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AUTHORITY

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ALEXANDER P. STEWART AND THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF HIS
DIVISION AT THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

LUKE J. BARNETT III, MAJ. USA
B.A., Wheeling College, 1975

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1989

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Major Luke J. Barnett III

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19. ABSTRACT (Continued)

This thesis is an historical analysis of Stewart's Division during the Battle of Chickamauga, 19-20 September 1863. It determines what tactical formations Stewart and his brigades employed, how this affected casualty totals and their significance to the outcome of the engagements in Stewart's sector.

This thesis concludes that Stewart's tactical formations contributed to his success on the nineteenth. Stewart's failure on the twentieth was more the responsibility of a higher echelon commander. In the final analysis Stewart's leadership abilities were more a contributor to the success of the division than the tactics that he employed.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

ALEXANDER P. STEWART AND THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF HIS DIVISION AT THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA: An analysis of the tactical formations employed by Stewart's Division during the Battle of Chickamauga, 19-20 September 1863.

This thesis is a historical analysis of Stewart's Division during the Battle of Chickamauga. It determines what tactical formations Stewart and his brigades employed, how this affected casualty totals and their significance to the outcome of the engagements in Stewart's sector.

This thesis includes a brief description of the evolution of Civil War tactics with a primary focus on infantry offensive doctrine. This is followed by a brief overview of the Chickamauga Campaign and Battle, and a description of Stewart and his unit. Thereafter, the focus will be on Stewart's actions from the crossing of Thedford's Ford on 18 September 1863, to the closing shots of the battle on the evening of the Twentieth. This will include the initial action at the ford site on the eighteenth and Stewart's numerous attacks on the afternoon of the nineteenth. Also included is his attack on the morning of the twentieth and his final attack later that evening. Conclusions will summarize the significance of Stewart's tactics and insights applicable to current doctrine.

The results of this thesis conclude that Stewart and his brigade commanders did not deviate from the published doctrine of the time. Except for a minor modification in timing, Stewart's attacks complied with the manuals. The decision to attack on the nineteenth, with a column of brigades, was more a result of limited frontage and restrictive terrain than a deliberate desire to add depth to his attack. However, this formation proved very effective and contributed to Stewart's success that day. Stewart's morning assault on the twentieth failed due to the collapse of an adjacent unit coupled with the fact that he was frontally assaulting prepared defenses with his flank exposed.

This thesis concludes that Stewart's tactical formations contributed to his success on the nineteenth. Stewart's failure on the twentieth was more the responsibility of a higher echelon commander. In the final analysis Stewart's leadership abilities were more a contributor to the success of the division than the tactics that he employed.
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INTRODUCTION

The Battle of Chickamauga does not receive the recognition in military writing that a battle of this scope, scale and consequence deserves. It has been overshadowed by the more popular campaigns and battles of the Eastern Theater of the American Civil War. The leaders in this battle also have not had their fair share of attention or critical analysis. The great distances this campaign covered and the many obstacles crossed coupled with the tremendous logistics burdens provide today's professional officer a useful case study of the art of war. The very nature of this battle, conducted in dense woods, provides useful insights into the problems of battlefield command and control. In fact, a study of this campaign and battle provides useful insights at every level of war from strategic through operational and tactical.

Numerous historians have postulated that the tactical doctrine used in the American Civil War was an inadequate response to the technological progress made in weapons by 1861. It has further been argued that most Civil War commanders did not alter their tactical formations and methods during the war and continued to waste lives in useless frontal assaults. A recent book ascribes
Confederate defeat in large measure to exactly this cause-the propensity to attack and attack frontally.2

It is the intent of this thesis to focus on Major General Alexander P. Stewart CSA and the tactical employment of his division at the Battle of Chickamauga; 19-20 September 1863. Stewart and his division were chosen for their distinguished fighting reputation within the Army of Tennessee and unique tactical formations used on the nineteenth of September the second day of the battle. In order to accomplish this goal the following questions must be answered. What was Civil War offensive tactical doctrine? What tactical formations did Stewart's Division employ during the battle? Did Stewart or his brigade commanders make modifications to the published doctrine based on their combat experience prior to the battle? If no changes were made—why not? What effect did these formations have on the outcome of the engagements in Stewart's sector and casualty totals? And finally, are any conclusions relevant to today's army?

For clarity a brief definition of terms are necessary. FM 100-5 defines doctrine as:

... the condensed expression of its [an army's] approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. Tactics, techniques, procedures, organizations, support structure, equipment and training must all derive from it.

The FM further defines military strategy as: "... the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation or
alliance to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force." FM 100-5 defines operational art as:

"... the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or a theater of operation through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations.

The FM defines tactics as: ". . . the art by which corps and smaller unit commanders translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements."³

In the world of the nineteenth century American fighting man, these terms were limited and best defined in the opening pages of Scott's INFANTRY TACTICS:

I call Strategy, the hostile movements of two armies, made beyond the view of each other; or — if he preferred — beyond the effect of cannon. Tactics, I call, the science of movements which are made in presence of the enemy; that is within reach of his artillery.⁴

Tactics were further subdivided into grand tactics and minor tactics. A Civil War division commander operated solely at the minor tactics level. Corps and army commanders operated at what they called grand tactics and minor strategy while the president, war department, and department chiefs concerned themselves with grand strategy.

Chapter one of this thesis will describe the evolution of Civil War infantry offensive tactics. Chapter two will provide a brief overview of the Chickamauga Campaign and Battle. Chapter three will cover Stewart—the man and his unit. Chapters four and five will be a
chronology of the actions of Stewart's Division during the battle. Chapter six will present conclusions and insights gained from this study.
INTRODUCTION

NOTES


CHAPTER 1

THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL WAR INFANTRY TACTICS

To analyze Alexander P. Stewart's tactical employment of his division, it is necessary to first understand Civil War tactics and a little about their origins. This chapter will provide a brief overview of the evolution of Civil War tactics up to the time of the Battle of Chickamauga. The primary focus will be on infantry tactics, although artillery and cavalry tactics will be mentioned briefly. The reason for this focus is that the composition of Stewart's Division was primarily infantry with some artillery and no cavalry except for one escort company. This chapter will describe the tactics of the Mexican-American War and the tactical theory and doctrine between the Mexican-American War and the Civil War. It will also describe the tactics during the Civil War up to the time of the Battle of Chickamauga.

"The Mexican War was the only major American War fought during the generation before 1861."¹ This war had a pronounced influence on the leadership of the American Civil War. Many Civil War generals served as company grade officers in the Mexican-American War and gained valuable
experience. Officers who fought side by side in Mexico would later find themselves on opposite sides during the Civil War. "Tactics are based on weaponry and the main infantry weapon of the Mexican War was the smoothbore musket, with either flintlock or percussion ignition system." The effective range of the musket was little more than one hundred yards at best. Rifles, although in use at the time, were not favored because of their slow rate of fire. Rifles, for the most part were viewed as a support to musketry.

The artillery weapons used by the United States in the Mexican-American War were among the best available in the world at that time. This was due to a concerted effort on the part of the U. S. government to modernize artillery several years prior to the war. In 1836 the antiquated equipment of the Revolution and War of 1812 began to be replaced, starting with the gun carriages. In 1840 a board of officers was sent to Europe to study the latest weapons development. The principal artillery weapons of the Mexican-American War were the six-pounder gun M1840 (range 1,523 yards), twelve-pounder howitzer M1840 (range 1,072 yards) and field gun M1840 (range 1,663 yards), and twenty-four pounder howitzer M1840 (range 1,322). The ammunition available for these guns were solid shot, shell, spherical case shot, canister and grape shot. The most
effective munition for close range was the canister round which had the effect of a giant shotgun on the battlefield. 

In summary, the available technology for the Mexican-American War had not changed significantly from the Napoleonic Wars except for some increased mobility of field guns. With the Napoleonic Wars the most recent on the world scene, it is no surprise to find their distinct influence on military tacticians.

The authorized tactical manual in use at the time of the Mexican War was General Winfield Scott's three volume *Infantry-Tactics*. It was based on French tactical theory and six editions were printed from 1835 to 1848. Scott's military ideas were heavily influenced by the wars of early nineteenth century Europe. Scott was not a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, but instead gained his military education from the study of European books. Infantry most often deployed in line, which emphasized fire power, or deployed in column formation which emphasized mass and shock effect. Infantry could also deploy in a combination of both line and column. A square formation was used by infantry to defend against a cavalry attack. Skirmish formation was used by small elements to support a larger formation.

Scott's three volumes covered tactical drill from the individual soldier through the division. Scott's first
volume covered the "School of the Soldier" and "School of the Company" and was primary a drill manual for the individual soldier through company level. His second volume covered the "School of the Battalion" which was an evolutionary step combining ten companies together. The third volume covered the "Evolution of the Line" and was for multiple battalions, brigade and division level organizations. Scott's third volume consisted mainly of complicated instructions on how to move several battalions from column formation to line and back again to column. Also included was how to orient the formation in a different direction and how to move the formation through an obstacle. "Winfield Scott's three volume work was the most extensive treatment of infantry tactics of any American contributor prior to the Civil War."  

Scott favored control and order over speed and elan. Scott knew the weaknesses of the musket and compensated by closely compacting his infantry to mass their firepower. According to Scott's manual, battalions (regiments) were to form in lines of either two or three ranks. The third rank was suspended by the War Department in 1835. This was probably done due to manpower shortfalls, with most companies not filled to their authorized strength. Ranks would be separated by thirteen inches with twenty-two paces between related units. (See fig. 1) Scott greatly stressed the necessity for elbows to touch within the formation. He
believed that this was the only way that alignment could be kept and gaps prevented. According to Scott's manual, men advanced at a "direct step" of twenty-eight inches; at a "common time" rate of ninety steps per minute, and a "quick time" rate of 110 steps per minute. In the final stages of a charge it could be accelerated to 140 steps per minute but this was considered out of the ordinary. According to Scott, loose order was only to be used by skirmishers.
Scott's manual also included instructions for skirmishers and how to use them in front and to the flanks of the regiment.

Scott's tactics were based on the fire power of the musket. A well trained infantryman could get about two to three shots off per minute. An attacking formation advancing at "quick time" was in the kill zone (effective range) of the defender for about one minute. This subjected his units to at most three volleys of enemy fire before he could close with the bayonet.

Instruction for Field Artillery, Horse and Foot, published in 1845, was the authorized artillery drill manual for the Mexican War. This was primarily a drill manual and not a manual for tactical employment. The artillerymen of the Mexican War developed their tactical employment techniques from field experience. However, the manual was an excellent drill manual and was based on a translated French manual. A three volume translation of French tactics, Cavalry Tactics, was authorized by the War Department in 1841. This manual called for a close order line with a two rank formation. "A ten squadron regiment would form in two ranks of five squadrons each, with only a twelve pace interval between squadrons." This concludes a look at the tactical doctrine.

Mexican-American War tactics were an outgrowth of early nineteenth century warfare. Infantry fought in lines.
advanced on enemy defenses in close order, used massed musket fire and closed with the bayonet. Artillery proved to be very effective in both the offense and defense. Once a weakness was found in the enemy formations, cavalry was employed with a saber charge. The bayonet charge was found to be effective even against defenders protected by field entrenchments. A Mexican strong point on the Churubusco River was taken by a bayonet charge at quick time.12

Some variations in tactics were employed. For example, at Resaca de la Palma, an open or loose order formation was used due to the restrictive nature of the terrain (dense chaparral). This tactic was found to lessen the effect of fire power and complicate command and control. Another example was Jefferson Davis' use of the "V" formation at Buena Vista. Davis' regiment of Mississippian had linked up with the 3d Indiana and formed a large V with the open end facing the Mexican cavalry. The Mexican cavalry rode up to within a hundred yards of the American line and halted well within range of the Mississippi rifles. When the Americans opened fire the Mexicans were devastated and forced to retreat into a ravine from which they later escaped. For the most part, these were exceptions to the rule and most commanders employed tactics as prescribed in Scott's manuals. Commanders found it was not necessary to always employ the square when coming under attack by Mexican
cavalry. On several occasions the line formation held against mounted attack.13

Artillery played a major role in the war. "The confidence American soldiers had in their artillery was not based on tactical theory but on the performance of the arm in the field."14 The limited range of the musket made artillery very effective on the offense. Artillery could move rapidly forward and devastate the close ordered ranks of a defender. It could do this safely out of effective musket range. When used in concert with attacking friendly infantry, it contributed greatly to their success. "Throughout the course of the war it proved itself the most efficient arm at determining the outcome of battles."15

Cavalry had many functions during the war. It was used to skirmish, cover the flanks of infantry, as couriers, performing reconnaissance and as reserves ready to conduct the pursuit. Cavalry was most often used dismounted in combat but there are several actions in which they conducted mounted saber charges. Mounted charges were used in the pursuit conducted at Churubusco and the engagement at Resaca de la Palma.16

In summary, the Mexican War validated the tactical doctrine of the time. It proved the superiority of the offense over the defense. These tactics even proved successful against fortified positions. Few tactical
innovations were made during the war because the standard
tactics proved efficient. Scott's tactics compensated for
the short-comings in the musket, with precise and close
ordered tactical formations. Americans returned home from
Mexico confident in their tactics, convinced of the
superiority of the offense, the futility of entrenchments,
and the proven worth of the bayonet.\textsuperscript{17}

The most significant advancement in military
technology, between the wars, was the adoption of the rifle
as a replacement for the musket. "For the first time in
American history the rifle superseded the smoothbore musket
and became the key weapon of the men who fought the
war."\textsuperscript{18} The problem of the slow rate of fire had been fixed
by the introduction of the "minie-ball". The
minie-ball was a cone shaped hollow based bullet that
allowed ease of loading and expanded into the rifling when
fired. It was the unique combination of percussion cap,
 rifling, and minie-ball that made for an extremely accurate,
reliable, and deadly weapon. It could be loaded with the
speed of a musket but had about three times the range.
Breechloading and repeating rifles were available but had
not been adopted. The most renowned of these was the seven
shot Spencer repeater, available in both carbine and rifle
models.\textsuperscript{19}

Rifled artillery pieces were introduced but did not
have the same effect as the introduction of the rifled-
musket. The rifled artillery pieces were more effective at long ranges but less effective at canister range because of the reduction in the size of the round. The smoothbore pieces continued to be the favored artillery piece with their deadly canister effect at short range.  

In summary, the introduction of the rifle was a significant advancement made in the technology of war. The capability of the rifle was not fully appreciated prior to the Civil War. However, the Civil War was to demonstrate the significance of this technological advancement with its casualty tolls. The next section will analyze if and how the military theoreticians kept pace with these new developments in technology.  

The preeminent tactical theoretician of the era was the Napoleonic historian Antoine Henri Jomini. It is not the purpose of this thesis to debate the extent of Jomini’s influence. It can simply be stated that he did have some influence on the major American theorists between wars. His 1838 book, *Summary of the Art of War*, favored offense over defense. He called the infantry the most important arm of the service. According to Jomini, there were five methods of forming troops to attack an enemy: "1. as skirmishers; 2, in deployed lines, either continuous or checkerwise; 3, in lines of battalions formed in column on the central divisions; 4, in deep masses; 5, in small squares." (See fig. 2)
The most important American military theorist, prior to the Civil War, was the West Point instructor Dennis Hart Mahan. Mahan also was an advocate of the tactical offense and his most important work was *The Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops, and the Manner of Posting and Handling Them in the Presence of an Enemy*. In this work, Mahan described his plan for an attack. An attack would be led by skirmishers who would clear the way and then fall back to the flanks or rear. The main body would advance in column and then deploy into line and assault. This method became part of Army Regulations in 1857. During this same period, field fortifications were
receiving attention in the literature of the day. Mahan's 1836 book, *A Complete Treatise on Field Fortifications*, proclaimed the need to improve positions with the use of field fortifications. Mahan would include this subject in his teachings at the Academy.\(^{22}\)

Another American who was influential was Henry W. Halleck. Halleck was influenced by both Mahan and Jomini in his work, *Elements of Military Art and Science*. Like the tacticians before him, Halleck emphasized the offense even when the enemy was defending from entrenched positions. According to Halleck, a defending commander should always look for opportunity to regain the offensive. Halleck, like Scott before him, was also concerned about control. In discussing the two line formation he warned that too loose order meant the lines could only advance slowly. If the lines move too quickly, the formation "breaks and exhibits great and dangerous undulations." Halleck also warned against commanders detaching too much of their force as skirmishers. Although well written, it is doubtful that many future Civil War commanders were familiar with Halleck's book. Halleck was aware of this fact and wrote:

> There are innumerable works in almost every language on elementary tactics; very few persons, however, care to read anything further than the [drill] manuals used in our own service.\(^{23}\)

In summary, the common theme of the military theories between the wars was the emphasis on the offense over the defense as the decisive form of warfare. The
musket and the bayonet were the main weapons of the infantry and close order formations were required. The use of loose order was minimized except for its limited traditional skirmish role. Finally, an entrenched enemy could be overcome by a spirited bayonet assault. 2

With the introduction of the rifle a new tactical manual was required. Scott’s three volume manual was republished in 1852, 1857, 1860 and 1861, but never revised. In 1855 the War Department endorsed Major William J. Hardee’s two volume manual, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics. Scott’s third volume would still be in effect for large formations. Hardee made significant changes to Scott’s system, the greatest being to increase the rate of advance. Hardee accomplished this by introducing the “double quick time” and the “run” as standard step rates. Hardee’s double quick time increased the step to thirty-three inches at 165 steps per minute. 25

The purpose behind Hardee’s increase in speed and step was to get the formation through the increased kill zone faster than the old tactics. The new kill zone, expanded by the rifle, was increased to five-hundred yards. This meant that the advancing formation was subject to ten volleys of accurate rifled fire. In the past they had had only three volleys of inaccurate musket fire with which to content with. Hardee also shortened the time it took for column to deploy into line formation. This would ease the
movement on the battlefield and eliminate the halts required in Scott's manual. Hardee's "little book" was in the hand of most commanders at the start of the war.26

Both sides entered the Civil War full of confidence with expectations of a quick victory. The telling effect of the rifle would quickly change that outlook. Casualty tolls reflected what advancing technology had done to war. "The tactical offensive proved to be a costly undertaking against defenders armed with accurate-firing rifled weapons.27

The basic offensive formation during the Civil War, like the Mexican-American War, was the two line formation. Distances between the lines were dependent on the circumstances of the battlefield. In theory, this allowed firepower to be extended on a broad front with the sustaining power of a second line close by. In practice, the first line was quickly reduced by rifle fire. This result caused commanders to shorten the distance between lines and even attack with successive lines. A company at full strength occupied a frontage of about twenty-seven yards in the line of battle formation. A regiment of ten companies would have a frontage of about three hundred yards and a brigade of four regiments had approximately a frontage of 1,300 yards. A division attacking in a column of brigades formation had a front nearly three-quarter of a mile long. The ranks could fire by volley or file but most often fired when the individual was ready.28
The attack with a succession of lines was the most typical assault formation used in the Civil War. The attack with successive lines increased depth and sustaining power. "The lines varied greatly in width and in the distance at which they followed one another." The distance between lines could vary from fifty to three-hundred yards, but the most common was 150 yards. The distance between soldiers and ranks had not changed from the Mexican-American War. However, the attack in successive lines greatly confused command and control and resulted in high casualty rates. This technique was used by the Confederates at the Battle of Shiloh and Murfreesboro, and by the Union forces at Antietam.

