ROSECRANS' STAFF AT CHICKAMAUGA:
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM S. ROSECRANS' STAFF ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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by

ROBERT D. RICHARDSON, MAJ, USA
B.S., UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, 1977

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Name of candidate: MAJ Robert D. Richardson, Jr.

Title of Thesis: Rosecrans' Staff at Chickamauga: The significance of Major General William S. Rosecrans' staff on the outcome of the Chickamauga Campaign

Approved By:

William G. Robertson, Ph.D., Thesis Committee Chairman
Dr. William G. Robertson, Ph.D.

Michael W. Dunn, MA., Member, Graduate Faculty
LTC Michael W. Dunn, MA.

Daniel W. Bagby III, MA., Member, Graduate Faculty
LTC Daniel W. Bagby III, MA.

Accepted this 2nd day of June 1989 by:

Philip J. Brooke, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

ROSECRANS' STAFF AT CHICKAMAUGA: the significance of Major General William S. Rosecrans' staff on the outcome of the Chickamauga campaign, by Captain Robert D. Richardson, USA, 208 pages.

Probably the most unpredictable variable in the "Fog of War," next to leadership, is the command and control process, comprised of three components: organizations, process, and facilities. Organizations include the formulation of staffs by the commander to accomplish the mission. Incorporated in the organization of the staffs are the roles, responsibilities, and functions.

Large Civil War armies like the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee required significant numbers of staff officers to support the armies logistically and to maneuver them operationally. During the Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga, these staff officers often played major roles and were instrumental in determining the outcome of the battle. The roles and functions performed by these staff officers evolved through the history of conflict.

This study is an analysis of the roles, responsibilities, and functions of General Rosecrans' staff prior to and during the Chickamauga campaign, using lessons learned in comparison to current Army doctrine on command and control. Primary sources for staff information on the Army of the Cumberland are the Official Records and actual telegrams from the staffs during this period. Doctrinal manuals on senior level staffs did not exist; therefore, these staffs were composites of regimental and War Department staff positions and ad hoc positions. The study uses evolving doctrine from Command and General Staff College that defines an outstanding staff as one that informs, anticipates, coordinates and executes the commander's guidance with enthusiasm and innovation.

This study concludes that Rosecrans' staff was significant to the outcome of the Battle of Chickamauga. Although none of the staff functions developed critical deficiencies during the campaign, their inability to relieve the commander of administrative burdens compelled him to abandon the battlefield.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"The Appointment of general officers is important, but of those of the general staff all important."

General George Washington
July 5, 1798

In order to demand superior performance from soldiers and leaders fighting with the latest doctrine and weapons, the United States Army must accelerate the development of command and control systems. The technology of warfare continues to magnify both the lethality and the complexity of weapons and support equipment. The Army continuously updates its leadership and tactics doctrine to accommodate the effects of technology. However, the unifying element that coordinates the employment of these components at the decisive place and time on the battlefield, the command and control system, has not kept pace with leadership and tactical emphasis.

The increasing distance between units, caused by the improving technology of weapons, places a greater burden of command and control on the leader of tomorrow's combat units. Additionally, AirLand Battle doctrine encourages independent maneuvering "within the higher commander's intent" and emphasizes four basic tenets: initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. Therefore, future battles will probably involve isolated and independent
engagements unless command and control capabilities continue to improve.\(^a\)

The command and control system connects the leader with the maneuver and support doctrine. Deficiencies in either leadership, maneuver doctrine or command and control can result in catastrophic results. History provides numerous examples of engagements involving deficiencies in command and control. One such campaign in the Civil War that incorporates strong independent leadership, AirLand Battle maneuvers, and a unique command and control system is the Chickamauga campaign (16 August-22 September 1863).

The U.S. Army's FM 100-5 states the only purpose of command and control system is to "implement the commander's will in pursuit of the unit's objectives." The system is composed of three components: organizations, process, and facilities. The term organizations pertains to formulation of staffs by the commander in order to accomplish his assigned missions. The organization of the staff is further subdivided into roles, responsibilities and functions.\(^9\)

This thesis looks at the effect of a staff on the commander's success or failure in the major campaign. The study will analyze the staff systems including the positions, personnel, training, and missions for a veteran army in a potentially decisive operation. Although time and technology have altered the staff titles and system, the primary purpose of the staff and basic
responsible for the entity remain unchanged. Because the staff functions and effectiveness in the Civil War correlate with the staff functions and effectiveness of today, the current criteria for evaluating staff functions and effectiveness should apply to the Chickamauga Campaign.

One of the best definitions of an outstanding staff found was in a Command and General Staff College product used for emerging doctrine. It defines an outstanding staff as "one that informs, anticipates, coordinates, and executes the commander's guidance with enthusiasm and innovation." In Chickamauga, the ability of the staffs to inform, anticipate, coordinate and execute can indicate their effectiveness to their commander. Today's modern battlefield, like battlefields of the past, will contain significant challenges at all echelons of command. The more capable leaders are of meeting those challenges, the greater the decisive edge over the opponent.

Large Civil War armies, like the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee, required significant numbers of staff officers to support them logistically and to maneuver them operationally. These staff officers played major roles and were instrumental in determining the outcome of the Battle and Campaign of Chickamauga. The roles and functions performed by Civil War staff officers evolved from the history of human conflict.

The evolution of the military staffs began in ancient
warfare when the first civilized human asked for an opinion. The Egyptians demonstrated the first recorded use of staffs around 2000 B.C. The introduction of professional soldiers and the extensive employment of chariots and horses created the requirement for supply bases and logistical assistants. Historic records exhibit the availability of paper, writing utensils, and an alphabet, which allowed for the recording of orders by an adjutant general. Initially the Egyptians built their army for defensive purposes. Later, with the development of intelligence gathering systems and staff officers, the Egyptian army accumulated sufficient information to attack other nations.

During the unification of the Greek city states, Phillip of Macedon (382-336 B.C.) constructed an army with new staff positions that assisted his son, Alexander the Great, in becoming a great conquerer. Phillip created engineer organizations to develop his missile-firing weapons, to construct his fortifications, and to conduct his siege operations. To enforce the Macedonian army's regulations, Phillip formed a police force, an early type of provost-marshals. To establish lines of communication for his army on the march, Phillip expanded the use of commissary and transportation personnel. The Macedonians developed hospital organizations during this period to respond to the increasing casualties from the escalation of violence on the battlefield.
About 300 years after Alexander the Great, the Romans instituted a unique concept of command. Each legion had six tribunes grouped in three sets of two. Each set controlled the legion for one day. The remaining four tribunes served as staff officers. Julius Caesar established a permanent commander of the legion and the tribunes served as a chief of staff and as an adjutant. The staffs in Caesar's legions contained supply officers, volunteer aides, orderlies, information collecting agencies, and engineers.

The next significant era in staff development occurred in the 17th century. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, the Father of Modern Warfare, established the staff system present in the Civil War. Gustavus separated the duties of the chief quartermaster from those of the chief commissary. The quartermaster was responsible for supplies, movement, and quartering of soldiers, and the chief commissary was responsible for distribution of provisions. Gustavus also echeloned staffs from regiments, brigades, and divisions to his own headquarters. The new judge advocate office separated the prosecution functions from the apprehension duties of the provost-marshals. The headquarters staff contained the same positions as the regimental headquarters with the inclusion of the chiefs from several combat support functions including artillery, engineers, and arms (ordnance).
Prussia, England, and France studied and adopted Gustavus Adolphus' efficient organizations. England and France were the first to employ these staffs in the New World. George Washington, who served as a staff officer for the British forces in the colonies, used this experience when he built his staffs. General Friedrich Wilhelm Von Steuben, selected by General Washington to serve as the colonial army's inspector, added Prussian efficiency and discipline to the disorganized American staff. Von Steuben believed the primary duty of the staff was to relieve the commander from routine tasks so that he could concentrate on the employment of his combat forces. Washington's and Von Steuben's efforts to establish a permanent General Staff dissolved, along with the army, after the American Revolution.

Washington continued to emphasize to Congress the need for a staff of high quality. In 1789 Congress established the Department of War which included adjutants, inspectors, quartermasters, paymasters, and surgeons. On 3 March 1797, the offices of Judge Advocate and Paymaster General joined the newly organized General Staff. Along with the War Department, Congress authorized the staff for a regular infantry regiment to include an adjutant, quartermaster, paymaster, surgeon, two assistant surgeons, a sergeant major, a quartermaster sergeant, and two senior musicians. These positions remained constant into the Civil War.
The formulation of staff officers at the turn of the 18th century was a developing process. The War Department requested Congress for additional positions as needed. The Medical department was established on 2 March 1798. A Physician General, an Apothecary General, a purveyor and a number of hospital surgeons comprised the basic organization. The creation of the Office of the Surgeon General in 1818 formally placed the medical department within the General Staff of the War Department.\textsuperscript{11}

The formation of the Quartermaster Department on 28 March 1812, became the first legal recognition of a supply staff. The director of the department was a brigadier general. The Ordnance Department was established on 14 May 1812. Congress added one inspector general, a paymaster general, three topographical engineers, a quartermaster general, and one commissary general of purchases to the General Staff in 1816. In 1821, Congress discontinued the Ordnance Department and the Judge Advocate Department; however, eleven years later the War Department separated the Ordnance Department from the Artillery and reinstated it in the General Staff. The War Department staffs remained in this configuration with minor changes until the Civil War.\textsuperscript{12}

During the period from 1821 to 1861, the United States improved both tactically and technically, which affected many staff functions. Neither the army nor the government had publishing offices or training development
agencies. Therefore, numerous tactical manuals, written as private publications, standardized the conduct of war in America. In 1833 a regiment of dragoons appeared and brought mobility and maneuver to American warfare. Additionally, the effect of horses and their subsistence requirements was to increase the commander's dependence on the quartermaster staff officer for planning the replenishment of these essentials.\textsuperscript{13}

The emphasis on artillery in the new tactics increased the necessity for an ordnance officer and led to the dilemma of whether the ordnance officer should serve as a separate branch on the army staff or belong to the artillery branch. The introduction of the conical bullet in 1855, required tacticians to adjust current manuals to the new technology and logisticians to increase resupply rates. Technology had developed rifles and artillery that could inflict severe casualties at increased ranges and allowed units to increase the number of rounds fired. Northern industry adequately supplied the Union army with ammunition and equipment; however, the tacticians failed to compensate for the effect of increased firepower on unprotected and advancing troops.\textsuperscript{14}

Although military staffs adjusted to the changing technology, the basic configuration and functional responsibilities of the regimental and War Department staffs remained behind the times. The rapid expansion of armies and staffs in the first few months of the Civil W-
tested the purpose and flexibility of the available command and control system.

Numerous sources exist on the Civil War and include histories of units, actions by commanders, and performance of technical branches. Several of these sources address the historical development of staffs, but none of the articles analyze the effect of the rapid development or ad hoc formation of staffs during the war and especially the Chickamauga campaign.

Army Regulations standardized the positions and roles for staff members in the Civil War; however, each area command developed ad hoc positions to accomplish specific or peculiar missions. The Army of the Cumberland was different from the Army of the Potomac; therefore, this thesis focuses primarily on the Army of the Cumberland from May to September 1863. Since staffs prepare for campaigns long before subordinate units begin to march, this thesis begins as the Army of the Cumberland consolidates after the successful Tullahoma Campaign from 24 June to 4 July 1863.

This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter one discusses the significance, background and the criteria of an effective staff. The second chapter contains a quick synopsis of the Army of the Cumberland to focus the reader on the subject and an introduction to the organization of the Union army, corps, and division staffs during the battle. Chapter three incorporates the staffs'
significance in preparation for the Chickamauga campaign, and chapter four incorporates the staff actions during the crossing of the Tennessee River, the conduct of the turning movement, and the consolidation of the Union army after McLeomore's Cove. Chapter five discusses the Battle of Chickamauga. Chapter six examines trends in the staff's analysis, develops possible correlation with today's staffs and concludes that Rosecrans' staff affected the results of the Chickamauga Campaign.
CHAPTER 1

END NOTES


4U.S. Army, E103/8, Staff Skills, Roles, and Relationships (Fort Leavenworth, KS.: Combined Arms and Services Staff School, 1987), iii.


6Hittle, Military Staff, 23.

7Hittle, Military Staff, 28.

8Hittle, Military Staff, 39-43.

9Hittle, Military Staff, 177.


12Gano, History of the United States Army, 149, 158, 173.


14Gano, History of the United States Army, 168.
CHAPTER 2

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND

QUESTION: How did your staff learn to fight better? How did you keep them from making mistakes?

General J.L. Collins: By functioning as a staff. Experience makes a good staff.

During interview with General Collins at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Spring of 1983

The United States found itself involved in a civil war with an autonomous war department in Washington and nineteen small regiments widely dispersed throughout the United States. Following the surrender of Fort Sumter on 14 April 1861, President Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to serve for ninety days. Immediately, northern states formed regiments and sent them to Washington. The forces remained relatively stagnant, protecting the capitals until July of 1861. Bull Run, the first major campaign of the Civil War, included these ninety-day volunteers, who were rapidly approaching their termination of service. The Union commander, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, leading an army of 35,000 soldiers, had no previous experience commanding more than 5000 troops, a deficiency which would contribute to the defeat of the Union army in this battle. Additionally, the army consisted mainly of a militia with only two months of training and operated without a staff to assist in the
planning. The Union army learned that the organizations for command and control at the regimental level were also necessary at division and department level.  

The regimental staffs, configured according to army regulations, included a major, an adjutant, a regimental quartermaster, a surgeon, a regimental quartermaster sergeant, a regimental commissary sergeant, and a hospital steward. Originally, the colonel of the regiment selected the adjutant, the chaplain and the noncommissioned staff of the regiment. The exception was the regimental quartermaster who was nominated by the colonel of the regiment for appointment by the Secretary of War. When Union forces mobilized, the Secretary of War discontinued the process of nominating quartermasters for regiments, brigades and divisions.

In the West, the state of Kentucky formed two regiments which became the cornerstone of the Army of the Cumberland on 23 April 1861. The commanders of the regiments, Colonel James Guthrie and Major W.E. Woodruff, were volunteers and had limited knowledge of organizations and logistics. Their staff officers were also volunteers with little knowledge of army capabilities and procedures. Additionally, since Kentucky was attempting to remain neutral, it did not recognize the formation of these units for war, Ohio had to supply the arms and equipment. The regiments were unprepared for combat.

As tensions rose within the state of Kentucky, the War
Department authorized formations of additional regiments. In June of 1861, Lovell H. Rousseau recruited the Sixth Kentucky Infantry and the Second Kentucky Cavalry. Lieutenant William Nelson of the Navy recruited the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Regiments of Infantry and the First Kentucky Cavalry. On 28 May 1861, the War Department incorporated the aforementioned units into the Department of Kentucky and designated Brigadier General Robert Anderson as commander. General Anderson organized his first staff in the regimental configuration and chose his officers from friends and well known businessmen.

With the addition of the State of Tennessee to General Anderson's responsibility, the War Department designated the command as the Department of the Cumberland. Brigadier General George H. Thomas relieved Lieutenant Nelson on 12 September 1861 and mustered four Kentucky and two Tennessee regiments into his brigade, the First Brigade of the Department of the Cumberland. Later, other brigades formed when a sufficient number of regiments assembled.

Command and control problems plagued General Thomas during his first few months in the Department of the Cumberland. He assumed control of Camp Dick Robinson which lacked trained soldiers and sufficient quartermaster and commissary stores. Thomas immediately appointed a quartermaster and a commissary of subsistence to shelter and feed the encamped recruits. He formed his staff from the undisciplined material that was available.
During his first significant field operations, General Thomas' inexperienced quartermaster personnel created delays because of confusion in transportation arrangements. While Thomas personally corrected his transportation deficiencies, Brigadier General W. T. Sherman, who assumed command of the Department of the Cumberland from Anderson, rerouted Thomas' supplies to Brigadier General W.S. Rosecrans in Virginia and cancelled Thomas' mission. Sherman inherited Anderson's staff which consisted of many noteworthy officers from the Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio regiments.*

On 9 November 1861, Orders # 97 discontinued the Department of the Cumberland and constituted the Army of the Ohio. Because of the administration's loss of confidence in Sherman, Brigadier General Don C. Buell became commander of the newly formed department. General Buell reorganized the army to form divisions with General Thomas as the First Division commander. The brigades kept their individual numbers without regard to division sequencing (e.g., First Division contained First, Second, Third, and Twelfth Brigade). Brigadier General Alexander McD. McCook commanded the Second Division which included the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Brigades. By the 15th of March 1862, General Buell's department consisted of twenty-three individually numbered brigades formed into seven divisions. The newly formed divisions created the further requirement for capable and cooperative
senior-level staff officers to manage not only the dramatic influx of infantry soldiers but also the demands of artillery and cavalry. Division commanders had selected battle-proven subordinate officers and relatives to fill these vacancies. Division staff positions included an assistant adjutant general, an assistant inspector general, a quartermaster, a commissary of subsistence, a division surgeon, and an aide-de-camp. Additionally, the divisions had assigned officers from the engineer, ordnance and artillery branches.

President Lincoln placed Major General Henry W. Halleck, previously commander of the Department of Missouri, in overall command of the three western departments to resolve a grave command and control problem in the Western Theater. Halleck immediately ordered Buell to move toward Savannah, Tennessee, and assist Major General Ulysses S. Grant near Shiloh. Buell and the Army of the Ohio staff performed exceptionally well at the Battle of Shiloh and gained the necessary combat experience that proved essential in the battles to come.

After the battle of Shiloh, Halleck added a wing level of command and control with the following: a right wing commanded by Thomas, a center wing commanded by Buell, and a left wing commanded by Major General John Pope. Grant became Halleck's second-in-charge, which was a unique concept. In this position Grant became ineffective.
intent of the theater's reorganization was to unify the force while retaining the departments' integrity. The resulting organization forced a Confederate withdrawal from Corinth, Mississippi and provided a strategic victory to General Halleck. 11

General Orders # 112, dated 14 August 1862, reconstituted the Department of Ohio to include the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and a portion of Kentucky. Buell organized three wings in the army commanded by Major General Alexander McD. McD. McCook, Major General Thomas L. Crittenden and Brigadier General C. C. Gilbert. Each wing contained three divisions, consecutively numbered. Thomas became the second-in-command. Although the addition of wing commanders and new regiments created a realignment of staff personnel, the wing staff positions remained relatively identical to the division staff positions which were patterned after the regimental staffs.12

Once again, another commander did not meet the expectations of the administration and Major General William S. Rosecrans replaced Buell as commander of the Department of the Cumberland. The same orders appointing Rosecrans commander formally designated the troops in the Department of the Cumberland as the Fourteenth Corps. He reorganized the Army of the Cumberland by placing Thomas in command of the "Center", McCook in command of the "Right Wing" and Crittenden in command of the "Left Wing."
and immediately marched the army to Murfreesboro, Tennessee. ¹³

The Battle of Stones River had many similarities to the Battle of Chickamauga. Over eighty percent of the Union staff officers and commanders that fought at Stones River participated in the Battle of Chickamauga. Furthermore, the army consolidated its widely separated marching troops, deployed directly into the fight, and conducted a hasty defense. The Battle of Stones River was nearly a disaster for the Union with their defenses crumbling; however, the Confederates withdrew from the battlefield without the near victory.

On 9 January 1863, The War Department formally designated the Center, Left Wing, and Right Wing of the Army of the Cumberland as the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-First Corps respectively. Furthermore, the orders placed the Cumberland River, one of the principle supply routes of the Army of the Cumberland, under Rosecrans control. The responsibility for the river required his staff to ensure security of the water lines of communication. ¹⁴

With the victory of Stones River, Rosecrans once again proved that he was a superior commander. With unflinching integrity, he was also patriotic, strong willed, and self reliant. His military education at West Point, which he graduated fifth in the Class of 1842, provided him with a well rounded education in history, military drill,
mathematics, and engineering. Assigned to the engineers after graduation, Rosecrans developed his skills in constructing fortifications and buildings. He also began to demonstrate innovation by inventing equipment to easily resolve mechanical problems. After leaving the army, Rosecrans continued to develop inventions during his prewar civilian life by opening a petroleum refinery. His business failed because he was a "micro manager." While on convalescent leave, Rosecrans allowed his untrained partners to mismanage the business. This characteristic of failing to instill responsibility in subordinates haunted him throughout his career.  

As part of the 75,000 militia called by Lincoln, Rosecrans reentered the army. His patriotism was only surpassed by his love for troops. When offered the position as Chief Engineer of Ohio, he initially declined in order to fight alongside the troops.

"Our people must go to the front with or without leaders and fight and die for the country. I cannot stay at home and see this; duty demands that I should offer my military acquirements to aid in diminishing the loss of life. I must go with our people to the front."

On 20 May 61, Rosecrans deployed as a provisional brigade commander in McClellan's army to Rich Mountain, West Virginia.

During his victories at Rich Mountain, Carnifex Ferry, and Iuka, he demonstrated aggressive tactics and dynamic leadership. The Battle of Corinth exhibited his defensive
ability through the use of alternate battle positions, kill-zones, interior lines and command and control under pressure. However, when reporting deficiencies of the battles, he cited his commanders for failure to support his efforts. This lack of tact to his superior commanders created future difficulties.  

Besides his excellent tactical abilities, Rosecrans was a proven humanitarian. He cared about his troops' pay, saying that pay enhanced the morale of the fighting soldier. His emphasis on the mail delivery system also focused on the increased morale factor. To ensure that his soldiers received the proper medical treatment, Rosecrans supervised the sanitation of hospitals. Rosecrans believed that large quantities of troops in hospitals were an indication of low morale. Additionally, he wanted properly equipped soldiers and demanded the standardization of weapons throughout units as much as possible.

When Rosecrans assumed command of the Army of the Cumberland in November of 1862, he found thinned ranks, filled hospitals, empty depots, poor discipline, and low morale. Rosecrans had proven to be an inventive commander and created new organizations upon his arrival in the department to resolve these administrative and support problems. Stones River was the first look at the new commander by the soldiers of this veteran army. He was highly visible, being exposed at the front and in the heat.
of the fighting. The victory, a result of his leadership on the battlefield, began to improve the soldiers morale and built them into hard fighters that became a valuable commodity in the months to come.  

Rosecrans surrounded himself with a young, energetic staff. Only Taylor, his quartermaster, was over fifty years old. He believed "young men without experience are better than experienced old men. Young men will learn; old men, fixed in their old habits and opinions, will not learn." Rosecrans requested energetic and inexperienced officers that would function in accordance with his requirements. The majority of the department's important staff officers came with him from the Army of the Mississippi. These officers had proven themselves in earlier conflicts and Rosecrans admired their ability to "know all that a commander knows." Rosecrans expected his staff to be precise in their observations and reports, and he did not tolerate mistakes. Formalized training for field staffs was nonexistent; therefore, Rosecrans personally gave lessons on his expectations of staff officers and required his staffs to study. His staff felt that Rosecrans was confident, bold, and tough in his every action. Although Rosecrans was hard to work with, the staff believed he was a very effective commander.  

The army had three types of staffs: the general staff, staff-corps or staff departments, and regimental staffs. The general staff included the adjutants, assistant
adjutants, aide-de-camps, inspector generals, and assistant inspector generals. Engineers, topographical engineers, ordnance, quartermaster, subsistence, medical, and pay departments comprised the staff sections. The army required the regiments to have a regimental adjutant and a regimental quartermaster; a regimental subsistence officer was an option.¹⁰

Although today's army titles the staff positions differently, the staff's functions are relatively similar. Currently, the army separates the staff structure into four main groups: the chief of staff, the coordinating staff, the special staff, and the personal staff. The chief of staff directs and coordinates the entire staff. The coordinating staff, comparable to the staff departments of the Civil War, assists the commander in all areas except those which the commander decides to control personally. The special staff, similar to the staff-corps, assists the commander in special skills, usually technical areas. The personal staff functions like the general staff and works for the commander directly instead of through the chief of staff or another staff officer. These functions are similar to those used by Rosecrans.¹¹

Like the standard staff of the other Union armies of the Civil War era, the structure of the Army of the Cumberland's staff incorporated a chief of staff, a personal staff, a coordinating staff, and a special staff. The personal staff group included an assistant adjutant
general, an assistant inspector general, a chaplain, and aide-de-camp. The Army of the Cumberland contained two coordinating staff groups, a field army staff and a department staff. Developed to support the organizations fighting the battles, the field army staff contained a quartermaster officer, a subsistence officer, the medical director, the ordnance officer, the topographical engineer officer, the provost marshal general, and the commissary of musters and disbursing. They normally remained with the headquarters and reported the status of functional areas when necessary. Containing similar staff positions, the department staff established security along the lines of communication, occupied the depots under the protection of area commanders and pushed supplies to the army in contact. Area commanders occasionally provided guidance to the depots; however, this was the responsibility of the chief of the staff agency.

