equivocating conduct of the Administration, as measured and interpreted in connection with these promises, is the proximate cause of the great calamity.
I have a profound conviction that the telegrams of the 8th of April of General Beauregard, and of the 10th of April of General Walker, the Secretary of War, can be referred to nothing else than their belief that there has been systematic duplicity practiced on them through me. It is under an impressive sense of the weight of this responsibility that I submit to you these things for your explanation.(28)
The object of deception already accomplished, Campbell received no reply to this letter nor to that of the following week in which he reiterated his demand for an explanation.
Further evidence of the "unscrupulous cunning"(29) practiced by Lincoln was the little known fact that the Powhatan, under the command of Lieutenant David D. Porter, sailed under disguise. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy dated 11 May 1861, Lincoln personally assumed the responsibility "for any apparent or real irregularity... in connection with that vessel."(30) Not only was her name painted out, as Captain Montgomery C. Meigs mentioned in a letter to William Seward,(31) but she was flying the flag of Great Britain(32) "so that she deceived those who had known her."(33)
It is evident that Lincoln had begun to formulate a plan to reinforce Sumter even before his inauguration. In fact, on 12 December 1860, a full three months before he had taken the oath of office, Lincoln was already acquainting at least one of his future subordinates with his policy of usurpation when he sent the following, and characteristically secret, message to General Winfield Scott: "Please present my respects to the general, and tell him, confidentially, I shall be obliged to him to be as well prepared as he can to either hold or retake the forts, as the case may require, at and after the inauguration."(34) Two weeks later, Robert Anderson, contrary to his orders of 15 November 1860,(35) mysteriously abandoned his position at Fort Moultrie and moved his forces to Fort Sumter. There can be little doubt that this action, which sparked profound resentment from the South Carolinians, as well as confusion among his superiors in the War Department(36) and alarm from President Buchanan,(37) was accomplished at the urging of General Scott in response to Lincoln's December telegram. Without any pretense of lawful authority whatsoever, Lincoln was thus interfering with and undermining the official capacity of the U.S. Government as a party to a morally binding agreement which Lincoln would later ridicule in his address to Congress on 4 July 1861 as a "quasi armistice."(38)
 
Part Three

Even though Anderson had caused resentment from the South Carolinians by transferring his command from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter — an act which the State authorities viewed as a breach of the pledge of the U.S. Government not to reinforce Sumter — they were still willing to attempt to pacify the situation by offering to provision the garrison now set in hostile array against them. It should be noted that on 28 December 1860, Anderson had sent this message to Adjutant General Cooper: "[The Governor] knows not how entirely the city of Charleston is in my power. I can cut his communication off from the sea, and thereby prevent the reception of supplies, and close the harbor, even at night, by destroying the lighthouses."(51) Since all of Anderson's communications with his government in Washington, D.C. had to go through the authorities in Charleston, he knew that this threat to close the Charleston harbor would be read by Governor Pickens. Nevertheless, on 19 January 1861, less than a month after this threat was made, South Carolina Secretary of War D.F. Jamison sent the following message from the Governor to Anderson: "Sir, I am instructed by his excellency the governor to inform you that he has directed an officer of the State to procure and carry over with your mails each day to Fort Sumter such supplies of fresh meat and vegetables as you may indicate."(52) Anderson's response is interesting: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date.... I confess I am at a loss to understand the latter part of this message, as I have not represented in any quarter that we were in need of such supplies. As commandant of a military post, I can only have my troops furnished with fresh beef in the manner prescribed by law, and I am compelled, therefore, with due thanks to his excellency, respectfully to decline his offer."(53)
Not having waited for a reply from Anderson, Secretary Jamison had arranged for "two hundred pounds of beef and a lot of vegetables" to be sent over to the fort,(54) which Anderson refused to accept. At this point, Anderson was given free access to the Charleston markets to purchase provisions at his own discretion. This amiable arrangement having been established, Anderson realized that interference from Washington would be a grave mistake and even wrote to Adjutant-General Cooper on 30 January 1861, "I do hope that no attempt will be made by our friends to throw supplies in; their doing so would do more harm than good."(55) On the seventeenth of March, Anderson indicated that he was "satisfied with the existing arrangement"(56) and on the first of April, Second Lieutenant Norman J. Hall reported to Anderson that there was "at least thirty-five days of comfortable subsistence for the command."(57) Thus, the U.S. Government's own records not only prove that Anderson's men were well-provisioned all along, but it also shows the popular caricature of the South Carolinians as "fire eaters" set to inaugurate bloodshed at the slightest provocation to be utterly false.

