What if....Meade had put the AoP on the Pipe Creek line?

theoldman

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Thanks to JerseyBart's heads up about C-Span showing parts of the 150th Commemoration at Gettysburg, I saw a very interesting 1 hour presentation by Kent Masterson Brown. Mr. Brown is well know for his book Retreat from Gettysburg, but for his lecture he talked about Day 1 at Gettysburg. Mr. Brown said that as late as the morning of July 1, it was Meade's intention to fight the Pipe Creek line. According to Mr. Brown, Meade sent a circular or directive to all his Corps Commanders on the morning of July 1, 1863 telling them to fight the Pipe Creek Line. Mr. Brown referred to a Jomini tactic for a corps to make contact, then fall back carefully drawing in the opposing force to where the Army Commander wants to fight the battle. It is unclear to me if Mr. Brown said that Reynolds either received the directive but was unable to execute or he was killed before he could relay the message to any subordinate, or he never received the directive at all. Doubleday apparently knew nothing of the plan. (O.O. Howard was not even discussed by Mr. Brown).

My "what if" question is simply, what if I Corps and XI Corps had fallen back to Pipe Creek and Meade had established the AoP there? Please assume everything else that really happened, i.e. Reynolds is killed, still happens. I have some thoughts but am interested to see others first.
Thanks.
 
From what I've read about Pipe Creek, the ground immediately to the south of the creek was high ground. To the north of the creek it was flat for 3/4 of a mile before coming to a slight rise. I see it as a Pickett's Charge type battle, all the features are there.
 
From what I've read about Pipe Creek, the ground immediately to the south of the creek was high ground. To the north of the creek it was flat for 3/4 of a mile before coming to a slight rise. I see it as a Pickett's Charge type battle, all the features are there.
I agree. I think that Lee would have been forced to use his forces similar to the way he used them in Pickett's Charge and attack the Federal line at Pipe Creek. If the Federals would have held like they did at Gettysburg the result would have been the same and Lee's army would have been turned back in defeat.
 
Thanks to JerseyBart's heads up about C-Span showing parts of the 150th Commemoration at Gettysburg, I saw a very interesting 1 hour presentation by Kent Masterson Brown. Mr. Brown is well know for his book Retreat from Gettysburg, but for his lecture he talked about Day 1 at Gettysburg. Mr. Brown said that as late as the morning of July 1, it was Meade's intention to fight the Pipe Creek line. According to Mr. Brown, Meade sent a circular or directive to all his Corps Commanders on the morning of July 1, 1863 telling them to fight the Pipe Creek Line. Mr. Brown referred to a Jomini tactic for a corps to make contact, then fall back carefully drawing in the opposing force to where the Army Commander wants to fight the battle. It is unclear to me if Mr. Brown said that Reynolds either received the directive but was unable to execute or he was killed before he could relay the message to any subordinate, or he never received the directive at all. Doubleday apparently knew nothing of the plan. (O.O. Howard was not even discussed by Mr. Brown).

My "what if" question is simply, what if I Corps and XI Corps had fallen back to Pipe Creek and Meade had established the AoP there? Please assume everything else that really happened, i.e. Reynolds is killed, still happens. I have some thoughts but am interested to see others first.
Thanks.
The Pipe Creek Plan was a plan prior to Meade's receiving updated info from the Gettysburg area. Meade rushed troops to Gettysburg to cut Lee off from going farther east. The Gettysburg plan is the same as the Pipe Creek Plan to wit: Find a strong position and invite Lee to attack. Same concept fought at Gettysburg instead of the Pipe Creek area. Results,could have been similar.
 
It was a brilliant move of Meade's to attempt to stop Lee in Pennsylvania instead of Maryland. Lee's army was spread across PA and only had a meagre and limited amount of artillery ammunition. Lee, logistically, only had a few days of big battles to survive north of Virginia.
The first day was Lee's, but Lee couldn't easily retreat from Gettysburg, without a number of exit points. Meade could sustain three days of brutal fighting; Lee could not. Lee lost troops he couldn't replace and lacked the resources and troops to continue a fight towards Washington after Gettysburg.
The decision to come north would be a decision that Lee and the Confederates, in defeat, would truly come to regret. So much was Meade's brilliance. Gettysburg was only important to Meade, as long as it stayed important. There was always the option of withdrawing to the Pipe Creek line, and forcing Lee to continue to attack.

For Lee is was a classic overestimation of his army and an underestimation of the enemy army.
 
There was one presentation I watched that day on C-Span3 that mentioned Reynold's intentions that day and it might have been Browns. I never heard this theory but he mentioned that Reynolds wanted Buford's cavalry to engage the confederates then fall back slightly south to the 1st Corps. Then they in turn would fall back south to the area of the Peach orchard where the 11th Corps would be. And then back to the Pipe Creek line. Of course Reynolds was killed and things happened. Interesting theory though.
 