General Rosecrans' staff followed the norm, but his special staff group was larger than other contemporary army staffs. With his engineer officer as commander, he formed the Pioneer Brigade, a collection of soldiers from each regiment in the Army of the Cumberland who performed engineering projects. Other special staff officer positions that Rosecrans developed when a problem surfaced were: chief of courier lines, chief of the army police, mail officer, chief of the army directory, and military superintendent of the railroad. Rosecrans' army also had
chiefs of artillery and cavalry, who served as advisors to the commander in their respective fields. With the invention of the telegraph, the superintendent of the telegraph became a necessary and valuable staff officer on the battlefield. The introduction of signal stations augmented the telegraph's ability to transfer information and added another staff officer to the army staff. His staff is displayed in figure 1.

Figure 1

-24-
The chief of staff was a new development for the United States Army during the Civil War and was found only at army and corps headquarters. The Europeans had already developed and integrated this position into their organizations and doctrine. Neither the Union nor Confederate armies made provisions for a chief of staff. However, both the North and South incorporated the position into their corps and division organizations. The functions of the chief of staff were dependent upon the personality of the commander. While most Civil War field armies, both North and South, used the chief of staff as a senior adjutant general responsible for issuing orders and directing movement, Rosecrans expected his chief of staff to assume additional functions.

Rosecrans considered his chief of staff as his principal advisor, counsel, and assistant. Brigadier General James Abram Garfield arrived on 25 January 1863, to interview for an expected command. He had won a seat in the House of Representatives, representing a constituency in Ohio, and was waiting until the House convened in November. The army commander conducted numerous and lengthy discussions which served to educate him on Garfield's background, lifestyle, attitudes, and expectations. Garfield had studied in the ministry which dominated his early adult life. Rosecrans did not particularly care for officers mixing politics, religion, or the military. As Garfield's experience rounded his
idealistic views, he was more acceptable. However, he remained a strong debater, a characteristic that Rosecrans admired and exercised.

Although Garfield could be molded by new influences, he stubbornly kept his old ideas. In other words, Garfield acknowledged current actions or ideas, but on several occasions he did not agree. He displayed apparent loyalty and then discussed his differences to confidential friends such as the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase. As a strong opponent of slavery, Garfield despised the idea and anyone involved, including Union officers that continued to support slavery. Only his desire for harmony compromised his staunch hatred of officers like Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood, who favored the return of slaves to owners. He believed that the war would not end until the United States completely subjugated the South.

Garfield felt that he had the attributes of a senior commanding officer in the United States Army. His definition of a good commander was one who had intelligence, a willingness to work, and strong personal courage. His selection to the courts martial of Colonel John B. Turchin and General Fitz-John Porter convinced Garfield that he represented the army's code of ethics. Therefore, he considered himself a candidate for high level commands. Although Garfield said that he would rather earn rank in the field, he had obtained his commission for colonelcy by convincing troops to join the
Union army. Rosecrans offered Garfield a command, but the idealistic minister saw the other offer of chief of staff as a chance to uniquely serve in a position second only to the commanding general. 

Sickness had plagued the military career of General Garfield. During the lull in action after the Battle of Shiloh, he became progressively ill to a point that the army relieved him of brigade command. He was also sick in the spring of 1863, but the army was only rebuilding its supplies and constructing defensive works. Immediately after Tullahoma, Garfield began to feel the symptoms of another bout with fever and stomach sickness. For a man of large frame and strong character, Garfield was constantly in a feeble and weak state of health.

Almost three weeks after Garfield's arrival in the Army of the Cumberland, Rosecrans selected him as the chief of staff. Garfield perceived his duties to include not only "chief clerk," but also to act as a counsel and assist in developing plans for the upcoming campaigns. Garfield considered his responsibilities as chief of staff to improve the army's effectiveness by coordinating and supervising the staff, organizing and systemizing the routine functions of the army, and providing quick and accurate information to the commander.

The choice of Garfield as chief of staff was political for both himself and Rosecrans. Garfield, who had expressed a repulsion of working for West Pointers, only
required the position until November of 1863 when Congress reconvened. Depending on the success of his military career, Garfield could have remained in the army, and reported to Congress only if requested. Rosecrans felt that having a general officer on his staff would release him to concentrate on more important matters. He also knew that Garfield was an incumbent congressman and that friends in strategic positions would assist him in future endeavors. Regardless of the reasons, the relationship between Rosecrans and Garfield shaped the history of the Army of Cumberland for the next nine months.

General officers appointed aides-de-camp to assist them in military duties during time of war. Regulations authorized two aides-de-camp for a major general and one aide-de-camp for a brigadier general. Aides-de-camp required the full confidence of their general officer because they represented the commander when delivering written or verbal orders. The aide's knowledge of the situation had to be comprehensive and analytical because the commander gave the aide the latitude to either modify an order if necessary or return to headquarters if the situation allowed time.

Rosecrans expected excellence from his aides. He constantly drilled them during the evening hours on troop locations, routes, and subordinate commander's quarters. Although the senior ranking aide-de-camp for General Rosecrans was Colonel Joseph C. McKibbin, the senior
aide-de-camp was Major Frank S. Bond. Rosecrans had offered McKibbin the quartermaster position prior to Tullahoma; however, McKibbin desired to remain his aide. His other aides-de-camp were: Captain J.P. Drouillard, Captain William Farrar, Captain Robert S. Thoms, Lieutenant William L. Porter, Captain Charles R. Thompson and Lieutenant James K. Reynolds. Rosecrans’ favored aide-de-camp was, deservedly, Captain Thoms, for he was a hard worker and quick learner. Thoms had proven himself as a responsible representative of the commander and was trusted with many independent projects in the command. After the Tullahoma Campaign, Drouillard and Thompson followed Rosecrans back to Nashville and Thoms remained with the forward headquarters at Tullahoma. 

Major Bond, a native from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, arrived in the western theater as a staff officer for Brigadier General Taylor. On 15 December 1862, Bond became aide-de-camp to Rosecrans and admirably performed on the field at Stones River. After the battle he was promoted to major.

Captain Thompson was a loyal and proven staff officer. As an ordnance officer in the Army of the Mississippi, Captain Thompson had served with Rosecrans since August 1862. For his bravery at the Battle of Corinth, he was appointed an aide-de-camp and followed Rosecrans to the Army of the Cumberland.

Captain J.P. Drouillard was not a stranger to loyalty
either. He had served as aide-de-camp to Major General Irvin McDowell since 20 December 1861, and remained with him even during McDowell's court of inquiry. Rosecrans, then commanding the Department of the Cumberland, requested Captain Drouillard as aide-de-camp.39

In the field, the assistant adjutant general maintained the personnel strength reports, including strength accounting, casualty reporting, assignments, reassignments, promotions, reductions, separations, and administration of leave policies. He visited and inspected the guards to ensure security and alertness and controlled and processed prisoners and deserters. Most important, the adjutant general managed correspondence and military orders.34

Responsible for leaves and orders, Captain Dickson and Major McMichael managed the department and army respectively. The assistant adjutant generals occupied two offices at Nashville and Tullahoma. Lieutenant Colonel C. Goddard and Captain J. Bates Dickson remained in Nashville, and Captain Henry Thrall and Major William M. McMichael worked from Tullahoma.

Serving with General Rosecrans the longest of all the staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel Goddard had performed as aide-de-camp on the general's staff in Western Virginia. Lieutenant Colonel Goddard acted as an assistant adjutant general at Stones River and, after the battle, Rosecrans appointed him as the assistant adjutant general.
with the rank of lieutenant colonel. 

The War Department was responsible for purchasing rations from a contractor and having the rations delivered to a depot. The commissary of subsistence notified the quartermaster who provided transportation from the depot to the army and built storehouses to store the rations. All rations were the responsibility of the army's chief commissary, who supplied the corps commissaries, who, in turn, supplied the division commissaries. Brigade officers picked up rations from division, and regimental officers received rations from brigade.

The Chief Commissary of the Army of the Cumberland was Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Simmons. Although a lawyer by trade, he had functioned as a commissary of subsistence since the beginning of the war. When Rosecrans assumed command of the Army of the Mississippi, he assigned Lieutenant Colonel Simmons to be his commissary chief. Simmons remained with Rosecrans when the General assumed command of the Army of the Cumberland. Rosecrans only kept proven performers and, judging by the length of his service, Colonel Simmons had performed well.

Water and land transportation for all troops were the responsibility of the quartermaster. He furnished horses for cavalry, artillery, and trains, and supplied tents, camp and garrison equipment, forage, lumber, and all materials for camps. The quartermaster built or chartered ships, steamers, docks and wharves, and constructed
barracks, hospitals, wagons, and ambulances. Construction or repair of roads, bridges, and railroads fell under the aegis of the quartermaster. He arranged the transportation for the wounded, established the hospitals and ambulance depots in the rear of respective units, and provided instructions for using the ambulances. Normally, the quartermaster section contained three sub-departments: equipage, transportation and supplies. First, equipage included articles of clothing, tentage and tools. The company commander obtained clothing for his men from the quartermaster. The quartermaster issued camp-kettles, mess pans, hatchets, axes, and spades to every 13-15 soldiers. Second, the quartermaster coordinated all transportation including animals, wagons, vessels, boats, railroads and cars in use. He issued one wagon per regiment and ten wagons per brigade. The enormity of this job is clear considering the Army of the Cumberland had over 3000 wagons and 600 ambulances and 50,000 head of horses and mules. Third, a sub-department of the quartermaster provided the buildings and regular supplies for the army, such as hospitals, barracks, quarters, fuel and stationery.

The quartermaster of the Army of the Cumberland was Lieutenant Colonel John W. Taylor. He had been a businessman in Illinois and Iowa and entered the army as an assistant quartermaster with the rank of captain. Taylor performed well in the quartermaster department at
Tipton, Missouri, his first assignment. His conduct of business induced General Pope, then commander of the District of Central Missouri, to select Taylor as his chief quartermaster. When Rosecrans relieved Pope as commander of the Mississippi, Taylor remained as the chief quartermaster. Having established an energetic and efficient image, Simmons followed Rosecrans to the Army of the Cumberland. Upon his arrival, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. At the battle of Stone's River, Taylor remained with Rosecrans on the battlefield.

Even though rail transportation was the responsibility of the quartermaster, General Rosecrans designated a special staff officer to directly assist him in the management of railroad operations. The long line of communications and the enormous complexity and importance of the rail system compelled Rosecrans to assign a dedicated staff officer to operate the railroad. Responsibility for the loading of supplies on rail cars remained with the assistant quartermaster officers. However, the superintendent of the railroad, Colonel John B. Anderson, was responsible for the complete operation of the system.

To assist the specific functions of rail transportation in the Department of the Cumberland, the superintendent managed several different types of railroad cars and trains. Dummy cars, a small engine with a cabin in the back with seats and a heater, provided transportation to
small parties and served as the preferred method of travel by the commanding general and his staff. A construction train assisted the repair and construction of worn or destroyed tracks and bridges. Passenger cars transported troops and civilians in the area of operation, while box and flatcars hauled supplies, equipment, and troops.

The Ordnance Department was responsible for furnishing all cannons and artillery carriages, small arms, horse accoutrements, horse medicines, and ammunition. The chief of ordnance at Washington procured cannons, projectiles, powder, small arms and accoutrements and delivered them to the army’s area of operation. The army’s chief of ordnance inspected the delivery and reported all defects in the quality or condition of ordnance supplies. Additionally, he collected all arms and accoutrements from deserters and prisoners and returned war munitions left on the battlefields to the respective commander.40

The Army’s of the Cumberland chief ordnance officer was Captain Horace Porter. He entered the active army as a brevet-lieutenant of ordnance in 1860 from West Point. Porter was chief of ordnance and artillery at the bombardment of Fort Pulaski. In 1862 Porter served as chief of ordnance for the Army of the Potomac. He became chief of ordnance for the Department of the Ohio in October, 1862, and again in Rosecrans’ Department of the Cumberland in January, 1863.41

The inspector general was responsible to the commander
for reporting on the army's status in the areas of troop morale, camp facilities, unit administration, and officer leadership. He inspected the discipline and military training of troops which encompassed the state of their arms, clothing, equipment, kitchens, and barracks, both in the field and in garrison. The inspection of camp facilities included the condition of the stables, horses, prisons, hospitals, and storehouses. Unit administration involved the management of company funds, regimental and company books, papers and files. The inspector general had to report on the ability of all officers in command of troops, and the commander's mode of enforcing discipline, and the effect of this discipline. Inspectors in the field were in charge of picket lines, ensuring pickets remained awake, knew passwords, and carried serviceable weapons.

The assistant inspector general of the Army of the Cumberland had subordinate inspectors of cavalry and artillery that concentrated their efforts in their respective technical areas.

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Charles Ducat, the inspector general of the Army of the Cumberland, had a civil engineering background and served as secretary and chief surveyor of the Board of Underwriters at Chicago prior to the war. He entered the army as a private in the infantry and rose rapidly to the rank of lieutenant-colonel because of his efficiency and meritorious service. After the Battle of Corinth, Ducat served as Rosecrans' chief of
staff until a new chief of staff arrived; thereupon, Rosecrans appointed Ducat as his inspector general. When Rosecrans departed for the Army of the Cumberland, Ducat accompanied him. An illness forced Ducat to miss the Battle of Stones River. He returned to the Army of the Cumberland about 1 April 1863.43

The primary medical staff officer in the army was the medical director, who was responsible for organization of the hospitals and the functions of his personnel. Positioned at the principal depot, the medical director established the location and the sanitation of hospitals and supervised the placing and procedures of the ambulance trains. He ensured the depots and ambulances had the necessary apparatus, medicines, and stores and reported all discrepancies to the unit's medical purveyor. The medical purveyor was responsible for procuring, storing, and distributing medical supplies in the unit. The Army of the Cumberland had 159 surgeons, 260 assistants, 84 contract physicians, 2500 attendants as stewards, clerks, cooks, and nurses, and 600 ambulances.44

Surgeon Glover Perin, Medical Director of the Army of the Cumberland, graduated from Ohio Medical School in 1846 and became a regular army surgeon. Perin served in the army from the Mexican War until the beginning of the Civil War. The army assigned him to Rosecrans' staff in February 1863.45

The provost marshal general, serving as a coordinating
staff officer on the army staff, conducted four types of operations: law and order, prisoner of war, area security, and refugee and straggler control. In law and order operations, the provost marshal general prosecuted soldiers for breaking army regulations and civilians and camp followers for disobeying common laws. Prisoner of war operations involved responsibility, accountability and internment of enemy prisoners of war received from division and corps units. Area security operations entailed protection for depots, supply routes, and refugees. Controlling the flow of civilian and military personnel on and off the battlefield comprised the straggler and refugee control operations.*

The provost marshal general of the Army of the Cumberland was Lieutenant Colonel William M. Wiles. Leaving the drug business, Wiles enlisted a company and served as its lieutenant in Missouri and Arkansas. In May 1862, Wiles became an aide-de-camp and provost marshal on Rosecrans staff at Corinth, Mississippi. Rosecrans admired Wiles' energy, humor, and work ethic. Rosecrans retained him as the provost marshal on his staff when he became the commander of the Army of the Cumberland.*

Before the army received a new company or regiment in the services of the United States, an officer had to muster and inspect the unit. Usually found at division, the commissary of musters performed the mustering in and duties. He forwarded the muster-rolls, taken during the
mustering inspection, directly to the Adjutant General of the army in Washington D.C. Another responsibility of the commissary of musters was to compare the mustering out roles with the mustering in roles and submit a justification for any discrepancies. The commissaries of muster served as assistant adjutant generals or aides-de-camp when not used in their primary duty.*

The Army of the Cumberland had two engineer departments, the Corps of Engineers and the Corps of Topographical Engineers. The Congressional Act of March 3, 1863 merged the two corps together. However, Rosecrans continued to operate with two separate sections because the duties of the two corps were different. The Corps of Engineers planned, constructed and repaired all fortifications, intrenchments, roads and bridges. Additionally, in the offense the engineers removed barriers, and in the defense they emplaced obstacles and destroyed roads and bridges. The topographical engineers surveyed defenses and fortifications, reconnoitered terrain, and constructed military maps.**

Brigadier General James St. Clair Morton served as Rosecrans' chief of engineers. Graduating from the Military Academy at West Point in 1851, Morton entered the army in the Corps of Engineers. In the Army of the Cumberland Rosecrans had Morton form the Pioneer Brigade by collecting soldiers, skilled in construction, from each company in the Department of the Cumberland. The army was
able to produce three battalions of carpenters, and bridge and road builders. Their mission was to concentrate on building roads and bridges for the Army of the Cumberland.\textsuperscript{30}

On 29 May 1863, Captain W.E. Merrill became the department’s chief topographical engineer reporting to Brigadier General J.St. Clair Morton. After the subordinate units had difficulty in regard to General Morton’s jurisdiction, he had all the topographical engineers report to Captain Merrill. Morton had attempted to control the topographical engineers by himself, but Captain Merrill, who controlled all corps, division, and brigade topographical engineers, requested Morton funnel orders for these engineers through him.\textsuperscript{31}

The chief of artillery was usually the senior ranking artillery officer in the organization. In the Army of the Cumberland, each brigade had a battery of artillery; however, the chief of artillery position was common only at division, and the position was usually filled by the senior battery commander in that unit. The chief of artillery advised the commander on the condition of artillery units and weapons and assisted the subordinate commander with tactical decisions on the employment of the batteries. He also kept the chief of artillery in Washington, D.C. updated on the status of artillery.

Colonel James Barnett served as the chief of artillery for the Army of the Cumberland. His education
concentrated on the hardware trade. At the beginning of the Civil War, Barnett commanded an artillery battery. After the Battle of Perryville, he was the chief of artillery on Major General Alexander McD. McCook's staff. Rosecrans designated Barnett as the army's chief of artillery on 24 November 1862. Barnett performed commendably for Rosecrans at Stones River.  

The signal stations proved essential for collecting and communicating battlefield intelligence which included discovering and monitoring enemy movement. The doctrinal use of the telegraph as a "combat multiplier" on the Civil War battlefield was in a developmental stage. The purpose of the signal stations and the officers who manned them, was to provide constant communication between the various organizations in the army and the different commanding generals. The advantages of the telegraph, coupled with the establishment of signal flag stations, greatly enhanced the communications capability of all wartime commands, especially in the Army of the Cumberland's area of operation. The soldiers composing the new signal office came from all different regiments within the Army of the Cumberland.

The massive coordination needed to manage the communications network required that a central point of contact be readily available on Rosecrans' staff. The officer selected for this responsibility was Captain J. Merrill. A native of Pennsylvania and an attorney by
profession, Merrill learned the signal codes and, when detailed from the Army of the Potomac, instructed the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland in these codes.

The telegraph was a relatively new invention and became extremely useful during the Civil War. This technology was slow to find its niche in the command and control process, but Rosecrans used the telegraph intensively. He expected telegraph service to be established quickly when he moved his headquarters. Rosecrans used the telegraph to communicate with Washington D.C. and other area commands. If possible, he tried to establish telegraph service to his subordinate commanders. Rosecrans' telegraph officer was Captain John C. Van Duzer, who had been the area supervisor of a civilian telegraph service. When the telegraph service became a formal staff agency in the army, only Van Duzer received a commission as an officer in the Army of the Cumberland.

Possessing no authority or resources, the chaplains served indirectly as personal staff assistants to commanders at all echelons in the army. The soldiers and commanders treated the preachers with little respect, requiring chaplains to be inventive to draw the soldiers' attention from the many vices and passions surrounding the camp. They believed their work was a necessity, a utility and a responsibility. The chaplains were responsible for the spiritual instruction and encouragement of the soldiers. Their greatest effect on the soldier was at the
hospitals where they visited and cared for the sick and wounded. The Army of the Cumberland considered the presence of chaplains at the hospitals a sense of duty. The Army of the Cumberland's chaplain was Father Trecy, an Irish-born Catholic priest "run out" of Huntsville because of his pro-North position. Father Trecy left for the Union army located at Iuka and had remained with General Rosecrans.

Probably the one organization that was of the most material benefit to the soldiers was the Sanitary Commission. The Sanitary Commission assigned a representative, although not on the department's staff, to serve as a special assistant to the commander. The primary focus of the Sanitary Commission was to preserve the health of the soldier and restore to health the sick and wounded. Their basic responsibilities were the inspection of camps and hospitals and the submission of reports on these inspections to Washington. Additionally, the commission provided suggestions to the command on the care of the men and food and on the preparation of the rations. The commission also served as a collection center for articles of necessity such as bandages and blankets for the sick and wounded. The representatives of the Sanitary Commission established depots for sanitary stores and distributed the stores upon formal request from unit surgeons. The service had tremendous effects on the health and welfare of the soldiers and aided the
commanders' warfighting ability by increasing the units' morale.

Essential to the stability of a command with extended lines of communications was the army Police. This was an ad hoc function required to reduce fraud and crime in the department's rear area. The police patrolled cities, armies, steamers, and hospitals. The police arrested rebel messengers, confiscated contraband, seized horses and mules for the department, detected and punished smugglers, and provided a sustainment base for the spy network.

The most unusual staff officer on Rosecrans' army staff was William Truesdail, otherwise referred to as "Colonel." Colonel Truesdail's primary function in the Army of the Cumberland was Chief of Police; however, he performed various duties depending on Rosecrans' priorities. Colonel Truesdail's background covers numerous business ventures; the most unusual of which was supplying beef to Grant's army. Under Pope, Truesdail had responsibility for the police, couriers, mail, secret service and scouts. When Rosecrans took command of Pope's army, Truesdail remained in his position and moved with General Rosecrans to the Army of the Cumberland. Two of Rosecrans important tasks were delivery of the mail and formation of an army directory. The mail delivery system in the Army of the Cumberland was almost nonexistent prior to Truesdail.

The mail was a link between the soldier and his family.
The civilian mail department could neither manage the immense mail flow nor organize the quagmire of dangerous routes. The Army of the Cumberland developed a mail delivery system patterned after the system General Rosecrans and Colonel Truesdail implemented in the Army of the Mississippi. The mail department moved with the army and received and distributed mail to the regiments through mail distribution centers.

Stragglers and relatives approached the headquarters of the Army of the Cumberland in hordes for information on locations of specific units. Rosecrans designated Truesdail to resolve the situation. Truesdail formed a small directory which compiled accurate locations of the new army organizations. The directory assisted guests in seeking friends in the army, provided burial lists to relatives attempting to find remains of their lost ones, and oriented citizens, Sanitary Commissioners, traders and visitors on unit locations. The directory was such a success that it continued to exist even after the initial purpose was complete.

The pay department was responsible for ensuring the army paid the troops as often as feasible, but within two months. The department paymasters received the units' pay from a pay district established by the Paymaster General and delivered the money to the troops' location. Muster and pay rolls, signed by the mustering and inspection officer, allowed the commander to pay the troops. The
Department of the Cumberland's paymaster, Major Smith, remained in Nashville. Rosecrans held Smith responsible for the payment of troops on time.

As shown above, the Army of the Cumberland had an enormous staff for one commander to supervise. The chief of staff became essential to assist the commander in managing the multitude of information channels. The organization was very complicated and dispersed which added to the complexity of even small problems, but the majority of the staff officers were no strangers to the demands that Rosecrans placed upon his staff officers. The following chapters analyze the pressures, decisions, problems and solutions which involved the staff officers of the Army of the Cumberland.
CHAPTER 2

END NOTES


3Revised Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1861, (hereafter Revised Regulations), (Philadelphia: J.G.L. Brown, 1861), 18, 208.


6Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, 28-27, 40; General Orders # 57 dated 15 August 1861 designated the formation of the first brigade in the Department of the Cumberland. Although, General Thomas was officially the commander of Camp Dick Robinson, he did not arrive until 12 September 1861.


8Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, 42.

9U.S. Army, General Orders, 1862, (Washington, D.C.: Adjutant General's Officer, n.d.; General Orders # 97, 9 Nov 1861; Van Horne, 98; Revised Regulations, 487; The primary staff officers were in Washington D.C.. Staff officers in subordinate departments and armies were called assistants staff officers (e.g. assistant adjutant general). Staff officers that the War Department had not approved were called acting assistants.

10Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, 122.

11Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, 98.

19Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, 217.


16Lamers, Edge of Glory, 21-22.

17Lamers, Edge of Glory, 27,29.

14Lamers, Edge of Glory, 63, 67, 92, 94, 184.


11U.S. Army, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, 2-3 to 2-5.

1All future references to army and department specifically identify the organizations in the field and in the garrisons respectively.