1. Boston Daily Advertiser, 1 January 1861; quoted by Lunt, Origin of the Late War, page 405.

2. Josiah Gilbert Holland, Life of Abraham Lincoln (Springfield, Massachusetts: Gurdon Bill, 1866), page 294.

3. New York Herald, 6 March 1861.

4. Editorial: "The Fearful and Threatening Aspect of the Revolution," op. cit., 8 March 1861.

5. Baltimore Sun, March 1861; quoted by Greeley, American Conflict, Volume I, page 428 (footnote).

6. Stephen Douglas, letter to Memphis (Tennessee) Daily Appeal, 2 February 1861; quoted by Edmonds, Facts and Falsehoods, page 152.

7. New York Tribune, quoted by Greeley, American Conflict, Volume I, page 454.

8. Lincoln, quoted by Charles William Ramsdell, "Lincoln and Fort Sumter," in The Journal of Southern History, February-November 1937, page 286.

9. Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America (Richmond, Virginia: R.M. Smith, Printer to Congress, 1864), page 92.

10. Frank Moore (editor), The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1861), Volume I, page 51.

11. William H. Seward to John A. Campbell, quoted by Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume I, page 268.

12. Campbell, quoted by Davis, op. cit., page 270.

13. Seward, quoted by Campbell in letter to Seward, 13 April 1861; in Davis, op. cit., page 683.

14. Campbell to Seward, in Official Records: Armies, Series I, Volume IV, page 259.

15. Seward to Campbell, quoted by Johnstone, Truth of the War Conspiracy, page 35; Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume I, page 273.

16. Campbell, letter to William B. Reed of Pennsylvania, 5 June 1861; quoted by McHenry, Cotton Trade, pages xiii-xv.

17. Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume I, pages 275-276.

18. Seward, quoted by William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South (Boston: T.O.H.P. Burnam, 1863), page 61.

19. Seward, letter to Charles Francis Adams, 10 April 1861; quoted by Pollard, Lost Cause, page 86; Munford, Slavery and Secession, page 299.

20. Simon Cameron to Captain Theodore Talbot, 6 April 1861; in Official Records: Armies, Series I, Volume I, page 245.

21. Cincinnati Daily Commercial, 6 May 1861; in Perkins, Northern Editorials on Secession, Volume II, page 826.

22. Lincoln to Cameron, in Official Records: Armies, Series I, Volume I, page 226; Inclosure No. 1, op. cit., page 227.

23. Lincoln to Andrew H. Foote, in op. cit., page 229.

24. Lincoln to Foote, in op. cit., Series I, Volume IV, page 109. It is interesting to note that this second, and very revealing, telegram was not included in Volume I alongside the first telegram where it logically belonged, but was placed in Volume IV instead. This is but one example of the "mystifying dis-arrangement" of the records which Johnstone referred to as "a work of genius" (Truth of the War Conspiracy, page 3; emphasis in original).

25. Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume I, page 284.

26. Lunt, Origin of the Late War, page 485.

27. Pierre G.T. Beauregard to Robert Anderson, 11 April 1861, in Official Records: Armies, Series I, Volume I, page 13.

28. Campbell to Seward, 13 April 1861; quoted by Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume I, page 685. This letter and the one which followed it were also omitted from the records, even though they had been filed in the Confederate States archives and were delivered to the U.S. War Department for inclusion.