The attack in succession of rushes was a tactical innovation only briefly experimented with prior to the Battle of Chickamauga. This technique was used at the Battle of Fort Donelson on 15 February 1862. A brigade consisting of two regiments attacked in succession of two lines. Skirmishers were advanced in front of the brigade as the men lay down in line of battle. The two lines rushed forward and absorbed the skirmish line. When the enemy fire was effective the brigade again laid down and opened fire. When the enemy fire slackened the brigade again rose up and rushed forward. This technique was far in advance for its time.
The other tactic in use, although criticized by inter-war tactical theory, was the column formation. The intention of the column formation was to throw maximum force on a narrow front to gain penetration. The column formation's major advantage was penetrating power. The column formation's weakness was its lack of firepower. The column formation had some limited success prior to the Battle of Chickamauga but proved very costly. The use of successive lines was an attempt to benefit from the firepower advantage of the traditional line formation as well as adding depth and mass to gain some shock impact of the column formation. Both the line and column formation were unable to overcor\textsuperscript{e} the defensive firepower of the rifle.\textsuperscript{32}

The major decision for the Civil War commanders was whether to attack using a column or line. A division commander had several options based on the tactical situation and terrain. He could place his division in line of battle with all brigades in a single line. A corps could also place all its divisions in a single line. This technique was used by the Confederate forces at the Battle of Shiloh. A division could also be arrayed with its brigades in column. Or, a mixture of formations could be used. The division commander could array his first two brigades in two successive lines and the third brigade with its regiments in closed column of companies. Columns could
be closed or open depending on the spacing between units. The most common maneuver was the movement from a road in column of fours to a line formation in an open field facing the enemy. A technique often employed by brigade commanders was the assignment of one of the subordinate regiments as the "battalion of direction." This was a control measure used by the brigade commander to assist in the command and control of his unit. All regiments were to align and move based on the actions of the regiment assigned this mission.33

The differences between the Civil War and the Mexican-American War were many. Formations had to deploy at greater distances from the enemy because of the effects of the rifle. Also, the size of the skirmish formations used in advance of units increased throughout the Civil War. Another technique used in response to the rifle was lying down in line of battle. This helped to protect the line from some fire but complicated the already difficult process of loading. The drill for passage of lines required by the manuals was found in practice to be impossible. Civil War units found a simple method of passing one unit through another lying on the ground in line of battle. The technique used that was to characterize future war was the practice of erecting breastworks. As the war progressed the individual soldier, more so than his leader, began to appreciate terrain and the protection it could provide in
both the offense and defense. As a result of the rifle the bayonet lost its preeminent role in battle. Although its use was still proclaimed, in reality it reverted to simple utilitarian purposes rather than as an instrument of war. 34

Artillery, so highly regarded in the war with Mexico, was less effective in the Civil War. With the added range of the rifle, the artillery could no longer push forward in the offense. When artillery tried to advance as it had done in the Mexican War it soon found itself in trouble because of the capabilities of the new rifle. However, artillery in close range defense devastated the close ordered formations of the attacker. Artillery had thus been relegated primarily to the defense. With the North's mighty industrial base the Union artillery enjoyed a marked advantage over its counterpart throughout the war. 35

The cavalry arm was perhaps the arm most affected by the advance in technology. Cavalry was virtually driven to the fringes of the close combat battlefield. As a result cavalry became preoccupied with reconnaissance, security, raiding and economy of force roles. Cavalry would fight most often dismounted. By the time of the Battle of Chickamauga Confederate cavalry was no longer preeminent. Again the North's industrial and logistical base was coming into play. The North's remount capability along with the fact it was able to equip its cavalry with breachloaders and repeaters was having its effect. 36
Shortly after the start of the Civil War, it was quickly realized that Hardee's first and second volumes did not work in conjunction with Scott's third volume. The publication in 1862 of William Duffield's, *School of the Brigade*, provided commanders of brigade and higher organizations with a manual compatible with Hardee's. John Richardson's, *Infantry Tactics*, provided compatibility with Hardee for use by Confederate forces.\(^3\)\(^7\)

On the Northern side of the Civil War, there was dissatisfaction with the primary tactical manual having been written by a Southern general (Hardee). This problem was resolved by the publication of Silas Casy's three-volume manual, *Infantry Tactics*, in August 1862. This manual provided a Northern author and a complete work from individual to large unit organizations. Casy's manual simplified the procedure for moving from a column to a line formation and also extended the interval between brigades from Scott's twenty-two to 150 paces.\(^3\)\(^8\)

In conclusion, the war with Mexico, although a useful combat experience for the leadership of the Civil War, was misleading and provided a deceptive and dangerous model. The years between the Mexican War and the beginning of the Civil War demonstrated only minor modifications to tactical doctrine based on technological advances. Tactical theory reinforced the lessons of the Mexican War. In the Civil War, few changes were made to infantry offensive tactics.
In either published tactical doctrine or its application in the field. On the other hand, the defense became stronger through the increasing use of field entrenchments. Little modification was made to the tactical doctrine during the first years of the Civil War. The changes that were made were for consistency and for ideology rather than a reaction to battlefield conditions. The next chapter will show this premise to be true. The Civil War battlefield was a deadly place, with casualty rates far greater than in the Mexican War. The tactical offense was an extremely costly affair even when successful.
CHAPTER 1
NOTES


2 Jamieson, "Development of Tactics," 2.


*Scott's manual uses the title "battalion" for what latter would commonly be called a "regiment" in the Civil War. However, some "regular army" formations would continue to be called "battalions" during the war.


20 McWhiney, Attack and Die, 59-60.; Military Analysis, 263.; Griess, West Point, 22.; Catton, Short History, 149.

21 Jomini, Art of War 207, 292.; Griffith, Battle Tactics, 202-03.


26 McWhiney, Attack and Die, 50-51.; McWhiney, Bragg and Defeat, 1:233.; Griffith, Battle Tactics, 190.; Range and engagement calculations were made by the author based on assumed battlefield conditions of smoke and terrain not solely on the technical capabilities of the weapons themselves.

27 Jamieson, "Development of Tactics," 75.


30 Military Analysis, 260-61.; McWhiney, Attack and Die, 81-82.
Military Analysis, 260-61.


Griffith, Generalship and Tactics, 12-13.; McWhiney, Bragg and Defeat, 1:228-31.; McWhiney, Attack and Die, 82.


McWhiney, Attack and Die, 60, 125.; Military Analysis, 264.; Dillon, American Artillery, 55.; Griffith, Generalship and Tactics, 26-7.


CHAPTER 2

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE

Although historians may disagree on which Civil War battle was the most decisive, most would agree that the latter part of 1863 was the most critical time period, encompassing the battles of Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Chickamauga. Meade's victory over Lee at Gettysburg pushed the southern invader back, and destroyed the myth of Lee's invincibility. Grant's victory at Vicksburg brought the strategic goal of controlling the Mississippi River into reality. Rosecrans' virtually bloodless victory during the Tullahoma Campaign succeeded in hurling Bragg from Tennessee without a substantial fight. To the political leadership in Washington the stage was set for complete and decisive victory and an end to the war. It was thought that if Rosecrans could defeat Bragg decisively in battle the war could be ended by year's end.¹

To the Southern political leadership this was also a critical period. Lee's defeat, together with the loss of the Mississippi and Bragg's move out of Tennessee, brought depression throughout the South. To many the end was near at hand. To the Southern leaders only victory could reverse
their dilemma. A battlefield victory was necessary to distract attention away from recent setbacks. For this reason Jefferson Davis decided to shift forces from the Eastern Theater and reinforce Bragg's army. Two divisions from Longstreet's Corps of Lee's army were sent west by rail. Both commanders were being pressured for action. Because most actions along the other fronts had quieted, this campaign became the focal point of attention.²

Rosecrans proved to be a skillful practitioner of the operational level of war. The campaign objective for Rosecrans was Chattanooga, which was the gateway to the interior of Georgia and the heartland of the South. Chattanooga was the center of an expansive rail network and both sides realized its strategic importance. (See fig. 3) Similar to the Tulluhoma campaign, Rosecrans was able to feint in one direction, northeast of Chattanooga, while moving his main force southwest and crossing the Tennessee River below the city. This skillful maneuver caused Bragg to withdraw from Chattanooga or risk having his lines of support severed. Rosecrans, not satisfied with the accomplishment of his campaign goal, which was the occupation of Chattanooga, moved in pursuit of Bragg's army. Rosecrans was under the impression that the Confederate army was in headlong flight. By the first week of September Rosecrans' army was spread over a forty mile front.³
Bragg was, in fact, not retreating. He was consolidating twenty-five miles southeast of Chattanooga in the vicinity of LaFayette, Georgia. Bragg also was receiving reinforcements from east Tennessee, Mississippi and additional forces were enroute from Virginia by rail. Now with superiority in numbers and the wide dispersion of the Federal forces to his advantage, the initiative was in Bragg’s hands. Bragg attempted to trap one of Rosecrans’ corps at Dug Gap but failed in the attempt. Stewart’s Division, a part of Buckner’s Corps, was a participant in this potentially decisive action. (see fig. 4) Bragg’s poor relationship with his subordinates was a primary reason
for this failure. Bragg's attempt alerted Rosecrans to the fact that Bragg was not in retreat. Seeing his error, Rosecrans quickly attempted to concentrate his army before Bragg could act again. Bragg would wait five days before attacking, allowing Rosecrans to consolidate the majority of his forces.⁴

Figure 4. Dug Gap
(Reprinted, by permission, from, Tucker, Chickamauga, 63.)
With the failure at Dug Gap Bragg’s weak command structure had finally collapsed. Bragg had lost confidence in all three of his corps commanders: Polk, Buckner and Hill. The opportunity to again strike at the dispersed Federals was present but Bragg chose not to do so. By 13 September, three Confederate corps were located at Rock Springs Church. Within easy striking distance five miles across the Chickamauga Creek was a Federal corps. Ten miles away were more Federals in McLemore’s Cove and thirty miles away more were located at Alpine. However, Bragg chose to pull his forces back to LaFayette and the initiative was passed to Rosecrans. A paralysis seemed to overtake the Confederate forces between 13 and 16 September. Information on the location of Federal forces was extremely poor and confusing. The hunter became the hunted as Bragg recoiled in fear of Federal action and at the demise of his own command structure. Rosecrans took this opportunity to begin concentrating his forces.5

Bragg was slow to begin action again. On the fifteenth of September he held a council of war with his corps commanders. They agreed to a plan to outflank the Federals to the north and get between them and Chattanooga. Orders were finally issued on the sixteenth for a march to begin on the seventeenth. However, a few hours prior to the movement, Bragg countermanded the order. More time was given to the Federals to concentrate their forces. Bragg

34
worked throughout the night of the seventeenth revising his plan and shifting his crossing locations on the Chickamauga. Again, Bragg again revised his plan on the eighteenth of September. This hastily made plan was faulty in both enemy and friendly locations and the ensuing confusion took most of the day to unravel. It was late afternoon before the Confederates arrived at their crossing sites on Chickamauga Creek. The Federal forces were farther north than Bragg had anticipated. Both sides were to collide unexpectedly on the morning of the nineteenth of September.

In summary, during this campaign Rosecrans had quickly gained the initiative, deftly maneuvered his forces and gained his objective. His decision to move on in pursuit was, from the advantage of hindsight, incorrect. Bragg's failure to take advantage of Rosecrans' mistake cost him the opportunity of striking Rosecrans when he was most vulnerable.

Chickamauga was the largest battle of the Western Theater and the bloodiest two day battle of the war. The Battle of Chickamauga has been characterized as a soldiers fight. The courageous, skillful and desperate fighting of the individual soldiers can be contrasted against inept and criminal leadership. It was one of the most strongly contested battles of the war. The closely wooded terrain made it both a confusing and difficult battle to fight and control. The battle took place in mid-September and was
characterized by warm dry days with cool nights, with the night of 19 September being extremely cold.\(^8\)

The battlefield area (see fig. 5) is bisected by the north to south direction of the LaFayette Road. This road would eventually mark the trace of the Union line. Further to the east ran the Chickamauga Creek with several bridges and ford sites within the area. The most dominating or key
terrain in the area was the Horseshoe Ridge/Snodgrass Hill complex. The entire area was heavily wooded with few fields or open areas. Farther to the west is the large ridge-line of Missionary Ridge with several passes controlling access into the area. Artillery fields of fire were limited to the open fields and cleared high ground.

The battle was fought between General Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland 56,965 strong and General Bragg's Army of Tennessee approximately 66,000 strong (see appendix for order of battle). Just prior to and during the battle Bragg received reinforcements from the Army of Northern Virginia (portions of Longstreet's Corps). General Rosecrans was not aware of these reinforcements until after the battle had begun.

On the eighteenth of September both sides began their movements that would result in the Battle of Chickamauga. Bragg after allowing the Union forces four critical days to concentrate, moved his forces north and attempted to cross to the west side of Chickamauga Creek. Rosecrans attempted to delay Bragg at the crossing sites while concentrating his forces for the impending battle. Bragg's plan was to place his forces between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. This would cut Rosecrans' lines of communications and force a decisive battle or Federal withdrawal. On the other hand, Rosecrans realized that he was overextended and was desperately trying to prevent Bragg from accomplishing his goal. By the
evening of the eighteenth some of Bragg's forces were across the Chickamauga Creek (see fig. 6). Elements of Stewart's Division were a part of these forces.¹¹

Figure 6. Battle Map
(Reprinted, by permission, from Tucker, CWTI. 15)

The battle on the nineteenth was a classic meeting engagement. Each side was unclear as to enemy situation and locations. Both sides were on the move and the situation was fluid. During the morning Bragg attempted to execute his plan. The fighting began in the northern part of the battle field with the successive introduction of forces into the battle. General Thomas, Union XIV Corps commander, continued to reinforce the Union left. Initially fighting with Brannan's division, he then reinforced it with
Baird's and Johnson's divisions. On the Confederate side, Brannan's division had initially fought with Walker's Corps, which was later reinforced by Cheatham's Division around noon. (see fig. 7)

Figure 7. Battle Map
(Reprinted, by permission, from Tucker. CWTI, 21.)

During the early afternoon the fighting intensified and both army commanders were unclear about the actual situation. The Union added Palmer's and Reynolds' divisions to the fray. At this point, Bragg ordered A. P. Stewart's Division to join the action. Stewart, taking advantage of a gap in the Union line, was able to penetrate across the La-Fayette Road and disperse the Union forces in the area.
However, without adequate support, he was forced to retire with the arrival of Federal reinforcements (Negley's and Brannan's divisions). With the repulse of Stewart's attack, General Hood's Division (part of Longstreet's Corps) went into the attack. Sheridan and Wood's divisions held against Hood's attack and the assault was broken off.¹³ (See fig. 8)

Figure 8. Battle Map
(Reprinted, by permission, from Tucker. CWTI, 24.)