14Smith, Life of Garfield, 66, 180.

15Smith, Life of Garfield, 169, 264, 278.

12Smith, Life of Garfield, 219, 280, 312.

17Smith, Life of Garfield, 274, 279.

14Smith, Life of Garfield, 275.

11Craighill, Army Officer's Pocket Companion, 51.
Bickham, Rosecrans' Campaign with the XIVth Corps, 29, 145.


Fitch, Annals, 53

Fitch, Annals, 54.

Craighill, Army Officer's Pocket Companion, 50.

Fitch, Annals, 47.


Fitch, Annals, 280.

Revised Regulations, 159-173; Craighill, 62; Fitch, Annals, 285-271.

Fitch, Annals, 272.

Revised Regulations, 567-588; Craighill, Army Officer's Pocket Companion, 64.

Fitch, Annals, 802.

Craighill, Army Officer's Pocket Companion, 49.

Fitch, Annals, 48-49.

Revised Regulations, 281-291; Fitch, Annals, 291.

Fitch, Annals, 49-50.

FM 101-5, 3-29; Fitch, Annals, 282.

Fitch, Annals, 286-287.

Revised Regulations, 489.

Corbin and Thian, Legislative History of the General Staff, 509; Craighill, Army Officer's Pocket Companion, 63.

Fitch, Annals, 81-81.

**Fitch, Annals, 288-300.**
**Fitch, Annals, 303-306.**
**Fitch, Annals, 321-325.**
**Fitch, Annals, 331-345.**
**Fitch, Annals, 346-352.**
**Fitch, Annals, 348-349.**
**Fitch, Annals, 311.**
**Fitch, Annals, 318.**
**Revised Regulations, 341.**
A message of 5 July 1863 from the Honorable Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War, which praised General Grant for a victory at Vicksburg and General Meade for the victory at Gettysburg, hurt the pride of General Rosecrans. His army had just completed a classical campaign of maneuver, capturing numerous supplies, wagons, horses and prisoners. He now occupied East Tennessee, the initial mission given to him when he assumed command of the Army of the Cumberland. His operational plan was masterful, causing the enemy to withdraw from well prepared defenses without a potentially disastrous engagement.  

July began with immense promise for the preservation of the Union and a quick end to a long and costly war. The Secretary of War did not want a report indicating advances; he wanted an engagement culminating in the complete destruction of the Army of Tennessee. With the presence of an invincible Union army in North Georgia enroute to Atlanta, the soft underbelly of a tough and bloodthirsty foe was now within the grasp of the nation. Secretary Stanton wanted material results like that from Vicksburg and Gettysburg.

After a risky Tullahoma campaign, General Rosecrans had several tasks to complete before continuing against General Bragg. Rosecrans had three options for crossing
the Tennessee River. First, a crossing at Chattanooga was difficult because of the narrow gorges and the heights commanding the approach routes. The second option was to cross the river north of Chattanooga; however, the area lacked sufficient water and forage. The country roads were too narrow and difficult to maneuver and would take the army away from its main supply lines. Finally, crossing below Chattanooga required the ability to collect sufficient subsistence, forage, ammunition, and bridge materials. The number of obstacles on this approach was phenomenal. Halleck's initial guidance on 24 October 1862, to cut the railroad at Chattanooga, Cleveland, or Athens, swayed Rosecrans to give the northern route some careful thought and planning. Because his planning process was long and the decision was difficult, General Rosecrans did not divulge his final decision until well into August.

Formidable terrain features (see Figure 2) covered the Army of the Cumberland's area of operation. The first obstacle the army saw upon initiating the advance was the Cumberland Mountains. The mountains rose from the low river valleys to heights of 2100 feet and contained wide plateaus. The orientation of the mountain range was generally southwest to northeast, which was perpendicular to their route. Numerous small rivers in deep valleys flowed down the sides of the mountains. South of Chattanooga, the avenue of approach through the Cumberland Mountains ended at the Tennessee River, but north of
Chattanooga the army had to contend with an additional obstacle, Walden's Ridge. The Sequatchie Valley, a four mile wide valley, separated the Cumberland Mountains from Walden's Ridge.

The roads traversing these immense obstacles were narrow, winding and arduous. The soil was sandy and excessive use by wagons and horses turned an essential route into a quagmire of impassible sandpits. Horse and mule teams had to be doubled in order to pull the wagons over the heights. With the wheels rigged for braking, the wagons skidded down the other side of the cliffs, sometimes flipping over or destroying the brake chains, resulting in the complete destruction of the wagons. For the infantry, the roads were constant quagmires. The troops either sloshed through the mud created by incessant rainfall, or trampled through the choking dust, common during periods of dry weather.

The valleys should have contained fields with planted corn along with well supplied farms; however, months of forage by the Confederate forces left the country barren and the Union Army dependent upon their own lines of supply for forage, rations, and stock. Rosecrans knew that the mountain routes challenged the physical stamina of the soldiers. These soldiers required plenty of nutrition to ensure they remained a combat effective force upon completion of this long and gruelling campaign. Rosecrans expected the campaign to last at least a month,
including the pursuit of Bragg on the east side of the
Tennessee River. Therefore, for the operation to be
supportable, the depots had to acquire sufficient rations
and forage for twenty days. A plan to procure and store
available rations secretly, so as not to arouse Southern
curiosity, deserved careful thought and development rather
than storming head first into a possible entrapment.

An essential task that became hard to manage was the
army's ability to carry fodder. To reduce the
transportation requirements, Rosecrans demanded ripened
corn in the fields for fodder prior to initiation of the
campaign. Additionally, to reduce the unnecessary baggage
and increase the mobility of Rosecrans' army, Halleck
required the Union army to decrease the number of
deployable wagons. Rosecrans' staff simply wrote a series
of field orders requiring the corps to carry the army's
fodder and ration requirements yet restricting the number
of wagons to employ. The necessity of carrying rations
for twenty days, ammunition for two big engagements, and
tools for traversing formidable rivers and tremendous
mountains, coupled with the reduced authorization for
wagons, overburdened the Union Army's transportation
capabilities.

The movement of the Union army toward Atlanta
significantly stretched the lines of communications for
the Army of the Cumberland. To assist in the
transportation of large quantities of ammunition, forage,
rations and pontoons, the Union army completed the repair of the railroad from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport, Alabama. Because of its central location between Chattanooga and Stevenson, Bridgeport was an ideal location for the Union’s forward quartermaster and subsistence depot. Rosecrans believed that a functional railroad system to the Tennessee River would sustain his forces operating from this area and threatening the rear of the Army of the Tennessee.

Figure 2

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In order to maneuver General Bragg out of Chattanooga, Rosecrans needed a substantial force to cross the Tennessee River and threaten Bragg's railway communications south to Atlanta. Rosecrans expected that a penetration in such strength would force Bragg into a decision to withdraw from Chattanooga and protect the Army of Tennessee's lines of communication. This withdrawal would have allowed Rosecrans to apply pressure from the south, west, and north. However, sending a sizeable force on such a daring and risky maneuver required a guarantee of flank security.

Halleck promised that Major General A.E. Burnside would secure General Rosecrans' northern flank. Burnside had commanded the Department of the Ohio since 25 March 1863, and he controlled his department from his headquarters in the rear at Cincinnati, Ohio. The acme of activity in his department between March and July was chasing General John H. Morgan, a cavalry commander for General Bragg, through Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio.*

Prior to Tullahoma, Rosecrans had argued with Halleck that conducting two simultaneous, decisive campaigns was ill-advised and would lead to the possible destruction of the Union armies in the Western Theater. Halleck's plan was to fix Bragg's army with Rosecrans' army, while Grant isolated and defeated General Johnsons' unit in Mississippi. Bragg then would not have been able to reinforce Johnson and defeat the Army of the Tennessee and
the Army of the Cumberland in detail. Rosecrans' wanted to avoid a decisive battle in case Grant were to lose and there would have been two defeated armies in the west incapable of supporting each other.

Organizing his preparation for this risky campaign, Rosecrans developed seven general requirements before continuing the attack against Bragg:

1. Convince Bragg that the army would cross north of Chattanooga.
2. Repair the railroads at Bridgeport which were essential to establishing a central depot.
3. Have each unit secretly accumulate 20 days of rations to prevent knowledge of an impending attack reaching the Confederates.
4. Construct pontoon bridges, bring them forward and conceal them.
5. Collect 20 days of rations and ammunition for two great battles for an advance via Chattanooga to Rome.
6. Allow the corn to ripen for proper fodder.
7. Attempt to cut Bragg's lines of communication to cause him to withdraw from Chattanooga and concentrate the Union forces between Bragg and Chattanooga.

Regardless of the stated reasons for delaying his continued offensive, General Rosecrans had to consolidate his army and prepare the rations, subsistence, forage and personnel for a long campaign both in distance and time. The first priority following Tullahoma was to begin rapid movement of supplies, personnel and equipment through the repaired railroad and bridges. Rosecrans was adamant about repairing the railroad. He knew the bridges were critical to his main supply path. Repair of the bridges would dictate his movement of supplies. Therefore, Rosecrans kept in constant contact with Colonel William P.
Innes, the commander of the engineers responsible for building the first major bridge on the Duck River. Rosecrans instructed Innes to work day and night and to begin repair of track south of the bridges. He emphasized that "every nerve must be strained to bring forward supplies." Innes kept Rosecrans informed, but the general would persistently torment the engineer commander for a status on the construction.

No sooner had the Union army consolidated from the Tullahoma Campaign than Rosecrans expressed his dissatisfaction with Colonel J.B. Anderson, superintendent of the railroads. Anderson was not a "take charge" leader. However, he could manage a preestablished operation. The current condition of the railroad required someone who could manage the repair of track and bridges simultaneously resupplying the units by railroad as far forward as possible. The repair of the railroad was sometimes dependent on the repair of the road bed below the rail, and, on several occasions, one unit's work on the rail stopped while another engineer unit completed the road bed. Additionally, Colonel Anderson paced his work load so as not to overwork his civilian laborers. General Garfield, supervising the staff from Tullahoma, threatened Colonel Anderson with replacement by Colonel Innes unless he drastically increased the rate of advance of the railroad. Colonel Anderson failed not only to supervise the laying of track, but also the positioning and movement
of rail cars. This led to the presumption that Colonel Anderson was an extremely unorganized rail manager.

The lack of rail cars located at Nashville for the movement of subsistence on 6 July continued to irritate Garfield. To preclude units from starving at Tullahoma, massive quantities of forage and subsistence had been accumulated at Nashville and Murfreesboro. Garfield directed Morton, Chief of Engineers, to repair the road network west of the railroad. The quartermaster transported the rations and forage as far forward as the railroad could travel, offloaded the supplies, and continued the supply lines by wagon trains. Anderson and Innes also used the closest supply lines as a service road to transport the iron and timber for the tracks and bridges. The resulting congestions further hindered the movement of supplies.

With the shifting of troops to new positions and the movement of refugees and citizens, the provost marshal of the Army of the Cumberland had a difficult task maintaining law and order. Straggling soldiers committed various atrocities on local citizens including improper foraging procedures and the destruction of local homes. Rosecrans demanded immediate action by commanders to preclude this conduct. He directed his staff to develop a procedure to assist the commanders in controlling unauthorized foraging. Knowing that the army would operate in this area for a long time, Rosecrans did not
need the additional pressure from the local populace to leave the area. The staff promptly published another field order restricting any unauthorized movement outside the camps. 10

General Rosecrans expected the provost marshals to keep the interest of the army first. He directed Major General Gordon Granger, commander of Nashville, to relieve one provost marshal for allowing numerous citizens to visit prisoners after being instructed to the contrary. Either the anger of the Unionists toward the prisoners or the disobedience of a verbal order aggravated Rosecrans into that decision. 11

Attempting to provide his soldiers with comforts which they so rightly deserved, Rosecrans personally requested, coordinated, and monitored the paymasters to expedite the issuing of pay. Rosecrans recommended that the pay office, upon arrival at Nashville, task organize and apportion the money in amounts equal to the size unit that the paymasters were responsible for paying. Although the general ensured proper organization of the paymasters, other staff agencies demonstrated problems. 12

The adjutant general's office became inundated with reports, messages, complaints, orders, and leave requests. During the Tullahoma offensive, the office had split into two centers; one section was in the town of Tullahoma while the main headquarters was still in the city of Nashville. During the consolidation phase following the
Tullahoma campaign, the adjutant general's office
accidentally positioned General Baird's division in the same
place as Colonel Wilder's command. This confusion in the
location of troop positions was not an isolated case with
this army and recurred on several occasions showing the
disorganization and poor management of the department. The
responsibility for placement of units in the field
belonged to the chief of staff. The information for
monitoring the placement of units came from the adjutant
genral's section. The Tullahoma campaign was Garfield's
first performance as chief of staff, and he had relegated
some of his responsibilities to the assistant adjutant
general officers. He failed to provide continuous
attention to positioning of units after the army completed
the campaign.

Captain Hodges, assistant quartermaster of Nashville,
learned a valuable lesson about Rosecrans' sense of duty.
On 10 July the quartermaster department failed to ship a
supply of horseshoes. Rosecrans ordered Hodges to dismiss
the responsible clerk as a warning to other clerks that
"no neglect will answer in military matters when the
success of the army depends upon promptitude and unfailing
devotion to duty is absolutely necessary in the
Quartermaster Department upon which so much movement
depends. The reaction to such a minute mistake was
severe. However, the emphasis the commander placed on
this error and the severe punishment imposed on the clerk
exhibited Rosecrans' deep sense of duty. A contradiction to General Rosecrans' expectations of his subordinates to punish careless mistakes was his failure to quickly dismiss his staff officers for similar poor performance or mistakes.

Later the same day, Garfield directed Captain Hodges to initiate the procurement of mules and horses to replace those worn out from the campaign. The order was unusual because the chief of staff issued the instructions directly to a subordinate staff officer in the department and not to the chief of the department. Additionally, the order to procure animals was unusual. Usually, quartermasters only accounted for such animals. Meanwhile, Rosecrans had his staff performing various additional tasks. 

One such task, which served as a distraction, was the mustering of Negroes to form a regiment in the Army of the Cumberland. Mustering the new unit took the combined efforts of the Department of the Cumberland staff. On 9 July Rosecrans instructed Major General D.S. Stanley, chief of cavalry, to collect Negroes and to send them to the provost marshal. Lieutenant Colonel Goddard, the adjutant general, requested Colonel Innes, commander of an engineer regiment, to provide a mustering officer to formally muster the Negroes into a regiment. General Rosecrans personally instructed his commissary of musters, Captain Young to ensure the appropriate forms for
mustering were available and that accurate records were kept. The staff's involvement with this process continued throughout the preparation for the Chickamauga battle.18

The middle of July brought increased message traffic among Halleck, Rosecrans, and Burnside. On 10 July, Halleck informed Rosecrans that enemy cavalry was in northern Mississippi and instructed him to rendezvous with Major General Steven A. Hurlbut, commander at Memphis, near Tuscumbia, Alabama. Rosecrans sent a division of cavalry to Huntsville with the intentions of joining Hurlbut's units near Tuscumbia. Rosecrans, in his message to Halleck, augmented his standard update with a request for Burnside's troops to secure the left flank of the Army of the Cumberland. 19

Although Halleck was not able to convince Burnside to move from his sanctuary in Cincinnati, Rosecrans continued to advance his headquarters. Garfield ordered Captain Thoms, the aide-de-camp to the army commander, to begin preparation for the deployment of the army's headquarters from Tullahoma to Winchester. Additionally, General McCook selected the headquarters position and Captain Van Duzer connected the headquarters to the main telegraph line. The movement created some confusion in the adjutant general's office.17

Throughout the entire month of July, the adjutant general section consolidated the various after action reports from the Tullahoma campaign, transferred technical
data to proper department forms, processed numerous personnel on leave and recruiting duty, and coordinated various court martial boards. Garfield became concerned with the army's unreadiness created by the absence of so many officers on leave and recruiting duty. General Garfield restricted the number of officers departing the area by personally approving all applications for leave and recruiting duty. When the chief of staff began to disapprove leaves, the officers applied for recruiting duty, which allowed officers to return home with the intention of encouraging men to join the army. Also during the headquarters move to Winchester, the adjutant general staff officers lost several boxes containing officer records and information messages essential for reports. 13

Furthermore, the "split operations," with adjutant general offices operating from Nashville, Tullahoma, or Winchester, created difficulties in numbering the general orders. Major McMichael lost count of which general order he last wrote. When he went on leave, Captain Thrall, his replacement at Tullahoma, had to coordinate with Nashville's officers to reestablish the numbering sequence. Although the loss of the ordering sequence seemed insignificant at this point, confusion and inefficiency, which multiplies on the battlefield, could have caused catastrophic results if the information pertained to moving troops. However, this staff section
was not alone in problems. 19

The quartermaster section was in a state of turmoil. General Rosecrans held Colonel Taylor, the Department's quartermaster, responsible for the slow resupply operations of the army. On several occasions the commander reprimanded Taylor for poor decisions. The quartermaster section had restricted the number of cars designated for provisions. This drastically reduced the resupply rate. Rosecrans also held Taylor personally responsible for accepting numerous "convalescent" horses from the War Department. He specifically ordered Taylor to personally return the horses to Nashville. 20

In an effort to decrease the managerial burden on Taylor, the army commander formed a depot for supplies at Nashville under the supervision of Captain H.C. Hodges. Officer positions at the depot were as follows: Captain S. Perkins, assistant quartermaster, river, rail and city transportation; Lieutenant C.H. Irvin, acting assistant quartermaster, means of transportation and quartermaster's stores; Captain J.D. Stubbs, assistant quartermaster, quarters, issues to hospitals, fuel, and forage; Captain Cox, assistant quartermaster, camp and garrison equipage, clothing, and stationary; Captain W. Mills, acting assistant quartermaster special duty to Captain Hodges. 21

The army commander was hesitant in replacing his staff officers. On 27 July, General Rosecrans telegraphed General Montgomery Meigs, Quartermaster General requesting
him to relieve Colonel Taylor and appoint Captain Hodges as Quartermaster of the Army of the Cumberland. This message served as a prime example of General Rosecrans inability to relieve one of his own staff officers. Although the War Department approved the army's quartermaster, Rosecrans was responsible to hire, train and fire.*

Colonel Taylor's continued presence in this position also served to condone inefficiency throughout the department. Initially, he did not provide any tools to the units preparing to move to the river and build pontoons. When commanders approached the assistant quartermasters for tools, they discovered only Colonel Taylor, who was not readily available, could sign the tools from the depots. He had failed to anticipate the requirements of the army and provide commanders with efficient means to acquire support.

The railroad served as another distraction for Rosecrans. Colonel Innes completed the Elk River Bridge on 18 July, and General Sheridan advanced with the construction train to within five miles of Bridgeport by 19 July. Progress on the repair of the roads and bridges decreased while construction engineers and conductors waited for the drawing estimates of the Northwest Railroad, which the adjutant general section had misplaced. Although the engineers nearly completed the railroad to Bridgeport, the delayed service to Tracy City
and unavailability of engines displeased Rosecrans. Rosecrans had several months earlier directed Colonel Anderson, superintendent of the railroad, to ensure the engines "were in order." Regardless of the manpower shortages and difficult terrain, the Superintendent's disobedience of the order to ensure the availability of the engines aggravated the Commander.  

Personnel changes plagued the inspector general's section in the Army of the Cumberland during this period. The army commander signed orders relieving from duty the inspector of cavalry, Colonel Hepburn, and consolidated the duties with those of the assistant inspector general, Colonel Ducat. Two days later, First Lieutenant W.A. Dennison assumed the duties as inspector of artillery. The manpower changes must have overburdened Colonel Ducat, because he remains unusually silent during this period. 

Halleck recommended that Rosecrans organize forage teams from the quartermaster and subsistence departments to reduce the army's requirement for large trains. The recommendation was useless because the army had already issued a general order which stipulated the number of wagons that subordinate units could bring. The order also directed the method of employing the trains to comply with the reduction of wagons. The method of resupply was for half the unit wagons to distribute supplies at troop locations while the other half loaded supplies at the depot. In effect, the units returned to a central supply
depot for supplies, easing the resupply burden on the quartermaster.

Additionally, administrative restrictions generated by Rosecrans usually involved the time and effort of several staff agencies. Rosecrans restricted the flow of personnel outside the encampments. Partially in response to the increase of destructive foraging parties and the rise of mischief, the Department of the Cumberland required all personnel to possess passes. The passes controlled the forage parties, but required command emphasis and further increased the army's dependence on its own supply system and magnified the burden on the quartermaster. The adjutant general prepared, printed and distributed the order, and the provost marshal was responsible for enforcing the restriction.

By the end of July, the Army of the Cumberland had Thomas' corps around Decherd, McCook's lead division near Bridgeport, Crittenden's corps in the vicinity of Manchester and Stanley's cavalry headquarters at Salem.

The locations of the units were important to the paymasters in that Rosecrans had directed Major Young, his Paymaster, to ensure expeditious pay to all soldiers. Typical of Rosecrans' intensive management technique, he instructed Major Young to have each paymaster identified to pay specific units prior to leaving Nashville. Although the result precluded the entire payroll being susceptible to possible robbery and expedited the pay process, the
commander had once again continued to over-supervise another staff agency in the performance of its duties. Rosecrans felt that every service and piece of new equipment provided to the soldier improved the fighting capability.

July was an extremely busy month for an army that had little or no contact with the enemy. Rosecrans began his intensive management of rations and forage, construction of miles of railroad and scores of bridges, and attempted to mount a whole division on horses. Several other projects which occupied him included obtaining 1,000 Sharps carbines for his cavalry, mustering several cavalry regiments in Tennessee and Kentucky, and establishing hospitals at Bridgeport. With all these distracting projects, the general was still proud of his soldiers for their efforts and accomplishments. His army had quickly consolidated from a victory by maneuver and the soldiers desired to continue the attack on Bragg's army.

By August, Halleck's constant hounding to advance frustrated Rosecrans. On 1 August, Rosecrans sent a sarcastic message detailing the "conditions of the problem" emphasizing the long distance from his base of supply to the army's positions, the 60-70 miles of barren country, the ominous Tennessee River, and a battle in mountainous terrain within the Confederate army's home territory. Rosecrans was so angry that he dared Halleck to relieve him on two occasions. The offer was not
serious because on the same day as the last offer of relief, Rosecrans ordered the Army of the Cumberland to prepare to advance and load ten days of rations and five days of forage in the wagons. His two biggest problems were forage and rail transportation, but the general directed the purchase of 50 more boxcars which should have resolved both problems, provided he had sufficient time.\textsuperscript{90}

In addition to the warning order to the corps commanders on 6 August, Rosecrans began to display further signs in preparation for the advance, such as increasing his efforts to reduce the army's vulnerability on its flanks during the penetration. Around the 8th of August he reestablished communication with Burnside's army of the Ohio. Burnside divulged his intentions of attacking Knoxville and was waiting for Rosecrans to initiate the movement toward Chattanooga. Rosecrans felt that Burnside should occupy the enemy's attention to the north before the Army of the Cumberland moved. Additionally, Rosecrans requested General Hurlbut's corps to protect the right flank of his army by occupying Florence, Alabama. Much coordination took place between the armies, but very little combat activity occurred.\textsuperscript{91}

As late as the 9th of August, Rosecrans had not finalized his plans to secure Chattanooga. However, he divulged to Burnside that Crittenden would maneuver to the north of Chattanooga, while the remainder of the army would pass to the south of the city. Message traffic
between the army's subordinate commanders reached a peak when Rosecrans ordered all commanders to provide a status of forage and rations. On the 16th of August Rosecrans issued the order to move toward Chattanooga.

The primary reason for delaying the advance, according to Rosecrans, was the inability of the quartermaster section to provide sufficient forage and transportation. This inability barely touched the surface of the various deficiencies in this specific staff area, which tended to focus on its manager.

The weakest link in the quartermaster section was its chief, Colonel Taylor. He failed to provide direction and organization to a critical and demanding service. He failed to compensate for a known transportation shortage by sending supplies directly to the forward depot at Stevenson. Colonel Taylor took until 8 August before he calculated the number of railroad cars required to sufficiently sustain the army and waited until 16 August before recommending officers procure additional cars. This effort was too late to assist the army that was now in motion.

When the quartermaster section ignored Rosecrans' inquiries, he took their failure to respond as inattention to detail and began to manage the department himself. First, he ordered Captain Hodges to return from leave and relieved Lieutenant Perkins of his duties as transportation officer of the railroad at Nashville.
establishing the shipment of forage as top priority over rations and pontoons, Rosecrans personally became involved in administrative projects. While the General had assistant quartermasters finding the status of horses for cavalry and harnesses for wagons, he sent other quartermaster officers to collect lumber and procure railroad equipment. 