29. Jefferson Davis, A Short History of the Confederate States of America (New York: Belford, Clarke and Company, 1890), page 58.

30. Lincoln to the Secretary of the Navy, in Official Records: Armies, Series I, Volume I, page 406.

31. Montgomery C. Meigs to William Seward, 10 April 1861; in op. cit., page 369.

32. Charles H. Poor to H.A. Adams, 2 September 1862; in United States War Department, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1896), Series I, Volume IV, page 132.

33. David D. Porter, report of 21 April 1861; in op. cit., page 122.

34. Lincoln, quoted by John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History (New York: The Century Company, 1886), Volume III, page 250.

35. Lorenzo Thomas to Anderson, in Official Records: Armies, Series I, Volume I, page 73.

36. In a letter to Anderson dated 27 December 1860, Buchanan's Secretary of War John B. Floyd wrote, "Intelligence has reached here this morning that you have abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burned the carriages, and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not believed, because there is no order for any such movement" (op. cit., page 3).

37. In a meeting with Senators Jefferson Davis and R.M.T. Hunter, Buchanan stated, "I call God to witness, you gentlemen, better than anybody, know that this is not only without but against my orders" (quoted by General Samuel W. Crawford, Genesis of the Civil War [New York: J.A. Hill and Company, 1887; emphasis in original], pages 143-144).

38. Lincoln, in Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Volume VII, page 3223.

39. John Shipley Tilley, Lincoln Takes Command (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1941), pages 179-180.

40. Tarbell, Life of Lincoln, Volume III, pages 14-15.

41. Anderson to Samuel Cooper, 28 February 1861; quoted by Simon Cameron, Official Records: Armies, Series I, Volume I, page 197.

42. John T. Morse, Jr., Abraham Lincoln (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1892), Volume I, page 244.

43. Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1911), Volume I, page 4.

44. Davis, Brother Against Brother, pages 132-133, 150.

45. J.G. Foster to Joshua G. Totten, Official Records: Armies, Series I, Volume I, page 186.

46. Foster to Totten, op. cit., page 187.

47. Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume I, page 289.

48. New York Herald, 8 March 1861.

49. Anderson to Cooper, Official Records: Armies, Series I, Volume I, page 2.

50. Anderson, quoted by Crawford, Genesis of the Civil War, pages 128-129.

51. Anderson to Cooper, Official Records: Armies, Series I, Volume I, page 113.

52. D.F. Jamison to Anderson, op. cit., page 144.

53. Anderson to Jamison, ibid.

54. Jamison to L.M. Hatch, op. cit., page 145.

55. Anderson to Cooper, op. cit., page 159.

56. Anderson to Jamison, op. cit., page 220.

57. Norman J. Hall, letter to Anderson, 1 April 1861; op. cit., page 231.

All quotes and excerpts taken from AMERICA'S CAESAR - The Decline and Fall of Republican Government in the United States of America - by Greg Loren Durand (taken from the free online ebook).

www.confederatereprint.com

www.americascaesar.com
 
CHAPTER TEN:
Hostilities Commence in the Charleston Harbor
...

To begin with, it would appear to me that Beowulf has just violated copyright by not acknowledging the source of this quote (which is an entire chapter of a published book). Since I believe I remember his being cautioned about that already, why do it again?

My guess is he just cut-and-pasted this from countrystar.narod.ru/lincoln10.html without acknowledging it. That site in turn is a little hard to navigate to find out where this comes from, but if you plug away a bit you'll find that this is a chapter of America's Caesar by Greg Loren Durand, Crown Rights Book Company, 2001. Crown Rights is owned by Mr. Durand, so this is a self-published effort.

I am not sure at all what the text of the book is doing online at a Russian website that is part of a webring of pro-Confederate sites. Maybe that is where Mr. Durand put it himself, since he seems to be involved in a number of such websites.

Other than that, there doesn't appear to be anything noteworthy here, other than Mr. Durand's intent to slant everything he sees and omit everything he doesn't want to admit. Any chance Mr. Durand is actually "Beowulf"?