The fighting continued into the early evening.
Reverting to his original plan, Bragg ordered Cleburne's and Cheatham's divisions to once again attack the Federal left flank. It was Thomas's corps that was defending on the Federal left. Expecting this subsequent attack, he
fortified his position with breastworks and the attack was repulsed. (see fig. 8). This completed the major fighting on the nineteenth. The night was spent in preparation for the next day's battle. The Union forces fortified their positions and concentrated their forces throughout the night. Union forces suffered greatly throughout the cold night because of a lack of water. The wounded on both sides, left on the field between the lines, also suffered greatly. 14

Confederate fortunes were enhanced with the arrival of LTG James Longstreet's force from the Eastern Theater. Longstreet found Bragg, who explained the plan of attack for the next day. The Confederate army was divided into two wings. The right wing was to be commanded by Lieutenant General Polk and the left wing by Lieutenant General Longstreet. Buckner's Corps, including Stewart's Division, was part of Longstreet's wing. Bragg's intention continued to be to turn the Federal left. The attack was to begin at dawn, starting with Polk's wing and proceeding in succession through Longstreet's wing. Unknown to the commanders was the fact that the Confederate left and right wings overlapped. Stewart's Division was the element from the left wing in front of the flank of the right wing. 15

The usual command problems plaguing the Confederate army were found at play again on the morning of the twentieth. Polk's attack was delayed and when he finally
attacked it was piecemeal. Bragg, frustrated by Polk's delay, ordered a general attack along the front which included Stewart's Division. Stewart attempted to clear the confusion between the army wings and was repulsed in an attack against the fortified Union line. (see fig. 9) During this period of time Rosecrans received information of a gap in his lines. Actually, the gap did not exist and the division reported to be missing was actually deployed in the woods and could not easily be seen. An order was issued to Wood's division but the intent was misunderstood. This resulted in Wood pulling his division out of line and creating a real gap in the Union lines. 16

Figure 9. Battle Map
(Reprinted, by permission, from Tucker. CWTI. 28.)
At this critical juncture by sheer luck Longstreet launched his attack. The right wing of the Federal line collapsed under the onslaught of Longstreet's attack. Some Union forces swung back onto the flank of the Union left and occupied Snodgrass Hill, while others broke and ran in disorder. Thomas took control of the Union left and organized the defense, determined to hold his position. (see fig. 10) Rosecrans was swept up in the rush to the rear. He finally decided to go back to Chattanooga to organize the defense, believing all had been lost at Chickamauga. Polk continued his ineffective attacks on the Union left while Longstreet continued to hammer at Snodgrass Hill. Longstreet was later to claim a total of twenty-five assaults against this hill.17

Figure 10. Battle Map
(Reprinted, by permission, from Tucker, CWTI, 32.)
Thomas' position was saved by the timely arrival of reserves. Granger's reserve Union corps, acting without orders, came to Thomas' assistance with Stedman's division and critical ammunition resupply. Thomas continued to hold well into the late afternoon. He received orders from Rosecrans to begin withdrawal at nightfall. At dusk Stewart's Division was ordered once again into the attack just as the Union forces were beginning their withdrawal. (See fig. 11) Stewart's forces assisted in the final push and captured many of the remaining Union forces, artillery and large stocks of arms and equipment.

Figure 11. Battle Map
(Reprinted, by permission, from Tucker, CWTT 42.)

On the Twenty-first, Bragg, despite the council of his subordinates, failed to conduct a pursuit of Rosecrans'
forces. Thus the opportunity to gain a truly decisive victory was lost. This battle would cost the Confederacy a tremendous loss of life, a loss they could no longer afford.

The next chapter will look at Stewart and his division in more detail.^[19]
CHAPTER 2
NOTES


5Connelly, Autumn Glory, 189-91.; Horn, Army of Tennessee, 254.; Steele, American Campaigns, 1:430. 1:440-41.

6Connelly, Autumn Glory, 193-97.; Horn, Army of Tennessee, 255.; Steele, American Campaigns, 1:431-32.
There is a discrepancy between the various sources concerning strength figures. Figures shown include Longstreet's reinforcements.


CHAPTER 3

OLD STRAIGHT AND HIS LITTLE GIANTS
A. P. STEWART: THE MAN AND HIS UNIT

Major General Alexander P. Stewart, known as "Old Straight" by his men, is regarded by some historians as the best division commander on the field at Chickamauga. His division would claim the opening and closing shots of the battle. On the nineteenth of September 1863, his division, acting independently, would pierce the Union line. It would take the better part of the Confederate army to repeat his performance on the next day. To analyze the tactical employment of Stewart's Division it is necessary to first study the experiences of Stewart and his division prior to the battle. This chapter provides the historical background of Stewart and his division.

Alexander Peter Stewart was born on 2 October 1821, in Rogersville, Tennessee. His ancestry, like many who settled the early frontier, was of Scots-Irish descent. He was one of sixteen children. His early education, from 1827 to 1831, was conducted in a primitive log cabin. In 1831,
the family moved to Winchester, Tennessee. Stewart attended Carrick Academy from 1831-1838 taking up residence with his wealthy uncle. On 1 July 1838, he entered the United States Military Academy. On 1 July 1842, he graduated twelfth in a class of fifty-six. Included in his list of roommates were James Longstreet and William S. Rosecrans. Stewart got along well with all his fellow students except for William T. Sherman. In later life he would remark: "...Sherman was an able student but no gentleman."¹

Upon graduation, his first assignment was to the Third Artillery (Braxton Bragg's regiment), at Fort Macon, Beaufort, North Carolina. In 1843, he was recalled to West Point to be an assistant professor of mathematics. On 31 May 1845, he resigned his commission and became a professor at Cumberland University, Lebanon, Tennessee. On 27 August 1845, he married Harriet Chase from New London, Connecticut. Stewart taught at Cumberland University, from 1845 to 1849. In 1847, Stewart's mother died and his father re-married.²

In 1849, Professor Stewart went to the University of Nashville. Bushrod Johnson, future subordinate and fellow division commander at Chickamauga, was also on the faculty. After one year Stewart returned to Cumberland University.
In 1854, he again spent a year at Nashville and also served as a city surveyor. In 1856, Stewart was offered a chancellorship but declined, preferring to stay "close to
his students." He returned to Cumberland University until the outbreak of the war. Stewart was held in high esteem by the students, involving himself in their religious and personal lives.3

From the moment he was eligible Stewart consistently voted the Whig ticket. He strongly opposed slavery and believed secession was unwise, even though constitutional. "Stewart voted against Tennessee's leaving the Union."4 When the Civil War began Stewart volunteered and was commissioned a Major in the Artillery Corps of Tennessee. He was first assigned to Fort Pillow along the Mississippi River above Memphis, Tennessee. There he organized and commanded the Tennessee Artillery Battalion. On 15 August 1861, Stewart was mustered into Confederate service. For Stewart's action during the early Battle of Belmont, he was commended by his superiors. General Polk in his report stated:

...to Major A. P. Stewart, who directed the artillery in the fort (Columbus). I am particularly indebted for ... skill and judgement manifested in the service of the guns. General McCown reported: The heavy battery under the command of Major A. P. Stewart rendered effective service...5

A few days after this battle, 8 November 1861, Stewart was promoted to brigadier general. Just prior to his promotion, Major Stewart and General Polk were involved in an accident caused by an exploding gun and ammunition magazine. Both escaped uninjured. On 26 February, Stewart
was detached from Columbus and sent to New Madrid, Missouri. Stewart was involved in actions to check the advance of General Pope's forces. Next, at Corinth, Mississippi, he was assigned as a brigade commander in Clark's Division of Polk's Corps. Later, Stewart was in the Battle of Shiloh.

The Battle of Shiloh was the first great pitched battle of the Civil War in the Western Theater of operations. In Polk's report of the battle, Stewart was commended for leading his brigade from the front and gained a good reputation from both days actions. Stewart took part in the bloody attack against the "Hornet's Nest." In this battle Stewart participated in an attack with four corps in successive lines. (see fig. 12) The attack was made over broken, wooded and difficult terrain. The corps line was three miles in length. Stewart assumed temporary command of a division during this battle. It was here that Stewart gained insights into the command and control problems associated with this tactical formation and the difficulties of attacking in close terrain.

Stewart's next major action was the Battle of Perryville, Kentucky. In August Bragg's army crossed the Tennessee, and moved north. Stewart was now in Cheatham's Division of Polk's Corps. In this battle Cheatham's Division conducted an attack in column of brigades. The brigades of Donelson, Stewart and Maney attacked across
difficult terrain and pushed the enemy left flank back about a mile. (See fig. 13) Bragg reported: "This charge of these brigades was one of the most heroic and brilliant movements of the war."
Murfreesboro was the next major action for Stewart and his brigade. Polk's Corps was arrayed in two successive lines of battle, with Stewart's Brigade in the second line. Bragg ordered Polk to attack and execute a difficult right wheeling movement. He also required them to keep up the touch of the elbows to the right to keep the line unbroken. (see fig. 14) The Confederates found it impossible
to maintain this alignment. Several desperate attacks were made and both sides in this battle sustained heavy losses.
Bragg was subsequently forced to retreat. Stewart was again commended in Polk's report of this battle.9

Prior to the Battle of Chickamauga, Stewart was assigned to Hardee's Corps. On 5 June 1863, Stewart was promoted to brigadier general and given command of a division. In August Hardee was replaced by Hill. On 3 September, Stewart and his division were transferred to Buckner's Corps for the Battle of Chickamauga. In the movements prior to the battle Stewart's Division was continually given a position of honor and responsibility in the march formations, such as advance guard and lead element.10

"Stewart was a man of high attainment both as soldier and educator."14 He believed in talking directly to his soldiers and placed great reliance on personal relationships. Prior to the war he was widely revered by his students and this continued during the war with his soldiers. "Old Straight," with his ramrod posture, was never self aggrandizing. He was complimentary of his subordinate leaders and staff and specially recognized his soldiers. He did not call attention to himself or his actions. Even his writings about the Battle of Chickamauga did not mention his own name.12

In an army characterized by bitter infighting and personal bias, Stewart seemed to have been universally held in high regard. His actions were praised in all his
superiors battle reports, from Bragg through Buckner. At the time of the Battle of Chickamauga, Stewart was forty-two years of age and in good health. During the battle he was early to rise, always present at the critical point of action, mentally alert and flexible in action.\footnote{13}

In summary, A. P. Stewart was professional and reliable. He possessed that unique sense of duty akin to Robert E. Lee. He had no Mexican War experience, although he was West Point trained. Having been originally an artillery officer, he understood the capabilities and limitations of those weapons. His leadership style put him forward in the fight and made him respected and revered by his troops. His military experience prior to Chickamauga exposed him to different tactical formations. He witnessed the devastating effects of artillery at Belmont. At Shiloh, he saw the limitations of extended linear tactics, the effects of close terrain, and the devastation wrought by the new rifle. Perryville showed the capabilities of a division attacking in a column of brigades. Murfreesboro exhibited the necessity of simplicity on the battlefield, the futility of attempting parade ground formations and fancy wheeling movements on the battlefield. Stewart had earned his respected position in the Army of Tennessee.

When Buckner assumed command of his corps on the third of September, he issued a general order to his new command prior to the Battle of Chickamauga.
In this order he addressed Stewart’s Division:

To the veterans of Stewart’s Division he would say: you are associated with younger troops. It is true, than yourselves, but with soldiers who will imitate your most gallant deeds.14

There is little written about Stewart’s staff at the time of the Battle of Chickamauga. Stewart, in his report of the battle, mentioned several of his staff and commended their actions. Two of Stewart’s sons were serving on his staff. The youngest was age seventeen and served as aide de camp. During the battle Stewart used his staff to assist in command and control, in liaison, as couriers and in the more traditional support and logistical actions. Stewart’s staff was broken down into several sections. There was a close inner circle of aides and assistants to handle paperwork, household duties and to serve as couriers. An adjutant general section handled correspondence and administrative actions. The inspector general section monitored discipline and drill while the quartermaster general section was broken down into subsistence and ordnance. Stewart also used a chief of artillery, surgeon and several medical officers.15

Stewart’s Division was organized similar to others in the Army of Tennessee and the Western Theater of operations. He had four infantry brigades, four artillery batteries and an attached escort company of cavalry and his staff. Similar to the practice in most armies in the Western
Theater, Stewart usually task organized his artillery down to brigade level prior to battle. The composition of his division prior to the battle is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STEWART'S DIVISION</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ESCORT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOULE'S CO. MISSISSIPPI CAVALRY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOHNSON'S BRIGADE</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(DETACHED)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BATE'S BRIGADE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58TH ALABAMA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37TH GEORGIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TH GEORGIA BN (SHARPSHOOTERS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/37TH TENNESSEE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20TH TENNESSEE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BROWN'S BRIGADE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18TH TENNESSEE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26TH TENNESSEE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32D TENNESSEE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45TH TENNESSEE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23D TENNESSEE BN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CLAYTON'S BRIGADE

18TH ALABAMA
36TH ALABAMA
38TH ALABAMA

ARTILLERY

YORK'S GEORGIA BATTERY
(DETACHED WITH JOHNSON'S BDE)

1ST ARKANSAS BATTERY
(ATTACHED TO CLAYTON'S BDE)

DAWSON'S GEORGIA BATTERY
(ATTACHED TO BROWN'S BDE)

EUFALA ALABAMA BATTERY
(ATTACHED TO BATE'S BDE)

Unit strength, going into the Battle of Chickamauga, is as shown in Table 1.

Stewart's Division was outfitted similar to most units in the Western Theater, with a mixture of both rifles and muskets. For both sides, Union and Confederate, the western armies were on the bottom of the supply priority. Stewart's Division was one-third to one-half musket equipped. Brigadier General Brown, one of Stewart's brigade
TABLE I. (Reprinted, from O.R., XXX., Pt. 2, 288, 373, 404.)

Tabular statement of the number of officers and men carried into the battle of Chickamauga by the regiments of Bate's brigade on each day of the fight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>September 18</th>
<th>September 19</th>
<th>September 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Georgia Regiment</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th Tennessee Regiment</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th and 16th Tennessee Regiments</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th Alabama Regiment</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chevalier's Sharpshooters</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Infantry</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tabular statement of the effective strength of Brown's brigade on the morning of September 19, 1863.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Regular general</th>
<th>Field officers</th>
<th>Line officers</th>
<th>Effective total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Headquarters]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Tennessee, Colonel Palmer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Tennessee, Colonel Lindsey</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Tennessee, Colonel Cook</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Tennessee, Colonel Scaggs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tabular statement of the effective strength of Brown's brigade on the morning of Sunday, September 20, 1863.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Regular general</th>
<th>Field officers</th>
<th>Line officers</th>
<th>Effective total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Headquarters]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Alabama, Captain Lowe</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Tennessee, Major Beall</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Tennessee, Colonel Cook</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Tennessee, Colonel Scaggs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Report of number of guns and of officers carried into battle on the 19th and 20th instant by Clayton's brigade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiments</th>
<th>Battle of 19th.</th>
<th>Battle of 20th.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Alabama</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Alabama</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
his brigade was about one-third equipped with muskets but following their first attack they outfitted with Enfields picked up from the battlefield. Stewart's ammunition expenditure report (see Table 2) showed a high proportion of .69 caliber musket ammunition. It is probable that this musket ammunition was "buck n'ball, a combination of ball and buckshot ammunition, very effective at close range.

TABLE 2.
(Reprinted from, O.R., XXX, Pt. 2, 148.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Rounds 12.75 caliber, 34.7 lb.</th>
<th>Rounds 3 inch, 30 lb.</th>
<th>Rounds Enfield, 34.7 lb.</th>
<th>Rounds .69 caliber</th>
<th>Rounds .69 caliber, buck shot</th>
<th>Rounds .69 caliber, 28 ga.</th>
<th>Rounds .69 caliber, 48 ga.</th>
<th>Rounds 12 lb. rifled musket</th>
<th>Rounds 18 lb. rifled musket</th>
<th>Rounds 3 inch rifled musket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheatham's</td>
<td>141,882</td>
<td>96,864</td>
<td>46,899</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breckinridge's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>98,996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>98,996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recapitulation of small-arms ammunition.

Stewart's artillery, like most Confederate artillery organizations, was a mixture of different types. The Eufaula Battery had four three-inch rifled guns. The 1st Arkansas and Dawson's batteries were a mixture of two twelve-pound Napoleons and two twelve-pound Howitzers each.17

Brigadier General William Brimage Bate commanded Stewart's aggressive veteran unit. Of the three brigade commanders and the division commander, Bate was the only one with Mexican War experience. Bate was born on 7 October.
1826, in Bledsoe's Lick, Tennessee. During the Mexican War he initially served as a private and latter served as a first lieutenant in the 3d Tennessee Infantry. After the war he became editor of a newspaper in Gallatin, Tennessee. From 1847 to 1849, he was a member of the Tennessee State House. He received his law degree from Lebanon University in 1852. From 1854 to 1860, he worked as an attorney in the Nashville District. By nature he was a staunch secessionist.16

After the outbreak of the Civil War, Bate once again enlisted as a private. He later rose to the rank of colonel and commanded the 2d Tennessee Infantry. He initially served in Virginia and participated in the Battle of First Bull Run before being sent west. He was severely wounded in the leg in the Battle of Shiloh in early 1862. Following the injury he had garrison duty at Huntsville, Alabama while he recovered from these wounds. On 3 October 1862, he was promoted to brigadier general. He commanded a brigade in Stewart's Division and participated in the Tullahoma Campaign prior to Chickamauga. Bate was brave to the point of recklessness on the battlefield. In the Chickamauga Campaign, prior to the actual battle, Bate's Brigade conducted repeated assaults into Hoover's Gap against troops outfitted with Spencer repeating rifles. Bate was thirty-seven years of age at the time of the Battle of Chickamauga.19
Brigadier General John Calvin Brown commanded Stewart's veteran Tennessee brigade. Brown was born in Giles County, Tennessee, on 6 January 1827. He graduated from Jackson College in 1846 and was admitted to the Pulaski bar in 1848. He was a Presbyterian and a Whig. In 1860 he became active in politics. Brown had just returned from an extended European trip when the war broke out. He enlisted as a private in the Confederate Army. On 16 May 1861, he was made Colonel of the 3d Tennessee Infantry. Sent to reinforce Fort Donelson he was captured with the garrison and exchanged in August 1862. On August 30, he was promoted to brigadier general and took command of a brigade in Buckner's Division. He fought under Bragg in Kentucky and Tennessee and was wounded at the Battle of Perryville. In February 1863, he and his brigade joined Stewart's Division for the Tullahoma Campaign. Brown was thirty-six years of age at the time of the battle. 20

Brigadier General Henry DeLamar Clayton commanded Stewart's "green" Alabama brigade. Chickamauga was the first major action for this brigade. Clayton was born in Athens, Georgia, on 7 March 1827. He was elected to the state legislature in 1857 and again in 1859. When war broke out he enlisted in the Clayton Guards, a local militia unit, and was sent to Pensacola. He rose to to the rank of Colonel of the 1st Alabama Regiment. After ten months he returned to Alabama and recruited the 39th Alabama Regiment.
Clayton joined Bragg's 1862 Kentucky Campaign and was severely wounded in the Battle of Murfreesboro in 1862. On 22 April 1863, while he recovered from wounds, he was promoted to brigadier general and given command of an Alabama brigade. In September 1863, he joined Stewart's Division with his brigade. He was judged "genial and pleasant" by his men. "He himself was not afraid to go where we were told to follow." Clayton was thirty-six years of age at the time of the battle.