There was one presentation I watched that day on C-Span3 that mentioned Reynold's intentions that day and it might have been Browns. I never heard this theory but he mentioned that Reynolds wanted Buford's cavalry to engage the confederates then fall back slightly south to the 1st Corps. Then they in turn would fall back south to the area of the Peach orchard where the 11th Corps would be. And then back to the Pipe Creek line. Of course Reynolds was killed and things happened. Interesting theory though.
It sounds like you saw the same program I saw. It was very interesting. An entirely new outlook on day one, for me at least.
 
I don't see a scenario anything like Gettysburg. Meade pulls back, the immediate pressure is off Lee. It's probably going to be another day or two before things settle out. Lee concentrates, probably in the Gettysburg vicinity. Stuart reunites with the ANV. Now Lee is free to advance with his army intact and develop a battle plan to his liking instead of responding to circumstance.
 
If Meade and the AoP had fallen back to the Pipe Creek Line I think General Lee would have been the happiest man in Pennsylvania that day. I see the ANV occupying Gettysburg and controlling that road network, maybe threatening Harrisburg. At a minimum that would send shock waves through the north. Lee could forage to his heart's desire, wait for Stuart to show up, and rest up the army for a few days at least. Most importantly, Lee could now choose the terrain he wanted to fight on. He would still have to protect his line of withdrawal, the mountain passes and his crossing point(s) on the Potomac. I have no doubt that in a matter of days Meade would have been ordered to kick the invaders out of the north. Meade and the AoP would have had to attack and maybe there would have been a Union version of the "charge" with the same bad results, except for the AoP.

I know many folks on this forum don't like "what ifs" and I am not a fan of them either, but I did want to throw this one out for comment. Thanks to the folks who responded.
 
If Meade had set up his lines around Pipe Creek then Lee would have been forced to attack. Meade being at Pipe Creek would sever Lee's supply lines, Lee would be trapped in the north. Militia units would have been pouring in from all over the north which in the very least would have been a thorn in Lee's side. Lee couldnt just sit in Gettysburg and wait, he didnt have shipments of food and ammuntion pouring in like the AoP did. Lee was in Penn. for one reason and that was to destroy the Union army.
 
There was one presentation I watched that day on C-Span3 that mentioned Reynold's intentions that day and it might have been Browns. I never heard this theory but he mentioned that Reynolds wanted Buford's cavalry to engage the confederates then fall back slightly south to the 1st Corps. Then they in turn would fall back south to the area of the Peach orchard where the 11th Corps would be. And then back to the Pipe Creek line. Of course Reynolds was killed and things happened. Interesting theory though.
Reynolds is not operating,independently. Reynolds receives Meade's order,to move to Gettysburg,about 4 a.m. July 1. Reynolds is simply following orders.
 
There was one presentation I watched that day on C-Span3 that mentioned Reynold's intentions that day and it might have been Browns. I never heard this theory but he mentioned that Reynolds wanted Buford's cavalry to engage the confederates then fall back slightly south to the 1st Corps. Then they in turn would fall back south to the area of the Peach orchard where the 11th Corps would be. And then back to the Pipe Creek line. Of course Reynolds was killed and things happened. Interesting theory though.

I have heard the same thing. What you mentioned was the original plan but when Meade sent Hancock forward to assess the situation Hancock sent word back to Meade suggesting that the whole army be sent forward based on the conditions and the ground. I have heard this from two different sources. :unsure:
 
Reynolds is not operating,independently. Reynolds receives Meade's order,to move to Gettysburg,about 4 a.m. July 1. Reynolds is simply following orders.
I can't speak for anyone but myself and I certainly am not saying that Reynolds was acting independently. What I did say was the Mr. Brown in his C-Span presentation said that as of the morning of July1 it was Meade's intention to fight the Pipe Creek Line. He sent a directive to all his corps commanders saying as much. Mr. Brown thought that perhaps it was Meade's intention to follow a tactic of Jomini and have the corps making initial contact to fall back slowly to draw the opposition onto the terrain where the Army Commander wants to fight. I believe I remember Mr. Brown said that Hancock was sent to remind I and XI Corps of this plan but when Hancock arrived both corps were too engaged to withdraw. Since Pipe Creek was a good 20 miles SE I don't see how that could have been accomplished. The rest, as they say, is history.:cool:
 