The lack of supplies at the depot at Stevenson was an example of the quartermaster's failure to anticipate. The staff had sufficient warning of the impending move; however, they failed to prepare the depots at Stevenson. On 8 August, Taylor told his staff officers to continue sending supplies to Winchester. Shortly thereafter, Rosecrans informed his staff and commanders that the army was going to cross the Tennessee River either north or south of Chattanooga. The subordinate commanders had to report the status of uploaded forage and rations on the 14th of August. The quartermaster department had to know the movement of the army to the river was pending. Several units were already near the Tennessee River and had secured the towns of Stevenson and Bridgeport. General Thomas reported on 14 August that there were no supplies at Stevenson. Two days later, after an inquiry by an assistant quartermaster at Nashville, General Rosecrans ordered the shipment of supplies directly to Stevenson. The inability to foresee the impending move and properly and efficiently transport the supplies affected the
availability of supplies throughout the movement of the army to the river.

The army's ability to transport by rail improved slightly during the first weeks of August. General Phillip H. Sheridan had already moved the majority of his division and headquarters by rail to the vicinity of Stevenson. Although Rosecrans used the railroad to visit several units at Shelbyville and Fayetteville, the slow service and response to his requests initiated the general's characteristic personal management of his staff. On 4 August he instructed Colonel Anderson in Nashville to initiate the building of railroad cars. Supervising the procurement of new equipment and directing the repair of specific bridges and "roads," Rosecrans personally ensured the improvement of this mode of transportation. He directed Colonel Innes to repair bridges in the vicinity of Stevenson and Mud Creek and even recommended the procedures for fixing worn engines.

The relationship between Rosecrans and the superintendent of the railroad was extremely strained. Rosecrans' distrust of these subordinates hindered their ability to adequately perform as proper staff officers. Unfortunately, the General had to provide specific guidance to Colonel Anderson on the priority of loading quartermaster stores in railroad cars and to Colonel Innes on the inspection of the express agent's contract for shipping army goods before civilian goods.
This relationship strangled any preparation, improvisation, or problem solving by Colonel Innes or Colonel Anderson and forced General Rosecrans to develop solutions. He instructed Colonel Anderson to use wrecked cars and coal cars to augment the current fleet of box cars hauling quartermaster stores. To circumvent a delay in crossing the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, General Rosecrans designated Colonel Innes responsible for providing timber to rebuild the Bridgeport Bridge. On 11 August, Colonel Innes formally replaced Colonel Anderson as superintendent of the railroad, resolving the problem of two chains-of-command. Even though the management change improved this essential mode of transportation, the results came too late to resolve shortages that would plague Rosecrans' army until the Union offensive in November. Regardless of the problems, the Army of the Cumberland had to move to the river.

While the cavalry maneuvered to the Tennessee River along the Huntsville railroad, the remainder of the army prepared for the movement to Chattanooga. The three corps accumulated sufficient forage and rations to convince Rosecrans that he could now deploy his army, and on 16 August he ordered the army to move under the following plan:

Major General Crittenden's corps in three columns, Brigadier General Wood to Terman in Sequatchie Valley, Major General J.H. Palmer to Dunlap, Brigadier General Van Cleve, with two Brigades to Pikeville. Colonel Minty's cavalry move on the left by Sparta and
then, covering the left flank of Brigadier General Van Cleve, proceed to Pikeville.

The XIV Corps, Major General Thomas commanding, move Major General Reynolds and Brigadier General Brannan to take post concealed near the Battle Creek mouth, Major General Negley and Brigadier General Baird to halt on Crow Creek between Andersonville and Stevenson.

Major General McCook, commanding the XX corps, move Brigadier General Johnson to Bellefonte, Brigadier General Davis to near Stevenson. The three brigades of cavalry cover the line of the Tennessee from Whitesburg up.  

The main purpose was to position the main body to cross the river below Chattanooga while demonstrating directly at or above the city.

The units drew rations from the depots at Stevenson, Tracy City, and McMinnville. The reserve corps, under General Granger, assumed control of forward depots and the security of the lines of communications as the army closed on the river. The army headquarters moved to Stevenson on the 18th of August.  

The movement on the left progressed favorably, but obstructed roads, caused by the heavy rains, allowed only half of the units to reach the top of the mountains on the first day. By the 19th of August, General Thomas' corps was in position with the First Division at Anderson Station, the Second Division between Anderson and Stevenson, the Fourth Division five miles from Jasper and the Third Division within supporting distance of the Fourth Division. General McCook's corps was closing in on Stevenson and Bridgeport, while Crittenden's lead elements reached Sequatchie Valley. The First Cavalry Division had
its headquarters at Larkinsville. Movement of the army went relatively smoothly because the enemy contact was relatively light.
General Bragg had consolidated his forces south of the Tennessee River in the vicinity of Chattanooga. The only known Confederate units outside the city were General Buckner's Corps at Knoxville and scattered cavalry forces north of the river. Estimates from engineer reconnaissance, Union spies, and Confederate deserters estimated the army of the Tennessee at 30,000 troops. The possibility of Bragg's army skillfully defending the river convinced Rosecrans to perform a demonstration. The demonstration further focused Bragg's attention to the north of Chattanooga.

The wealth of rumors confused Rosecrans' decision process; however, the variety of information did not alter his initial plans. Some sources hinted that the Army of the Tennessee would defend Chattanooga, while other sources reported that Bragg would withdraw from the city. Halleck sent messages asking if Bragg was reinforcing Lee and also informing Rosecrans that Johnston's forces had reinforced Bragg's units. The constant barrage of questionable information decreased Rosecrans' ability to assimilate intelligence which proved costly within the month.48

Rosecrans had his forces in position to cross the river by the 22nd of August. McCook occupied the north bank of the Tennessee River from Bellefonte to Bridgeport. Thomas' four divisions encamped from Battle Creek to Shellmound. The majority of Crittenden's units secured the Sequatchie
Valley while brigade size elements from Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions demonstrated along the Tennessee River north of Chattanooga. The cavalry remained in the vicinity of Larkinsville and established courier lines with General McCook's headquarters. Between the 22nd and 28th of August, the forces prepared for the anticipated river crossing and resupply of the army, especially forage and rations.

The army's movement from Tullahoma to the Tennessee River involved the efforts of every section and army staff member in Rosecrans' organization. As already seen, the most visible problems were forage, rail, and cavalry. However, each staff department affected the operations of the Army of the Cumberland in the endeavor to reach the River.

Rosecrans' first and most important staff officer was his chief of staff. Garfield encouraged coordination, requested information, and demanded support for subordinate commanders from the army staff. Representing the general, he controlled the movement of forces and coordinated support from the staff.

General Garfield soon encountered difficulty in controlling maneuver units. He traveled with the commander; therefore, his information on troop locations came from couriers and available staff officers. The random delivery of intelligence increased confusion and led to inaccurate positioning of units. The chief of
staff was responsible for the smooth operation in the headquarters including the proper synthesis of information. Poor organization and control allowed mistakes like improper depiction of unit locations and assigning two brigades to the same location.

Additionally, during the movement to the Tennessee River, Garfield lost communication with Crittenden's XXI Corps and Stanley's Cavalry Corps. Although, the responsibility for communication with higher headquarters belonged to the subordinate units, the chief of staff should have recognized the possible failure of the units to do so and ensured the situation did not continue. However, both organizations complained that the commander failed to respond to their messages. This revealed a possible problem with receiving messages by the adjutant general.

The ability of General Garfield to effectively control his staff was questionable. The headquarters did not have a standard operating procedure as demonstrated by the multitude of action officers signing messages during this portion of the campaign. An analysis of the telegrams and reports found duplication in effort and numerous retransmissions. Either the staff departments ignored the correspondence or the communication systems were inoperative. The result was a loss in command and control.

By failing to keep the staff informed, Garfield
hindered his staff's performance. Staff members usually learned about impending moves simultaneously with subordinate commanders. Staff planning for prepositioning rations, forage, and mission equipment was non-existent. Guidance and directions to the staff came directly from Rosecrans and usually after a problem had developed. Normally, directions to the staff were the responsibility of the chief of staff; however, the commander's style of managing every deficiency left Garfield restricted in his efforts to assist Rosecrans.

Garfield tolerated the inefficient staff organizations developed by Rosecrans. The chief of staff had to manipulate two superintendents of the railroad, two quartermasters, a multitude of adjutant general officers, proliferating aide-de-camps, and numerous commissaries of subsistence. Garfield did not keep his staff informed because of the sheer magnitude numbers and locations of the staff. Furthermore, Rosecrans' faulty use of a chief of staff impeded General Garfield's effectiveness in regards to the army staff and subordinate commanders.

The aide-de-camps performed remarkably well. They attempted to keep Garfield as up to date as possible on staff operations, troop movements, and enemy positions. Rosecrans used his aides constantly for writing and delivering messages to commanders and staff members throughout the battlefield. Although the aides-de-camp were reactive to Rosecrans' every request, they lacked
administrative skills. During the move of the army's headquarters from Tullahoma to Winchester, Captain Thorns lost administrative paperwork, office equipment, and orders. For the next month, messages appeared requesting missing orders and maps. An identical situation occurred in the move from Winchester to Stevenson. The aides-de-camp effectively assisted the army commander in extending his abilities in the operation, but displayed, during this phase of the campaign, poor organization of administrative skills.4a

The locations and duties of the aides remained relatively stable. Captain Drouillard traveled with Rosecrans during his visits and inspections. Major Bond and Captain Thompson stayed with the main headquarters, although on 17 August Rosecrans selected Thompson to command the first black regiment in the Department. The responsibility for deploying the headquarters belonged to Captain Thorns; therefore, whenever the headquarters moved forward, Captain Thorns loaded the aides' baggage and equipment including desks, chairs, order books, and cipher machines. A new acting aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Porter, arrived and assisted the Commander in establishing coordination between army headquarters and subordinate units.4b

Administrative duties consumed the time of the adjutant general section. With all the leaves, orders, reports, and personnel accounting in progress, the officers had
difficulty keeping an adequate supply of forms on hand. The responsibility for storing and accounting for forms in the department belonged to Lieutenant Bakhaus in Nashville. When the blank forms officer was out of forms, one of the assistants ordered more from an outside contractor. The duties of several officers in the adjutant general department, seemed very menial and insignificant to the overall campaign.

Another distracting function of the adjutant general section was scheduling numerous courts martial boards. The section had designated many regimental and brigade commanders for courts martial duty. When the army deployed toward the Tennessee River, many of these commanders had to accompany their units. The adjutant general section had to rewrite the orders removing the previous board member and adding a new one. The efforts to rewrite the orders and find new board members was tedious and time consuming.

The adjutant general section assisted the chief of staff with receiving, synthesizing, and sending information. Usually Garfield positioned his office near an assistant adjutant general's desk and corresponded with the various commanders and staff officers. The section wrote and printed numerous general orders for the army commander. In an effort to convey to the people of Tennessee the necessity to respect deserters from the rebel army, Garfield ordered Captain J. Bates Dickson in
Nashville to print 10,000 copies of Rosecrans' response to the Tennessee people. The adjutant general section for the Department of the Cumberland, managed by Captain Dickson at Nashville, performed much of this administrative action that the Union army required. Major McMichael, located at Winchester and then Stevenson, performed similar actions for the Army of the Cumberland.*e

Administrative problems, similar to those of the aides-de-camp, plagued the adjutant general sections. The action officers lost forms, reports, boxes, general orders, books, and even entire desks. After every move of the headquarters, half the message traffic consisted of searching for missing equipment and orders. The adjutant general section had consistently demonstrated disorganization during and after movement of the army headquarters and lent credence to the proposition that this section could have contributed to confusion on a battlefield involving a mobile headquarters.***

The personnel problems of August followed the administrative challenges of July. To assist in the administrative workload, the army headquarters received Lieutenant Cist, a new acting adjutant general. However, Major McMichael and Captain Thrall became severely ill and were evacuated to the hospitals in Nashville. The net loss of manpower affected operations and General Rosecrans ordered Lieutenant Colonel Goddard to return from ordering badges in Cleveland and Colonel McKibbin to return from
business in Washington D.C. These administrative and personnel problems of the adjutant general section affected the quality and consistency that Rosecrans expected from his staff. *1

Following Tullahoma, the Commissary of Subsistence, Colonel Simmons, concentrated on building the quantity of rations for the army. In preparation for continuing the campaign to Chattanooga, he shifted about 500,000 rations from Nashville to Tullahoma. Even though General Rosecrans requested his presence at the army’s headquarters, Simmons managed the subsistence of the entire area of operations from Nashville. The commissaries, assisting him to operate the various depots were, Captain Williams, Captain Anderson and Captain Stewart. During the construction of the Elk River bridge, Captain Bridges supplied the laborers with rations. Upon visiting the newly established depot at Stevenson in early August, Colonel Taylor designated Captain Craig as the post commissary. On 24 August Lieutenant Warren relieved Captain Craig as the post commissary at Stevenson. *2

Colonel Simmons had established a good working relationship with the other staff departments. The Pioneer Brigade built platforms at Stevenson for stores; the quartermaster moved the livestock from Nashville to the vicinity of Stevenson; and the railroad superintendent, Colonel Innes, coordinated rations for the government workers. Rosecrans had instructed Simmons to
provide rations for the government railroad workers, but Simmons had Colonel Innes handle the tasking.63

Insufficient rations at the depot during the movement of the army to the Tennessee River marred the performance of the commissary of subsistence. Normally, the chief commissary kept accurate records on the status of rations at depots; however, toward the end of August, Crittenden's inability to acquire rations for his corps blemished this fine reputation. Colonel Goddard had advised the chief commissary to send rations to Tracy City to feed General Wood. Colonel Simmons told General Crittenden that the commissary had 20,000 rations at Tracy City and 200,000 rations at McMinnville and recommended that XXI Corps draw down McMinnville as much as possible. Unfortunately, Tracy City did not have any rations, and McMinnville contained only a fraction of the requirement.64

To ensure that the lack of subsistence did not affect the army's river crossing operations, General Rosecrans quickly assumed the management of ration levels at depots. Although the commissary of subsistence could have handled the resupply of the corps, the army commander became personally involved and the problem continued to serve as a distraction to his primary focus, the operations to seize Chattanooga.

The movement to the Tennessee River was demanding of the quartermaster department. Rosecrans replaced Colonel Taylor, quartermaster of the Army of the Cumberland, with
Captain Henry C. Hodges, who was promoted to colonel upon assumption of duties. Taylor resigned because of "feeble health"; however, his health probably failed from the constant pressure to correct his inefficient performance. Taylor's removal was unusual for Rosecrans because the quartermaster was one of the general's loyal supporters and proven performers from the Army of the Mississippi.

Familiar with the problems in the quartermaster arena, Colonel Hodges knew that he had assumed a disorganized system. The army was moving to the Tennessee River without sufficient rations, forage or equipment to sustain its movement, and commanders were already complaining about empty depots and poor support. The supply deficiencies fell within three separate agencies: the commissary of subsistence, who monitored the levels of rations at the depots; the railroad supervisor, who managed the railroad operations; and the quartermaster, who stored the forage and equipment at depots and was responsible for all transportation in the army's area of operation. Therefore, resolving this problem required total staff coordination and cooperation.

Anticipating the problems created by the failures of the previous quartermaster and try to allow time for Colonel Hodges to reorganize the quartermaster section, Rosecrans continued to manage the agency. He ordered Hodges to report to army headquarters and manage the department from Stevenson. To resolve the XXI Corps'
impending shortage of forage, Rosecrans instructed the quartermaster at McMinnville to begin obtaining forage. Displaying a tremendous ability to recall the details of prior staff actions, Rosecrans continued with Taylor's unfinished projects. Telegraphing Colonel Parsons, Chief of Transportation at St. Louis, Rosecrans reemphasized his need for additional railroad cars. Colonel Hodges had a difficult time staying ahead of the army commander when the commander knew more about the projects and problems within the section than the new section chief. Rosecrans expected a total effort by his staff officers to resolve problems, and if the department chief was slow to react, Rosecrans grabbed control.

Gradually Colonel Hodges reestablished proper operations in the quartermaster section. Although arranged by Rosecrans, Hodges' first project was to send boats down the Cumberland River to pick up box cars and platform cars. On 22 August, the Quartermaster began shifting his personnel to the main depot at Stevenson. He ordered Captain William A. Warren to move all his equipment and material from Murfreesboro and assume duty as post quartermaster at Stevenson. Captain E.D. Baker received orders to report to Stevenson; however, he had to escort stock back to Nashville. The change of dispositions shifted the support forward which favored Rosecrans' implied concept of support.

If possible, Rosecrans attempted to support his staff
officers with the proper personnel and resources to accomplish their missions. He telegraphed General Meigs in regard to obtaining an assistant quartermaster for Colonel Hodges. Captain C.H. Irwin had organized the work shops and stables at Nashville, and Hodges considered him highly indispensable. Additionally, the quartermaster had a fund to provide readily available cash to procure essential supplies. Rosecrans requested Meigs to divert funds from Colonel Taylor's account to Colonel Hodges' account, to provide money to procure equipment necessary for crossing the Tennessee River.

The War Department continued its procrastination on Rosecrans' request to mount the 1st Division of the XIV Corps, adding to Rosecrans' frustration and staff problems. In early August, Secretary Stanton took under consideration the Army of the Cumberland's request for an estimated 5000 mules and carbines. Meigs told the Secretary that the Union army could support the request. At the same time Meigs attempted to convince the Army of the Cumberland's new quartermaster that the War Department had fielded a sufficient number of horses and mules. Hodges responded that he had issued the mules already and could not spare any more for mounting the 1st Division, XIV Corps. Therefore, stalwart thinking by the new staff officer held the War Department bound to their directive of purchasing mules and weapons for a mounted division.

This phase of the operation displayed numerous changes
within the quartermaster department. The severe inefficiency and confusion which required the personal intervention of Rosecrans, concluded with the replacement of the quartermaster and the establishment of a depot at Stevenson. The quartermaster department now had two main depots to organize, Nashville and Stevenson. Assistant quartermasters at Nashville included Captain Stubbs, Captain Winslow, Captain Perkins, Captain Irwin, and Captain Stewart. The forward depot at Stevenson included Colonel Hodges, Captain Warren, and Captain Baker. As previously stated Captain W.H. Johnson occupied a small depot at Decherd, and Captain A. Edwards moved from Nashville to Bridgeport.

Although Colonel Innes was now responsible for the railroad, Rosecrans continued managing the railroad operations. The general ordered Innes to initiate repair of bridges on the Columbia Railroad, to pick up lumber at Louisville and Cincinnati for repair of other bridges, and to investigate the misuse of rail transportation by sutlers. Rosecrans became very specific on several occasions, such as recommending that Colonel Innes' men cut wood rather than sit idle and the quartermaster ship half car of sanitary commission supplies daily. While supervising the railroad, Colonel Innes continued to command the 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics Regiment. Rosecrans ordered the superintendent of the railroad to provide troops for building boats and operating saw mills
at Bridgeport. Trying to remain in control of his command, Colonel Innes performed these missions without a complaint.\textsuperscript{61}

In an effort to increase the supply rate, Rosecrans studied the possibility of opening the "line" to Decatur, Alabama. The cost, according to General Granger and Colonel Innes, was five additional locomotives and one hundred cars. They warned that without the additional engines and cars, the effort to open the road was useless. Rosecrans eventually directed General Granger to delay on opening the road until the army could acquire additional cars. Frustrated with the lack of assistance from the War Department in obtaining additional railroad assets, Rosecrans requested Grant's assistance in acquiring cars and engines.

The quartermaster was extremely slow in determining the army's transportation requirement. The quartermaster finally calculated the number of cars per day needed to sustain operations to the Tennessee River. The quartermaster should have quantified the Department's rail requirements a month earlier in order to properly support the Union army's move to the river.\textsuperscript{62}

As a result of planning during the execution phase during the campaign, the railroad failed to supply sufficient quantity of forage, rations, and equipment to the units operating from Tracy City. As usual, Rosecrans focused Colonel Innes on the method to resolve the
problem. The army commander knew the situation and the corrective action before the responsible staff officer had time to analyze the situation. Rosecrans' knowledge and guidance indicated that he positioned people not for what they knew, but for their proven ability to execute his instructions.

The poor management of the railroad served as constant distraction to General Rosecrans' ability to concentrate on the Army of the Cumberland's main mission, the capture of Chattanooga. His constant attention to the railroad caused him to lose sight of the purpose of the campaign and properly synchronize the Union assets for the organized crossing of the Tennessee River. Nevertheless, the railroad was not the only department that Rosecrans intensively managed. He focused his attention on numerous support functions and administrative actions that his staff officers had continuously failed to support.

The ordnance department worked on additional miscellaneous projects while the Union army prepared to move to the Tennessee River. The ordnance officers spent most of their time obtaining equipment for horses, replacements for worn out saddles, and arms for newly mustered cavalry and black regiments. Observing the effects of the weather on the saddles currently on hand, Rosecrans requested 2,000 saddles be immediately shipped to his army with another 2,000 saddles to be delivered later.
The request for more saddles coincided with the request for mounting a division of infantry. The War Department wondered if the two requests had a connection and General Meigs warned the quartermaster in Nashville not to issue accoutrements or horse equipment to noncavalry soldiers. The warnings from Meigs could have been dangerous and restricted to the subordinate commanders' ability to improvise. The ordnance department interpreted the order to mean they were to restrict the issuance of horse equipment to all commanders. The Army of the Cumberland ordnance officer directed his depot officers that the only authorities to release the equipment were Rosecrans or the War Department. This directive delayed the mustering of cavalry units shortly thereafter. The post commander of Nashville, responsible for the mustering of these units, had to wait several days for horse equipment in order to find Rosecrans to approve this action.  

Incorporated into army headquarters entourage at Tullahoma, Captain Porter left the responsibilities of ordnance officer to Lieutenant Mayre. When Captain Porter temporarily departed because of illness, Rosecrans requested Lieutenant Mayre serve as the replacement. During Captain Porter's absence, Rosecrans relied heavily on Captain Townsend, the ordnance officer at Nashville. The two remaining ordnance officers concentrated on managing the ordnance depots at Nashville and Tullahoma and coordinating with the War Department on arms and horse
equipment for units in the Army of the Cumberland.*

The inspector general section was relatively inactive. While the other staff agencies were attempting to resolve potential crises, the inspector general section conducted scheduled and unscheduled inspections. Because the duties of the inspector general's involvement in all areas of the commander's interest, the section had an unlimited span of authority. Demonstrating this lack of activity, the department submitted only two insignificant reports during this period, which discussed the mistreatment of horses by division quartermaster officers and the mismanagement of an artillery unit in Nashville. **

The medical department, directed by Surgeon Perrin, had thoroughly prepared for the campaign and required no supervision by Rosecrans. Prior to the Tullahoma campaign, the regiments drew three months of medical supplies and the corps formed a train of reserve medical supplies. The reserve supplies included medicines, dressings, food, blankets, and hospital tents and were sufficient to last through several large battles.**

Surgeon Perrin ensured that adequate hospital beds were constantly available and accessible. The Union Army had a field hospital with a 3,000 bed capacity at Nashville and one of 12,000 bed capacity at both Louisville and Cincinnati. After the Battle of Stones River, the medical department established a 1,500 bed tent hospital at Murfreesboro. Upon capture of Tullahoma, XIV Corps built a
tent hospital in that city. The Army set up a temporary hospital at Winchester for XX Corps after the Tullahoma campaign, at Tullahoma for XIV Corps, and at Manchester and McMinnville for XXI Corps. Around 12 August Surgeon Perrin directed the movement of half of the Murfreesboro hospital to Cowen. By 17 August the remainder of the Murfreesboro hospital deployed to Stevenson. When units occupied Bridgeport in force, the XX Corps established a small hospital there. **

Demonstrating foresight and anticipation, the medical director requested the construction of hospital cars for the evacuation of casualties and the evacuation of forward hospitals to the large field hospitals. The hospital trains arrived late in the month and began running regularly to Nashville providing expeditious evacuation to the rear. The early evacuation of sick and wounded to the rear kept the forward tent hospitals empty and prepared to accept massive casualties if required. **

One slight problem which enraged Surgeon Perrin was the General Order that decreased the number of cargo wagons carried by a unit on the march. The order encouraged the use of ambulances for the officer's baggage. The primary purpose of the ambulances was casualty evacuation and the units positioned the ambulances behind the front lines. The baggage on the ambulance trains, however, pushed the ambulances to the rear to protect the "precious" cargo while ignoring the wounded and sick. Surgeon Perrin
performed many inspections to monitor the employment of trains during this campaign. The provost marshal general performed his usual duties of enforcing law and order, interrogating enemy prisoners of war, and providing area security. In an effort to control rampant foraging, the Union army published General Orders establishing specific procedures for commanders to follow. The provost marshal, Lieutenant Colonel Wiles, spent the month of July processing the 1800 prisoners of war captured during the Tullahoma campaign. At Rosecrans' request, the provost marshal also became involved with the commissary of musters in coordination with Washington for the mustering of "loyal" prisoners that the Confederates had impressed into service.