Each of Stewart's brigades had its own personality. This was based on the experiences of the regiments and separate battalions and batteries that comprised these brigades. Leadership, prior battle experience, weaponry and health conditions were all factors that went into the development of this unit character. To better understand the tactical movements of these organizations a review of their histories prior to the Battle of Chickamauga is necessary. In some instances there is little or no information available.

BATE'S BRIGADE

58th Alabama, Colonel Bushrod Jones.

The 58th Alabama was originally organized with eight companies as the Ninth Alabama Battalion in November 1861, at Newborn, Alabama. The following spring the regiment moved to Cornith and fought in the Battle of Shiloh. After Shiloh, it participated in a number of skirmishes, suffered
only with slight losses. The battalion was attrited heavily by disease during its stay in Corinth and Tupelo. In the summer of 1862 the battalion was sent to Mobile for garrison duty until April 1863. In April it joined Clayton's Brigade and was involved in the action at Hoover's Gap and several other smaller engagements. In July two additional companies were added and the 58th Alabama regiment was formed. Upon organization the regiment was moved to Bate's Brigade of Stewart's Division.  

37th Georgia. Colonel A. F. Rudler.

The 37th Regiment Georgia Infantry was formed in part by the consolidation of the 3d and 9th Battalions Georgia Infantry on 6 May 1863. The 9th Battalion had also been known as the 17th Georgia Infantry. Both the 3d and 9th battalions were veterans of the bloody Battle of Murfreesboro. Soon after consolidation the 37th Georgia was assigned to Bate's Brigade and involved in the engagement at Hoover's Gap.  


The 4th Battalion Sharpshooters was organized from elements of the 3d Georgia Infantry Battalion during the spring of 1863. The battalion consisted of four companies and was assigned to Bate's Brigade. The battalion joined Bate's Brigade just in time to participate in the action at Hoover's Gap.
The 15th Tennessee Regiment was organized on 7 June 1861, at Jackson, Tennessee. In July the 15th totaled 744 men armed with flintlock muskets. The regiment fought in the Battle of Shiloh where it sustained heavy losses of over two-hundred killed and wounded. The regiment next fought in the Battle of Perryville. Upon retreating from Kentucky to Tullahoma the regiment fought in the Battle of Murfreesboro. After this hard fought battle the regiment was reorganized with the 37th Tennessee in June 1863. The 37th Tennessee Regiment was first known as the 7th Tennessee Provisional Army of the Confederate States. It was organized on 10 October 1861, at Camp Ramsey, Tennessee. Originally the men had wanted to be a rifle regiment but found the equipment was lacking. On 6 April 1862, the regiment could hear the sounds of the Battle of Shiloh but they were not employed. Its next action was in the Battle of Perryville. They were involved in a hard hand-to-hand fight. The regiment moved on to middle Tennessee and the Battle of Murfreesboro. It sustained losses of about 50 percent killed and wounded during the battle. On 9 June 1863, the 37th Tennessee, at a strength of 484 men, was combined with the 15th Tennessee then at a strength of 1,150. This combination was not welcomed by either regiment. The combined regiments joined Bate's Brigade and were held in reserve during the
engagement at Hoover's Gap. Following this engagement they moved to Tyner's Station in preparation for the Chickamauga Campaign.25

20th Tennessee. Colonel Thomas B. Smith.

The 20th Tennessee Regiment was known as "Battle's Regiment" and was organized in June 1861. at Camp Trousdale, Tennessee just south of the Kentucky state line. In July the 20th was 880 man strong and was equipped with flintlock muskets. In August it was ordered to Knoxville. While in Knoxville the 20th was involved in some minor skirmish activity. On 18 January, the regiment was involved in heavy action in the vicinity of Mill Springs located on the south bank of the Cumberland River. The regiment sustained heavy losses in this fight. The 20th moved to Murfreesboro just prior to the Battle of Shiloh. It was here they gratefully exchanged their flintlocks for Enfield rifles and cartridges. The regiment was committed late on the first day of the Battle of Shiloh. In October 1862, they returned to Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The 20th was ordered to conduct a difficult charge during the Battle of Murfreesboro. Out of 350 men engaged they lost 178 killed and wounded. In June the 20th joined Bate's Brigade. The 20th next participated in the Tullahoma Campaign and fought at Hoover's Gap. From there it retreated back to Tyner's Station and prepared for the Chickamauga Campaign.26
Eufaula Alabama Battery Captain Mcdonald Oliver.

The Eufaula Battery was organized on 26 February 1862, at Eufaula, Alabama. The men came from Barbour and adjoining counties. It was originally organized with six guns and 262 personnel. The battery was assigned to the Army of Tennessee and participated in the campaigns and battles of this army prior to Chickamauga. After fighting at the Battle of Murfreesboro it was assigned to Stanford's and then to Eldridge's Battalion of Artillery.

BROWN'S BRIGADE


The 18th Tennessee Regiment was organized on 11 June 1861, in Camp Trousdale, Rutherford county, Tennessee where it elected its officers. It remained in camp and drilled and disciplined until 17 September, when it was ordered to Bowling Green, Kentucky. The 18th Tennessee, a part of Buckner's Division, was sent to assist Fort Donelson. On 16 February 1862, the 18th Tennessee was surrendered along with the garrison of Fort Donelson. The regiment was broken up and sent to separate prison camps throughout the north. After six months in prison the regiment's troops were paroled, reunited and sent to Knoxville. Upon learning of Bragg's withdrawal they were diverted and linked up at Murfreesboro. There they joined up with Breckinridge's Division. On the second day of battle the 18th took part in a very bloody charge and suffered severe losses. The 18th
performed well in this action and was accorded many accolades. On 19 January 1863, the 18th was reported in Brown's Brigade with 305 effectives. The regiment stayed with Brown's Brigade through the remainder of the Chickamaugan Campaign. 

26th Tennessee, Colonel John M. Lillard.

The 26th Tennessee Regiment was organized on 6 September 1861, at Camp Lillard near Knoxville, Tennessee. In late September it moved to Bowling Green, Kentucky and organized with a brigade. The regiment assisted in building fortifications in and around Bowling Green. In January it was ordered to Russellville, Kentucky. In February the regiment joined in the defense of Fort Donelson. On 16 February 1862, the 26th was surrendered along with the entire garrison at Fort Donelson. The regiment was split up and sent to separate prison camps. In September 1862, the officers and men of the regiment were paroled. The regiment was reorganized in October and sent to Murfreesboro. It was placed in Brown's Brigade and fought in the four days Battle of Murfreesboro. It was part of Breckinridge's Division's desperate charge and sustained heavy losses barely recovering its colors from the field. In late June the 26th took part in the action at Hoover's Gap. The regiment remained with Brown's Brigade through the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns.

The 32d Tennessee Regiment was organized in the summer of 1861 at Camp Trousdale, Tennessee. In the early fall the men were equipped with flintlock muskets. The 32d was later sent to support the defense of Fort Donelson. The 32d participated in some desperate fighting in the fort's defense. On 16 February 1862, the regiment stacked arms and was surrendered along with the entire garrison of the fort. The men of the regiment were separated and distributed through many prison camps throughout the north. After six months of confinement the men were paroled and sent to Jackson, Mississippi. The 32d moved on to Murfreesboro and began drilling and recruiting enlistments. The regiment grew to eleven-hundred officers and men primed for battle. During the Battle of Murfreesboro they were held back as headquarters guard. After the Battle of Murfreesboro the 32d went into winter quarters at Tullahoma. While at Tullahoma they were finally organized under a brigade headquarters commanded by the newly promoted Brigadier General John C. Brown. On 31 July, the 32d was transferred to Stewart's Division along with the rest of Brown's Brigade. The 32d was moved south and joined Stewart's Division in the incident at Dug Gap just prior to the Battle of Chickamauga.
45th Tennessee. Colonel Anderson Searcy.

The 45th Regiment was organized with ten companies at Camp Trousdale, Tennessee, in December 1861. The men of the regiment elected their officers while in camp. The 45th's first major engagement was the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862. During this battle it was assigned to Statham's Brigade, Breckinridge's Corps. Following the battle it was reorganized in May 1862, and assigned to the District of Mississippi. While assigned to this district it was active at Baton Rouge, Louisiana and Jackson, Mississippi. In the fall of 1862 the 45th moved to Murfreesboro, Tennessee and was assigned to Walker's Brigade. On 19 December 1862, J. C. Brown was given command of the brigade. During the Battle of Murfreesboro the 45th was part of Breckinridge's Division and sustained heavy casualties during the attack on 2 January 1863. During January and February the regiment was stationed in Tullahoma and during March and April was stationed in Fairfield, Tennessee. Following the retreat to Chattanooga, the 45th was stationed at Loudon and Charleston, Tennessee.


The 23d Tennessee Infantry Battalion was organized at camp near Murfreesboro 29 November 1862. Tazewell W. Newman was elected as their commander. Newman had been the former commander of the 17th Tennessee Regiment. The battalion consisted of five companies, two of which had previously
served in the 9th Kentucky Regiment. Some of the men from the Kentucky regiment were veterans of the Battle of Shiloh. On 28 February 1863, it was assigned to Brown's Brigade, Breckenridge's Division. The Battalion remained in camp at Shelbyville and Tullahoma until 22 April 1863. On 22 April, it moved to Fairfield, Tennessee. In July, it joined the retreat to Chattanooga. During July and August the 23d was stationed at Loudon and Charleston, Tennessee. 31 Dawson's Georgia Battery, Lieutenant R. W. Anderson.

(No information available)

CLAYTON'S BRIGADE

18th Alabama, Colonel J. T. Hoitzelaw.

The 18th Alabama Regiment was organized on 4 September 1861 at Auburn, Alabama. The field officers were appointed directly by President Jefferson Davis. The regiment moved to Mobile and was organized with a brigade. In March it was ordered to Corinth. The 18th Alabama fought in the first days action at the Battle of Shiloh. Its losses were 125 killed and wounded out of a total of 420. It did not fight in the second day of the battle. The regiment was later sent back to Mobile, Alabama to perform garrison duty until April 1863. In April it rejoined the Army of Tennessee and was assigned to Clayton's Brigade. 32
36th Alabama, Colonel Lewis T. Woodruff.

The 36th Alabama Regiment was organized on 12 May 1862 at Mount Vernon Arsenal, Alabama. The unit remained at the arsenal for one month and was then sent to assist in construction of fortifications at Oven. From August 1862 to April 1863, it performed garrison duty at Mobile, Alabama. The regiment joined Clayton's Brigade of Stewart's Division for the Tullahoma Campaign prior to Chickamauga. 34

38th Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. Lankford.

The 38th Alabama Regiment was organized in May 1862, at Mobile, Alabama. The regiment was not deployed but remained in Mobile, performing garrison duty in the city's defenses until February 1863. In February the regiment joined Clayton's Brigade of Alabamians in Tullahoma. The 38th's first action was at Hoover's Gap where it received slight losses. Although a "green" regiment like the 36th, its fighting spirit was revealed in the names of some of its companies: the Alabama Invincibles, the North River Tigers, and the Dixie Rifles. 35

1st Arkansas Battery, Captain John T. Humphreys.

The 1st Arkansas Battery was organized in the summer of 1861 with men from Ft. Smith, Arkansas. The battery took part in the Battle of Elkhorn Tavern and then moved east of the Mississippi. After the Kentucky Campaign it was
assigned to McNair’s Brigade and later Eldridge’s Battalion of Artillery, Army of Tennessee. The battery saw action in the Battle of Murfreesboro.36

In summary, Stewart’s units were a mixture of hard-bitten veterans and untested "green" troops. The majority were from the back country of Tennessee and Alabama. The brigades each had a distinct character of their own. Bate’s Brigade, although combat experienced, was the least cohesive of Stewart’s three brigades at Chickamauga. Bate had been with his regiments for only three months prior to the battle. State affiliation was a strong binding element within the Confederate armies. Bate’s Brigade, unlike Brown’s and Clayton’s brigades, was a mixture of several state units, Georgia, Tennessee and Alabama. The 58th Alabama was just recently assigned from Clayton’s Alabama Brigade and still closely associated with that brigade. In fact, during the battle without orders it would join in an attack with Clayton’s Brigade. Command and control was difficult with five subordinate units of varying sizes. There was also some disunity within the 15/37th Tennessee due to its recent reorganization. Bate was able to test his brigade under fire at Hoover’s Gap. Although Bate had been only a short time with the brigade it began to take on the aggressive character of its leader.

Brown’s Brigade was the most cohesive brigade, having served an average of eight and one-half months together
prior to Chickamauga. It was also the most combat experienced of the three brigades. Being an all Tennessean brigade it held strong feelings about abandoning Tennessee without a substantial fight. The men were determined to fight hard and regain their state's territory. Brown's Brigade shared the command and control problems associated with having several subordinate units of varying sizes. Three of Brown's regiments had shared in the disappointment of Fort Donelson and the ensuing captivity.

Clayton's "green " Brigade was the least experienced of Stewart's brigades. All three regiments had served in garrison duty in Mobile Alabama and were eager to test themselves in battle. Clayton and his regiments had been together for an average of five and one-half months prior to Chickamauga. Clayton's Brigade was best designed to facilitate command and control at the brigade level. There were only three subordinates commands of about equal size but the overall strength matched the other brigades.

All three brigades had been toughened by long service. The weak and sickly had been weeded out over time along with those faint of heart. They were proficient in the tactical skills and weaponry of their day along with skills necessary to survive on the march and in camp. Their ragged appearance was a result of a supply system that provided little beside food and ammunition. Wearied by this long war and disheartened by news from home and other
fronts, they continued to hold on. Their dwindling ranks and cherished colors bespoke a stubborn belief in their cause. Some faltered under these burdens and hardships while others excelled. Truly unit morale was a combat multiplier.

Stewart's Division was unique in the Army of Tennessee. It possessed high morale. Unlike Lee's Army of Northern Virginia flushed with victories in early 1863, the Tennessee Army was not so fortunate. It suffered under Bragg's dubious leadership and sometimes brutal discipline. The army was always short of supplies, traversing difficult terrain, and campaigning under the worst of weather. As a result their morale plummeted. Although hard fighters, victories eluded them and they continued to give ground from Kentucky through Tennessee and Georgia. 37

Through it all however, Stewart's Division prevailed. This can only be attributed to the quality of leadership within the division. From the top down the leaders shared the hardships and privations of the campaigns. Their willingness to lead from the front and share in the dangers of the battlefield was evidenced by all three brigade commanders having received serious wounds. Stewart's Division, like most in this unfortunate war, believed that any obstacle or defense could be overcome if only the attacker was resolute and determined. The recognition of the division's achievements by both Stewart and the army
kindled a confidence and determination within the ranks. Even the newly assigned units found this spirit infectious. Despite his misgivings Stewart did not partake in open criticism of Bragg or other commanders. This attitude had the effect of bolstering the chain of command within the division. Stewart's humility and willingness to reward his subordinate was known throughout the army.

Many of Stewart's units had shared similar experiences together. Captivity after the capture of Fort Donelson or the rights of passage battles of Shiloh, Perryville and Murfreesboro, or the drudgery of garrison duty in Mobile created important camaraderie. These factors contributed to unit cohesiveness which would weld units together in battle. Stewart's Division was not a "state of the art" unit equipped with special weapons or added mobility. It was just an average unit not unlike many others in the Western Theater. What set Stewart's Division apart was the quality of leadership and the determination of his soldiers. It possessed high morale in an army known for a lack of morale. On the eve of the greatest battle fought in the Western Theater Stewart and his division were ready to play their role.
CHAPTER 3
NOTES


24 Crute, Confederate Units, 85.


27 Crute, Confederate Units, 35-36.: Brewer. War Record, 700.

28 Crute, Confederate Units, 33.: Tennesseans in C.W., 212-13.: Lindsley, Annals of Tennessee, 360-64.


32 Crute, Confederate Units, 296.: Tennesseans in C.W., 167.

33 Crute, Confederate Units, 16.: Brewer. War Record, 617-18.


Crute, *Confederate Units*, 63.

