cash
Brev. Brig. Gen'l
- Joined
- Feb 20, 2005
- Location
- Right here.
First of all, Jefferson Davis was not a fool, nor was he an idiot. He had a first-class mind with decades of political experience. A West Point graduate, a hero of the Mexican War, and a former Secretary of War, Davis did not take the issue of going to war lightly, and he wouldn't make the decision to go to war on a whim, or simply because his pride was wounded. The viewpoint that Lincoln maneuvered Davis into firing on Fort Sumter presupposes a Jefferson Davis with no such intellectual abilities. It presupposes a master strategist Lincoln and a Davis with no strategic forethought or abilities at all. After all, the confederates had plenty of warning about the resupply effort from Crawford, Roman, and Forsyth, who were reporting back to Davis from Washington nearly every day.
Let's look at the situation Davis was in. Secession had been stopped at seven states. The nascent confederacy was relatively tiny. "At the very least, as the most modest of the Southern imperialists envisaged it, the full-grown Confederacy would have to include Virginia, Maryland, and other slaveholding states of the Upper South and the border." [Richard N. Current, _Lincoln and the First Shot,_ p. 131] The Virginia convention voted 89-45 against secession on 4 April. "Thus, in early April, it appeared that (unless something drastic were done) the Confederacy was doomed to carry on, if possible, as a mere string of seven states, an aborted empire.
"What was worse, it appeared that, given time, one or more of the seven might abandon the Confederacy and return to the Union. If, in the lower South, true Unionists or 'reconstructionists' were few, they were nevertheless too numerous to suit the thoroughgoing, fire-eating secessionists. Especially in Alabama, the home state of the Confederate government, reconstructionism in one guise or another seeemed a threat to Southern independence. The outstanding secessionist, William L. Yancey, a resident of Montgomery, had failed to win election to the Confederate Congress. In one Alabama town this 'fire-eater' had, in a sense, actually eaten fire: he had been burned in effigy. 'We are in danger,' the _Charleston Mercury_ warned (March 25), 'of being dragged back eventually to the old political affiliation with the states and people from whom we have just cut loose.' " [Ibid., pp. 132-133]
Time was not on their side. The Mobile Mercury said, "The country is sinking into a fatal apathy and the spirit and even the patriotism of the people is oozing out under this do-nothing policy. If something is not done pretty soon, decisive, either evacuation or expulsion, the whole country will become so disgusted with the sham of southern independence that the first chance the people get at a popular election they will turn the whole movement topsy-turvy so bad that it never on earth can be righted again." [Quoted in Current, Ibid., p. 134]
In their Joint Resolution, the Virginia Assembly, without a single negative vote in both houses, said,
"JOINT RESOLUTION concerning the position of Virginia in the event of the dissolution of the Union. Adopted January 21, 1861.
"Resolved by the General Assembly of Virginia, That if all efforts to reconcile the unhappy differences existing between the two sections of the country shall prove to be abortive, then, in the opinion of the General Assembly, every consideration of honor and interest demands that Virginia shall unite her destiny with the slave-holding States of the South." [OR Series IV, Vol. I, p. 77]
Virginia was on record as saying she would join the confederacy if and when a war started.
Davis had advisors who were urging him in that direction as well. L.Q. Washington wrote, "I fear the present Virginia Convention will not pass an ordinance of secession unless a collision or war ensues; then public feeling
will force them to it. There is a majority of old Federal submissionists,
who got in by pretending to be resistance men." [OR Series I, Vol I, pp. 263-264]
"One Alabamian had warned Davis, 'Unless you sprinkle blood on the face of the Southern people they will be back in the old Union in less than ten days.' A sprinkle of blood, too, should bring the fencesitters--Virginia and the other border states--into the Confederate fold." [W. A. Swanberg, _First Blood: The Story of Fort Sumter,_ p. 286]
There are the words of Virginian Roger Pryor, who, speaking to a Charleston audience on April 10, 1861, said, "But I assure you that just as certain as tomorrow's sun will rise upon us, just so certain will Virginia be a member of the Southern Confederacy; and I will tell your Governor what will put her
in the Southern Confederacy in less than an hour by Shrewsbury clock. Strike a blow!" [Ibid.,_ p. 289]
That same day, Davis received a telegram from Louis T. Wigfall, urging, "General Beauregard will not act without your order. Let me suggest to you to send the order to him to begin the attack as soon as he is ready. Virginia is excited by the preparations, and a bold stroke on our side will complete her purposes. Policy and prudence are urgent upon us to begin at once." [Wigfall to Davis, 10 Apr 1861, quoted in Richard N. Current, _Lincoln and the First Shot,_ p. 151]
Davis was already looking to start the war at Fort Pickens in Florida, knowing in advance the Federals were not going to attack.