Initially, Wiles was responsible for monitoring the security of the lines of communication. This area was extremely large and numerous violations of foraging procedures occurred. One instance required that Rosecrans reprimand a general officer for poor control of his unit. Additionally, with Confederate General John H. Morgan in the Army of the Ohio's "backyard", Wiles constantly provided General Rosecrans a situation update on Burnside's operations against the Confederate commander. Rosecrans asked Colonel Joseph C. McKibbin to become the provost marshal general with Colonel Wiles as his assistant, but McKibbin requested to remain an aide-de-camp to Rosecrans. This request implied either...
Wiles was becoming inefficient or that Rosecrans believed McKibbin deserved a permanent staff position. Because there were no adverse comments on Lieutenant Colonel Wiles, the latter was most probable.\textsuperscript{74}

While the Union army continued to march toward the Tennessee River, General Granger assumed the responsibility of securing the lines of communication and Colonel Wiles concentrated on prisoner interrogation and the enemy order of battle. Although the provost marshal's duties intertwined with this commander's mission, General Granger performed the preponderance of the coordination with both Rosecrans and the local populace.

The only significant mustering of soldiers that occurred in August was the creation of the first black regiment in the Army of the Cumberland. Lieutenant Willet, mustering officer for the regiment, was so successful that Rosecrans immediately informed General Lorenzo Thomas, the War Department Adjutant General, of the potential such regiments provided. Rosecrans believed that by the time the Union army arrived in Georgia, they might have raised an army.\textsuperscript{74}

The fielding of a black regiment was a coordinated staff effort. The mustering officer came from the 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics Regiment. The ordnance officer, Captain Townsend, armed and equipped the regiment. On 17 August Rosecrans appointed Captain Thompson, his aide-de-camp, as commander of the regiment.
The quartermaster of the 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics Regiment supplied the officers of the new regiment with equipment. With the full cooperation of everyone involved, including the army commander, the mustering of the first black regiment proved a success.73

August was a month of construction and reconnaissance for the engineers. Normally the quartermaster was responsible for the building of bridges, buildings and roads, but the Department of the Cumberland was unusual in that a brigade of engineers performed part of this construction. Usually an engineer officer developed the plans and supervised the work while regular units supplied the labor. The Army of the Cumberland used this technique on many occasions, specifically for the building of magazines at Murfreesboro and fortifications at McMinnville. However, the Pioneer Brigade and the 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics Regiment proved an invaluable asset as a consolidation of volunteer craftsmen to perform specific projects such as constructing bridges, repairing roads, and laying railroad track.74

While the engineers were constructing roads and bridges, the topographical engineers reconnoitered the Cumberland Mountains and the Tennessee River. The XXI Corps topographical engineers reported good roads and fords on the southern approaches to the river, but rains had washed away roads on Walden’s Ridge. Around 20 August Lieutenant Burroughs examined the river near Stevenson and Caperton’s
Ferry. He provided the information on the crossing sites to the XX Corps as well as to Army Headquarters. The 20 August report by Lieutenant Burroughs was insignificant to the army's scheme of maneuver on the river crossing sites. The report contained essential information, but the order to perform the reconnaissance and submission of the data was too late to affect the army movement plan. The Army commander should have sent a reconnaissance team of topographical engineers, with cavalry as protection, along the river a month before the army's movement plan. Therefore, the results, recommending the best crossing sites could have been incorporated into the final plan.

Although the Pioneer Brigade performed well in construction, its commander, Brigadier General J. St. C. Morton, struggled as a staff officer for Rosecrans. On 22 August Rosecrans relieved General Morton from duty as Chief of Engineers because of "disability." The two officers had argued on numerous occasions; therefore, a more probable reason was incompatibility. Rosecrans appointed Captain W. Merrill as the successor to Chief of Engineers, so the commander of the Pioneer Brigade was the most senior commander on duty, which was unclear at this time. The Pioneer Brigade still received its orders from the Chief of Engineers. In a message to General Halleck, General Rosecrans revealed that he needed an engineer officer who could manage pontoon-bridge trains. Regardless of the reason for replacing General
Morton, the turnover occurred during a critical phase for engineers, the preparation to cross the Tennessee River. The relief of Morton reflects confusion and inefficiency in the department and dissension and turmoil on Rosecrans' staff.  

General Rosecrans seemed more interested in protecting his flanks and rear than gathering intelligence on enemy locations. Although Major General D.S. Stanley, chief of cavalry, was a special staff officer to Rosecrans, the cavalry units operated as major maneuver elements on flank security and reconnaissance. Cavalry assets served as security for the Army's lines of communication and courier lines for the communications link between corps and army headquarters. As the lines of communication became extended, the requirement for mobile security forces pushed the army toward the increased use of cavalry units. Furthermore, the use of cavalry to establish courier of lines and deliver messages displayed a failure to dedicate forces that could gather intelligence during offensive maneuver. As the lines of communication became longer, Rosecrans tightened his positioning of cavalry forces.

The staff had been extremely fortunate as it was able to remain intact in the face of numerous problems. As the Union army moved into hasty defensive positions along the Tennessee River, the headquarters staff continued to resupply forage, rations, equipment, and pontoons. Enemy contact was light, but the Cumberland Mountains served as
a temporary adversary. Even with little or poor staff support, the soldiers had survived the march to the river; however, a large part of the success was due to the subordinate commanders, who were the motivating forces that accomplished the mission.

The quartermaster section required the most attention and assistance. The Pioneer Brigade and the 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics Regiment assisted the quartermaster by rebuilding bridges and roads. The Railroad Superintendent managed the railroad responsibilities of the quartermaster. General Rosecrans formed a depot in Nashville to support the storage responsibilities of the department. Even with all the initiatives to relieve the burden on him, Colonel Taylor still could not perform adequately and Rosecrans finally had to replace him.

This was not the only removal that occurred during this time period. The railroad Superintendent and the Pioneer Brigade Commander also received notices to seek further employment. Rosecrans replaced three out of four of his most critical staff officers (subsistence being the fourth). Luckily, the effect was not readily destructive because the enemy situation was passive, the lines of communication were responsive, and subordinate commanders realigned supplies to alleviate shortages.

Nor was this period a glorious credit to the Chief of Staff. Garfield failed to coordinate the actions of the
commissary of subsistence, the superintendent of railroad, and the quartermaster prior to the shortages in XXI Corps. He failed to control the staff according to Rosecrans' expectations as demonstrated by the commander's constant managing of the staff. Across the board, the staffs did not anticipate requirements, position supplies to avoid potential shortages, or effectively coordinate to resolve these shortages.

The movement from Tullahoma to the Tennessee River developed many administrative, logistical, and transportation problems that Rosecrans attempted to resolve personally. His concentration on the staff deficiencies detracted from his ability to prepare for the enemy and the impending river crossing operation.
CHAPTER 3

ENDNOTES

1 O.R., XXIII, Pt. 1, 403; O.R., XXIII, Pt 1, 10.

2 Lamers, Edge of Glory, 294.


5 O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 552.

6 Lamers, Edge of Glory, 294.

7 General W.S. Rosecrans to Colonel W.P. Innes, 3 July 1863, Telegram, Department of the Cumberland, Telegrams Sent, October 1862 - June 1865, RG 393, Entry 918, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter all reference to telegrams will cite author, recipient and date).

8 General J.A. Garfield to Colonel J.B. Anderson, 4 July 1863, Telegram.

9 General J.A. Garfield to Colonel J.B. Anderson, 6 July 1863, Telegram; General J.A. Garfield to General J. St.Clair Morton, 8 July 1863, Telegram.


11 Colonel C. Goddard to General G. Granger, 1 July 1863, Telegram.

12 General W.S. Rosecrans to Major W. Allen, 10 July 1863, Telegram; Colonel C. Goddard to Major W. Smith, 14 July 1863, Telegram.

13 General W.S. Rosecrans to Captain H.C. Hodges, 10 July 1863, Telegram.

14 General J.A. Garfield to Captain H.C. Hodges, 10 July 1863, Telegram.

15 General W.S. Rosecrans to General D.S. Stanley, 9 July 1863, Telegram; Colonel C. Goddard to Colonel W.P. Innes, 14 July 1863, Telegram.

16 O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 528.
General J.A. Garfield to Captain R.S. Thoms, 19 July 1863, Telegram.


Major W.M. McMichael to Captain J.B. Dickson, 20 July 1863, Telegram; Captain H. Thrall to Captain J.B. Dickson, 31 July 1863, Telegram.


General W.S. Rosecrans to General M.C. Meigs, 27 July 1863, Telegram.

General J.A. Garfield to W.P. Innes, 18 July 1863, Telegram; Major F. Bond to Captain Bridges, 19 July 1863, Telegram; Major F. Bond to Major W.M. McMichael, 20 July 1863, Telegram; General W.S. Rosecrans to Colonel J.B. Anderson, 31 July 1863, Telegram.


O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 549.

O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 590.

General W.S. Rosecrans to Major W. Allen, 10 July 1863, Telegram; Colonel C. Goddard to Major W. Smith, 14 July 1863, Telegram.

O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2, pp. 598-599; General J.A. Garfield to Secretary of War Stanton, 30 July 1863, Telegram; General J.A. Garfield to Captain J.H. Young, 20 July 1863, Telegram; Major F. Bond to General D.S. Stanley, 24 July 1863, Telegram; Captain J.P. Drouillard to General P.H. Sheridan, 28 July 1863, Telegram; General Meigs' vision of the mounts were mules not horses.


R. , XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 601.

- O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 601; Colonel C. Goddard to Captain J.B. Dickson, 18 August 1863, Telegram.

- Captain R. Thompson to Captain F.S. Winslow, 12 August 1863, Telegram; Major F.S. Bond to Captain J.B. Dickson, 12 August 1863, Telegram; Major F.S. Bond to Captain Winslow, 12 August 1863, Telegram; Major F.S. Bond, 14 August 1863, Telegram.


- Captain J.P. Drouillard to Mr. Beggs, 2 August 1863, Telegram; Captain C.R. Thompson to Mr. Beggs, 12 August 1863, Telegram; Captain R.S. Thoms to Colonel J.B. Anderson, 4 August 1863, Telegram; Captain C.R. Thompson to Colonel W.P. Innes, 4 August 1863, Telegram; Major F.S. Bond to Colonel W.P. Innes, 11 August 1863, Telegram; Railroad terminology for track was "road."

- Major F.S. Bond to Colonel W.P. Innes, 13 August 1863, Telegram.

- General W.S. Rosecrans to Colonel J.B. Anderson, 8 August 1863, Telegram; O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, p. 4.


- Major F.S. Bond to General L. Thomas, 18 August 1863, Telegram.

- O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, p. 75.


- O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, p. 126; 1st Brigade, 4th Division, XIV corps, Colonel Wiler's Brigade, attached to General Hazen.

- Captain R.S. Thoms to Captain C.R. Thompson, 22 August 1863, Telegram; Captain R.S. Thoms to Captain C.R. Thompson, 23 August 1863, Telegram.

- Captain C.R. Thompson to Lieutenant Colonel Hunton, 17 August 1863, Telegram.

- Lieutenant W.L. Porter to Lieutenant H. Bakhaus, 2 August 1863, Telegram; Lieutenant H.M. Cist to Mr. W.A. Webb, 8 August 1863, Telegram.

- Colonel C. Goddard to Captain J.B. Dickson, 23 August 1863, Telegram.

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**General J.A. Garfield to Captain J.B. Dickson, 2 August 1863, Telegram.**

**Captain C.R. Thompson to Captain H. Thrall, 18 July 1863, Telegram; Captain H. Thrall to Captain E.D. Baker, 25 July 1863, Telegram; Colonel C. Goddard to Captain J.B. Dickson, 26 August 1863, Telegram.**

**Captain C.R. Thompson to Colonel Goddard, 8 August 1863, Telegram; Captain J.P. Drouillard to Colonel C. Goddard, 11 August 1863, Telegram; Captain R.S. Thoms to Colonel J. McKibben, 12 August 1863, Telegram.**

**Captain J.P. Drouillard to Captain Bridges, 16 August 1863, Telegram; Colonel C. Goddard to Colonel S. Simmons, 24 August 1863, Telegram.**

**General J.A. Garfield to Colonel S. Simmons, 5 August 1863, Telegram; Lieutenant H.M. Cist to General J.B. Steedman, 23 August 1863, Telegram; Major F.S. Bond to Colonel S. Simmons, 14 August 1863, Telegram.**

**Captain R.S. Thoms to General T.L. Crittenden, 23 August 1863, Telegram; Major F.S. Bond to Colonel S. Simmons, 23 August 1863, Telegram; Captain J.P. Drouillard to Colonel S. Simmons, 24 August 1863, Telegram; O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, p. 140; O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, p. 147.**

**O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, p. 56.**

**O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, p. 78; O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, pp. 136-137.**

**Captain J.P. Drouillard to Lieutenant Colonel H.C. Hodges, 17 August 1863, Telegram; Major F.S. Bond to Chief Quartermaster at McMinnville, 18 August 1863, Telegram; Captain J.P. Drouillard to Colonel C. Parsons, 19 August 1863, Telegram.**

**Colonel C. Goddard to Colonel S.D. Bruce, 20 August 1863, Telegram; Colonel C. Goddard to General G. Granger, 22 August 1863, Telegram; Colonel C. Goddard to Captain E.D. Baker, 22 August 1863; Lieutenant H.M. Cist to General J.B. Steedman, 23 August 1863, Telegram.**

**General W.S. Rosecrans to General M.C. Meigs, 24 August 1863, Telegram; General W.S. Rosecrans to General M.C. Meigs, 27 August 1863, Telegram.**


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O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, p. 4; Lieutenant W.L. Porter to Colonel W.P. Innes, 17 August 1863, Telegram; Major F.S. Bond to Colonel W.P. Innes, 18 August 1863, Telegrams; Major F.S. Bond to Colonel W.P. Innes, 19 August 1863, Telegram.


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General W.S. Rosecrans to General J.W. Ripley, 14 August 1863,Telegram; Colonel C. Goddard to Captain E.F. Townsend, 23 August 1863, Telegram; Colonel C. Goddard to Captain E.F. Townsend, 24 August 1863, Telegram.

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Major F.S. Bond to Lieutenant W.A. Mayre, 8 August 1863, Telegram.


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CHAPTER 4

CROSSING, TURNING MOVEMENT, CONSOLIDATION

"The Emperor needs neither advice nor plans of campaign, no one knows his thoughts and our duty is to obey"

Berthier
Chief of Staff to Napoleon

The crossing of the Tennessee River, the turning movement to Alpine, and the consolidation for the battle were perhaps the greatest and most audacious displays of operational maneuver in Major General Rosecrans' career. The classic envelopment was a trademark of General Rosecrans throughout his Civil War career. His tactical victories at Rich Mountain, Iuka, and Tullahoma incorporated fixing the enemy force while enveloping the exposed flank. The Chickamauga Campaign exemplified his characteristic form of maneuver. He fixed General Bragg's forces north of Chattanooga with one corps and turned the southern flank with two corps to threaten the Confederate lines of communication. Rosecrans' original objectives of the Chickamauga campaign remained to remove the Confederate army from East Tennessee and occupy Chattanooga. The army had already breached the Cumberland mountains, but it still had to cross the additional obstacles of the Tennessee River and the Georgia mountains.

Rosecrans had conceived a deception plan to allow his
maneuver corps to quickly cross the Tennessee River. He feinted to the north initially with Crittenden's corps above Chattanooga and moved McCook's and Thomas' corps below Chattanooga to four separate crossing sites: Caperton's Ferry, Bridgeport, Battle Creek, and Shellmound. The lack of Confederate activity south of Chattanooga told the army commander that his deception plan was successful. The majority of the Union forces arrived at the river by 21 August 1863; however, the units did not begin crossing until 28 August. Rosecrans had not announced when the units would cross, but he did direct that each unit begin developing methods and constructing materials to cross the river. The available pontoons and transportation could only support the two crossing sites accessible to the railroad; therefore, the northern two crossing sites required innovative ideas. 9

The army commander decentralized control of the crossing sites by using specific division commanders. Major General Joseph J. Reynolds built eight "good size" flat boats to cross the river at Shellmound. Brigadier General John M. Brannan constructed timber rafts to cross at Battle Creek. Rosecrans directed Major General Phillip H. Sheridan to rebuild a trestle bridge at Bridgeport. The bulk of the army's trains crossed at Bridgeport, which became a choke point in the Union's main line of communication. Because of an inaccurate assessment and insufficient materials, Sheridan completed the bridge with
pontoon bridge at Caperton's Ferry. On the 28th of August Rosecrans approved units to cross the river at their respective sites. Prior to moving his corps, Crittenden left two brigades from his corps, a brigade from Thomas' corps, and a brigade of cavalry to continue the deception plan north of Chattanooga. By the 5th of September, the three corps had crossed to the east side of the Tennessee River. The deception forces crossed between 8 and 15 September. Rosecrans had moved his army in position to either consolidate at Chattanooga or continue the turning movement against Bragg's rear.

On 3 September 1863, Rosecrans published a fragmentary order that directed his army to move on three routes as follows: Crittenden's corps in the north, Thomas' corps in the center, and McCook's corps in support of Stanley's cavalry in the south. Once across the river, Rosecrans' northern corps moved to fix the enemy at Chattanooga while the center and southern corps, including the cavalry working with McCook, threatened Bragg's lines of communication and forced the Confederate commander to withdraw from Chattanooga on 8 September. The withdrawal altered Rosecrans' intentions for the Chickamauga campaign. Total victory over the opposing army seemed to be within Rosecrans' grasp, and rather than consolidate his army at Chattanooga, he continued the pursuit of the
The poor employment of cavalry began to affect the momentum of the campaign. Rosecrans had assigned the cavalry the mission of destroying the Confederate lines of communication near Rome. However, because of Bragg's withdrawal from Chattanooga and the cavalry's procrastination to advance toward Rome, the attack on these lines of communication never materialized. The raiding mission prevented the cavalry from performing reconnaissance missions that were requested by Thomas. The burden of providing forward reconnaissance was now each corps commander's responsibility. On 10 September Thomas, in the center, had lead units in contact with a large force west of Dug Gap in McLemore's Cove and attempted to hold until reinforcements arrived. The skirmish at McLemore's Cove caused Rosecrans to question his initial belief that Bragg was fleeing toward Rome. Two days later, Crittenden's contact with Polk's Corps at Lee and Gordon's Mill, coupled with the inactivity in front of McCook's corps, convinced Rosecrans that Bragg had remained in the vicinity of Lafayette and was not retreating to Rome. He now believed the Confederates were consolidating around Lafayette and would attempt to retake Chattanooga. Rosecrans ordered XX Corps on 12 September to close on Thomas as soon as possible and seize the head of McLemore's Cove with Stanley's cavalry corps covering McCook's movement. Thus Rosecrans' turning movement ended
with the loss of surprise and the offensive. The Union commander had to unite his force somewhere between Chattanooga and the Confederate army. The most logical place was at the intersection of the Lafayette-Chattanooga Highway and the Chickamauga Creek around Lee and Gordon's Mill. The adjutant general issued the orders for the two southern corps to join the XXI Corps by the most expeditious routes.

The Army of the Cumberland now consolidated for an impending battle. While General McCook slowly moved toward Stevens' Gap via Lookout Valley, Thomas and Crittenden positioned forces to stop any further attempts by Bragg to penetrate or maneuver toward Chattanooga. Crittenden encamped at Crawfish Springs and positioned troops along the Chickamauga Creek. Waiting for McCook to arrive at Stevens' Gap, Thomas became impatient and began sending forces to Crawfish Springs on the 18th of September. Rosecrans told Granger, the Reserve corps commander, to expedite the forward movement of all forces manning depots to Chattanooga. Rosecrans' army continued to shift forces to the north along the Chickamauga Creek as the Confederate army maneuvered northward toward Ringgold. Colonel John T. Wilder, on the afternoon of September 17, sent a message to Garfield that enemy troops were located between Alexander's Bridge and Gordon's Mills. Upon receiving Wilder's notification of the Confederate attack in force against him on the 18th of
September, Rosecrans ordered Thomas to conduct a night march and engage the enemy that had crossed the Chickamauga Creek at Reeds Bridge.
The Chickamauga Campaign, with its long lines of communication and multiple obstacle crossings, required an immense coordination effort from the army staff. To ensure sufficient supplies were available for crossing the Tennessee River, Rosecrans' staff had to perform extensive planning and preparation weeks in advance. Supporting four simultaneous and independent crossings required quick and responsive staff work. The movement of pontoons in support of crossing the Tennessee River began as early as 1 July. Rosecrans directed his chief engineer, General Morton, to begin stockpiling pontoons at central locations such as Nashville, Murfreesboro, and Tullahoma.

Understanding the advantages of the trains concept for support, Rosecrans instructed Norton to transport the pontoons south, to train the "pontooners", and to conceal the pontoons near the river until the coordinated assault.

Spanning the river by pontoon boats was not a new mission for the Army of the Cumberland or the Pioneer Brigade. Throughout July and August, the quartermaster at Nashville was building pontoon frames and sending them forward. The engineers had used the pontoons to repair the wagon bridges on the Elk River and the Duck River. However, as late as 5 August, Rosecrans could not find a staff officer who knew where all the pontoons were.

Morton provided little support to the preparation required to cross the Tennessee River; therefore,
Rosecrans began to coordinate directly with other staff officers. He directed Colonel Innes to cut timber for rebuilding the bridge at Bridgeport. He also requested Lieutenant George Burroughs, an assistant engineer staff officer, to arrange for the transportation of the pontoons. Lieutenant Burroughs was rather slow in assuming this responsibility and assessing the priority of the project. After receiving three messages instructing him to have the pontoons located, loaded, and moved promptly, the Lieutenant replied that he had pontoons at Nashville, Murfreesboro, and Elk River and inquired if the headquarters wanted them sent forward.

The lack of staff supervision in the positioning of pontoons, especially that shown by the chief of engineers, irritated the army commander. The pontoons began arriving in Stevenson on 22 August, but no one unloaded them, which wasted precious time. When Rosecrans inquired as to the blame for this error, he found a general lack of responsibility within his staff officers for accomplishing his taskings. Rosecrans designated Colonel Innes to personally supervise the loading, transporting, and unloading of pontoons and later supplies to Stevenson. Rosecrans had replaced Morton for the failure to supervise, although some sources identify Rosecrans' temper as a reason why Morton resigned his position as chief of engineers. Even though Burroughs had done a good job with locating the pontoons, Rosecrans did not select
him to serve as the chief of engineers when Morton resigned because of his inexperience. Captain William H. Merrill became the chief of engineers for the Army of the Cumberland as well as chief of topographical engineers.12

The delivery of pontoons incorporated the duties of several staff agencies and required the devotion of one staff officer to coordinate the loading, movement, delivery, and installation of the pontoons. Therefore, the chief of staff should have coordinated the staff effort to ensure the delivery and unloading of pontoons on time. This failure to coordinate this tasking displayed a lack of management ability by Garfield in consolidating the efforts of the engineers, railroad superintendent, quartermasters, and subordinate commanders.

Once Colonel Innes assumed control of the operation, the procedures ran relatively smoothly. The railroad contacted the depot due to receive the pontoons prior to arrival and the subordinate units had soldiers available to unload the trains. The movement went quicker and the notification by the railroad resolved the turn around delays. The significant organizational failure was the lack of action taken by the staff until the commander became involved. The staff was slow to coordinate common duties and failed to supervise the completion of support missions.