CHAPTER 4

BLUE JACKETS AND YELLOW JACKETS

18-19 SEPTEMBER 1863

The death knell of the Confederacy was not sounded by a battlefield defeat but instead by an incomplete victory. Chickamauga's place in history is established not for what happened but for what could have happened there. Few battles in history can compare with the amount that luck and chance played in this battle. Few battles could match the level of courage displayed by its soldiers or incompetence by some of its leaders. This chapter covers Stewart's entrance into the battle. It follows the preliminary action on the eighteenth of September as the division moved and crossed the Chickamauga Creek at Thedford's Ford. It continues into the following day as Stewart's Division played out its critical role. The battle will be viewed at the lowest level of warfare, down amongst the trees and meadows of northwestern Georgia in mid-autumn 1863. The cool nip of winter's approach was in the air. After months of marching and waiting the anticipation of decisive action was felt by all.
At sunrise on the seventeenth of September, Buckner's newly organized corps consisting of Stewart's and Preston's divisions commenced the march from LaFayette, Georgia. Buckner's Corps bivouacked for the night along Peavine Creek. Peavine Creek was located about two and one-half miles east of Chickamauga Creek.\(^1\) Earlier that day the corps had been read Bragg's General Orders Number 180 appealing to the army:

```
Headquarters Army of Tennessee, in the Field. 
LaFayette, Ga., September 16th, 1863.

The troops will be held for an immediate move against the enemy. . . . Soldiers, you are largely re-enforced: you must seek the contest. In so doing I know you will be content to suffer privations and encounter hardships. . . . Trusting in God and the justice of our cause, and nerved by the love of the dear ones at home, failure is impossible and victory must be ours.

Braxton Bragg.  
Commanding General.\(^2\)
```

Stewart's Division had begun its march at ten A.M. on the seventeenth. The cooks spent the night of the seventeenth preparing three day's rations. The soldiers were ordered not to build fires or play musical instruments and to sleep in the rear of the guns. Lem Roberts of the 37th Georgia had a premonition of death and gave his chaplain an ambrotype of his wife. In two days time he was dead. Early on the morning of the eighteenth, Stewart received an order from Bragg's headquarters at Leet's Tanyard. The order outlined the scheme of maneuver for the various corps to cross Chickamauga Creek and turn the flank of the Federal forces. Trains were to be sent to Ringgold
and Taylor's Ridge. Ordnance trains were to remain with their units. Cooking was to be done at the trains and forwarded to the troops. ³

At 8 A.M. Stewart resumed the march in the direction of Thedford's Ford with Bate's Brigade in front. Clayton's following, and Brown in the rear. Buckner's movements on the eighteenth were hampered by the fact the route in part was shared with Walker's Reserve Corps. Prior to movement, Stewart allocated his batteries. The battery commanders reported and moved with their parent brigades. Around noon, cannons could be heard booming to their right, left and front. Anticipating action the division's pace quickened. By mid-afternoon Stewart was about a mile from Thedford's Ford. Stewart was then ordered by Major General Buckner, his corps commander, to occupy the key terrain dominating the ford but not to bring on an engagement with the nearby enemy unless necessary. ⁴ (See fig. 15)

Stewart sent his attached engineer officer, Major Nocquet, on a reconnaissance to the ford site. Bate's Brigade was ordered forward and it deployed from column into line and advanced at the double quick. The 20th Tennessee was to the rear of the ordnance train and had to double quick about a half mile through ankle deep dust in order to regain their position in line. Bate, with the assistance of Major Nocquet, quickly emplaced his command on dominating terrain with the Eufaula Battery on high ground to his front
and left, downstream from the ford site. Bate next advanced the 4th Georgia Battalion of sharpshooters. Clayton's Brigade moved on high ground upstream from the ford site along with its battery. Brown's Brigade was moved up behind Clayton's as a reserve. The Eufaula Battery and 4th Georgia Sharpshooters opened fire on the enemy skirmishers across the Creek. The Eufaula Battery would later claim this incident as the opening shots of the Battle of Chickamauga.\(^5\)
The enemy skirmishers withdrew but Stewart's Division then came under a severe shelling from an enemy battery in the vicinity of Alexander's Bridge to the northeast. An enemy cannon ball struck about five paces from Stewart and ricocheted, narrowly missing Captain Cheney of Brown's staff. The enemy's solid shot killed Tom Mize, a medical aide from Company A, 58th Alabama, and wounded five or six others of Bate's Brigade. Clayton's Brigade had one man killed. The infirmary corps came forward and carried the wounded to the rear. Stewart and his staff were concerned about what effect this would have on Clayton's Brigade, this being their first action. The Eufaula Battery fired nine rounds and silenced the enemy battery.

Three companies from the 18th Alabama under the command of Major Hunley waded across the creek and deployed as skirmishers on the far side. Clayton joined them for a personal reconnaissance. The three companies were deployed as pickets in the far woodline. In the distance, the noise from the fighting around Alexander's Bridge grew in intensity. Walker's Corps to Stewart's north was attempting to cross the Chickamauga Creek at the bridge. It is probable the veterans of Hoover's Gap in Stewart's command recognized the staccato sound. Wilder's Union brigade with Spencer repeating rifles was at work at Alexander's Bridge. About 5 P.M. the rumor spread that Major General Hood had
arrived and Longstreet was enroute. This news spread encouragement throughout Stewart's Division.7

After nightfall the remainder of Clayton's Brigade waded across the creek just upstream from the ford site. The Eufaula Battery was positioned in a cornfield on Clayton's left with the 38th Alabama in support. The remainder of Clayton's Brigade was ordered to bivouac on the creek bank. Stewart's Division settled down for the night. Pickets were posted and the ford site was secured on both banks. Some soldiers busied themselves by raiding a sweet potato patch from a nearby farmstead. The inhabitants did not object with such close proximity of the Yankee invaders. The 18th Tennessee patrolled the creek bank throughout the night under the control of Lieutenant Colonel Butler. No fires were allowed and the soldiers huddled in their damp uniforms against the night chill.8

The actions of Stewart and his division on the eighteenth of September displayed the quality of the unit and its leadership. The action could be used as an classic example of how to conduct an obstacle crossing. Stewart led with his most experienced brigade. The ford site was reconnoitered and the artillery was placed on key terrain to overwatch. Stewart effectively used his staff and maintained a responsive reserve. Stewart's brigades had moved quickly from column to line formation and advanced at the double quick making effective use of the terrain. The
enemy on the far bank were engaged by combined arms, an artillery battery and battalion of sharpshooters, the minimal force necessary to accomplish the mission. Stewart's rifled battery with its longer range was used to conduct counter-fire missions against enemy artillery.

With his overwatch in place and the enemy dispersed, Stewart sent a small force to secure the far side. This force employed skirmish drill and advanced in open ranks reducing their vulnerability to enemy fire. Leadership at all levels was forward, directing the action. Medical support was on site and quick to respond. Ammunition resupply was readily available. Masked by darkness Stewart crossed a third of his force to secure the opposite bank. Alternate crossing sites were utilized and security was posted. Noise and light discipline was enforced and patrols were conducted throughout the night.

In summary, Stewart's Division responded as if battle drilled for the occasion. They moved with a sense of purpose and urgency. Discipline and proficiency were in evidence. Even Stewart's 'green troops' behaved well under fire. This would portend of what was to come the next day.

After daybreak, Saturday morning 19 September, Stewart's other two brigades waded through the cold knee-deep water of Chickamauga Creek and formed behind Clayton's Brigade. The division halted in an open field and quickly built fires of fence rails to warm themselves.
against the morning chill. Like most soldiers, the majority had consumed their three day's rations in the last twenty-four hours. To fill empty bellies some made breakfast of sorghum strips and others stored them in their haversacks for a later meal. They greeted the warming sun as it broke through the clouds and rose to a beautiful, bright and clear day.

General Buckner arrived and updated Stewart on the tactical situation. Buckner ordered Stewart to move forward and form to the left of McNair's Brigade. McNair was the left brigade of Bushrod Johnson's provisional division. Bushrod Johnson, previously of Stewart's Division, was given command of a provisional division just prior to the battle. Stewart's Division was formed into three lines. (See fig. 16) Clayton's Brigade, bearing to the right, was moved about a mile or two. It moved through a cornfield and woodland into position facing west. Clayton formed his brigade with three regiments abreast in a double rank line of battle. The brigades of Brown and Bate formed in line of battle to Clayton's rear. The enemy could be viewed on the distant hills. Preston's Division came up and formed on Stewart's left.

The sound of firing began to the division's right. Unknown to Stewart, Buckner ordered the Eufaula Battery forward to open fire on the enemy. The battery moved forward and fired two rounds and returned. This resulted in
return fire and the wounding of some members of the division. R. J. Turner, the assistant surgeon of the 58th Alabama was one of those wounded. The enemy shelling caused some confusion in the ranks as they formed. While waiting in this position, Stewart rode through the ranks of his division. He spoke to the men and encouraged them to fight aggressively and to charge over every obstacle, make contact with the enemy and rout him from his position. Buckner ordered the division to shift right about the distance of a brigade front. This was accomplished and the sound of fighting intensified in the distance. The division waited, listening to the sound of battle for several hours.\textsuperscript{11}
Stewart's Division looked on in envy at Hood's troops with their new dark gray uniforms. Hood's men called out that they were here to show the westerners how a real army fights. The day would provide enough fighting for both divisions to get their fill. The din of rifle fusillades blended until indistinguishable. The leaves of the trees above Stewart's Division quivered with each cannon blast.

Major Pollok Lee of Bragg's staff rode up with orders for Stewart to move his division where the firing had started. Stewart figured this was some distance to his right and rear. Confused by this vague order Stewart sought clarification from the army commander who was nearby. Bragg told Stewart that Walker's Corps was heavily engaged on the right. Walker's Corps had been badly damaged and the enemy was threatening to turn his flank. Bragg informed him that Polk had been put in charge of that wing and that Stewart would have to be governed by circumstances on the employment of his division.

Stewart quickly moved his division by the right flank in the direction pointed out by Bragg. The division moved about a mile through heavy woods and arrived at a cornfield. Beyond the cornfield the heaviest firing could be heard. Stewart dispatched several messengers to link up with Polk with negative results. Not sure of Bragg's actual intent Stewart could do one of three things. He could continue moving north and around the army coming into support Walker...
on his flank, but this would take time. Or, he could follow in support of Cheatham's Division in action beyond the cornfield to his front. If he did this his division's left flank would be exposed. Or, he could attack through the gap between Hood and Cheatham's units. Although this was a narrow gap (one quarter of a mile) allowing only a brigade frontage, both flanks would initially be secure. Stewart, sensing the urgency of the situation, decided on the latter course to get his division into action.14

Stewart came upon one of Polk's aides, Lieutenant W. B. Richmond. The aide was in search of Polk as well. Knowing something of the lay of the ground and the enemy situation, Lt. Richmond agreed with Stewart's decision on where to attack. At 3 P.M. Stewart ordered Clayton to attack with his brigade. Clayton was advised by Stewart to act for himself and be governed by circumstances. Clayton's Brigade was formed from left to right with the 38th Alabama, 36th Alabama and the 18th Alabama. The 1st Arkansas Battery was to follow in support. The regiments were formed in a close ordered single line of battle consisting of two ranks with twenty-two paces between regiments. The brigade frontage was approximately fifteen-hundred feet. The firepower consisted of 1,352 muskets which could be brought to bear. The 18th gave three cheers for Alabama and smartly marched off elbow to elbow. With skirmishers forward the brigade proceeded about a hundred yards through thick
tangled underbrush. Clayton halted his brigade to adjust their alignment. Colonel John Carter of the 38th Tennessee of Wright's Brigade raced over to Clayton on foot. He informed Clayton that he was marching in the wrong direction and was in great danger of being enfiladed by the enemy. Restricted by the nature of the terrain, Clayton changed directions, marching by the left flank and filing obliquely to the left and rear.\textsuperscript{15}

The 1st Arkansas Battery was ordered to follow and support Clayton's Brigade. It had great difficulty in keeping up in the close woods. Captain Humphreys kept the caissons in the rear, advanced, and deployed first in line then in battery. But the woods prevented him from supporting Clayton with fire. Stewart sent Major Hatcher, assistant adjutant general, to keep a watch on Clayton's Brigade. As Stewart followed he was overtaken by an aide of General Wright of Cheatham's Division. The aide informed Stewart that Wright's Brigade had been turned and their battery captured. A little further Stewart came across Wright himself and was informed that his brigade had fallen back. Stewart ordered Brown forward in support of Clayton. The weather was cold and chilly but now the heat of battle was upon Stewart's Division.\textsuperscript{16}

Just as Clayton finished his reorientation he came under fire. (See fig. 17) Clayton's Brigade returned the fire. The regiments fired as fast as they could load. The
brigade was ordered to lie down. Clayton, realizing this was their first major action, noticed their fire was too random. He advised his officers to steady the men. They
were told to cease firing unless they had a target. Each man carried a basic load of forty rounds in the cartridge box slung over his shoulder. Firing hastily without aiming, the brigade could easily expend its basic load in less than twenty minutes. Scavenging the cartridge boxes of the wounded and dead would not extend this time by much. The enemy had the advantage of higher ground that enveloped the flanks of Clayton. Their artillery loaded with canister brutally tore into Clayton's men as they lay on the ground. The firing was intense for about one hour and then quieted. The men remained under fire for about another thirty minutes still taking heavy casualties. Colonel Holtzeclaw of the 18th Alabama was thrown from his horse and command was passed to Lieutenant Colonel Inge.17

Clayton had his staff inform his regimental commanders to prepare for a charge. Reports came back that ammunition was becoming critical. Clayton reconsidered and sent Lieutenant River from the battery back to Stewart requesting assistance. Clayton's Brigade had expended close to fifty-four thousand rounds in this brief battle. The majority were fired high over their enemy's heads or slapped harmlessly into the tree trunks. The line was formed but instead of attacking the order came to march by the left flank and them to fall back. Brown's Brigade was close behind Clayton's, so close many were killed and wounded from the fire directed at Clayton. In Newman's Battalion of
Brown's Brigade two men were killed and six were wounded. Included in the wounded was the commander, Colonel Newman. Brown's men watched the many wounded carried through their lines knowing what was in store for them. Clayton's Brigade fell back in some disorder but quickly rallied three-hundred yards to the rear. They reformed and began resupplying ammunition from the ordnance wagons. In the withdrawal two of Clayton's limbers were disabled, along with twelve horses killed. With difficulty, the guns were hauled back out of danger without having fired a shot.