Tim
 
To begin with, it would appear to me that Beowulf has just violated copyright by not acknowledging the source of this quote (which is an entire chapter of a published book). Since I believe I remember his being cautioned about that already, why do it again?

My guess is he just cut-and-pasted this from countrystar.narod.ru/lincoln10.html without acknowledging it. That site in turn is a little hard to navigate to find out where this comes from, but if you plug away a bit you'll find that this is a chapter of America's Caesar by Greg Loren Durand, Crown Rights Book Company, 2001. Crown Rights is owned by Mr. Durand, so this is a self-published effort.

I am not sure at all what the text of the book is doing online at a Russian website that is part of a webring of pro-Confederate sites. Maybe that is where Mr. Durand put it himself, since he seems to be involved in a number of such websites.

Other than that, there doesn't appear to be anything noteworthy here, other than Mr. Durand's intent to slant everything he sees and omit everything he doesn't want to admit. Any chance Mr. Durand is actually "Beowulf"?

Tim

If you would be so kind as to read the entire post, you would see that Greg's book is credited with the aforementioned chapter and verse from his book...

The entity known as BEOWULF is not Greg Loren Durand, but the two know of each other, have worked together on projects in the past, and are kindred spirits in a biased world of 'historians'.

The text was taken from his on-line ebook, which is free to the public, and can be easily accessed at www.americascaesar.com Most of what Greg writes in his book, (which, in its unabridged form, is a colossal and magnificent two volume set) is from
actual period writings. That alone makes the book worth owning.

This is for scholarship purposes, and constitutes a fair use, as has been posted by at least one other member of these pages...


Beowulf
 
If you would be so kind as to read the entire post, you would see that Greg's book is credited with the aforementioned chapter and verse from his book...

The entity known as BEOWULF is not Greg Loren Durand, but the two know of each other, and are kindred spirits in a biased world of 'historians'.

The text was taken from his on-line ebook, which is free to the public, and can be easily accessed at www.americascaesar.com

This is for scholarship purposes, and constitutes a fair use, as has been posted by at least one other member of these pages...


Beowulf

Ah, I see it now, down at the end of the third post.

FYI, such a long direct quote from a published work would not generally be called fair use. If the author/publisher has given you permission, you're clear. Otherwise, you should ask him before making such posts, and refrain from doing it unless he has given you specific permission, or has published a general release.

Tim
 
Way too many statements accepted as fact for response. Way too many incomplete trains of thought, as well.

One example: Floyd's letter to Anderson on the 27th and Buchanan's protest to SC representatives that he knew nothing about it. The story ends there before following up their outrage to the point where Buchanan had to admit that Anderson disobeyed no orders in moving to Sumter. This part of the story was omitted. Any guesses why?

Another: Anderson's prevarication on the state of his supplies. The quoted story concludes that Anderson was well supplied when, in fact, it was later discovered that he was not. I don't know why Anderson would paint an overly rosie picture of his actual situation. Perhaps he took a sloppy count at face value. Perhaps he was independently trying to avert a government effort to supply the fort. It remains that Lincoln was floored when he found out just how desperate were the straits inside the fort. Somehow, perhaps intentionally, perhaps inadvertently, Anderson blindsided the administration.

I'll place American Caesar next to South Under Seige and The Rise and Fall as totally useless from a historical perspective. If Mr. Durand, Conner and Davis can present only that which supports their contention -- even just once in a whole book -- and ignore that which does not, then their work has no value to someone looking for the whole of history.

ole
 
Fair Use

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Fair use is pretty hard to get a handle on. Here is a link to the guidelines from my alma mater, the University of Texas.

http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/intellectualProperty/copypol2.htm

While quoting paragraphs, notes, etc. from a book are generally considered fair use, the posting of an entire chapter is probably pushing it. After all, it does not take many posts of an entire chapter to post an entire book and then who needs to buy it?
 
Way too many statements accepted as fact for response. Way too many incomplete trains of thought, as well.