"It is scarcely to be doubted that for political reasons the U.S. govt. will avoid making an attack so long as the hope of retaining the border states remains. There would be to us an advantage in so placing them that an attack by them would be a necessity, but when we are ready to relieve our territory and jurisdiction of the presence of a foreign garrison that advantage is overbalanced by other considerations. The case of Pensacola then is reduced [to] the more palpable elements of a military problem and your measures may without disturbing views be directed to the capture of Fort Pickens and the defence of the harbor. You will soon have I hope a force sufficient to occupy all the points necessary for that end. As many additional troops as may be required can be promptly furnished." [Jefferson Davis to Braxton Bragg, 3 Apr 1861]
"This letter indicates that Davis was willing to start the war. He would have liked to do precisely what Ramsdell claimed Lincoln did--maneuver the enemy into firing the first shot--but the Confederate President considered such a scheme, in his own words, 'overbalanced by other considerations.' Davis counseled action--'your measures may without disturbing views be directed to the capture of Fort Pickins'--and the tone of his letter implied that he expected Bragg to take the fort should he fire the first shot." [Grady McWhiney, "The Confederacy's First Shot," _Civil War History,_ Vol XIV, No. 1, March, 1968, p. 12]
In the cabinet meeting, Toombs warned Davis that firing on Fort Sumter would inaugurate the Civil War.
"Mr. President, at this time it is suicide, murder, and will lose us every friend at the North. The firing upon that fort will inaugurate a civil war greater than any the world has yet seen." [Robert Toombs to Jefferson Davis, quoted in W. A. Swanberg, _First Blood: The Story of Fort Sumter,_ p. 286]
But Davis knew this anyway. He had predicted a civil war earlier. "When Lincoln comes in he will have but to continue in the path of his predecessor to inaugurate a civil war" [Jefferson Davis to Franklin Pierce, 20 Jan 1861]
Davis went ahead and ordered the fort reduced.
It was actually a good strategic move. It immediately brought 4 additional states into the confederacy, including, most critically, Virginia, and there had been a possibility of bringing a total of 7 in. Had all those 7 come
into the confederacy, there would have been no way for the Union to prevail. Lincoln knew the border states were crucial. So did Davis. It unified the confederate populace and suppressed thoughts of reconstructionism as they rallied around the confederacy. The malaise talk of March and early April ceased at once and was replaced with patriotic exhortations and renewed recruiting of young men into the army.
I think if we look at the total situation, the viewpoint that Davis ordered the firing on Fort Sumter to bring the upper south and the border states
into the confederacy fits the entire situation, whereas the viewpoint that Davis was merely passively reacting to bold, brilliant strategic moves made by Lincoln until he finally had to attack because there was no alternative is a misrepresentation of Davis and does him a great disservice.
Regards,
Cash
Let's look at the situation Davis was in. Secession had been stopped at seven states. The nascent confederacy was relatively tiny. "At the very least, as the most modest of the Southern imperialists envisaged it, the full-grown Confederacy would have to include Virginia, Maryland, and other slaveholding states of the Upper South and the border." [Richard N. Current, _Lincoln and the First Shot,_ p. 131] The Virginia convention voted 89-45 against secession on 4 April. "Thus, in early April, it appeared that (unless something drastic were done) the Confederacy was doomed to carry on, if possible, as a mere string of seven states, an aborted empire.
"What was worse, it appeared that, given time, one or more of the seven might abandon the Confederacy and return to the Union. If, in the lower South, true Unionists or 'reconstructionists' were few, they were nevertheless too numerous to suit the thoroughgoing, fire-eating secessionists. Especially in Alabama, the home state of the Confederate government, reconstructionism in one guise or another seeemed a threat to Southern independence. The outstanding secessionist, William L. Yancey, a resident of Montgomery, had failed to win election to the Confederate Congress. In one Alabama town this 'fire-eater' had, in a sense, actually eaten fire: he had been burned in effigy. 'We are in danger,' the _Charleston Mercury_ warned (March 25), 'of being dragged back eventually to the old political affiliation with the states and people from whom we have just cut loose.' " [Ibid., pp. 132-133]
Time was not on their side. The Mobile Mercury said, "The country is sinking into a fatal apathy and the spirit and even the patriotism of the people is oozing out under this do-nothing policy. If something is not done pretty soon, decisive, either evacuation or expulsion, the whole country will become so disgusted with the sham of southern independence that the first chance the people get at a popular election they will turn the whole movement topsy-turvy so bad that it never on earth can be righted again." [Quoted in Current, Ibid., p. 134]
In their Joint Resolution, the Virginia Assembly, without a single negative vote in both houses, said,
"JOINT RESOLUTION concerning the position of Virginia in the event of the dissolution of the Union. Adopted January 21, 1861.