Brown's Brigade next entered the fray. The fighting intensified and dense acrid smoke filled the air. The already poor visibility worsened with the added smoke of burning woods and brush. Twenty paces distance was all that could be seen. The noise level grew and blended into one continuous roar. Officers shouted orders could no longer be heard and confusion reigned. The cries of the wounded were masked by the terrible din. Men functioned mechanically, tearing, loading, ramming, capping and firing their pieces. Their faces were smeared with black powder, sweat and blood. "Close it up." became the chant of the file closers, "close it up!" With each volley of enemy fire men dropped in heaps. Every blast of canister cut a path through the ranks. Minutes seemed to pass like hours. Clayton's Brigade had had its baptism of fire. On the ground that Brown's men now traversed lay scores of
Alabamians. Brown's Brigade was formed in a line similar to Clayton's. Its regiments were arrayed from left to right with the 26th Tennessee, Newman's Battalion, 32d Tennessee, 45th Tennessee and the 18th Tennessee. The brigade frontage was approximately fourteen-hundred feet with the firepower of twelve-hundred muskets. 19

Stewart's Division was facing Dick's and Beatty's brigades of Van Cleve's Union division. Their brigades were arrayed in two successive lines of battle. These brigades had just been ordered into battle. They had crossed the La-Fayette road moving from west to east when they had run into Clayton's Brigade. The Union brigades were later joined by E. King's brigade that fell in on their right flank. Brown's Brigade advanced at the double quick. Companies A and E of the 26th Tennessee under the command of Captain Cash deployed forward as skirmishers. At 150 yards Brown's men ran into the same withering fire that Clayton's had. The Union rifle fire of the three brigades was reinforced by three artillery batteries, two to Brown's front and one to his right flank. Brown ordered his brigade to fire as it advanced. Brown's Brigade advanced four-hundred yards through the fire. They pushed the Union first line of battle back on the subsequent line. (see fig. 18) Colonel Lillard of the 26th Tennessee fell from the fire of the Union second line and command was passed to Major Saffell. Brown, like Clayton, could not employ his artillery battery
because of the restrictive terrain. Brown was unhorsed by canister fire. Brown's Brigade was momentarily checked but then succeeded in routing the Union second line of battle and reaching the crest of the ridge.20

Figure 18. Brown's Attack
(Map by author)

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The fighting intensified as the distance between the two forces shortened. Colonel Palmer, while leading the 18th Tennessee was shot through the right shoulder but was saved by the timely application of a tourniquet by his men. Brown's men succeeded in recapturing the battery of Wright's Brigade on the ridgeline. They also killed some of the horses and gunners from two Federal batteries. A soldier of the 18th Tennessee recalled the close fighting. He remembered charging the guns and being splattereded with the brains and hair of a comrade to his front as well as being burned by the powder discharge of the cannons. By accident, probably because of the confusion resulting from dark uniforms, the 18th Tennessee fired into some of Longstreet's troops advancing in support. Brown's Brigade passed beyond five guns the Federals were unable to haul away. The infantrymen of Brown's Brigade were not allowed to break ranks to claim them but continued with the attack. Men from Brown's supporting artillery battery took the Union guns from the field as well as thirty prisoners.\textsuperscript{21}

The Federals counterattacked into Brown's right flank with the 75th Indiana Regiment. The 75th had just arrived on the field and this was their first action. The counterattack caused the collapse of Brown's right regiments, the 18th and 45th Tennessee. These regiments broke in disorder and the rest of the brigade soon followed. Major Saffell of the 26th Tennessee, acting without orders,
withdrew his regiment. Colonel Cook of the 32d Tennessee saw no support on either flank and ordered the withdrawal of his regiment. Part of the 18th Tennessee stayed in place on the ridgeline covering the withdrawal of the brigade until relieved. Brown's men passed through Bate's as they lay on the ground. Portions of the brigade rallied a short distance behind Bate's Brigade. The 32d Tennessee became separated in the withdrawal but eventually linked back up with the brigade. Part of the brigade was a short distance further back with the ordnance wagons. Brown's Brigade resupplied ammunition as it reorganized and rallied stragglers.\textsuperscript{22}

With the withdrawal of Brown's Brigade Stewart ordered Bate's "crack" brigade to advance. Bate the "Old War-horse" rode over to Colonel Smith of the 20th Tennessee and said:

\begin{quote}
Now, Smith, now, Smith. I want you to sail on those fellows like you were a wild cat. Smith turned and ordered: Attention Battalion! Fix bayonets! Forward! Double-quick! March!\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

At 5 P.M. Bate's Brigade moved at the double quick with no skirmishers forward. Bate's Brigade was also formed in a single line of battle. From left to right the brigade was formed with the 15/37th Tennessee, 58th Alabama, 37th Georgia, 20th Tennessee and Caswell's Battalion of Sharpshooters. The brigade frontage was twelve-hundred feet with the firepower of its 1,080 muskets. The decision not to employ skirmishers was driven by the close proximity
of the enemy. Double canister greeted Bate’s men. "The only words to be heard above the roar of battle were: Close up and forward, men!" 24

Bate’s line was overlapped by the enemy, yet it continued to advance. A portion of the 37th Georgia became disoriented in the attack and intermingled with a regiment of Law’s Brigade. The enemy had reformed out in the middle of the open Brotherton Field and was attempting to contain the penetration. The fire was intense. Bate’s three right units, the 4th Georgia Battalion, the 20th Tennessee and the 37th Georgia were enfiladed. The three commanders of these units were wounded along with about 25 percent of their commands. The three units broke. The enemy continued to push on Bate’s right flank and captured a field gun and courier. Bate’s units quickly reformed and recaptured their gun. The flag of the 51st Tennessee of Wright’s Brigade was recaptured. Bate’s Brigade then split into two parts. The 58th Alabama and 15th/37th Tennessee continued to press across the LaFayette Road to the west. The 4th Georgia Battalion, 20th Tennessee and the 37th Georgia moved into the woods on the north side of the Brotherton field. The 15th/37th were joined by a detachment of the 4th Alabama. While the commander of the 15th/37th was integrating these troops into his line the brigade moved out without his knowledge. When he realized the brigade had moved he ordered three times three for Tennessee and charged.
the enemy at a run. With a shrill rebel yell they captured four pieces of artillery before withdrawing and finding their brigade again. The Eufaula Battery carried four captured guns and one caisson to Alexander's Bridge and remained there for the night.\textsuperscript{25}

Stewart, sensing the critical moment, decided to send Clayton's Brigade in support of Bate. As Clayton's Brigade advanced, Colonel Rudler of the 37th Georgia thought a general advance had been ordered and told his regiment to charge. This order was given just as the 36th Alabama was passing through the 37th Georgia. Both units intermingled and advanced. It was with great difficulty that they were later separated. The 58th Alabama of Bate's Brigade intermingled with the 36th Alabama as well. When the commander of the 58th finally reported back to Bate he was told: "You have done right; I take my hat off to your regiment." At this point the enemy was routed. Companies A and K of the 58th Alabama, along with elements of the 36th and 38th Alabama captured twenty to thirty prisoners and three guns of a Federal battery. Major Thornton of the 58th Alabama was wounded in the foot but mounted a stray artillery horse to keep up with his regiment. The scene became a circus. Union troops fled in all directions while panicked horses ran amok with limbers and caissons. Confederate ranks lost their organization. Units split and
intermingled while some advanced, others withdrew and still others held in place. (See fig. 19)

Figure. 19 Bate's and Clayton's Attacks
(Map by author)

While observing the action Stewart and his staff encountered a number of yellow jacket nests. Ridley of Stewart's staff
would later recall:

... the kicking of the horses and their ungovernable actions came near breaking up one of the lines. Blue Jackets in front of us, yellow jackets upon us, and death missiles around and about us...27

While the brigades of Bate and Clayton exploited their success, Brown's Brigade completed resupply behind the ridge line. Brown received an erroneous report of enemy approaching on his left flank, and he quickly reacted. He readjusted his line and threw out a strong screen of skirmishers. Once Brown had discovered the report was in error he readjusted his line and reported to Stewart.28

Clayton realized other regiments were accompanying his brigade in the pursuit. He especially noted the excellent order of the 58th Alabama of Bate's Brigade who joined with his Alabamians. Clayton's Brigade continued west one half mile beyond the LaFayette road to the Tanyard, overrunning an enemy battery along the way. Bate's troops hauled the guns back. One of Clayton's staff officers reported the approach of strong enemy force (Brannan's division) from the north. Another staff officer reported cavalry (Wilder) approaching from the distant south. Negley's division was also approaching from the southwest. Union General Reynolds had rallied all available forces in the area, including twenty cannon, and was hammering Stewart's exposed forces from three sides. Sensing the danger of his exposed position Clayton ordered the
withdrawal of his brigade. Bate pulled back the portion of his brigade that had veered to the north.

The withdrawal was quite organized considering the circumstances. As the sun set, Bate's and Clayton's battered brigades rallied and reformed on the ridgeline east of the LaFayette road. (See fig. 20) They quickly resupplied themselves with ammunition. The men of Bate's Brigade armed with smoothbores quickly exchanged them for Yankee Enfields discarded by the routed troops. Stewart ordered Clayton to orient his brigade toward an expected threat from the southwest. Brown's Brigade was brought forward to the left front of Clayton's. Stewart personally placed Brown's battery on the ridge line. Brown put forward a line of skirmishers and was ordered to hold the position for the night. The enemy was 250 to three-hundred yards in front of Clayton's line. The men were ordered to lie on their arms for the night. After Stewart's early conversation with Bragg he had not seen a superior officer all day. After nightfall he sent a staff officer back to report to Buckner. Stewart received instructions to remain in position until further orders.

The night turned extremely cold. Frost lay on the ground. The wounded suffered greatly and the stink of burnt flesh was in the air. To ward off the cold some of Brown's men started fires. The enemy spotted the flash of flames and opened up with artillery and small arms knocking limbs
from the trees. Brown personally came forward and reprimanded the offenders, forbidding fires for the remainder of the night. The men of Stewart's Division were disheartened by the noise of activity within the Union lines. James Cooper of the 20th Tennessee would recall: "All night long the Yankees were busy arraying their lines."
and the clatter of thousands of axes, fortifying, and the rolling of artillery to positions... They could only imagine what was in store for them the next day. The heart-rending sounds of the wounded were all about. During the night Clayton's pickets brought in about forty prisoners, some of whom were company grade officers.32

The first day of the Battle of Chickamauga was what today would be called a meeting engagement, a non-linear battlefield typified by confusion and uncertainty. Just like today, those units with good leadership, responsive battle drill and cool heads prevailed. Why some units were overrun and others succeeded is hard to measure. Those that seized the initiative and were willing to take risks prevailed. The timid and cautious were swept away. Stewart's tactical formation of column of brigades was probably driven by the narrow frontage presented. However, his experience at Perryville with this type formation may have influenced his decision. Stewart's tactical formations followed the doctrine manual exactly. His brigades formed in a single line of two ranks. The order was close with elbows touching. The spacing between units was difficult to maintain within the dense wooded terrain. The regiments continuously used the double quick step developed by Hardee. The technique of having a brigade lie down lessened their vulnerability but complicated the already difficult loading process. What was unique about Stewart's tactical
formations was how he employed them. From Shiloh he learned the lessons of feeding successive lines into battle, one behind the other. There, the lines intermingled, command and control was lost and everyone ran out of ammunition at about the same time.

On this first day of battle Stewart sent only one brigade into action at a time. When that brigade reached its culminating point he retired it and sent in the next. The initial brigade would then resupply and reorganize. This kept a fresh brigade attacking against the enemy, who soon were overwhelmed. This method also kept a ready reserve under Stewart's control. When Stewart sensed the critical moment he sent this additional brigade in support and completed the breakthrough of the enemy line. Despite the woods, smoke and noise Stewart was effectively able to command and control this type of employment. Stewart's logistics were kept close behind and moved with his division. Other divisions had to completely pull their brigades out of line and go back to their trains sites. This was not the case with Stewart's Division. This method is similar to today's employment of attack helicopter battalions, one company attacking, one resupplying, and the other enroute back to the battle.

Some of the problems Stewart encountered are the same seen today at the Army's National Training Center. Stewart's division had problems identifying friendly units.
and fired on them. Improper flank coordination caused intermingling with adjacent units on both flanks. Stewart fought, just as we expect to fight today, on a dirty battlefield with the problems incurred with command and control. Stewart's artillery was badly managed at brigade level. The terrain was not conducive to its employment.

With the brigade commanders closely involved in the fight Stewart on several occasions placed their batteries. For this battle it would have been better to retain them at division under Stewart's chief of artillery. Passage of lines, as always, is a difficult mission. When Stewart attempted to pass his brigades through one another some regiments joined the passing brigade. Stewart's medical units, although well positioned, were quickly overwhelmed by the massive casualties. Light discipline was breached by some during the night but upon discovery the chain of command quickly reinforced it.

On the Union side facing Stewart, the brigades of Dick and Beatty were each tactically deployed in two successive lines of battle. This lessened the amount of firepower they were able to apply against Stewart's brigades. When the Union first line broke it fell back masking the second line's ability to fire on the pursuing Confederates. However, the Union batteries made up for the shortfall in fire power, sometimes endangering friend as
well as foe. The local counterattack conducted by the 75th Indiana was effective and well timed.

In Summary, Stewart achieved tactical success on the first day of battle. His choice of tactical employment was a contributor to that success. However, without corps or army operational orchestration the success was not decisive for the overall battle. The later attacks of Bushrod Johnson's and John Hood's divisions were in no way coordinated with Stewart's efforts. Stewart's leadership was a part of this success. It was demonstrated by his calming influence when steadying his division as it waited for action. When the orders were unclear he sought face to face clarification with the army commander. He showed initiative in deciding when and where to attack. In turn, Stewart encouraged initiative among his subordinates. Clayton was given discretionary orders when sent into the attack. Stewart was well forward and at the point of decision at all times. The discipline of Stewart's Division was shown by his men not breaking ranks to capture enemy guns but continuing with the attack. Upgrading their capability by scavenging better weapons also showed initiative. When leaders fell, others quickly took their place. When Stewart was unable to join Polk he should have sent couriers to inform Buckner or Bragg of his situation. This was not done till after nightfall. The Confederate army's best chance for victory was this first day of battle.
The Union commander was still concentrating his forces and moving to the battlefield. This prevented the defender from preparing his position with breastworks. Such was not the situation on the following day.

In conclusion, Stewart’s Division demonstrated its tactical proficiency on both the eighteenth and nineteenth of September. On both days Stewart and his division proved their sound tactical capabilities. The next chapter will follow Stewart’s Division into the second and last day of the battle. Some of the same problem were to reappear. Having taken advantage of the night the Union forces would provide a warm welcome for Stewart’s Division.
CHAPTER 4

NOTES


3Rev. S. M. Cherry to Rev. J. William Jones, D. D., Minister Sketches How he conducted Services During Hectic Days of Civil Conflict, Chattanooga Free Press, 21 September 1938, clipping in Hamilton County Bicentennial Library, Chattanooga, Tennessee.: Ridley, Battles & Sketches, 206-08.: O.R., XXX, Pt. 2, 357.: Hampton, An Eyewitness, 29.: Connelly, Autumn Glory, 198, 201.: Arndt Stickles, Simon Bolivar Buckner: Borderland Knight (University of North Carolina Press, 1940; reprint, Wilmington, North Carolina: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1987), 230 (page references are to reprint edition).: Battles & Leaders, 3:2:647.: Steele, American Campaigns, 1:431.: Times referenced in the text are only approximations. During the Civil War there were no standard times zones as we know them today. Those commanders with time pieces set them according to the position of the sun or their best guess. Many contradictions exist within the Official Records because of this fact.


O.R., XXX, Pt. 2, 361, 401, 405.; Tucker. Chickamauga, 152.; The term muskets is used in this context to represent firepower and does not distinguish between smoothbore and rifled weapons.


Ridley, *Battles & Sketches*, 220.

Tucker, *Chickamauga*, 160, 162.


31.; M'Murray, Confederate Veteran, 2:11:329.;
Bodenhamer Memoirs. Civil War Collection, TSLA.; Henry D.
Jamison. Letters and Recollections of a Confederate Soldier:
As dawn broke, Stewart's Division was quickly put under arms and stood in line of battle in expectation of an enemy counterattack. It did not come. The weather was clear and crisp with fog hanging in the low areas and smoke still adrift in the woods. Stewart saw the approach of a lone horseman unaccompanied by staff or escort. The rider's overcoat hid his badge of rank. As he neared, Stewart recognized his old roommate James Longstreet and shook his hand. In the distance, Longstreet's newly arrived troops, distinguished by their new dark gray uniforms, could be seen moving forward. Longstreet informed Stewart that he would receive his orders directly from him that day. He also relayed Bragg's scheme of maneuver to Stewart. Bragg had divided the army into two wings. The right wing was under the command of Polk and the left wing was under the command of the recently arrived Longstreet. The attack was to commence on the extreme right of the army just after daylight, and was to continue down the line by division in
succession. Stewart was to attack when the unit to his right moved.\textsuperscript{1}

Stewart informed Longstreet of his concern for his right flank. There were no Confederate units in that direction for at least a half mile. Longstreet ordered Stewart to move his unit a quarter of a mile to the north. At eight A.M. Stewart moved his division by the right flank five-hundred paces and established a new position. (see fig. 21) Brown's Brigade formed on a slight ridge, stacked arms and began constructing breastworks of rotten logs, stones and brush. Brown's battery took position on a hill to the brigade's front with orders to remain until the enemy position was taken. Although exposed to enemy shelling, the battery was ordered by Brown not to fire in order to prevent an artillery duel. Clayton's Brigade established its position a few hundred yards to Brown's rear on a parallel ridge. Bate's Brigade anchored on Brown's right and extended obliquely to the right and rear.\textsuperscript{2}

Bate threw out his battalion of sharpshooters at right angles to his line to prevent his flank from being turned. Bate's Brigade also began constructing breastworks. A section of the Eufaula Battery was placed in line between the 15/37th Tennessee and the 58th Alabama. However, the guns were soon moved, without having fired a shot, to a more favorable position. Stewart knew his division was the right flank unit of the Confederate left wing. Unsure of the
location of the left flank of the right wing he positioned Bate's Brigade to protect his exposed flank. As Brown's skirmishers moved forward they became involved in a sharp fire fight. They took six casualties and were driven in.
The skirmish line was reinforced and made good use of the terrain, pushing out 150 yards. The Union line was only four-hundred yards distant and witnessed Stewart's movement. As they lay behind their temporary fortifications, Stewart's Division came under a severe shelling. Many casualties resulted from the enemy's canister, spherical case and solid shot. The regiments were arrayed within the brigades much as they were the previous day, however, their frontages were significantly reduced by casualties.

Around 9:45 A.M., movement was discovered to Stewart's rear. This was Cleburne's Division of the army's right wing. Cleburne's Division was thrown into some confusion by the discovery of a friendly unit (Stewart) to its front as it advanced. Deshler's Brigade, Cleburne's left flank unit, was pulled out of line in an attempt to adjust. Both Stewart and Brown rushed to the scene to help coordinate the alignment and minimize the confusion. Wood's Brigade was brought on line with Brown's Brigade and halted. Deshler's Brigade was brought into position on line with Bate's also facing obliquely to the right. (see Fig. 22) This was all accomplished while still under enemy artillery fire.