With Morton gone and the army in the mountains of northeast Georgia, the engineers began having
organizational and administrative problems. The movement over Sand and Lookout Mountains was much slower than expected. One reason for the slow movement across the mountains was the inaccurate maps. With the army separated by numerous mountains and valleys, the poor maps exacerbated the control dilemma. The lack of accurate maps frustrated Garfield, and he directed both the cavalry and the corps topographical engineers to submit updated maps. Captain Merrill had been coordinating the results of reconnaissance from topographical engineers in subordinate units. Rosecrans wanted a "full-time" chief of engineers for the army headquarters. Organizational problems confused this selection. The senior ranking colonel in the Pioneer Brigade was to be its brigade commander, and the commanders in the Pioneer Brigade did not want to command their units and serve in the headquarters as the chief of engineers. Therefore, the battalion commanders reported to Captain Merrill for missions which added to continued management of the engineers by Rosecrans. He requested the Chief of Engineers at the War Department to furnish another general officer to serve as chief of engineers in the Army of the Cumberland. This disorganization of the engineers, resulting from the relief of this primary staff officer reflected inadequate supervision and coordination of the staffs by the chief of staff.18

With the army's combat power separated from its
supplies by a formidable river obstacle, Rosecrans ordered the reserve commanders, who were responsible for the army’s lines of communication, to adequately defend these positions, especially bridges. Engineers turned their mobility efforts toward survivability tasks. Rosecrans told Granger, the reserve corps commander, to expedite the forward movement of all forces manning depots to Chattanooga and to continue fortifying bridges at Bridgeport and Battle Creek. On the 16th of September, Rosecrans had directed Granger to float the pontoon bridge at Caperton’s Ferry to Battle Creek. Lieutenant Burroughs, provided the technical guidance to position and fortify the pontoon bridge at Battle Creek. Trying to route the supply lines through Chattanooga, Rosecrans ordered Brigadier General George D. Wagner, commander of Chattanooga, to complete additional pontoon bridges along the Tennessee River. As the army consolidated at Crawfish Springs, the engineers were constructing bridges, repairing steamboats, roads, and sawmills, and improving fortifications. A company in The Pioneer Brigade had assisted Reynolds in constructing boats when his division prepared to cross the Tennessee River. General McCook used the Pioneers to clear trails during his movement from Alpine to Stevens’ Gap.¹⁰

Rosecrans changed his engineer staff just prior to the battle. The designated chief engineer in the Army of the Cumberland was still Captain William Merrill. The Chief
of Engineers in Washington D.C. offered General W.F. Smith to replace Morton. Because General Smith requested a leave of absence and topographical difficulties occupied Merrill, Rosecrans reinstated Morton as the chief of engineers. The move pulled together, possibly because of Morton's high rank, all the engineers in Army of the Cumberland. Although Merrill did not immediately disagree, he did have a problem with Morton's relationship with the topographical engineer section.  

Although the quartermaster section seemed to be making steady improvement, Rosecrans continued to influence Colonel Hodges. The quartermaster's rising influence with the commander increased Colonel Hodges' responsibilities. On 3 September Rosecrans ordered Hodges to make contracts with Cincinnati businessmen for the construction of the railroad bridge at Bridgeport. The general also requested Major General George Stoneman, Chief of Cavalry in Washington, D.C., to authorize Colonel Hodges to purchase animals, mules, and horses. Even though Hodges had the General's confidence to ensure his section ran efficiently while he coordinated contracts and purchased animals for the army, Rosecrans continued to occupy himself with managing the movement of ammunition and with locating quartermaster officers for Generals Brannan and Granger.  

Rosecrans reestablished a depot of supplies at Nashville. When Colonel Hodges assumed the duties as Assistant Quartermaster General for the Army of the
Cumberland, General Granger became responsible for all supply activity in the District of the Cumberland to including Nashville. With Granger concentrating his forces toward Stevenson, Rosecrans established a depot administratively separated from the post at Nashville. The quartermaster officers on duty at the Nashville depot carried on all routine business and reported directly to the army quartermaster at Stevenson rather than the post or district commander at Nashville. The names and duties of the officers were as follows: Captain S. Perkins, chief quartermaster of the depot, dispersing for the depot and the railroad; Captain T.J. Cox, clothing, camp and garrison equipage, and stationery; Captain J.D. Stubbs, river transportation forage and fuel; Captain C.H. Irvin, transportation for the use of the Department, quartermaster's stores and shops; Captain W. Mills, acting quartermaster, inspector of sutler goods. Captain F.S. Winslow left the depot and became quartermaster of the post of Nashville. The depot relieved the rear commander of the responsibility for supplying the forward corps; the quartermaster streamlined his control of resupplying equipment and forage from the Cumberland River to Stevenson.16

The corps commanders prepared for the impending movement order of 3 September by reducing the number of regimental and brigade wagons to be transported across the river. These commanders required their units to carry only
the minimum regulation allowance of baggage to make room for 24 days of rations and 3 days of forage. Consolidating axes, spades, picks and ammunition in the ammunition trains, the unit quartermasters collected the tools from the regimental wagons and the unit ordnance officers collected the ammunition from the company wagons. The commanders were able to reduce the size of the regiment and brigade trains, which allowed them to consolidate the excess wagons at division. Here, the division and corps quartermasters split the trains and sequenced them to provide constant resupply. The turn around of trains kept the army's quartermaster abreast of the divisions' movements and eased the resupply burden on the system. 17

The quartermaster section was relatively quiet after crossing the Tennessee River. Since the corps organized their trains to perform their own resupply and Rosecrans required subordinate commands to assign subordinate field commanders to supervise these trains, the army's quartermaster concentrated on his duties to manage the resupply of forward depots. Realignment efforts in the Department pushed quartermaster support forward to the river. Captain Warren became fully responsible for the Stevenson depot and Captain Baker managed the general supply train with the assistance of Lieutenant Pelham at Tullahoma. Captain W. H. Johnson left the depot at Decherd and reported to Chattanooga. 18
Supplies and transportation became critical problems as the army moved into North Georgia. The quartermaster section's support plan was to accumulate supplies at Stevenson. However, on 14 September Rosecrans directed Hodges to begin transporting forage to Bridgeport and to resupply the corps trains from that location. Intimately involved with uniting his army in the most expeditious manner, Rosecrans focused his attention more toward the army in the field. Rear commanders assisted in coordinating and managing the supply effort. Hodges remained forward with the army staff as requested by Rosecrans. On 17 September just prior to the battle, Hodges accompanied Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, on unit inspections. Unfortunately, the army continued to resupply the corps from the far side of the Tennessee River. When Rosecrans decided to consolidate and fight the Confederate forces below Chattanooga, the quartermaster should have resupplied the army trains from Chattanooga and initiated the build up of military supplies before September 20th.

Rosecrans' staff did not exploit the ideal location of Chattanooga as a forward depot. If Rosecrans had pursued Bragg's army to Rome or Atlanta, the Union army would have required this closer and more easily accessible resupply base than Stevenson. The valleys from Chattanooga to Lafayette provided more expeditious and supportable routes to deliver supplies to forward units. The mountain
routes, which oriented generally from Bridgeport to Lafayette, were slow and extremely arduous routes to negotiate.

Once Rosecrans decided to build stockpiles of supplies in Chattanooga, the Union army hesitated in the development and execution of measures to increase the flow of supplies into the city. First, any shipment of supplies into Chattanooga continued to travel over the northern tip of Lookout Mountain. The army commander had contracted to rebuild a bridge at Bridgeport, but doubts about the security and continued availability of the bridgehead delayed construction until long after the Battle of Lookout Mountain (November 24-25, 1863). Next, the lack of any forethought by the army staff in the use of Chattanooga as a depot caused the long delay in completion of the bridges at Battle Creek and Chattanooga. Lastly, Rosecrans did not emphasize the necessity of a pontoon bridge to the backdoor of Chattanooga until Brigadier General Wagner took command of the city around the 14th of September.

Additionally, Wagner emphasized the shipment of rations before ammunition or forage. He reasoned that commanders had to sustain the army first. As a result, the storage sites at Chattanooga began receiving rations on September 16th. Only 200,000 rations, about three days worth, had arrived in the city by September 17th. On the 18th of September Wagner still did not have any ammunition or
forage. The availability of a railroad line would have aided the resupply efforts.

The railroad was essential to the survival of the Army of the Cumberland during this phase of the campaign. Rosecrans kept in constant communication with the rail superintendent, providing him guidance and missions. Earlier, the commander had delayed the opening of the Western Railroad because of the lack of engines and boxcars. Now, the railroad equipment had arrived, but the priority for General Granger's and Colonel Innes's efforts was on the Northwest (Louisville and Nashville) Railroad until the army completed the current movement. As the army began crossing the river, Rosecrans focused the railroad efforts on repairing track, thereby preventing accidents and increasing the supply flow.

By 1 September the primary mission of the superintendent of the railroad was transporting Granger's units toward Stevenson and timber for the Bridgeport bridge. Since the army was already moving across the river and carried a basic load of supplies, the movement of supplies by rail became a lower priority. The army made a contract with McCallum Bridge Company to rebuild the railroad bridge at Bridgeport. Rosecrans notified Mr. J. Guthrie, President of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, that his railroad must be responsive to transporting bridging material required by the contractor. This act of coordination was significant in
that Rosecrans provided the information update personally while his army conducted a risky river crossing operation. Although the assault across the river involved a significant amount of stress and concentration, Rosecrans continued to monitor all support functions.26

The army commander intensively observed the flow of railroad freight and investigated every incident of delay. He considered any delay in the movement and unloading of trains a “criminal act” and threatened commanders and staff officers with severe penalties if they did not correct the deficiencies. Of particular note was the similarity of Rosecrans response to delays in freight during the river crossing and delays in troop movement on the morning of 20 September 1863. His extreme frustration was a characteristic response to a problem that he could not directly control.27

The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company was not solely responsible for the ongoing delays. Two days after Captain Little’s report, Colonel Innes had to investigate reports that the Nashville depot had not immediately unloaded railroad cars, which hindered the return of empty cars to Louisville. The army also proved inefficient and partially at fault for the insufficient number of cars.28

The railroad superintendent did not concentrate totally on the management of the railroad. Colonel Innes, while examining the operations of the depots, sent four of his engineer companies to build railroad bridges on the
Northwest Railroad as requested by General Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee. Additionally, Rosecrans ordered a company from Innes to build bridges on the river at Chattanooga. Colonel Innes also had his men scattered from the Cumberland River to the Tennessee River building and repairing track.

The army commander continued to react quickly to logistical problems identified by the department staff. As the Union army extended the lines of communication and moved troops from Nashville towards Chattanooga, the consumption of subsistence and supplies increased. Lieutenant Little, commissary of subsistence at Nashville, reported that the army consumed supplies faster than the railroad was transporting them. Rosecrans immediately notified the President of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and Major H.C. Symonds, the commissary of subsistence at Louisville of the shortfall and directed them to ensure the problem was resolved.

The requirement for rail transportation multiplied as the impending battle drew closer. The army took several steps to increase and improve its rail capability. Rosecrans coordinated with General Stephen A. Hurlbut for an additional six locomotives, which arrived from Memphis after the battle. Simultaneously, the army commander warned Mr. J.P. Guthrie, President of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, that army freight had priority over all others. Rosecrans had previously accused Guthrie's
railroad of favoring the transporting of private freight. Now, the army commander threatened to press the whole railroad into service if the railroad office did not remedy this problem.

Although Rosecrans had staff officers that were responsible for the depots at individual posts along the lines of communication, the junior staff officers who occupied the depots reported through post commanders. Rosecrans expected the post commanders to attempt to resolve problems using their rank and inherent experience. Post commanders elevated acute problems to the army commander's level. For example, Captain Little reported a shortage in rations to Granger, post commander of Nashville, and not Colonel Simmons, the army's commissary of subsistence. As another illustration, on 4 September Garfield directed the post commander of Stevenson, Brigadier General John H. King, to furnish cavalry with arms and to procure horses and equipment. These actions were typically the responsibilities of the ordnance officer and the quartermaster officer respectively.

Finally, Rosecrans published a general order on 12 September that placed Brigadier General George D. Wagner in command of Chattanooga to protect government stores, supervise construction of bridges, and provide for prompt transportation of supplies. These duties were the responsibility of the quartermaster, but Rosecrans had his post commanders analyze the situation first and, if
necessary, implement solutions without bothering the primary staff officers with trivial affairs.\textsuperscript{26}

The performance of the Commissary of Subsistence was marginal and disrespectful. For reasons unknown to Rosecrans, Colonel Simmons was in Nashville while the army was crossing the Tennessee River. Even after Rosecrans directed the subsistence officer, on three occasions, to report to army headquarters, Simmons failed to appear. During his absence, the maneuver commanders decided the amount of rations to carry on the next phase of the campaign and Rosecrans assumed control in distributing these rations.\textsuperscript{30}

Colonel Simmons was supposedly in Nashville to coordinate rations for the cavalry supply point in Huntsville and Crittenden's supply point at Tracy City. Rosecrans, in the absence of the commissary of subsistence, directed the distribution of rations for the army. Originally, Rosecrans had directed the XXI Corps to obtain rations at Bridgeport, but Thomas reported that the amount of rations there was insufficient. Therefore, the commander redirected the wagons to obtain rations and forage at Stevenson and cross the river at Bridgeport. Because of the proximity of available stores, Rosecrans ordered Crittenden's units to use the rations at Tracy City to replenish the corps supply trains. Managing the use of depots and stores was the responsibility of the commissary of subsistence, not the army commander.\textsuperscript{31}
The absence of Colonel Simmons during the initial stage of the river crossing reveals that the army staff did not know the specific plans for crossing the river. However, the continued absence by the commissary of subsistence indicated a lack of loyalty in accomplishing the directives of the army commander. Since Rosecrans was performing the duties admirably, the presence of the section chief was not essential. The commissary provided sufficient rations for the army, even though alternate supply points became necessary.

Rosecrans directed the commissary of subsistence on 14th September to establish operations at Bridgeport. With the cooperation of the commander of Chattanooga, Simmons began storing rations and water barrels in the city around the 16th of September. However, the number of rations available in Chattanooga at the outbreak of the Chickamauga battle was insufficient to sustain the army for more than four days.

The medical section, as usual, planned and prepared far ahead of the other staff sections. The Union army sent all casualties south of the river to the hospital in Stevenson. This allowed the quick evacuation of sick and wounded by rail to Nashville if required. Upon the occupation of Chattanooga, Surgeon Perin made immediate arrangements to forward supplies, equipment and personnel sufficient for a possible major engagement to the city. Perin organized the Chattanooga hospital with Surgeon
Israel Moses as curator, accompanied by Surgeon Peter J. Cleary, Surgeon Francis Salter, and Surgeon C.C. Byrne. A medical inspection of the Army of the Cumberland, performed by Surgeon F.H. Hamilton during this period, found the lack of fresh vegetables in the soldiers' diets as the only imperfection. Since the inspector found no suffering attributed to this deficiency, he praised the medical section for its preparation and sanitation.

While the medical section was making efforts to save lives, the commissary of musters was attempting to raise additional units. Restricted by the Secretary of War from enlisting prisoners of war, Captain John H. Young, commissary of musters, had to report each request individually through the commander of the Army of the Cumberland to the Secretary of War. While Captain Young was collecting these requests, Rosecrans asked Colonel W. Hoffman, Commissary General of Prisoners in Washington, to convince the Secretary that the restriction was infeasible. Although Captain Young was the project officer for this action, the communication remained between Rosecrans and the War Department. Initially the Union army commander had permission to enlist individual deserters, but only after War Department approval. Within a month the number of enlistees became unmanageable and Rosecrans requested additional authority to enlist entire regiments at once. Although the Department approved the request, it still held approval authority on officers. On
11 September, Captain Young received Lieutenant George K. Sanderson to assist in mustering the cavalry and Confederate deserters. Before the commissary of musters received prisoners as potential enlistees, the provost marshal general interrogated them.\(^{34}\)

The Provost Marshal section spent its time interrogating prisoners and enforcing regulations and orders, especially the flagrantly violated order against foraging. Several provost marshals conducted guard mounts to secure the corps and division headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel William M. Wiles remained in Chattanooga and consolidated administrative and interrogation reports. The provost marshal at Stevenson, Major Scarritt, received many of the deserters. Wiles also informed Rosecrans of the availability of river boat pilots to navigate the Tennessee River once the engineers completed construction of river boats. The chief of police assisted the provost marshal in maintaining law and order in the area.\(^{35}\)

The Chief of Police, Colonel Truesdail, uncovered a plan to purchase cotton with forged and counterfeit notes and defraud the United States of revenue from the illegally purchased cotton. Rosecrans transferred the evidence to the Department’s Judge Advocate, Major J.L. Fullerton at Murfreesboro, for determination of jurisdiction.\(^{36}\)

The signal corps continued to develop as Rosecrans primary means of collecting intelligence. He remarked
that the signal corps was "growing into usefulness and favor daily for the last four months and now bids fair to become one of the most esteemed of the staff services."

This new tool of the battlefield commander became extremely valuable since numerous couriers were consistently late, slow or captured. In a rapidly developing battle over difficult terrain, the courier system proved less efficient than the signal stations. Captain Jesse Merrill established an effective system of communication to connect the separated army. As the army consolidated, signal stations linked Rosecrans to his subordinates at either flank. The stations provided information on the locations of his units and quickly delivered messages to their commanders. 

The telegraph service, which continued to augment the signal corps, attempted to keep the headquarters in contact with the army commander’s superior and his subordinates. As the army headquarters deployed toward Trenton, the ability to communicate with subordinate units became impaired. As the army moved onto Sand Mountain, Rosecrans relocated his headquarters on the 4th of September to Cave Spring. Captain Van Duzer maintained constant telegraph communications in the headquarters. When the commander and his staff left the interim camp of Cave Spring in the afternoon of 6 September and arrived near Trenton late that evening, they had to rely on signal stations and couriers for unit information while Van Duzer
waited for protection to run the wire from Whiteside to Trenton. The lack of a telegraph cost the army commander about a day in the delivery of message traffic. This became very annoying and confusing. The slow message traffic by subordinate commanders aggravated the staff, especially Garfield.

The superintendent of the telegraph reestablished telegraph communications to the army headquarters when it moved from Trenton to Chattanooga. Terrain and time precluded the feasibility to establish wire communications across the mountains. Therefore, Rosecrans used courier and signal stations when he visited Thomas at Stevens' Gap. Van Duzer established a telegraph line to Crawfish Springs when Rosecrans established his headquarters there. Although Rosecrans had excellent communications with Washington, D.C., his staff and subordinate commanders at Chattanooga and Crawfish Springs, had to depend on couriers.

The terrain severely hindered the adjutant general section's responsiveness and accountability. As the corps consolidated at Crawfish Springs, they initiated their movements before the army headquarters provided instructions. An example of the staff's delay was the recrossing of Lookout Mountain by McCook. Thomas had told McCook to cross back into Lookout Valley via Winston's Gap because the enemy occupied McLemore's Cove. Because of the slowness of couriers, a later message from army
headquarters informing McCook to remain on top of Lookout Mountain reached XX Corps after they were already in Lookout Valley and moving north. The lack of timeliness with messages cost the army in synchronization and efficiency.  

Accountability of messages and unit locations continued to plague the adjutant general's section, especially during the consolidation of the army for the battle. Numerous messages to Thomas ordering his movement toward Crittenden on the 16th of September never arrived. The Union army headquarters had moved four times in six days. The staff had previously demonstrated problems with accountability of messages and orders when they moved. With the constant repositioning, Rosecrans' staff temporarily lost control of the Union army positions on the 16th of September, and he would not issue any further orders until subordinate commanders reported their locations. Either the unreported repositioning of divisions by frustrated commanders or the failure of the staff to properly account for the movement of troops led to confusion in Rosecrans's assistant adjutant general's positioning of unit locations. Rosecrans was attempting to sequence the flow of Thomas' troops into Crawfish Springs and he did not know the order of divisions nor even the identity of the lead division.  

While the Army of the Cumberland was advancing through northern Georgia and Alabama, the army staff continued to
administratively support the activities at hand. Although it submitted the monthly reports late, the adjutant general section wrote, logged, and distributed the normal message traffic. The section had difficulty with subordinate commanders' submission of the monthly reports for August. At the end of a campaign and the end of every month units were supposed to provide a synopsis of actions. Because of the separation of trains, much of the office supplies remained on the west side of the Tennessee River. The army and corps headquarters supplied paper and pens to units east of the river. Even after this assistance, units still failed to submit required reports.\footnote{1}

The campaign began to fatigue Rosecrans as demonstrated by careless actions that placed his aides in sensitive positions. After ordering the XXI Corps commander to move forward and take command of his units, Rosecrans sent Colonel McKibbin, an aide-de-camp, to accompany Crittenden and report on the corps' actions. The thought of a staff officer overseeing a commander thoroughly embarrassed Crittenden. Upon the arrival of Colonel McKibbin at Crittenden's corps headquarters, every message from corps to army headquarters stated that McKibbin would provide the information. After the third such message, Rosecrans withdrew the aide-de-camp. Coincidently, the Secretary of War sent Charles A. Dana to oversee the activities of Rosecrans, much to the displeasure of the army.
Indirectly, Major Bond became a victim of Rosecrans' temper. Shortly after McLeMORE's Cove, Major Bond sent a message to Stanley directing the cavalry commander and General McCook to immediately open communications with the army headquarters, proclaiming that "there was no military offense, except running from the enemy, so inexcusable as a neglect to keep up communications with headquarters."

When McCook saw the message that accused him of inexcusable neglect, he immediately protested the unjust comments by Major Bond to Garfield. McCook's excuse for the lack of continuous communications with the headquarters was the movement of the army headquarters to Chattanooga without notifying the XX Corps which was the adjutant general's responsibility. McCook also cited the poor performance of the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry as a partial problem to the delay in message traffic. McCook thought Bond wrote the message misusing Rosecrans' name to emphasize the severity of the order. Garfield found the message and replied to McCook that the General had not intended to censure the corps commander. This situation demonstrated the support Garfield gave his subordinate staff officers and the diplomacy required by the Chief of Staff to keep command relationships harmonious. Both Rosecrans and McCook would later be accused of this offense.40

The 16th and 17th of September were confusing days in
positioning the army's units. For the third time in two
days the army's adjutant general section required a report
on unit locations from the corps commanders. As a result
of the delayed repositioning of units by the army staff,
corps began to run into each other and intermingle.
McCook's corps bumped into Thomas' rear division on the
road north of Pond Springs. Upon notifying the army
headquarters of the road block, Rosecrans ordered XX Corps
to hold and take up blocking positions until he could
determine the situation. On another occasion, Thomas'
corps attempted to relieve Crittenden's corps, who did not
have orders for relief. Crittenden's brigade commanders
would not allow Thomas' units to move up and the situation
required Colonel Ducat, Rosecrans' Inspector General, to
acquire orders and monitor operations. Rosecrans
constantly urged Thomas and McCook to expedite their
movements to the north. However, the army staff could not
properly control the rapid movements of Union troops.**

The Union army's inspector general became extremely
active in the final phase of the campaign by positioning
units and inspecting pickets. On the 17th of September
Rosecrans verbally ordered Colonel Ducat to reconnoiter
the west side of the Chickamauga Creek and position
General Palmer's division near Crawfish Springs. That
afternoon, Ducat inspected the pickets and grand guards of
the units in this vicinity. During the inspection he
found sparsely positioned pickets and improperly spaced
grand guards. Ducat had the subordinate inspector generals remedy this problem and report the reestablishment of secure lines.

The next day Ducat solved a road congestion problem involving a lack of movement orders. Negley's division was to relieve Palmer's division; however, Palmer's brigade commanders would not move until they had received proper orders. In the mean time, the road congestion caused by Negley's division, blocked Brannan's movement to the north. Rosecrans told Ducat, through Lieutenant Drouillard and Lieutenant Reynolds, not to leave until all units accomplished their moves.

Almost all information, whether messages, orders or intelligence data, funneled into one central location in the Army of the Cumberland. The army headquarters, with the chief of staff as the "chief clerk", organized, synthesized this information. Garfield was the main staff officer responsible for processing information affecting all staff members. He managed and directed the staff. Garfield was in an excellent position to easily supervise the activities of the staff by assigning tasks, resolving confusion, and controlling quality. Garfield, although recuperating from a bout of sickness, should have ensured that the army staff officers accomplished their missions. Because the delivery of pontoons incorporated the efforts of several staff officers, Garfield should have been the central point of contact. He could have resolved the
disorganization in the engineer corps if he had provided William Merrill and Morton some guidance and assistance before the situation grew out of control. Although the chief of staff did not relieve the commander from his responsibilities, his mission and position as chief of staff authorized him to guide, direct, and control the staff officers to better serve the commander and relieve him of the administrative burden. Garfield did not accomplish this during this phase of the battle.

The Army of the Cumberland had pushed four corps across a tremendous obstacle with little opposition, yet numerous staff deficiencies. The engineers continued to have administrative and organizational problems, the quartermaster section continued to reorganize, the railroad slowed the successful delivery of freight from Nashville to Bridgeport and the commanding general became the subsistence officer. Miscellaneous administrative actions constantly kept the commander diverted from the main operation, the river crossing. The constant involvement in staff functions by the commander became such a common occurrence that the section chiefs were leaving the headquarters for unknown reasons and the chief of staff could not control or monitor them.