One example: Floyd's letter to Anderson on the 27th and Buchanan's protest to SC representatives that he knew nothing about it. The story ends there before following up their outrage to the point where Buchanan had to admit that Anderson disobeyed no orders in moving to Sumter. This part of the story was omitted. Any guesses why?

Another: Anderson's prevarication on the state of his supplies. The quoted story concludes that Anderson was well supplied when, in fact, it was later discovered that he was not. I don't know why Anderson would paint an overly rosie picture of his actual situation. Perhaps he took a sloppy count at face value. Perhaps he was independently trying to avert a government effort to supply the fort. It remains that Lincoln was floored when he found out just how desperate were the straits inside the fort. Somehow, perhaps intentionally, perhaps inadvertently, Anderson blindsided the administration.

I'll place American Caesar next to South Under Seige and The Rise and Fall as totally useless from a historical perspective. If Mr. Durand, Conner and Davis can present only that which supports their contention -- even just once in a whole book -- and ignore that which does not, then their work has no value to someone looking for the whole of history.

ole

Thank you, sir. This is what I was looking for. As Paul Harvey says, The Rest of the Story...

What can you tell me about the letter of the 27th? Can you print it for us? (If you print your 'take', or version, on it, you can then explain why it is your contention that this, or that, was actually 'true').

Do you have Buchanan 'backing down' in the original?

And what do you have to prove that Anderson was starving? You still hold that he and his men were 'hungry', even in the face of all of this? I would think that this subject would be something for you to attack first, seeing that the other side has so much committed to that flank. If you want to take a hill, that would be my choice of one to move against!

Here again, this is why history students would rather take a lethal injection than American History! This petty bickering between the sides. A thing happened. Let's talk about ALL of it.

Let's have your side. That's why I put this out here. Don't assume that 'everyone knows... this, or that'. Assume we don't!

What, exactly, is this '"it was later discovered that he was not" well-supplied?

What were his provisions, exactly?

Beowulf

(I am fairly sure that Anderson, from his days in Dixon, Illinois with Jefferson Davis and most of this cast of characters, along with this failure of a soldier named Lincoln (read Strode's account of this in the DAVIS trilogy)... I am sure that Anderson knew what an incompetent civilian nerd he was dealing with in Lincoln, how dangerous he was, and so he was trying to play both sides against the middle... so he wouldn't lose his job, on the one hand, or his life, on the other!).
 
Fair use is pretty hard to get a handle on. Here is a link to the guidelines from my alma mater, the University of Texas.

http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/intellectualProperty/copypol2.htm

While quoting paragraphs, notes, etc. from a book are generally considered fair use, the posting of an entire chapter is probably pushing it. After all, it does not take many posts of an entire chapter to post an entire book and then who needs to buy it?

As Ole has just complained about 'incompleted thoughts', the whole chapter is not out here. Go to the free ebook and read the rest.

And visit the websites, as well.

Beowulf
 
The site's Home page says clearly the site and its contents are copyrighted (2004). It is open for anyone to read the book online for free.
 
My apologies. It looked like the entire chapter.

I was not intending to take a swipe at you. I appreciate your attempt at thoroughness. Since the issue of fair use has come up a couple times, I thought it best to put out some information about fair use.
 
My apologies. It looked like the entire chapter.

I was not intending to take a swipe at you. I appreciate your attempt at thoroughness. Since the issue of fair use has come up a couple times, I thought it best to put out some information about fair use.

Any chance I can get your thoughts on the information in the thread?

My purpose is to get the other side, but such prevarications in a court of law are often done to slow the tone of the actual case to a crawl...

Ole says that Anderson was hungry, but does not show me the hunger; just the allusion of the state of his want of supplies...

I have moved pawn to king four...

Will there be a countermove, or a forfeit?

Beowulf
 
Any chance I can get your thoughts on the information in the thread?

My purpose is to get the other side, but such prevarications in a court of law are often done to slow the tone of the actual case to a crawl...