Bragg and his staff were seen dashing along behind Stewart's line. Major Lee of Bragg's staff approached in search of Hill and Polk. Around 10:15 A.M., Major Lee
returned and delivered an order to Stewart to advance at once and attack the enemy. Stewart informed the staff officer of his previous orders from Longstreet and that no attack had been made on his right. Major Lee said that he had been directed by Bragg to pass along the lines and...
give the order to every division commander for every captain to attack. Stewart at once coordinated with Wood so that the advance of Brown's Brigade would have some support on its flank. Bate was ordered to move on line with Deshler's Brigade when it moved.6

Brown's and Wood's brigades stepped off at the double quick, elbow to elbow and with skirmishers forward. They drove into the enemy skirmish line. Just prior to movement, Brown's rations had arrived and were placed on the ground to the rear of the brigade line. With the order to move out the men had no time for ration issue. Clayton's Brigade was moved forward into Brown's former position. Bate noticed that Deshler's Brigade had not moved. He was informed that the brigade commander, Deshler, had just been killed. Bate sent a message to Stewart asking for instructions. He received orders to advance and attack. Bate's command received the order to advance with a shout. Clayton's and Bate's brigades moved forward to be within supporting distance of Brown and Wood. Bate's battalion of sharpshooters was kept deployed at right angles to the brigade line of battle. (see fig. 23) Their mission was to protect the right flank of the brigade and provide early warning. Stewart's Division then advanced under a storm of shot and shell.7

Stewart's men rushed wildly into the attack. Colonel Searcy of the 45th Tennessee reported: "The regiment moved
forward in good order but rather too fast; it seemed impossible to restrain the men." In some cases they could not be restrained and alignment was broken and regiments became separated. The 18th Alabama of Clayton's Brigade followed the lead of A Company and broke into a run. The men of the 18th were winded prior to reaching the point where they should have started the charge. The men of Bate's 58th Alabama advanced cheering on the run. Stewart's Division was partially masked as it climbed a small hill. Upon cresting it the men came under a devastating fire. An enemy battery opened up to their front and one to their right both supported by small arms. Clayton was struck by a canister round and forced to dismount for a short time. 

Figure 23. Stewart's Morning Attack
(Map by author)
The enemy's first line of resistance broke. They withdrew from their log barricades to a second line of breastworks. The Union breastworks were about two feet high and not entrenched into the ground. As the Confederates continued their advance they came under heavy enfilading fire on their right. Wood's Brigade broke and withdrew in confusion to the rear disrupting the advance of Bate's Brigade. (see fig. 24) Brown's Brigade continued another seventy-five yards to within fifty yards of a Federal battery and defensive line. Brown's Brigade then passed into an open field. In this exposed position Brown's unsupported right came under a terrible crossfire of musketry and artillery. Brown's two right regiments, the 45th and 18th Tennessee, gave way in disorder and fled back to their starting position. All efforts by Brown to rally these two regiments were in vain. Three men of the 18th Tennessee refused to withdraw and waited until the next brigade came forward. Corporal Soper, acting color bearer of the 18th, refused to retire until directly ordered by his commander.9

Bate's Brigade advanced without support on its right flank. The smoke became so dense from the enemy guns that Lieutenant Colonel Smith, commander of the 37th Georgia, could only see his regiment for brief intervals. Bate moved to his right rear and asked Major General Cleburne, who was nearby, for assistance. Cleburne had no troops he could
Figure 24. Stewart's Morning Attack Continued
(Map by author)

spare. Easte was compelled to withdraw the right wing of his brigade or uselessly sacrifice it. The right wing, consisting of the 37th Georgia, 20th Tennessee and the 4th
Georgia Battalion of Sharpshooters, withdrew in good order. The right wing initially reformed in front of Bate's hastily prepared breastworks from that morning and then moved behind them. Bate's left wing, consisting of the 18th Alabama and 15/37th Tennessee, continued the advance while covering the withdrawal of the right wing. The 58th Alabama held at the woodline exchanging fire with the enemy. The 58th used the cover of trees, logs and folds in the ground in an attempt to protect themselves from the enemy fire. The enemy was pushed back behind its defenses. The 15/37th continued on unsupported but eventually was forced back. Colonel Jones, commander of the 58th Alabama, had received no orders to hold his position, advance or retire. Acting without orders he withdrew his regiment. The three commanders of Bate's right wing were wounded in the previous day's battle. Bate felt it was appropriate to remain with that wing of his brigade. He dispatched Lieutenant Blanchard of his staff to monitor the activities of the left wing's advance.

The remainder of Brown's Brigade, with Clayton's and part of Bate's following in support, pushed through a cornfield and across the LaFayette Road. Clayton's Brigade was greatly scattered. This was caused by soldiers being winded, having advance too quickly, and the disruptive effect of some of Wood's units fleeing through their ranks. An enemy battery was situated on the road facing south
enfilading Stewart's line. Just a few yards on the east side of the road the division was stopped. New enemy batteries had been put in position heavily supported by infantry. Stewart's command was unable to advance any further in this fire. The division risked total destruction if it remained exposed in the open field and was therefore forced to withdraw to its starting position. Stewart's Division fell back with several enemy field pieces. The Confederates thought it was a wonderful sight to see the Yankee guns running to the rear, driven by Yankee drivers and guarded by two to three Confederates per piece.

Confusion became the norm for the three brigades of Stewart's Division. Some of Brown's units broke and fell back through Clayton's Brigade causing great confusion. The 32d Tennessee of Brown's Brigade retired in disorder and partially reformed on the LaFayette Road. The 32d was still exposed to the flanking fire and Brown ordered them to return to their breastworks. Upon return the 32d found their breastworks occupied by Clayton's Brigade. Th 32d formed to the rear of Clayton's Brigade and began to rally the remainder of Brown's returning units. The 18th Tennessee had lost all its field grades and Captain Mathew was now in command. Three color bearers of the 18th had fallen in quick succession in this charge. While reforming his line Brown was slightly wounded by a spent canister...
round and passed command to Colonel Cook. Blanchard, of Bate's staff, reported to his commander that the left wing of the brigade was withdrawing in good order. Bate met them personally and placed them in line with his other wing. Lieutenant Colonel Frayser of the 15/37th Tennessee sent forward a party to retrieve the wounded fearing they would be burned. The grasses and bushes were again on fire. Some wounded did burn and the discharge of their guns in the fire could be heard.¹²

During the charge Dawson's Battery, of Brown's Brigade, was exposed to a most destructive fire. The battery lost six men and fifteen horses without firing a shot. The battery was forced to retire, pulling two pieces off by hand. The horses had been without water and food for two days and were suffering greatly. Bate's artillery was positioned behind the center of his brigade but was unable to support the attack. Clayton's artillery battery, further to the rear, was under division control for the day and did not participate in this action.¹³

The Union forces that opposed Stewart's morning attack were elements of two divisions. On the northern flank was Brigadier General Turchin's brigade of Major General Reynolds' division. Turchin was defending east of the LaFayette Road. The brigade's right flank turned back towards the road, positioned on very defensible ground. The next brigade in line to the south was Colonel Edward
King's brigade, also from Reynolds' division. King's brigade was defending west of the road and took the brunt of Stewart's attack. Colonel Croxton's brigade of Brigadier General Brannan's division was the next Federal brigade in line. All three Federal brigades were defending in two successive lines of battle with each line behind breastworks. The 74th Indiana had been issued an additional sixty rounds of ammunition. As Stewart's Division approached the 74th was ordered to kneel behind their breastworks. Brown's Brigade got within seventy yards of the 74th when it was ordered to stand and commence firing. Several of the other Federal units had run out of ammunition and been forced to withdraw to their second line during Stewart's attack.14

Stewart's Division reformed with Clayton's Brigade in the middle, Bate's Brigade on the right and Brown's Brigade on the left. As the men formed up, the cost of this attack was evident by the narrowed regimental frontages. Hood's Corps could be seen passing to the rear of Stewart's Division preparing to go into battle. The enemy breastworks were visible a short distance to Clayton's and Brown's front. Here the division stayed in position for the remainder of the afternoon, under random Federal shelling. In the distance could be heard Longstreet's column making its grand assault. Longstreet's attack had relieved some of
the pressure on Stewart's left flank. Hood's troops expanded across Stewart's front as they charged the Federal positions.15

Taking advantage of the situation, Stewart repositioned his division. Clayton's and Brown's brigades moved forward to the road and then moved by the right flank north about a quarter mile. Bate's Brigade followed and established his line to the rear of Clayton's Brigade. "During the reforming of the lines, Bate, Brown, Clayton, Stewart and their staffs nearly all received contusions from spent grape and canister."16 The men were ordered to lie down. Stewart was preparing to go into the attack in support of Longstreet's right flank. However, Buckner arrived and told Stewart not to attack but to hold his present position and await orders. Stewart could observe a severe struggle going on in the vicinity of the Kelly House. The 26th Tennessee of Brown's Brigade was ordered back into the woods two-hundred yards to their right in order to lessen the effects of the enemy artillery fire. The division waited the long hours of the afternoon laying in line of battle. They watched through the smoke and listened as the fighting on both their right and left intensified. The enemy bombardment of their position continued. Stewart knew, from information gained from a prisoner, that the position across from his was defended by Reynolds' division.17
About 5 P.M. one of Longstreet’s staff officers rode up with orders for Stewart to move forward upon the enemy. Stewart was also ordered to place a brigade in support of an artillery battalion occupying a slight rise in the cornfield to the division’s left. Brown’s Brigade, now under the command of Colonel Cook, was directed to support that artillery. The 26th Tennessee moved under fire across the open field to support a battery positioned directly on the LaFayette Road. The 32d Tennessee was ordered to move and lay down behind a battery in the open cornfield. The trampled corn allowed no concealment so most of the men lay between the ridges of the plowed field. The remainder of the brigade’s regiments were positioned to the rear of the batteries on the slight hill in the field. A fearful artillery duel was begun. The federal breastworks were set on fire by the shelling.

Clayton’s Brigade with Bate’s Brigade following was ordered to assault the enemy position. (see fig. 25) This assault happened to coincide with the Federal order to withdraw. Clayton’s Brigade caught the majority of the Federals in the open, away from their breastworks. The enemy quickly gave way and was routed. Clayton’s men leaped the breastworks and began pursuing the Federals through the Kelly Field. Clayton halted his brigade about midway into the field and continued to fire into the fleeing Federals.
The dust in the fields and roads was from four to six inches deep. From thousands of fleeing union feet arose a great dust cloud.19

Other Confederate units were entering the Kelly Field
from all directions. Clayton had halted his line for fear of intermingling and subjecting his brigade to friendly fire. A Federal brigade of regulars and regiments of Ohio volunteers were mixed in confusion throughout the field. Major Hatcher, Stewart's assistant adjutant general, led the staff and escort company into the center of the regulars. This desperate action cut the regular brigade in half and contributed to the capture of four-hundred to five-hundred prisoners. The 38th and 18th Alabama were sent back across the field to secure a Federal hospital established around the Kelly House. Three hundred prisoners along with a like number of wounded were captured in the vicinity of the hospital. Smoke and dust covered everything and everyone. The dust was so thick men could hardly breathe or see through it.

Bate's Brigade had changed front forward on his right battalion and followed Clayton's Brigade through the Federal position. The Eufaula Battery closely followed Bate's infantry despite the difficult terrain. Seeing the opportunity for employment in the open field Stewart ordered Major Eldridge, chief of artillery, to bring up the battery. Eldridge shouted: "Bring up the Eufaula Battery! Forward! double quick! march!" The battery charged into position forward of Bate's line. It fired sixty-nine rounds of shell and canister into the fleeing Union forces. The Eufaula Battery would later claim this as the closing shots of the
battle. In the twilight the white flag could be found as Federal troops came forward and stacked arms in surrender. The "Rebel Yell" rose alone the lines. Even some of the Confederate wounded, lying in the fields, joined in the rejoicing. Stewart's men began collecting the spoils that had been abandoned by the late occupants of Kelly Field. Stewart's position became a gathering place for many of the celebrants. "The generals who gathered included Longstreet, Stewart, Buckner, Bushrod Johnson, Law, Bate, Clayton and Brown." The generals shook hands and passed around congratulations. Longstreet ordered his wing to hold in place, restock ammunition boxes, collect stragglers and prepare everything for a pursuit in the morning. Brown's Brigade was moved by the right flank about a half mile to the east of the LaFayette Road and ordered to stack arms and rest for the night. Bate's Brigade along with Clayton's stacked arms and rested within the former enemy position. The artillery batteries were moved to the creek to water, feed and rest their horses. Some men attended the wounded in the immediate vicinity while others were ordered to begin collecting the accouterments, weapons and other spoils spread throughout the fields. The long awaited provisions were brought up and distributed. Fires were built with fence rails to heat coffee and rations and provide warmth to the tired soldiers. After the excitement of the day's events had subsided the men lay down among the dead for a...
long needed rest. Picket lines were established forward and details were sent back to the creek for water. The second day of the Battle of Chickamauga was over.

From the Confederate perspective the second day of battle can be characterized as deliberate attack. However, some of the essential elements of a successful deliberate attack were missing. These missing elements were: reconnaissance, coordination and preparation. No attempt was made at either the division or wing level to properly discern the enemy position behind its screen of skirmishers. Sufficient time was available because the dawn attack was not conducted as scheduled. A reconnaissance in force, consisting of a heavy line of skirmishers would have accomplished this essential task. This force would have driven in the enemy skirmish line and discovered the disposition of the enemy's main defenses. It would have discovered the bend in the Union line at the point where Stewart conducted his attack. With this information it is doubtful that Stewart would have attacked in such a fashion and exposed his right flank.

The second essential task not accomplished was coordination. The responsibility for this omission lies more at army and wing level than it does with Stewart's Division. This failure to coordinate resulted in the confusing overlap of the army wings. This led to Stewart's "ad hoc" arrangement with Wood in an attempt to coordinate
an attack on the enemy position. The resulting failure of the attack was predictable. The last essential task not accomplished was preparation. This was more a result of the restrictive nature of the terrain than a tactical omission on the part of Stewart. With the density of the woods Stewart was not able to prepare the enemy position with an artillery bombardment prior to attacking. The enemy was in prepared defensive positions, behind breastworks, and suffered under no artillery preparation. It is surprising that Stewart was able to penetrate the position at all.

On the second day of battle Stewart did not have the tactical success he did the day prior. Stewart did not attempt to attack in column of brigades this second day. It is doubtful if this formation would have been successful even if attempted. When Stewart's brigades crested the hill and came into the open field they still would have been exposed to the devastating fire of Turchin's brigade on their flank. Longstreet halted any support on Stewart's left flank and the early rout of Wood's brigade left Stewart's flanks unsupported. While unsupported flanks are typical in a meeting engagement they are deadly in a deliberate attack against a prepared position.

Stewart's leadership ability and the discipline of his unit were again in evidence on the second day. The division quickly stood to arms in the morning and was ready for action. When Stewart received Bragg's orders to attack
he questioned them but obeyed. This behavior was unique for the Army of Tennessee. Realizing the exposed nature of his right flank he deployed Bate's Brigade obliquely to protect it. Bate in turn deployed his battalion of sharpshooters in like manner. When the problem with the right wing developed, Stewart and Brown quickly reacted and went to the point of decision. When rations arrived prior to the attack it was understood the mission came first. The frenzied nature of Stewart's attack was again characteristic of the fighting quality and reputation of this division. Stewart's ability to "see the battle" was again shown when he attempted to attack a second time to support Longstreet's breakthrough. However, the interference of Buckner prevented Stewart's initiative from again coming into play in this battle. For a second time in as many days Stewart's Division was denied a decisive role in the battle.

Stewart's second attack made at dusk was against the union forces already pulling out of position. The attack was better coordinated and benefited from an artillery preparation. Some lessons evidently had been learned from the previous days fighting. Stewart's subordinates had halted their units rather than let them intermingle and be subjected to fratricide. Stewart's Division maintained discipline in a situation where it could have quickly broken down. Exhilarated by the victory and the opportunity for
pursuit. Stewart's men demonstrated restraint and compassion for their former enemies.

The tactics used by Stewart's Division again were standard. The order was close with the brigades and regiments deployed in a doubled ranked single line of battle. Bate's use of his sharpshooter battalion was unique. Some of the units became winded when they increased the pace from the double quick to the run too soon in their attack. Again the problem of artillery employment was seen. Stewart's artillery was misused again on the second day. One battery was placed in an exposed position and devastated. It was not even allowed to fire in its own defense. Another battery sat out the battle in the rear. When the artillery finally was able to be utilized at sundown only one battery was available.

On the Union side, the defenders had made good use of their time. The position on the east side of LaFayette Road was situated on very defensible terrain. This position provided mutual support to the positions west of the road to their south. With two successive lines of prepared defenses, the positions were virtually impregnable. Artillery was well placed and repositioned within the defensive line.

In conclusion. Stewart's Division had again demonstrated its tactical proficiency during the last day of the Battle of Chickamauga. Technology had stacked the deck against Stewart this day with the defender armed with
rifled muskets behind prepared breastworks. Technology coupled with Bragg's inability to effectively orchestrate his plan doomed Stewart's attack to failure. The fact that some limited gains were made into the Federal position was a testament to the tenacity of Stewart's men, rather than through any skill of tactical or operational employment. Frontal assaults, even when successful were a costly affair. More poignant was their wastefulness when they failed.
CHAPTER 5
NOTES


21O.R., XXX, Pt. 2. 382. 399. 403. 413.: Terry H. Cahal Letters, Civil War Collection, TSLA


24Ridley, Battles & Sketches, 225.


CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

IT[HISTORY] PROVIDES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROFIT BY THE STUMBLIES AND TUMBLES OF OUR FORERUNNERS.