The turning movement by the Union army across Sand and Lookout Mountain required decentralized resupply which shifted problems from the army staff to corps and division staffs. The main items such as rations, forage and
equipment arrived at the forward supply point in Stevenson and corps and divisions staff officers were responsible for supplying their units. As lines of communication lengthened, logistical burdens fell more and more on post commanders.

Rosecrans was now concentrated more on tactical maneuvers and intelligence networks than the logistical problems, even though he continued to personally supervise the mustering of additional soldiers. A change had occurred in the interests of the army commander. He adamantly insisted on constant communication and intelligence. The large separation between the corps, coupled with slow communications and inadequate intelligence, were critical factors in Rosecrans' change of interests.
CHAPTER 4

ENDNOTES


3 O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, pp. 35-38.


U.S. Army, FM 100-5, pp. 7-2, 7-4; Fragmentary orders provide pertinent extracts from more detailed orders or change previous orders; O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, pp. 222-223, 344.


General J.A. Garfield to General J. St. Morton, 1 July 1863, Telegram.

General J.A. Garfield to Lieutenant C.H. Irvin, 1 August 1863, Telegram.

9 O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, pp. 19, 56; Major F.S. Bond to Lieutenant C. Burroughs, 17 August 1863, Telegram; General W.S. Rosecrans to Colonel E.D. Townsend, 28 August 1863, Telegram.

10 O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, pp. 111, 170; Major F.S. Bond to Colonel W.P. Innes, 23 August 1863, Telegram; Lamers, Edge of Glory, 300.


General W.S. Rosecrans to Major General G. Stoneman,
3 September 1863, Telegram; Captain R.S. Thorns to Colonel
H.C. Hodges, 1 September 1863, Telegram; Colonel C.
Goddard to Lieutenant A. Pelham, 31 August 1863, Telegram;
Colonel C. Goddard to Commanding Officer of Tullahoma, 31
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General W.S. Rosecrans to General J.G. Totten, 29
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Captain R.S. Thorns to Mr. J.G. Beggs, 31 August
1863, Telegram; General J.A. Garfield to General W.H.
Lytle, 13 August 1863, Telegram.

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O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, p. 867; Captain J.P. Drouillard to Colonel Innes, 16 September 1863, Telegram; Captain J.P. Drouillard to General S.A. Hurlburt, 16 September 1863, Telegram; Captain J.P. Drouillard to the Honorable J.G. Guthrie, President of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 16 September 1863, Telegram.

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General J.A. Garfield to Colonel S. Simmons, 30 August 1863, Telegram; Colonel C. Goddard to Colonel S. Simmons, 29 August 1863, Telegram; Colonel C. Goddard to Colonel S. Simmons, 30 August 1863, Telegram; Captain R.S. Thoms to General Crittenden, 1 September 1863, Telegram.

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*O.R., LII, Pt. 1, p. 77.

*O.R., LII, Pt. 1, p. 78.
CHAPTER 5

THE CHICKAMAUGA BATTLE

War being by nature confused and the process of command complex, it is virtually certain that some breaks and errors will occur, a fact that a wise commander will take into account and provide for.¹

The final days of the Chickamauga campaign contradicted the expectations of Major General William S. Rosecrans. He had been known for meticulous operations; however, the first day of the battle was an uncoordinated meeting engagement. The army had displayed an offensive spirit throughout the campaign, but the battle ended in the destruction of the Union defensive. Similarly, Rosecrans assembled his staff for reasons contrary to their employment. The subordinate staff officers were responsible to supply equipment, rations, and ammunition to the army from various depots along the Union lines of communication. The primary staff officers were positioned at the headquarters as directed and served as simple couriers for the commander.

The Battle of Chickamauga started as rapidly as it ended. Thomas initiated the battle on the morning of the 19th of September. The divisions of Brigadier General J.M. Brannan and Brigadier General A. Baird attacked Brigadier General Nathan B. Forrest's cavalry and Major General W.H.T. Walker's Reserve Corps of Bragg's army. The
XIV Corps commander had devised a plan to attack in the direction of Reed's Bridge while the XXI Corps commander advanced a division from Gordon's Mill. The delay in the movement of Crittenden's division and the change in the enemy situation turned the planned envelopment into a series of meeting engagements. Johnson, whom McCook ordered to move north and report to Thomas, slid in between Baird and Palmer, who was delayed because of Crittenden's misunderstanding of Thomas' and Rosecrans' intent.

As the Confederate army piecemealed units into action to the south, so did the Union army. The employment of brigades and regiments became very confusing and unorganized. Timing of committing forces was critical but coincidental. Major General J.M. Palmer's division, from Crittenden's corps, followed Johnson into the battlefield. As soon as Major General J.J. Reynolds' division formed on Palmer's right flank, the three divisions of Johnson, Palmer and Reynolds' attacked the left flank of the enemy who was attacking Brannan and Baird.

About 1100 hours on September 19th, Rosecrans displaced his headquarters to Widow Glenn's house. One of the last messages written by Garfield was for Crittenden to expedite the attachment of Brigadier General H.P. Van Cleve to Thomas. Crittenden delayed committing Van Cleve for almost an hour and a half because the XXI Corps commander believed the employment would have wasted his
troops. The delay allowed the misplaced Confederate division of Major General A.P. Stewart to organize a brilliant attack against Van Cleve's newly committed division, pushing him off the battlefield. However, the
coincidental counterattack of Major General J.S. Negley and Brannan hit both flanks of Stewart's division simultaneously and forced him to withdraw behind the Lafayette Road. 

While Thomas' corps eliminated the salient created by Stewart, Rosecrans continued to commit the remainder of the army into the battle. The engagement was pandemonium interspersed with moments of reorganization. Some subordinate commanders displayed initiative while others exhibited either hesitation or direct disobedience to orders. A commander's unexpected movement of his troops often confused any attempts of the staff officers at headquarters to project or control the current situation. In other words, the staff officer could neither immediately enforce Rosecrans' orders nor ensure a subordinate commander's exact location. The corps commanders met with Rosecrans at the Widow Glenn's house that night to discuss the next day's strategy.

Through intuition, Rosecrans believed that he was in control of the battle. Three options at his disposal were to attack, defend, or withdraw. The long march had tired his men and the piecemeal attack had disorganized his army; therefore, the best option was to remain on the battlefield and defend. The army commander began to develop his plan of action. Rosecrans knew Bragg would continue to attack from the Union army's left, so he ordered Thomas to remain in position with Brannan in

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reserve, McCook to refuse the right and cover the Widow Glenn's house, and Crittenden to place two divisions in reserve in support of the army.  

Rosecrans' knowledge of current unit locations was lacking because he had remained at the Widow Glenn's house the entire afternoon and his staff attempted to position forces on a map using information obtained from messages. During the strategy conference that night, the assistant adjutant generals and the chief of staff had to reconstruct the locations of units from the attendees.

On the morning of September 20th, Rosecrans, with Garfield, Ducat, and several aides, "trooped the line" making corrections in the positioning of divisions. The army commander approved Thomas' defensive plan, including the request for Negley to support the army's left flank. Upon passing Negley's position, Rosecrans ordered him to support Thomas. The army commander further ordered McCook's forces to replace Negley in position. Upon Rosecrans' return to the position, he noticed McCook's units had failed to promptly reposition in obedience to the order, thereby delaying Negley's efforts to join Thomas. Rosecrans immediately grabbed the nearest unit, Wood's division, to replace Negley. Rosecrans sent Captain Thomas with orders to Crittenden informing him of this decision.

After further corrections to Davis' positions, Rosecrans returned again to Negley's position and found
that Wood had occupied only the reserve position and Negley remained in the front line waiting for a replacement. Rosecrans sent Captain Thorns again to order Wood forward, finally freeing Negley to support Thomas. During this process, the Confederates attacked on the far left of Thomas' corps. Although Negley's delay cost Thomas a formidable left flank, the forces which had arrived proved substantial enough to stop the Confederate attack and reestablish the battle lines.

The movement of units during the battle added confusion to the intent of orders. As the intensity of the battle increased and shifted toward the XIV Corps' center, Thomas requested additional troops. Rosecrans reassured Thomas that Negley should have arrived on the left flank and Van Cleve should be moving to support the battle in the north. Because Brannan was the XIV Corps' reserve, Thomas sent his aide, Captain Sanford C. Kellogg, to bring Brannan's division in support of his corps. While Brannan and Reynolds discussed the dilemma of Thomas' movement of Brannan's division, Reynolds instructed Kellogg to inform Rosecrans that the flank was exposed and required additional forces to protect his flank. Rosecrans, believing Brannan had left the front lines, directed Major Bond to publish the order for Wood to "close up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." Rosecrans also ordered Davis to close on Wood and prevent any gaps in the Union line.\*
The intent of the message to Wood was to close a gap; however, the wording of the actual message does not reflect this "object" nor allow much discretion to question the order. Historians also question the location of Garfield when Bond wrote this order. The best account of this incident is the testimony of Colonel Lyne Starling, chief of staff to Crittenden, which is recorded in Crittenden's court of inquiry. Colonel Starling witnessed Rosecrans giving the order and actually delivered it to Wood. Rosecrans told Starling to order Wood to close on the left of Reynolds and support him. Garfield had to clarify the order to Starling, that the intent of the order was for Wood's division to occupy the vacancy formed by the removal of Brannan's division. Starling said he verbally informed Wood of the object of the order when he delivered the written order. The entire incident seemed coincidental that Garfield had expressed feelings of contempt for Wood in April 1862, and, one year later, Garfield mysteriously did not sign a critical message that linked Wood to the defeat of the Union army at Chickamauga. Regardless, Bond wrote the fateful order which specifically directed Wood to move and support Reynolds.10

Rosecrans informed Thomas that the entire army would fully support Thomas' efforts on the left. About 1030 hours, Rosecrans directed Ducat to order the two brigades of Sheridan's division to report to Thomas. While
Sheridan organized to execute this order, Wood had vacated his position and was moving behind Brannan to support Reynolds of Thomas' corps.\textsuperscript{11}
The simultaneous movement of all these units set the stage for the destruction of the Army of the Cumberland's right flank. Precisely at 11:10 hours and in close proximity to Dyer's Field, four Union divisions were moving north, exposing their right flanks. Van Cleve was moving north to support Thomas. Wood was repositioning behind Brannan to support Reynolds. Sheridan was moving two brigades enroute to support Thomas, and Davis was filling the vacancy left by Wood. At the same time the Confederate left wing under Lieutenant General James Longstreet penetrated Wood's old position with about 11,000 screaming Confederates. The right flank of Rosecrans' army, hit while moving, scrambled to escape and regroup. The divisions of Van Cleve, Davis, and Sheridan broke and left the battlefield for Rossville. Although Davis and Sheridan tried to reform and attempted to reengage, their efforts were too late and futile. Fragments of Wood's and Brannan's divisions reconsolidated on Snodgrass Hill and fought admirably until Thomas withdrew all forces from the battlefield late that afternoon.12

When Rosecrans and his staff left the Widow Glenn's house that morning, they would never return. After reviewing the units' battle positions, Rosecrans established a mobile headquarters, containing his immediate staff, and his escort, on a hill about 800 yards behind Wood's division. This was an excellent spot from
which to observe the units moving north to assist Thomas. When Longstreet's corps broke through the Union lines, the command post dissipated. Rosecrans, along with Garfield, Hodges and McMichael went to the south toward McCook's headquarters. When the commander and the staff became separated, the staff immediately consulted on a direction to move. The staff decided to move toward Thomas' position rather than attempt to find McCook's headquarters. Rosecrans, assisted by Garfield and McMichael, tried to rally Lytle's brigade of Sheridan. Upon the failure of this difficult task, they rode north to Rossville in an attempt to reach Thomas. In the vicinity of Widow Glenn's house, Ducat and Burt, whom Rosecrans had sent to order Sheridan north, joined with Lieutenant Colonel Hodges and temporarily rallied the infantry to repulse the wave of unhindered Confederates. Once the enemy broke this line of troops, the staff officers rode north toward Rossville.  

Two of Rosecrans' staff officers remained in the vicinity of the forward headquarters. Captain Horace Porter's horse had become temporarily lame, so the ordnance officer began rallying broken troops. Joined by Captain J.P. Drouillard, they formed about a hundred troops. The line vanished after several shells exploded in close proximity. Drouillard and Porter reformed another line which also dispersed after receiving fire. Porter attempted to hold the troops in line by appeals to
pride, threats with a pistol, and blows with his sabre. Two of the reformed soldiers attacked Porter with their bayonets; however, Porter was not injured. Upon seeing their position as untenable, Porter and Drouillard left the battlefield and rejoined Rosecrans. For his "initiative and tenacity" in holding the enemy, Porter was awarded the Medal Of Honor.¹⁴

After the Confederates shattered the right flank of the Union army, Rosecrans and a few members of his staff, to include Garfield, Bond, McMichael, and Captain John H. Young, rode to Chattanooga via Rossville and Dry Valley Road. When the party reached the vicinity of Rossville, Rosecrans stopped and discussed with Garfield whether to return to the battlefield. Rosecrans, in the Report to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, stated that someone had to estimate the conditions at the front, move a supply train to a secure position, and ensure the security of Chattanooga. Rosecrans attempted to explain his requests to Garfield, but the chief of staff was convinced that the instructions were too difficult to comprehend and that the commander should make the dispositions and give the orders. After sending Garfield to assist Thomas at the front, Rosecrans returned to Chattanooga to secure the bridges and to forward ammunition and supplies to Rossville.¹⁵

During the entire Chickamauga Campaign, Rosecrans had performed the duties of his staff. By his return to
Chattanooga, he continued to convey his lack of faith in his quartermaster, ordnance and subsistence staff officers. Additionally, his habit of performing staff functions convinced him to abandon his army on the battlefield, an action which cost Rosecrans his command and ultimately his career.

Rosecrans' fragmented staff began slowly moving toward Rossville. McCook, his staff, and Morton rode up behind them. Morton, who had initially travelled south behind Rosecrans, joined McCook and continued with him for the remainder of the day. Members of the forward headquarters, to include the staff and Rosecrans' escort, stopped near McFarland's Gap. Ducat arrived and commenced to reform retreating troops along with Lieutenant William Porter, Lieutenant James Reynolds, and Captain Joseph C. Hill. Goddard, who had been with the majority of the staff, continued to Rossville and arrived in Chattanooga with the commanding general and McMichael.

Ducat assumed responsibility for the staff and began assigning duties. He instructed Captain J.P. Drouillard to take several prisoners to the rear and Captain Horace Porter and Colonel Barnett to supervise evacuating an ammunition train. Crittenden rode by enroute to see Rosecrans at Chattanooga. Upon McCook's arrival, the available commanders and staff officers decided that Sheridan should return to the battle and Negley should defend Rossville. Ducat sent Captain Hill to inform
Rosecrans of the situation. McCook put Lieutenant Colonel Wiles, Rosecrans’ provost marshal, in charge of some stragglers and continued to Chattanooga. When Colonel Joseph C. McKibbin arrived at McFarland’s Gap, Rosecrans’ only staff officer remaining on the battlefield was Garfield. 17

The final phase of the Chickamauga Campaign proved very frustrating for the various staff agencies. Overall, they had complied with Rosecrans’ directions and guidance. However, the presence of specific staff officers at army headquarters hindered their ability to accomplish their primary missions. The quartermaster was not able to perform his proper duties until after the battle. During the battle, Hodges assisted the army commander’s efforts to rally the retreating Union troops. Upon departing the battlefield, he immediately began to coordinate with his officers in Stevenson and Nashville for the forwarding of supplies.19

The army’s commissary of subsistence was supervising the rapid stockpiling of rations at Chattanooga. However, the number of rations available in Chattanooga at the outbreak of the Chickamauga battle was insufficient to sustain the army for more than four days. The commissary of subsistence was able to consolidate the army’s rations, because on 19 September the corps had sent their supply trains containing rations to Chattanooga as a prelude to a possible retirement.19
Sufficient ammunition was available for the army because of the low ammunition usage during minor skirmishes prior to the 19th and 20th of September. The ammunition trains in the divisions carried sufficient bullets and artillery rounds for a large engagement and additional ammunition trains were returning with more rounds. Even after the first day of the engagement, the trains contained sufficient ammunition for the next day's engagement. The terrain in this battle had altered the ordnance section's planning figures for ammunition usage. The thick vegetation permitted close, unhindered advance of the enemy which decreased the artillery rounds and increased the small arms ammunition expended as compared to Stones River.

Overall the Union army had sufficient ammunition on the battlefield to defeat the enemy. However, tactical decisions restricted the availability of ammunition for specific periods and locations. Although the second day of the battle began with a healthy ammunition posture, the early evacuation of corps and division ammunition trains by several senior commanders around 1200 hours on the 20th of September proved catastrophic to the ability to successfully defend or withdraw without receiving severe casualties. After the battle Rosecrans commended Captain Horace Porter, the army's ordnance officer, for improving the army's ammunition distribution system by marking ammunition wagons. This provided the corps a rapid
turnaround capability when picking up ammunition.\textsuperscript{21}

The final phase of the Chickamauga Campaign heavily stressed the preparations and employment of the medical department. Although Rosecrans praised Surgeon Perin for his efficiency and management at army level, the medical director's placement of hospitals and procedures for evacuation were deficient at the tactical level.\textsuperscript{22}

As the Union army concentrated near Crawfish Springs to fight the Confederates, Perin quickly designated the site of the Lee House as the "main depot" for the wounded. According to Perin, all division hospitals, excluding two division hospitals from XIV Corps, established operations in the close vicinity of the house. When the battle began to the north, several hospitals displaced near the division areas only to return to Crawfish Springs as the battle moved southward.\textsuperscript{23}

The ambulances worked continuously on September 19th to evacuate all known casualties to Crawfish Springs. The distant battle created long evacuation routes and made the movement of wounded from the battlefield longer and more harsh. Darkness and undefined battle lines precluded evacuation of the remaining wounded on the battlefield for that day.\textsuperscript{24}

The army's movement to the north on the 20th of September continued to affect the hospital's ability to support the corps. The extended ambulance routes from the battlefield to Crawfish Springs became extremely
susceptible to enemy pressure. When the Confederates severed the right flank of the Union army, the hospitals at Crawfish Springs instantly became a burden to the army commander. Rosecrans assigned the mission of evacuating and safeguarding the hospitals to the cavalry.

Although evacuation of the 4000 wounded began on the 19th of September, many severely wounded soldiers and several attending surgeons remained behind. The division hospital behind the XIV Corps and the two hospitals on the northern flank received the bulk of the army's wounded and rapidly became immobile. Upon the hasty withdrawal of Thomas' corps, the hospitals contained more wounded than ambulances. The ambulatory casualties either walked or became prisoners. Perin estimates approximately 1500-2500 wounded moved to Rossville and Chattanooga via Dry Valley Road. The wounded and dying soldiers lined the road almost as a witness to the department's poor evacuation plan. The ambulances did not return for wounded stragglers until the 21st of September.

Rosecrans' medical director established army hospitals in Chattanooga under the supervision of Surgeon I. Moses. As soon as the Confederates left the city, Perin instructed Moses to find 5000 beds. The Union army evacuated 4000 wounded on the 19th of September. The medical department evacuated 3000 wounded to Stevenson across the newly completed pontoon bridge in the city. The department attempted to expedite the wounded to Stevenson,
Nashville, and points north. The intent was to clear Chattanooga of all sick and wounded to the degree possible.\textsuperscript{7}

While the majority of Rosecrans' primary staff were conducting a fast and complex battle, Lieutenant Colonel Wiles, the Union army's provost marshal, was developing the enemy order of battle and processing the incoming prisoners of war. The results of interrogations went directly to Rosecrans. Wiles' estimate of the enemy at the end of the battle was between 80,000-100,000 infantry and 15,000-20,000 cavalry. His exaggerated estimate and his belief that Longstreet would continue to reinforce Bragg was another reason why Rosecrans did not reenter the battle.\textsuperscript{8}

The signal corps continued to evolve as Rosecrans primary means of collecting intelligence. In reference to the signal corps performance during the Chickamauga Campaign the army commander wrote, "...growing into usefulness and favor daily for the last four months and now bids fair to become one of the most esteemed of the staff services." This new tool of the battlefield commander became extremely valuable because numerous couriers were consistently late, slow or captured. In a rapidly developing battle over difficult terrain, the courier system proved less efficient than the signal towers.\textsuperscript{8}

Captain Jesse Merrill established an effective system
of communication to connect the separated army. As the army consolidated, signal stations linked Rosecrans to his subordinates at either flank. The stations provided information on the locations of his units and quickly delivered messages to their commanders. The use of signal stations appealed to Rosecrans as a quick and accurate method of gathering intelligence. Signal officers confirmed enemy skirmishing along the battle line and identified possible activity on an unprotected flank. Toward the end of the campaign Rosecrans ordered commanders to position officers on all high ground to validate and report information as intelligence. The signal corps filled Rosecrans requirement for fast and accurate intelligence that cavalry had failed to accomplish.

Probably the quietest and most affected staff position on Rosecrans staff during this battle was the chief of artillery, Colonel James Barnett. As the armies grew in size, artillery had to concentrate its firepower in order to provide the same impact of shock on the battlefield. However, the Army of the Cumberland attached the artillery batteries to brigades. Captain Bradley, chief of artillery for Wood's division, commented on the effect of this on his performance as a division staff officer. "It will thus be seen that I was only chief of artillery in name and did not have actual command of any battery but my own." This attitude of command and control of artillery
pervaded this army and fostered inefficiency and ineptitude.\textsuperscript{31}

Because of his inability to properly control the employment of artillery and his ineffective performance as Chief of Artillery on the army's staff, Rosecrans replaced Barnett with General Brannan. Although Rosecrans complimented Barnett after the battle, which he normally did to his staff officers, careless use of the artillery asset required the army to reorganize the employment and structure of artillery units. The most visible change was the selection of Brannan as the new chief of artillery and the consolidation of artillery at division.\textsuperscript{32}

The adjutant general section's inability to manage the location of subordinate units was very significant to the conduct of the battle. The long distances and thick vegetation removed Rosecrans from visual control of his army and forced him to rely on his staff to properly locate and control subordinate units into and on the battlefield. The confusion in the headquarters, generated by the inadequate knowledge of unit positions, forced staff officers to write incomplete, uncoordinated, and ambiguous orders. The army sent corps to relieve units that had no orders for relief, to march through units that had also received orders to march, and to relieve units in critical situations. This tactical inefficiency and recurring discrepancy proved catastrophic to the success of the battle.\textsuperscript{33}
When the army entered the thick vegetation on the Chickamauga battlefield, much of the information that affected Rosecrans' decisions came from the aides. Rosecrans expected constant communication with corps and independent unit headquarters, and courier lines established with staff officers proved the most reliable form of communication in this difficult environment. Cavalry communications had become untimely and undependable, so the aides delivered the bulk of the instructions and information to the various commanders.

Almost all the staff officers that traveled with Rosecrans performed as aides-de-camp during the battle phase. The thick vegetation and canalized routes increased the time necessary to deliver messages and impart direction to the commanders. The delay magnified the requirement for additional aides. Therefore, other staff officers and commanders served as aides and couriers including Lieutenant W.L. Porter, Lieutenant Burroughs, Captain Hill of the 5th Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel Ducat, and Colonel J.P. Sanderson.

Although Rosecrans used the inspector general as a messenger during the 18th and 20th of September, Ducat still considered himself separate from the commander's personal staff. He seldom worked with the other staff officers and had to coax or encourage them to comply with his recommendations, especially during the withdrawal to Rossville. His only assistant was Captain A.S. Burt,
acting assistant inspector general. His inspector of artillery, Captain W. Neil Dennison, had departed on 17 September to command an artillery battery in the Army of the Potomac. Therefore, Ducat had lost his inspector of cavalry and inspector of artillery prior to the battle. This should have increased his workload, but after a short inspection he positioned himself with the commander.

Rosecrans ordered Ducat, his inspector general, to push the troops arriving at Crawfish Springs forward. Ducat was actually responsible for the random sequencing of brigades into the battle on the 18th of September. McCook, after reaching Crawfish Springs, did not use the services of the inspector general. Therefore, Ducat returned to army headquarters at Widow Glenn's House.

Ducat portrayed himself in his after action report as performing above and beyond the call of duty. However, other staff officer reports mention little of Ducat's presence on and off the battlefield. Furthermore, had Ducat continued to inspect pickets and grand guards on the 20th of September, rather than serve as another aide-de-camp, the dispositions of the right flank would not have led to such confusion, and Rosecrans would have known the strength of the enemy across from this flank.