"Resolved by the General Assembly of Virginia, That if all efforts to reconcile the unhappy differences existing between the two sections of the country shall prove to be abortive, then, in the opinion of the General Assembly, every consideration of honor and interest demands that Virginia shall unite her destiny with the slave-holding States of the South." [OR Series IV, Vol. I, p. 77]
Virginia was on record as saying she would join the confederacy if and when a war started.
Davis had advisors who were urging him in that direction as well. L.Q. Washington wrote, "I fear the present Virginia Convention will not pass an ordinance of secession unless a collision or war ensues; then public feeling
will force them to it. There is a majority of old Federal submissionists,
who got in by pretending to be resistance men." [OR Series I, Vol I, pp. 263-264]
"One Alabamian had warned Davis, 'Unless you sprinkle blood on the face of the Southern people they will be back in the old Union in less than ten days.' A sprinkle of blood, too, should bring the fencesitters--Virginia and the other border states--into the Confederate fold." [W. A. Swanberg, _First Blood: The Story of Fort Sumter,_ p. 286]
There are the words of Virginian Roger Pryor, who, speaking to a Charleston audience on April 10, 1861, said, "But I assure you that just as certain as tomorrow's sun will rise upon us, just so certain will Virginia be a member of the Southern Confederacy; and I will tell your Governor what will put her
in the Southern Confederacy in less than an hour by Shrewsbury clock. Strike a blow!" [Ibid.,_ p. 289]
That same day, Davis received a telegram from Louis T. Wigfall, urging, "General Beauregard will not act without your order. Let me suggest to you to send the order to him to begin the attack as soon as he is ready. Virginia is excited by the preparations, and a bold stroke on our side will complete her purposes. Policy and prudence are urgent upon us to begin at once." [Wigfall to Davis, 10 Apr 1861, quoted in Richard N. Current, _Lincoln and the First Shot,_ p. 151]
Davis was already looking to start the war at Fort Pickens in Florida, knowing in advance the Federals were not going to attack.
"It is scarcely to be doubted that for political reasons the U.S. govt. will avoid making an attack so long as the hope of retaining the border states remains. There would be to us an advantage in so placing them that an attack by them would be a necessity, but when we are ready to relieve our territory and jurisdiction of the presence of a foreign garrison that advantage is overbalanced by other considerations. The case of Pensacola then is reduced [to] the more palpable elements of a military problem and your measures may without disturbing views be directed to the capture of Fort Pickens and the defence of the harbor. You will soon have I hope a force sufficient to occupy all the points necessary for that end. As many additional troops as may be required can be promptly furnished." [Jefferson Davis to Braxton Bragg, 3 Apr 1861]
"This letter indicates that Davis was willing to start the war. He would have liked to do precisely what Ramsdell claimed Lincoln did--maneuver the enemy into firing the first shot--but the Confederate President considered such a scheme, in his own words, 'overbalanced by other considerations.' Davis counseled action--'your measures may without disturbing views be directed to the capture of Fort Pickins'--and the tone of his letter implied that he expected Bragg to take the fort should he fire the first shot." [Grady McWhiney, "The Confederacy's First Shot," _Civil War History,_ Vol XIV, No. 1, March, 1968, p. 12]
In the cabinet meeting, Toombs warned Davis that firing on Fort Sumter would inaugurate the Civil War.
"Mr. President, at this time it is suicide, murder, and will lose us every friend at the North. The firing upon that fort will inaugurate a civil war greater than any the world has yet seen." [Robert Toombs to Jefferson Davis, quoted in W. A. Swanberg, _First Blood: The Story of Fort Sumter,_ p. 286]
But Davis knew this anyway. He had predicted a civil war earlier. "When Lincoln comes in he will have but to continue in the path of his predecessor to inaugurate a civil war" [Jefferson Davis to Franklin Pierce, 20 Jan 1861]
Davis went ahead and ordered the fort reduced.
It was actually a good strategic move. It immediately brought 4 additional states into the confederacy, including, most critically, Virginia, and there had been a possibility of bringing a total of 7 in. Had all those 7 come
into the confederacy, there would have been no way for the Union to prevail. Lincoln knew the border states were crucial. So did Davis. It unified the confederate populace and suppressed thoughts of reconstructionism as they rallied around the confederacy. The malaise talk of March and early April ceased at once and was replaced with patriotic exhortations and renewed recruiting of young men into the army.
I think if we look at the total situation, the viewpoint that Davis ordered the firing on Fort Sumter to bring the upper south and the border states
into the confederacy fits the entire situation, whereas the viewpoint that Davis was merely passively reacting to bold, brilliant strategic moves made by Lincoln until he finally had to attack because there was no alternative is a misrepresentation of Davis and does him a great disservice.
Regards,
Cash