Ole says that Anderson was hungry, but does not show me the hunger; just the allusion of the state of his want of supplies...

I have moved pawn to king four...

Will there be a countermove, or a forfeit?

Beowulf

Very well. I will have to take some time to read it all and then get back to you. After all, I am posting instead of working. :wink:
 
For one thing, Anderson told Beauregard that the fort would have to be evacuated on the 15th because of the ration situation. I didn't say that they were hungry or starving. When you start reading what you want rather than what is written, your arguments are as lost as your cause.

It's obvious that you've read nothing on the situation in Charleston Harbor except your favorite three authors. You have the ORs don't you? Read the first hundred pages of Volume I, Series I. And then read a book that doesn't stop early in the story to mislead the reader.

ole
 
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
1. "Educational purposes." That covers an area worlds apart from whatever information is in this book.
2. If cows could copyright their offal, I don't think they'd be suing the dairyman for scooping it out of the barn.
3. The amount is considerable, but its substance is of limited value. This one don't count either.
4. Can't diminish the value of something that has none.

I note that Mr. Duran owns Crown Rights books; he should stick with religious publications. Confederate Reprint is an affiliate (possibly to distance the publisher from such tripe). The original printing of Conner's dementia was Crown Rights. It has been subsequently reprinted by Confederate Reprint.

What we seem to have here is a mutual admiration society in which the members can cheerfully agree that each other's work is outstanding and, in which they have no qualms about citing Jefferson Davis's post-war apologia as a real source. Not even DiLorenzo would sink to that.

ole
 
What were his provisions, exactly?
Wasn't it you, sometime back when, that said do your own research? I know or have access to information on what he had on hand during the months he spent in Sumter. Check out a book; any book on the commotion there: Swanberg, Garrison, Hendrickson, Detzler, David Brion Davis, Nicolay, Nofi.... any one who respects history and whose agendas are harder to detect than Conner or Duran's or Stepens' or Jefferson Davis'; that is, someone who even pretends to be objective.

ole
 
Wasn't it you, sometime back when, that said do your own research? I know or have access to information on what he had on hand during the months he spent in Sumter. Check out a book; any book on the commotion there: Swanberg, Garrison, Hendrickson, Detzler, David Brion Davis, Nicolay, Nofi.... any one who respects history and whose agendas are harder to detect than Conner or Duran's or Stepens' or Jefferson Davis'; that is, someone who even pretends to be objective.

ole

When I said to do your own research, it was because you had all my sources available to you. You know the names of the books, and the authors...

You have listed some people, here. I can admit that I am no historian, and have no idea what side these people are 'on'. I wanted to hear from people on your side. Your people, the ones who convinced you that Anderson was in dire straits... I wanted your special people to argue your side...

My 'people' don't always agree.

Case in point: HW Johnstone seems to think that Anderson was in on it:

Page 17 WAR CONSPIRACY...

"... Major Anderson will comprehend the plan for his relief..."

(Hall and Anderson had discussed the plan for relieving Sumter. This gives Johnstone a reason to suspect him as an accomplice to the treachery done by Lincoln)...

"This can only mean that Anderson was in collusion with Fox, Hall, Blair, Lincoln, and others in their 'plans'; to reinforce Sumter and inaugurate war; for Hall was sent by Major Anderson who would 'comprehend the plan' to 'to reinforce and relief Fort Sumter'."

END QUOTE

(Remember Major Anderson's vandalism at Fort Moultrie
with his garrison on 25 December, 1860...)

So believes HW Johnstone.

Other pro-Confederates have a different view of Anderson.
They see him as a victim of Lincoln...

So, I wanted to get your special 'take' on it all. I am inclined to believe that Anderson was
duped into being a sitting duck target. I haven't read it all yet.

Johnstone could still be right without Anderson being privy to the four expeditions, but privy to an 'idea' about an idea of 'throwing in' supplies. I don't think Lincoln would have tipped off Anderson that his behind might not survive the 'provisions' being forced into Sumter, and there is the telegraph that says Anderson was stunned to learn of his exposure to this crisis...