The final and most significant staff officer in this campaign was the chief of staff, General Garfield. He was responsible for the administrative organization of the assistant adjutant general, the fateful message from the
senior aide-de-camp, and the tragic decision by the army commander. Garfield was largely responsible for the improper message that tasked General Wood to vacate his final position on 20 September. Normally at this phase of the battle, according to Theodore Smith, Garfield wrote all the orders. He was in close proximity to address any immediate problems with the alignment of forces on the battle line and to ensure Bond sent a clear and easily understood message. Garfield was responsible for the unit locations and the efficient functioning of the staff. He knew that Brannan was not out of line when he clarified the intent of the message to Starling. Also, Garfield wrote clear and explicit messages. He usually gave commanders an explanation for the order, especially if it was controversial. If Garfield had written the message, the commander would not have had to deduce the fallacy in the order. Garfield should have rewritten the message rather than have released it. Nevertheless, this situation would not be his last mistake.37

The decision for Rosecrans traveling to Chattanooga and Garfield returning to the battlefield was another tactical error. Since Garfield was the coordinator for the staff and responsible for organizing the resupply efforts, he should have traveled to Chattanooga. Rosecrans, responsible for the decision to withdraw Thomas, should have returned to the battlefield and assumed command. As a result of this decision, Rosecrans only delegated
himself to be a staff officer to supply Rossville, and Garfield simply observed the actions of Thomas. Because this decision ruined the army commander's career, the reasons that compelled Garfield to return to the battle did not justify his later claims of heroism and glory.

Other staff agencies, although considered by many as insignificant to the battle, played important roles in Rosecrans' decision to remain off the battlefield. The provost marshal reported exaggerated numbers of the enemy that convinced the general to call back the remaining units from the battle. The engineers had prepared the fortifications along the river and built the pontoon bridge at Chattanooga. If the engineers had informed the commander that they had completed the bridge and fortifications then why did Rosecrans return to Chattanooga? These assets and information, if used properly, could probably have changed the outcome of the battle.

The Battle of Chickamauga challenged every department on Rosecrans' staff. Administratively, the adjutant general section came under close scrutiny. The rapid pace, coupled with the critical decisions, compelled these staff officers to make decisions and write critical orders based on inaccurate and insufficient information. Logistically, the battle tested the preparation of the support departments on the army staff. Although units reported numerous instances of inadequacies in supplies.
the army staff had sufficient rations, forage, ammunition
and equipment available to defeat the Confederates.
However, Rosecrans left the battle to ensure that
logistical and administrative functions were accomplished
in Chattanooga rather than direct his primary staff
officer, his chief of staff, to complete these duties.
CHAPTER 5

END NOTES


"O.R., XXX, Pt. 1, p. 57.


"O.R., XXX, Pt. 1, p. 58.


120.O.R., XXX, Pt. 1, p. 81.


Major F.S. Bond to Colonel S. Simmons, 14 September 1863, Telegram; O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, pp. 715, 729.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Staff members should be assigned in a manner that ensures that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force.¹

The Battle of Chickamauga became the bloodiest two day battle in the history of the Civil War. The losses to both sides were considerable, yet fairly equal: approximately 18,000 Confederate casualties compared to a reported 18,351 Union casualties. These high casualties represent mistakes of the commanders. This chapter discusses the Army of the Cumberland staff's effect on the overall campaign, followed by the development of proposed solutions to reduce future problems. The significance of Rosecrans' staff for the operation, the commander, and the command and control process offers several valuable lessons. Learning these lessons may preclude such severe casualties in the future.²

Although the Confederates were victorious on the Chickamauga battlefield, the Union army's original objective, Chattanooga, was still secure, but now endangered. Directing Garfield to locate Thomas, Rosecrans went to Chattanooga to "ensure the security of the river crossing sites and organize ammunition trains." Elements from the routed right wing formed the initial forces for the defense of Rossville and to cover the
withdrawal of Thomas' forces. Because of the lack of ammunition, food, water, and the condition of the soldiers, Thomas directed his remaining units on the battlefield to conduct a hasty but orderly withdrawal to Rossville at about 1630 hours. Except for three regiments that were captured, all organized remnants of the Army of the Cumberland had departed the battlefield by 1830 hours, and the Confederates began to celebrate. The Union was able to disengage without losing significant combat power. However, the Federals left considerable amounts of equipment on the battlefield for the Confederates to conduct a massive resupply program.

Upon the army's consolidation at Rossville, Thomas determined the defensive positions untenable. Rosecrans ordered the units at Rossville to move back and occupy positions for the defense of Chattanooga. The army remained in these positions until it attacked on 23-25 November 1863 during the Battle of Chattanooga. Rosecrans' staff reoriented their efforts to prepare for Chattanooga's defense.

With the army reformed at Chattanooga, the staff focused on repairing, reconstituting, and reorganizing. The signal officer, Captain Jesse Merrill, acquired rockets necessary for immediate notification of enemy attack, and distributed them along the front lines. The engineers began "staking out" the interior lines for the construction of rifle pits. The medical director

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continued to send casualties to Stevenson by the pontoon bridges north of Chattanooga. The ordnance officer ordered up ammunition, which had to travel under a strong escort from Bridgeport. While acquiring pioneer tools (axes, shovels, and picks) for the corps to construct rifle pits, the quartermaster requested additional horses and controlled the movement of supplies. The staff could have avoided this massive endeavor if support activities had occurred continuously throughout the campaign, not just as a reaction to a catastrophic defeat.

Therefore, the question remains, did Rosecrans' staff affect the results of the Chickamauga Campaign? The Army of the Cumberland staff both directly and indirectly affected the outcome of the Chickamauga campaign. The improper and poorly written message by Rosecrans' aides at a most critical period, coupled with the involvement of the chief of staff in Rosecrans' decision to return to Chattanooga after the Confederate penetration, were contributing factors to the Union defeat at the Chickamauga battle. The lack of intelligence and a planning function on the staff and the failure to relieve the administrative burden from the commanding general, detracted from Rosecrans ability to effectively manage his army and allowed the Confederate troops to shape the battle.

The responsibility and eventual blame for the failures of the Union army at Chickamauga were directly due to
General Rosecrans’ inability to make clear and sound decisions. Rosecrans had several chances to regain control of the army, but he directed Thomas to break off the engagement and save the army for the next battle, without seeing the situation on Snodgrass Hill himself. Rosecrans intensively managed his army, which began to affect his health. He was extremely tired from little rest and constant worry for adequate support to his widely spread army. Additionally, his information from commanders and staff that should have assisted his development of decisions was confusing and unreliable.

When analyzed by personal, coordinating, and special staff groups, it can be shown that Rosecrans’ staff also affected the Union defeat at Chickamauga. Rosecrans’ personal staff affected the battle both favorably and unfavorably. The aides-de-camp served Rosecrans admirably and were able to meet his every expectation. However, the headquarters had three agencies writing messages, the adjutant general, the aides-de-camp, and the chief of staff. How can this organization keep continuity of information and synchronization of activity with different authors synthesizing bits of intelligence and providing partial guidance to the subordinate commanders?

Although the coordinating staff departments did not produce any critical failures, they continuously distracted Rosecrans from his primary focus or objective, the capture of Chattanooga. The staff’s inefficiency and
inability to thoroughly comply with guidance produced distracting doubt in the commander. This lack of confidence in his coordinating staff compelled Rosecrans to depart the battlefield for Chattanooga in order to ensure the completion of necessary tasks.

The special staff, similar to the personal staff, both surprised and disappointed General Rosecrans. The failure of the engineers and artillery to follow instructions or comply in the overall commander's intent added to the commander's confusion and frustration. These staff elements had essential roles in developing the flow of the battle and their poor performance increased the probability of misfortune for the Army of the Cumberland during the campaign. Although Rosecrans inefficiently used his communication capabilities, the telegraph and signal departments performed extremely well. The information that the agencies were responsible to send was prompt and accurate. The operations of the telegraph and signal departments provided numerous advantages to the commander, such as the rapid reporting of troop locations and enemy activity.

As discussed earlier in the introductory chapter, an effective staff is a staff that informs, anticipates, coordinates, and executes. The remainder of this conclusion will analyze this criteria against the staffs' performance during the four phases of the campaign: the preparation, the river crossing, the turning movement, and
the battle.

The ability of the staff to inform requires having the basic knowledge or information to provide. The staff did not do well in this area because Rosecrans had such strong personal control over the duties of his staff. He knew more information than his staff. The army commander had ridden the lines and knew the exact locations of the troops. The subordinate commanders complained directly to Rosecrans if there was poor support. Therefore, Rosecrans knew of shortage problems before his staff. The lack of staff supervision became evident on numerous occasions, especially during the preparation phase. The staff also did not voluntarily report shortages of supplies at Tracy City or the delay in sending pontoons to Stevenson.

The staff officers' lack of knowledge of their areas of responsibility developed from their requirement to remain at army headquarters and respond to ideas from Rosecrans and problems of subordinate commanders. The staff reacted to situations rather than anticipated potential problems. Staff officers also did not inspect critical areas. Some staff officers that did not affix themselves to the staff headquarters "hid" in the administrative quagmire at depots, such as the subsistence officer and the quartermaster officer at Nashville. The resulting combination of having a commander that demanded perfection and a staff that only reacted to directions produced a one-way communication flow which severely degraded
effective staff operations.

The channeled communication flow was not the fault of the staff entirely. Rosecrans selected his staff officers, not on their ability to perform their missions, but on their ability to follow instructions. He wanted youth in his officers at the risk of experience. Rosecrans heavily involved himself in the duties of the various staffs and fired several staff members for poor performance or for incompatibility with Rosecrans' methods. The staff knew their fate was sealed if they failed to agree with or accomplish the army commander's plans.

Very few staff sections anticipated the next move in the campaign. Almost all the agencies, except the medical department, reacted to the commander's orders instead of planning and preparing for follow-on operations. Rosecrans' requirement for the staff's presence at headquarters caused the staff to correct problems, not prevent them. They seldom provided advice to the commander or developed contingency plans. The army commander normally required the staff's physical presence when he had problems or anticipated difficulties. The staff was seldom present while Rosecrans planned, except for the chief of staff. The staff officers avoided the commander during the early planning phase, hindering initial preparations required to sustain the army.

On at least two occasions the staff did not adequately
anticipate the army's requirements. First, upon consolidation after the Tullahoma Campaign, the immediate replenishment of supplies direct to units outweighed the necessity of forward basing subsistence, forage, pontoons, and ammunition for long term support. Although forage and ammunition did not become a problem, the failure of the staff to supervise movement of supplies and pontoons demonstrated the inconsistent sense of responsibility in several staff members. The engineers were extremely slow in sending the pontoons to the river. The subsistence officer did not know of the empty depots at McMinnville and Tracy City during the movement to the Tennessee River.

The second occasion was the failure of the staff to prepare Chattanooga to function as a depot. The army completed the crossing of the Tennessee River on 5 September. By 3 September, Rosecrans had announced his intent to draw Bragg's forces out of Chattanooga and push them toward Atlanta. The staff should have made plans to sustain the Union army from Chattanooga once Bragg vacated the city on 8 September 1863. Almost a week after Bragg's army left Chattanooga, and only after Rosecrans ordered the build-up of supplies did the depots at Stevenson and Bridgeport begin shipping rations to Chattanooga. Later, the staff did not anticipate or plan for the expeditious resupply of the army from Chattanooga during the final phase of the campaign.

The only staff agency which, on repeated occasions,
organized and prepared for impending combat was the medical department. Perin exhibited his preparation for casualties by sequencing the movement of hospitals forward to include establishing medical support in Chattanooga. This provided constant medical facilities for unexpected engagements. He instituted the construction of hospital railroad cars to evacuate the increased flow of casualties to Nashville and other Northern hospitals. Even though the medical support did not handle the enormous numbers of casualties that the Union army received, the medical department, unlike the other support agencies, had at least prepared and quickly addressed the problems.

The Chickamauga Campaign required immense coordination to accomplish the myriad of functions. The campaign encompassed long lines of communications, widely separated corps, a river crossing, a turning movement, and culminated in a two day battle in thick vegetation. One of the fundamental understandings Garfield had of the chief of staff position was to coordinate the staff functions. Garfield and the staff had many coordination problems in the first phase of the operation. Rossercans reacted by shifting some responsibilities from the quartermaster to newly-created agencies to handle some problems. He formed the railroad superintendent’s position to resolve the difficulties in rail transportation. The Pioneer Brigade constructed the roads and bridges to allow the quartermaster to concentrate on
resupplying the army by wagon trains. The addition of special staff officers and agencies removed the burden of synchronizing these activities from the quartermaster and placed the responsibility for coordination under the commander and the chief of staff. Garfield would spend the remainder of his tour as chief of staff attempting to relieve Rosecrans of this coordination responsibility.

The long lines of communication caused numerous logistical problems that required a synchronized staff to resolve. During the first phase of the campaign, the slow movement of pontoons demonstrated the lack of staff coordination and cooperation. The quartermaster was, by regulations, responsible for rail and ground transportation and the movement of bridging assets, but was unable to efficiently manage the rail, wagon, and bridging requirements in a timely manner. One of the reasons Rosecrans formed the engineers was to perform bridge building missions. He also established a railroad superintendent to assist the quartermaster. As a result of the staff's inability to coordinate or supervise the loading, movement, and unloading of pontoons, Rosecrans made the railroad superintendent responsible for any delays in rail movement. Additionally, the staff did not request, send, or inspect the supplies shipped to remote depots in support of the corps' movement to the Tennessee River. The lack of staff coordination in critical areas caused Rosecrans to place personal emphasis in the areas
of rail movement, subsistence, forage, and bridge building.

The final and most evident coordination problem was the consistent failure of Rosecrans' staff to execute assigned missions. Initially, the emphasis of the army commander during the movement phase was to support the corps with rations, forage, and equipment. Although the subordinate commanders accomplished the overall mission of reaching the Tennessee River, Rosecrans had to become personally involved because of the inefficient performance of his staff to support the army's movement. The staff's assistance to the corps in river crossing operations was almost nonexistent. The pontoons for the bridges were late arriving at the units and the troops, rather than the Pioneer Brigade, constructed the majority of the boats and bridges.

Also, because the corps performed their own logistic operations, the army staff could have concentrated on the command and control of subordinate units, including writing orders and positioning units. However, problems existed in this area also. Thomas' corps delayed consolidation at Crawfish Springs because he never received the orders. Additionally, Rosecrans did not publish further orders on 17 September because his staff "lost track" of unit movements. The assistant adjutant general failed to publish orders repositioning Crittenden's units when Thomas' troops arrived to replace
them. The relief of the corps on 17 September was poorly executed because of the improper staff work.

Inefficiency and confusion plagued the headquarters during the actual battle. The critical Union mistake was Rosecrans' aide-de-camp writing the movement order to General Wood on 20 September. This ambiguous message demonstrated the poor ability of the staff to monitor the battle and properly analyze and execute the commander's intent. The staff officer that could have resolved this lack of coordination and staff supervision was the chief of staff. Garfield's position necessitated that he not only perform as "chief clerk", but also supervise the staff and provide quick and accurate information to the commander. Garfield was cognizant and even acknowledged his responsibility of these duties. However, he often demonstrated a lack of supervision of the staff. Comparatively, Rosecrans knew more about the logistics requirements to run an army than Garfield. Rosecrans intimidated Garfield into performing as a chief clerk. During the movement phase, Rosecrans intensively managed his logistical staff officers. Only when the army commander lost his temper and threatened to relieve his staff did Garfield organize them to resolve problems and prevent their duplication. Finally, by the end of the campaign, Garfield and the staff knew that they had to cooperate in order to remain on this staff.

The chief of staff did not adequately relieve the
commander of administrative burdens. This mission was extremely difficult for Garfield because Rosecrans closely supervised the quartermaster, subsistence, railroad and pioneer sections. Garfield could not convince Rosecrans to allow the chief of staff to manage the staff so that the commander could focus on the campaign. Garfield's difficulty in controlling the staff was a direct product of Rosecrans's large span of control. As specific problems required concentrated attention, Rosecrans created additional special staffs. These staffs reported directly to the army commander rather than to the original staff agency responsible for the specific function. The total number of staff sections that reported to Rosecrans increased dramatically and exceeded his span of control. The end result was a loss of effectiveness which the chief of staff could have circumvented by reorganizing the staff and becoming more assertive.

As the campaign progressed, Garfield appeared to gradually reestablish supervisory authority over the staff. However, with his abrupt exit from the battlefield, Rosecrans' fateful decision to return to Chattanooga confirmed the doubt he had for his staff's reliability. Rosecrans rode to Chattanooga to coordinate activities that were the responsibility of the chief of staff. Garfield returned to the battlelines to sit under a tree. Had Rosecrans returned to the battle, the outcome would probably have changed. During the battle of Rich
Mountain, Iuka, and Stones River, Rosecrans had demonstrated an inclination to remain on the battlefield after a costly engagement. In every instance that Rosecrans remained, the enemy pulled off the battlefield leaving Rosecrans to claim a tactical victory by holding the field. His presence on Snodgrass Hill would have convinced him to strengthen his defenses and Bragg possibly would have withdrawn. Regardless, Garfield's military career ended with "personal credit and distinction." Even though Garfield's administrative and leadership skills improved during the campaign, he had learned at Rosecrans' expense.

In summary, Rosecrans was solely responsible and partially to blame for the loss at the Battle of Chickamauga. He personally selected the courses of actions, developed the plans for the campaign, analyzed the intelligence, issued the fateful order to move General Wood, and decided to return to Chattanooga. Rosecrans also selected, trained, and poorly utilized his staff officers. The adverse environment within the staff was the responsibility of Rosecrans. However, the inability of his chief of staff to remove the administrative burden from the commander, coupled with the numerous distractions created by the inefficient staff significantly and directly contributed to Rosecrans' loss at Chickamauga.

Chickamauga provides future commanders a myriad of lessons to learn and mistakes to avoid, especially in the
command and control process. Commanders, like Rosecrans, exist today and staff officers must learn to adjust to different styles of leadership and management. The staff can begin by: being at the headquarters when the commander develops the critical decisions; feeding the commander essential information in a timely manner, even if he is reluctant to listen; being innovative to gain the commander's attention to important issues; support the commander, especially in the area of loyalty; and finally, asking questions to anticipate and plan for impending operations.

Commanders must be thoughtful and provide the staff lead time to prepare for operations. Otherwise, the chief of staff should advise the commander to conduct staff meetings or to relay the information to the staff through him. Commanders must be open minded and never too self-confident. The learning environment is essential to an effective and efficient staff. If a commander establishes an atmosphere that allows him to "micro-manage" the functions of the staff, then the commander will not foster initiative or efficiency. The result of over-control is the isolation of the commander, loss of staff feedback and productive information, and degradation in the freedom of movement of the commander.

The army must improve programs to train, test, and evaluate the performance of staffs to correct problems prior to actual conflict. "As the budget dictates
procurement and the direction of the army, the army needs to concentrate on Command and control in the AirLand Battle." For twenty years this nation has remained free from a military conflict and the assessment of the current command and control process, including the operation and coordination of the staff to effectively function in the next war, is almost pure speculation. Because the capability to rapidly deploy a unit to any location on the face of the earth is available, the army must increase the emphasis for realistic simulators to train a commander and his staff to function in any scenario and against any enemy. Additionally, commanders should dedicate critical training time to conduct exercises such as Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs), Command Post Exercises (CPXs) and programs to include the Battle Command Training Program which serve as the army's primary training devices in the development of an effective staff."

Even though commanders of the past and present make the final decision for the execution of plans and operations, they are limited by the information provided by the staffs. If the staff does not provide information, or the commander does not listen, the results will be the same as Chickamauga. The staff must properly inform, cooperate, analyze and execute in order to function effectively for a commander in any period of history. If it fails to execute these tasks, the results may be as severe as those befalling the Army of the Cumberland in the Chickamauga
campaign.

In the age of AirLand Battle, the requirement for a coordinated staff that can inform, anticipate, and execute is as necessary today as it was at Chickamauga. As commanders display bold and audacious maneuvers on tomorrow's battlefield, the greater the need will be for effective staff officers meeting this same criteria. The strength of this link in the command and control process will make a difference. Just as at Chickamauga, the ability and knowledge of a single staff officer could affect tomorrow's future battle. However, commanders are responsible for training their staff officers.
CHAPTER 6

END NOTES


²O.R., XXX, Pt. 1, pp. 62, 64; Losses for the Union during the battle were as follows: 2,250,000 rounds of musket, 7,325 rounds of cannon, 36 artillery pieces, and 8,450 rifles.

³O.R., XXX, Pt. 1, pp. 80-81.


⁵O.R., XXX, Pt. 3, pp. 867-868, 702.

⁶Smith, Life of Garfield, 360.

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND
Major General William S. Rosecrans

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS
Major General George H. Thomas

FIRST DIVISION
Brigadier General Absalom Baird

SECOND DIVISION
Major General James S. Negley

THIRD DIVISION
Brigadier General John M. Brannan

FOURTH DIVISION
Major General Joseph J. Reynolds

TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS
Major General Alexander McD. McCook

FIRST DIVISION
Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis

SECOND DIVISION
Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson

THIRD DIVISION
Major General Philip H. Sheridan

TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS
Major General Thomas Crittenden

FIRST DIVISION
Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood

SECOND DIVISION
Major General John M. Palmer

THIRD DIVISION
Brigadier General Horatio P. Van Cleve
RESERVE CORPS
Major General Gordon Granger

FIRST DIVISION
Brigadier General James B. Steedman

SECOND DIVISION
Brigadier General James D. Morgan

THIRD DIVISION
Brigadier General Robert S. Granger

CAVALRY CORPS
Major General David S. Stanley
Brigadier General Robert B. Mitchell

FIRST DIVISION
Colonel Edward M. McCook

SECOND DIVISION
Brigadier General George Crook

PIONEER BRIGADE
Captain Patrick O'Connell

# General William S. Rosecrans' Staff

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COMMISSARY OF SUBSISTENCE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SAMUEL SIMMONS
CAPTAIN BRIDGES ELK RIVER
LIEUTENANT WARREN STEVENSON
CAPTAIN CRAIG STEVENSON
MAJOR H.C. SYMONDS LOUISVILLE
CAPTAIN S.J. LITTLE NASHVILLE

QUARTERMASTER

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL HENRY C. HODGES

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CAPTAIN PERKINS NASHVILLE
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CAPTAIN C.H. IRWIN (ACTING) NASHVILLE
CAPTAIN W.H. JOHNSON CHATTANOOGA

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CAPTAIN W. MILLS NASHVILLE

RAILROAD CARS
CAPTAIN STEWART NASHVILLE

RIVER TRANS., FORAGE, FUEL
CAPTAIN S.D. STUBBS NASHVILLE
CAPTAIN F.S. WINSLOW NASHVILLE [REPLACED 2 SEP 33]
LIEUTENANT PELHAM TULLAHOMA

COMMISSARY OF MUSTERS

CAPTAIN J.H. YOUNG TULLAHOMA
LIEUTENANT G. K. SANDERSON STEVENSON

SUPERINTENDENT OF RAILROAD

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COL W.P. INNES [CDR 1ST MI ENGINEERS & MECHANICS]
CHIEF OF ORDNANCE
CAPTAIN E.F. TOWNSEND NASHVILLE
CAPTAIN HORACE PORTER
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SURGEON H.H. SEYS
ASSISTANT SURGEON D. BACHE
SURGEON A.H. THURSTON NASHVILLE
SURGEON FRANCIS SALTER CHATTANOOGA
ASSISTANT SURGEON C.C. Byrne CHATTANOOGA
SURGEON PETER CLEARY CHATTANOOGA
SURGEON ISREAL MOSES CHATTANOOGA

CHIEF OF ARTILLERY
COLONEL JAMES BARNETT

CHIEF OF ENGINEERS
BRIGADIER GENERAL J. SAINT CLAIR MORTON [REPLACED 22 AUG]
[RETURNED 1 SEP]
CAPTAIN WILLIAM E. MERRILL TOPOGRAPHICAL
CAPTAIN P. O'CONNELL PIONEER BRIGADE
CAPTAIN W.C. MARGEDANT TOPOGRAPHICAL
LIEUTENANT GEORGE BURROUGHS

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CHIEF OF SIGNAL
CAPTAIN JESSE MERRILL

SUPERINTENDENT OF TELEGRAPH
CAPTAIN J.C. VAN DUZER

MAIL AND POLICE
COLONEL TRUESDAIL

SECRET POLICE
CAPTAIN SWAIM (AAG FOR GARFIELD)

CHIEF OF COURIER LINES
LIEUTENANT M. J. KELLY
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   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 66027

5. LTC Daniel W. Bagby III
   Center for Army Tactics
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 66027

6. Mr. Robert D. Richardson Sr.
   22613A Nadine Circle
   Torrance, California, 90506

7. Mr. John W. Sanders
   Box 121 Baylors Lake
   Fleetville, Pennsylvania, 18420