I can't speak for anyone but myself and I certainly am not saying that Reynolds was acting independently. What I did say was the Mr. Brown in his C-Span presentation said that as of the morning of July1 it was Meade's intention to fight the Pipe Creek Line. He sent a directive to all his corps commanders saying as much. Mr. Brown thought that perhaps it was Meade's intention to follow a tactic of Jomini and have the corps making initial contact to fall back slowly to draw the opposition onto the terrain where the Army Commander wants to fight. I believe I remember Mr. Brown said that Hancock was sent to remind I and XI Corps of this plan but when Hancock arrived both corps were too engaged to withdraw. Since Pipe Creek was a good 20 miles SE I don't see how that could have been accomplished. The rest, as they say, is history.:cool:
I thought my first response was not clear,so,I was just clarifying that Reynolds was ordered to Gettysburg by Meade. The battle simply unfolds. Buford engages Heth west of Gettysburg,before,Reynolds arrives. Reynolds is about 3 miles from Gettysburg,at this time. Buford sends couriers to Reynolds and Meade re the engagement. Reynolds rides up the Emmitsburg road to communicate with Buford and to assess the developing situation. Reynolds sends couriers to rush his troops forward and update Meade. Reynolds message to Meade is that he(Reynolds) "will barricade the streets of Gettysburg if he has to,to stop the Rebels." Reynolds is killed sometime after he sends this message to Meade. Meade,Reynolds,and Hancock are old friends. Meade does not know Howard,who succeeds Reynolds in command,well. So Meade sends for Hancock and,over Hancock's objection,promotes Hancock over Howard and sends Hancock to take over the field at Gettysburg and assess the situation. The fighting is still west and north of Gettysburg,at this time. As Hancock arrives,the Union troops have been beaten back to Gettysburg. Howard and Hancock reform the troops just beyond the town on Cemetary Ridge,etc. The fighting gradually subsides as dark is approaching. Meade arrives about 11 or midnight. Just a brief overview.
 
I can't speak for anyone but myself and I certainly am not saying that Reynolds was acting independently. What I did say was the Mr. Brown in his C-Span presentation said that as of the morning of July1 it was Meade's intention to fight the Pipe Creek Line. He sent a directive to all his corps commanders saying as much. Mr. Brown thought that perhaps it was Meade's intention to follow a tactic of Jomini and have the corps making initial contact to fall back slowly to draw the opposition onto the terrain where the Army Commander wants to fight. I believe I remember Mr. Brown said that Hancock was sent to remind I and XI Corps of this plan but when Hancock arrived both corps were too engaged to withdraw. Since Pipe Creek was a good 20 miles SE I don't see how that could have been accomplished. The rest, as they say, is history.:cool:

I forget if it was the Reynolds' lecture I attended or something I watched, but I heard that although not disobeying orders, because Reynolds had some leeway on Day One...but once he got to Gettysburg he realized that it was the place to fight the battle and unless or until orders were given to fall back to Pipe Creek, he was fighting there. He died. Hancock got there and liked the ground and that's here the battle was fought. Kind of a see no order, hear no order, speak no order situation...
 
If the AotP falls back to the Pipe Creek line, they are not in an immediate position to cut Lee off from Virginia (they'd have to swing the army over to the west to do that). Therefore, why should Lee bother with them? A far better strategy in that situation would be for Lee to continue to operate in Pennsylvania until pressure from the government forces the AotP northwards to stop him or Meade decides to swing west and cut Lee off from home, then to attack the AotP after it leaves the Pipe Creek position.
 
If the AotP falls back to the Pipe Creek line, they are not in an immediate position to cut Lee off from Virginia (they'd have to swing the army over to the west to do that). Therefore, why should Lee bother with them? A far better strategy in that situation would be for Lee to continue to operate in Pennsylvania until pressure from the government forces the AotP northwards to stop him or Meade decides to swing west and cut Lee off from home, then to attack the AotP after it leaves the Pipe Creek position.
I agree, with a big if. IF Lee had the resources to keep moving in PA, Meade would have had to come away from Pipe Creek to him. Meade couldn't have Lee heading for Harrisburg while he sat at Pipe Creek.

If Lee didn't have the resources to move further into PA, he still could have concentrated in Gettysburg and forced Meade to come to him there, after he had taken the high ground. If it didn't work and he ran short of resources, Lee still had a solid route back to Virginia.

Longstreet was right about one thing. The only way for the PA Campaign to work out for the Confederacy was for Lee to find good high ground and get Meade to come to him. There was no way Lee attacking Meade on Meade's chosen ground was going to work.
 
Official Records Series 1, Volume 27, Part 1, page 61. Meade's prime directive is in bold. Meade was not going to attempt to get behind Lee to cut him off from Virginia if it uncovered Washington.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., June 27, 1863.

Major General GEORGE G. MEADE,
Army of the Potomac:
GENERAL: You will receive with this the order of the President placing you in command of the Army of the Potomac. Considering the circumstances, no one ever received a more important command; and I cannot doubt that you will fully justify the confidence which the Government has reposed in you.
You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will, therefore, maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him so as to give him battle.
All forces within the sphere of your operations will be held subject to your orders.
Harper's Ferry and its garrison are under your direct orders.
You are authorized to remove from command, and to send from your army, any officer or other person you may deem proper, and to appoint to command as you may deem expedient.
In fine, general, you are intrusted with all the power and authority which the President, the Secretary of War, or the General-in-Chief can confer on you, and you may rely upon our full support.
You will keep me fully informed of all your movements, and the positions of your own troops and those of the enemy, so far as known.
I shall always be ready to advise and assist you to the utmost of my ability.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
 
Meade was under specific orders that no matter what else he did he must keep his Army between the ANV and Washington D.C. This direct order influenced everything he did, especially in the pursuit. Meade had established his supply base at Westminster, MD. He wanted to fight the Pipe Creek Line in a large part because of the location of his supply base.
 
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