I think Lincoln thought Anderson and his boys were very expendable in order to start a conflict where the lives would far exceed 85 guys in a fort!



Beowulf
 
...
(Remember Major Anderson's vandalism at Fort Moultrie
with his garrison on 25 December, 1860...)

Since this was Federal property and Anderson was the commanding officer responsible for it (undoubtedly having signed the inventory when he assumed command, a normal procedure for Army and Navy officers then and now), this is only vandalism if his superiors decide it is. Clearly they did not. Your statement is just more of the usual false rhetoric we see constantly from people who are concerned only with making things up to support their grudge.

So believes HW Johnstone.

Other pro-Confederates have a different view of Anderson.
They see him as a victim of Lincoln...

Piffle. It was President Buchanan and General Scott who strapped Major Anderson into this mess. Lincoln had nothing to do with it, since he was still home in Illinois, months from assuming office, at the time.

So, I wanted to get your special 'take' on it all. I am inclined to believe that Anderson was duped into being a sitting duck target. I haven't read it all yet.

It doesn't appear that you have even read enough to form an opinion if you can make statements like these. Anderson was most vulnerable at Ft. Moultrie, which he would estimate in December 1861 he could only hold for sixty hours if the Confederates chose to besiege him, and perhaps no time at all if they chose a surprise assault.

Johnstone could still be right without Anderson being privy to the four expeditions, but privy to an 'idea' about an idea of 'throwing in' supplies. I don't think Lincoln would have tipped off Anderson that his behind might not survive the 'provisions' being forced into Sumter, and there is the telegraph that says Anderson was stunned to learn of his exposure to this crisis...

I think Lincoln thought Anderson and his boys were very expendable in order to start a conflict where the lives would far exceed 85 guys in a fort!

More proof that you should stop posting opinions without finding out what the facts were.

Major Anderson was a very talented and experienced officer. In the entire US Army, Winfield Scott was reputed to have two favorites: Robert E. Lee and Robert Anderson. Scott hand-picked Anderson for the Ft. Sumter post.

Anderson would have known where he stood in no time at all; certainly within a few days of taking command, if not before he arrived. No competent soldier could have avoided it. Anderson was the one who made the decision on what to do in December -- much to the surprise of Buchanan and Floyd. If he was the sort to shirk responsibility, he'd have just stayed where he was. But he was the sort of officer who faced hard tasks head-on. He weighed his options, he decided what he would do, and he acted.

If he had wanted to terrorize Charleston, and thought he could hold the post, he'd have occupied Castle Pinckney. With a Federal garrison there, the city would lie under his guns and be at his mercy. He knew it; he just decided the occupation of Sumter was a better option.

Why? Because there was no practical way for the secessionists to get at his command at Sumter without months of effort. In a practical sense, that gained lots of time for negotiation and political settlement. OTOH, the Charleston papers and drawing rooms bubbled with discussions of how to take the Federal posts in the harbor, secessionist troops far outnumbering his command were already mustering, and his post was under constant observation by South Carolina militia (who did a very lousy job, but were there nonetheless).

But in all of that, he also understood that during that period, Sumter commanded the approaches to Charleston. If he had chosen to do so (and if Buchanan/Scott had reinforced him promptly), Anderson could shut Charleston harbor for weeks or months. Once the Confederates made their preparations, Sumter was an undefendable post for him; until they did he was safe there. Anderson simply acted as a talented and loyal officer should; I have always suspected Robert E. Lee would have done the same if he had commanded at Charleston.

Lincoln had nothing to do with all that. It happened months before he assumed office. Lincoln arrived in office to find it all there already, a stinking mess left as a present by the Buchanan administration. Yet in your apparent rabid hatred of Lincoln, and your mania for blaming Lincoln for anything and everything, you make all these statements that have no basis in real history. If you want to know why people dismiss all your diatribes, that's why.

Tim
 
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