B.H. Liddell Hart, Why Don't We Learn From History

The purpose of this thesis was to study in detail a commander and the tactical employment of his division. A study, using essentially primary source material, was initiated to answer the critical question: what happened? The goal was to determine the truth, despite the passage of time, by comparison and analysis of many accounts of the same incident. If this thesis was written only to tell a story it would have ended at that point. However, analysis was conducted to answer the question: why did it happen? To answer this question a review of the experiences of the participants and their leadership was necessary to evaluate the causes for their actions. A final question, which is the purpose of this chapter, must be answered: What is the significance of this study?

Civil War tactical doctrine did not exist as we know doctrine today. The Civil War tactical commander was equipped only with a drill book when he went to war.

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Today's tactical doctrine is flexible and adjusts to the conditions of METT-T: (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, and Time). The Civil War commander, without this flexible doctrine, continued to attempt to execute his drill despite the conditions stated above. Civil War tactics had evolved with very minor changes from those used by Frederick the Great a century before. The Mexican-American War had done nothing but confirm the validity of Scott's drill book approach to war. The Mexican War had been the only large scale combat experience for the leadership prior to the outbreak of the Civil War. "The idea was to bring the dense linear formation close to the enemy's position, punish him with a volley and then finish him with the bayonet." A capability to develop doctrine did not exist in the army at that time. The boards held to review the manuals were simply reviewing translations of foreign manuals. There was no attempt to initiate new techniques or procedures independent of the European experience. ²

Like today's commander, the Civil War commander was concerned with training. Civil War commanders were initially faced with large volunteer armies. As the war progressed conscription began. In the North large numbers of foreign born contingents were added to the force. This resulted in a tremendous training burden on the leadership. Much time was required to train these inexperienced troops in the tactical drills of the day. The company-grade
officers and NCOs were trained as drill instructors to assist in the training and control of these tactical formations. To make any significant change in the tactical doctrine would have required a significant change in the entire training base. However, some of the basics of later day tactical doctrine were there with Hardee's "comrades in battle" and the more flexible skirmish drill tactics.3

Some of the tactical problems faced by Civil War commanders still exist today. Today's mechanized commanders still face the decision between line and column. They use the column for speed and control and the line formation to deliver fire. Battle drill is used to speedily move from one formation to another. A unit caught in column or on an exposed flank suffers the same problem as his distant predecessors. The difference is that today's commander attempts to avoid the enemy's strength and maneuver against his weakness, while taking advantage of the conditions as they exist on the battlefield(METT-T). Technology had created a situation with very few options. If the commander attempted to disperse his force he faced the problem of the reduction of firepower and limited communications capability. Units had to remain massed because of the limitations of the single-shot muzzle-loader and the span of control in a non-wireless environment. Technology was definitely on the side of the defender. The individual soldiers, not their leaders, were beginning to grasp an
appreciation for terrain. When given the opportunity the soldiers were quick to adapt to terrain conditions. The heavy skirmish line in open order and the attack in succession of rushes were steps in the right direction. However, they were not in widespread use at the time of the Battle of Chickamauga.

Major General Alexander P. Stewart was a product of Nineteenth Century military training. By nature he was not an innovator or nonconformist. His West Point background and educational experiences coupled with his leadership ability made him an excellent commander. This background also made him an excellent trainer and developer of junior leaders. The tactics used by Stewart in the Battle of Chickamauga were not revolutionary. On the nineteenth of September Stewart attacked using the "column of brigades' formation. This attack was a "succession of lines" attack. Despite the nature of the terrain Stewart’s formations were close ordered and the alignment was maintained as much as possible. The interval between units and disposition of forces was in compliance with the manuals of the day.

The minor modification that Stewart made was in his timing. When Civil War commanders attacked in successive lines the practice was to commit one line behind the other until they all mingled together into the enemy. Stewart did not do this on the nineteenth of September. He only committed one brigade at a time into battle until the
critical point was reached. Each brigade fought cohesively until its culminating point was reached and then it was replaced by another brigade. This also facilitated Stewart's ability to command and control in such close terrain. Stewart's use of logistics complimented and facilitated his maneuver. Stewart's brigade commanders did not deviate from the standard tactics of the day. They did, however, practice the technique of lying down in line of battle to reduce their vulnerability to enemy fire.

On the twentieth of September Stewart again attacked using the traditional tactics of the day. Stewart's attack this day is hard to evaluate or analyze. His attack was complicated by the overlap with the army's right wing and all the ensuing confusion this brought about. The "ad hoc" nature of this attack against an entrenched prepared defender was predictable in outcome. With the disillusionment of the units accompanying Stewart, Wood's and Deshler's brigades, he ended up attacking with one brigade forward and two brigades back. Added to this was the fact that Stewart's Division was attacking with its flank exposed to a bend in the Union line. Despite these problem Stewart's attack did succeed in a limited penetration of the Union first line of breastworks. This testifies to the fighting quality of Stewart's Division, not to any tactical innovations on his part. One again, similar to the previous day's encounter, Stewart's formations were
close ordered. No attempt was made on the twentieth to time these attacks or sequence the brigades as on the previous day. This was probably due to Bragg's insistence upon an immediate attack along the entire front. Bate's use of his sharpshooter battalion on his right flank was unique but was only a variation of the current skirmish drill.

As stated in an earlier chapter, Stewart's tactics were probably based on his experiences prior to the Battle of Chickamauga. Shiloh, Perryville and Murfreesboro had exposed Stewart to large scale warfare. At Shiloh he witnessed the problems of an attack in successive lines on an extended frontage in wooded terrain. From this he learned an appreciation for command and control under those conditions. As a brigade commander during the Battle of Perryville he took part in a successful division attack in column of brigades. If the conditions were right this technique had a chance for success, although a costly one. At Murfreesboro he witnessed an attack conducted while attempting a difficult wheeling movement. From this could be learned that tactical drill, better designed for the parade field, did not work under the conditions found on the battlefield and especially in the Western Theater of operations. Stewart's timing on the nineteenth and use of logistics were common-sense adaptations based on an intellect trained in mathematical problem solving.
Was it smart for Stewart to send his most inexperienced brigade into battle as the lead element on the nineteenth of September? John Keegan's book, *The Face of Battle*, describes the effects of battle on those not in the forward ranks at Waterloo. As reviewed in an earlier chapter, Clayton's brigade went into the fight with Brown's brigade close on its heels. Brown's brigade took casualties without the ability to return fire. Brown's men witnessed the destruction of Clayton's ranks and Clayton's wounded passing through their ranks to the rear. Keegan suggests that Napoleon's most veteran unit broke under fire because of the rear rank's inability to deal with the terror of the unknown. Brown's seasoned brigade was able to withstand this pressure better than Clayton's less experienced unit. Clayton's brigade was able to see the enemy and return fire. This may have been a consideration as Stewart arrayed his order of battle on the morning of the nineteenth of September.

What effect did Stewart's tactics have? Stewart's tactics on the nineteenth of September contributed to the tactical success of his division on that day. His tactics resulted in a "steam-roller" effect on the Union opposition. The Union brigades were arrayed in two successive lines per brigade requiring two Union brigades to equal the firepower of one of Stewart's brigades. When the Union first line broke, it fell back and disrupted the second rank just as
one of Stewart's brigades was closing. When Stewart determined the critical moment he sent in an additional brigade while continuing to maintain one in reserve. This resulted in success for Stewart's immediate sector of the battlefield. Why this was not decisive or supported has already been previously discussed. On the twentieth, Stewart's tactics had little effect on the outcome of battle in his sector.

What impact did Stewart's tactics have on his casualty totals? Overall, Confederate casualties were higher than Union casualties in this battle. Ross' Army of the Cumberland lost a total of 16,170 out of 56,965 men. Bragg's Army of Tennessee lost 18,454 out of an approximate 66,000 men. These figures were a result of the Confederates being on the tactical offensive throughout the battle. With the advantages to the defender this result was predictable. Stewart's casualties were 1,704. This was above average when compared to the other divisions in the left wing. (see Table 3) Casualties within Stewart's Division are shown in Table 4. Clayton's high percentage of 42.4 was probably a result of the unit's "green status" and the high casualties sustained in its first attack on the nineteenth. Bate's Brigade had the highest percentage of Stewart's three brigades with 48.7% casualties. This was probably caused by the brigade taking on the reckless character of its leader.
TABLE 3
(Reprinted from O.R., XXX, Pt. 2, 291.)

Return of Casualties in Stewart’s division at the battle of Chickamauga, September 19 to 20, 1863.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JOHNSON’S BRIGADE.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Tennessee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Tennessee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th Tennessee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total...</td>
<td>3 05</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROWN’S BRIGADE.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Tennessee</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Tennessee</td>
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<tr>
<td>44th Tennessee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newman’s battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total...</td>
<td>5 08</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATE’S BRIGADE.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Alabama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Georgia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Georgia battalion</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd Tennessee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Tennessee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total...</td>
<td>7 50</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAYTON’S BRIGADE.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Alabama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Alabama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total...</td>
<td>6 52</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTILLERY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan’s battery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawson’s battery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey’s battery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total...</td>
<td>3 51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recapitulation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>24 217</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>12 117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total...</td>
<td>24 217</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td>12 118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 4.
(Reprinted from O.R., XXX, Pt. 2, 365, 367.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Casualties and killed in action</th>
<th>Casualties and missing in action</th>
<th>Casualties and mortally wounded</th>
<th>Total casualties and missing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOODY'S DIVISION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson's brigade</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law's brigade</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1,965</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2,069</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILAWS DIVISION</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kercheaw's brigade</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,049</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humphreys' brigade</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,149</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIGGINS' DIVISION</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson's brigade</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,374</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swart's brigade</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHNSON'S DIVISION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson's brigade</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregg's brigade</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McNair's brigade</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUCKER'S CORPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEWART'S DIVISION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESTON'S DIVISION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade's brigade</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trigg's brigade</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelly's brigade</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total infantry</td>
<td>2,562</td>
<td>4,942</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>6,503</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>7,565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Casualties: 1,090 casualties, 6,503 missing, 872 fatalities.
- Percent: 10.9% casualties, 36.2% missing, 9.3% fatalities.

---

**Casualties of the Left Wing, Army of Tennessee, in the engagement of September 20, 1863, near Chickamauga, Ga.**

---

**In action.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Mortally wounded</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brown's</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betts</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clayton's</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowley's battery</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enslin's battery</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphreys battery</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort company</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4,403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bate's reckless nature was best described in Tucker's book, *Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West*, recounting Davis' visit. Soon after the battle Confederate President Jefferson Davis toured the battlefield. When crossing the field where Stewart's Division had conducted its attack, on the nineteenth of September, he came upon a horse with the trappings of a general officer. When he inquired as to its ownership, he was told it belonged to General Bate of Stewart's Division. Next he came upon a black mare three hundred yards further across the field. Again Davis was told that it was Bate's. When Davis' party reached the former Union entrenchments he found a dead artillery horse sprawled on top of them. Davis was told that the mount had been ridden by Bate. Such was the character of the man and his brigade. On the afternoon of the nineteenth it was Bate's Brigade that splintered into separate pieces. Some regiments attacked to the west and some to the north. On the twentieth of September it was Bate's Brigade that was exposed to the flanking fire from the curve in the Union line. The brigade again split, with some parts advancing and some withdrawing. 7

If Stewart's tactics were not a radical departure from those in vogue why did he succeed and others fail? Why was the reputation of his division so high within the Army of Tennessee? Here lies the significance of this study for today's professional army officer. The answer does not lie
in tactics but in leadership. This study provides useful insight into combat leadership. Stewart's leadership and the impact it had on his division was the critical factor. The morale and fighting quality of Stewart's Division accounted for a better execution of the current tactics on the field at Chickamauga. The words of FM 100-5 apply:

Wars are fought and won by men, not machines. The human dimension of war will be decisive in the campaigns and battles of the future just as it has in the past... The most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership. Leadership provides purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. It is the leader who will determine the degree to which maneuver, fire power, and protection are maximized; who will ensure these elements are effectively balanced; and who will decide how to bring them to bear against the enemy.

Stewart epitomized these words. A further study of this battle could compare the tactics as well as the leadership styles of the different commanders and their divisions. In spite of overwhelming problems Stewart excelled and provides an example to combat leaders of today and the future.

In the final analysis and once the force is engaged, superior combat power derives from the courage and competence of soldiers, the excellence of their equipment, the soundness of their combined arms doctrine, and above all the quality of their leadership.
CHAPTER 6

NOTES


7Tucker, Chickamauga, 161.

8FM 100-5 Operations, 5, 13.

9FM 100-5 Operations, 14.
ORDER OF BATTLE OF FEDERAL FORCES
AT CHICKAMAUGA

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, U.S.A.

Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans

Fourteenth Corps
Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas

First Division
Brig. Gen. Abraham Biddle
1st Brigade: Col. Benjamin F. Scribner
3rd Brigade: Brig. Gen. John H. King

Second Division
Brig. Gen. James S. Negley
2nd Brigade: Col. William L. Stoughman
3rd Brigade: Col. William S. Wood

Third Division
Brig. Gen. John M. Brannan
1st Brigade: Col. John M. Connolly
2nd Brigade: Col. John G. Crean
3rd Brigade: Col. John H. Hoy

Fourth Division
1st Brigade: Col. John T. Wilder
2nd Brigade: Col. Edward A. King
3rd Brigade: Col. John S. Robinson

Twentieth Corps
Maj. Gen. Alexander McCook

First Division
Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis
1st Brigade: Col. Sidney P. Post
2nd Brigade: Brig. Gen. William P. Currie
3rd Brigade: Col. Henry C. Hays
Col. John A. Martin

Second Division
Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson
1st Brigade: Brig. Gen. August W. Whiffen
2nd Brigade: Col. Joseph H. Dodge

Third Division
Brig. Gen. William H. Wilton

20th Corps
Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden

First Division
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood
1st Brigade: Col. George F. Booth
2nd Brigade: Brig. Gen. George J. Wagner (in command)
3rd Brigade: Col. Charles G. Harker

Second Division
Brig. Gen. John H. Palmer
1st Brigade: Brig. Gen. Charles Craft
2nd Brigade: Brig. Gen. William H. Hazen
3rd Brigade: Col. William Green

Third Division
Brig. Gen. Horatio H. P. Van Cleave
1st Brigade: Brig. Gen. Samuel Beatty
2nd Brigade: Col. George F. Dick
3rd Brigade: Col. Sidney M. Barnes

Reserve Corps
Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger

First Division
Brig. Gen. James B. Steedman
1st Brigade: Brig. Gen. Walter C. Wintzker
2nd Brigade: Col. John B. Mitchell

Detached Brigade
Col. Daniel McCook

(c) captured  (k) killed  (w) wounded
ORDER OF BATTLE OF CONFEDERATE FORCES
AT CHICKAMAUGA

ARMS OF TENNESSEE, C.S.A.
General Braxton Bragg

Right Wing
Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk

Polk's Corps
Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk

Cheatham's Division
Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham
Jackson's Brigade: Brig. Gen. John K. Jackson
Meyers' Brigade: Brig. Gen. George W. Meyers
Smith's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Prather Smith
Wright's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Marcus J. Wright

Stahl's Brigade: Brig. Gen. O. F. Stahl

Moldman's Division
(Assigned to Longstreet)

Hill's Corps
Lt. Gen. Daniel H. Hill

Cobb's Division
Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne
Pett's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Lucien E. Pett

Donelson's Brigade: Brig. Gen. James Breckinridge 
(Assigned to Hood's Corps)

Brooke's Division
Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge
Hoke's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Benjamin H. Hoke
Hannah's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Claudio Lee

Stevens' Brigade: Brig. Gen. Marcellus A. Stevens
Walker's Reserve Corps
Maj. Gen. W. H. T. Walker

Walker's Division
Brig. Gen. States Rights Gist
Gist's Brigade: Col. P. H. Colquitt (of)
Laidlaw's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Matthew D. Laidlaw
Wilson's Brigade: Col. Claudius C. Wilson

Liddell's Division
Brig. Gen. St. John R. Liddell

Liddell's Brigade: Col. Daniel C. Govan
Waltz's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Edward C. Waltz

(g) captured (k) killed

Left Wing
Lt. Gen. James Longstreet

Beckner's Corps
Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner

Stewart's Division
Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart
Butler's Brigade: Brig. Gen. William B. Bate
Clayton's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Henry D. Bate
Hale's Brigade: Col. Edmund C. Cook

Preston's Division
Brig. Gen. William Preston
Kelley's Brigade: Col. John H. Kelley
Trigg's Brigade: Col. Robert C. Trigg

Moldman's Division (attached to Petk's Corps)
Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman
Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson
Anderson's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson
Coad's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Zachariah C. Coad

Hood's Corps
Maj. Gen. John B. Hood

Wade's Corps
Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Korshaw
Humphrey's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Benjamin C. Humphreys

Johnston's Division
Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson
Johnston's Brigade: Col. John S. Fulton
Gregg's Brigade: Brig. Gen. John Gregg
Brig. Col. Cyrus A. Sugg
McNair's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Evander McNair
McNair's Brigade: Col. David Coleman

Hood's Division
Brig. Gen. E. McPherson Law
Law's Brigade: Col. James L. Sheffield
Col. William C. Gates
Robertson's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson
Benning's Brigade: Brig. Gen. Henry L. Benning

APPENDIX B
Battles in the West
(Sears: Princeton Book Co., 1969)

page 158
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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THESIS

Alexander P. Stewart and the Tactical Employment of His Division at the Battle of Chickamauga

General Albert C. Wedemeyer's Missions to China, 1944-1947

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burgessse@Leavenworth.army.mil