What if... General Lyon did not capture Camp Jackson

What if General Lyon's forces didn't capture Camp Jackson?

  • Missouri would stay in the Union as a neutral but would fight both sides that try to enter the state

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Missouri would stay in the Union as a neutral but refuse to supply weapons and troops to either side

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Negotiations would continue between Jackson & Lyon, resulting in Missouri staying loyal to the Union

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Total voters
    3

4th-MSM

Sergeant
Joined
Aug 4, 2012
If General Lyons' forces hadn't captured Camp Jackson and moved the St. Louis arsenal across the Mississippi, how could things have turned out different and how do you think it would have affected the Western Theater and the Civil War as a whole?

(If anyone has ideas to add to the poll, I'd like to hear them! :smile: )

Thanks!
 
I'll have to think about this one awhile.

1. Lyon didn't have to capture Camp Jackson. He had enough men on hand and was well enough prepared nearby to prevent Jackson's militia from taking it. (Jackson had done everything he could to strip St. Louis of its own police force and hand it over to Southern interests, but there were too many armed German regiments in town for it to work, and Lyon would not allow his patrols to be restricted.) Had Lyon waited and Jackson convinced Frost to move against the arsenal it would have most likely been a disaster for Southern interests in the state. Jackson's outright treason would have been exposed (having artillery shipped in from the CSA to do the deed.) Picture this: there was a warrant for Jackson's arrest for treason against the United States...and there was captured correspondence to prove it.

2. Lyon's move on Camp Jackson was undone by a tactical blunder, marching the captured militia to the arsenal. This resulted in a riot, and dozens of dead civilians. This wasn't in Lyon's design and happened because of the resistance to being paroled on the spot. Lyon came off as the bad guy and Jackson then got legislative backing for his bill to create the MSG. Note, there was no MSG until after the Camp Jackson Affair. Before that there was a Missouri militia in various districts that could be called to muster each year.

3. Jackson and Lyon were aggressive proponents of their causes. Neither represented the views of the majority of the state. Jackson was elected as a conditional Unionist, when instead he was actually a fire-eater. He was popular with outright secessionists, but they were a minority (and a much smaller minority was Lincoln supporters.)

4. Neutrality was an understandable desire, especially in Missouri, but it was not feasible, anymore than balancing an elephant on dental floss. So it is more a matter of how the war comes to Missouri rather than if.

5. The border war history made Missouri a lightning rod for the most ardent of both persuations.

I can see a scenario where Jackson is arrested for treason, Missouri volunteers for the Union army are accepted and the legislature stays in place, doing what they can to slow Federal domination of the state, while southern men head to Arkansas to enlist.
 
2. Lyon's move on Camp Jackson was undone by a tactical blunder, marching the captured militia to the arsenal. This resulted in a riot, and dozens of dead civilians. This wasn't in Lyon's design and happened because of the resistance to being paroled on the spot. Lyon came off as the bad guy and Jackson then got legislative backing for his bill to create the MSG.

Yes, I believe this is a critical point. This incident forced most Missourians to take sides, who previously wanted to remain neutral. It also made it easier for the elected Missouri government to declare it's secession from the Union (although never officially recognized by the Federal Government). Without an incident like it, many conditional Unionist would probably still have wanted to remain in the Union.

Note, there was no MSG until after the Camp Jackson Affair. Before that there was a Missouri militia in various districts that could be called to muster each year.

Thanks for the correction, I said Missouri State Guard but meant the Militia.

4. Neutrality was an understandable desire, especially in Missouri, but it was not feasible, anymore than balancing an elephant on dental floss. So it is more a matter of how the war comes to Missouri rather than if.

5. The border war history made Missouri a lightning rod for the most ardent of both persuations.

Agreed. Neutrality was what many Missourians wanted, but sooner or later that would not have been an option.

If I remember correctly, the Missouri State Guard was originally formed to protect the state from both sides, until General Lyon marched against Governor Jackson and his administration. Then they had to side with the Confederates to get the help they needed to try to halt the Union's advance into the state (although this alliance was probably Governor Jackson's original intention for forming the unit).

For a state to defend against two sides would be nearly impossible, one opponent would be hard enough under the circumstances. In my opinion, remaining neutral and refusing to supply either side would also have been a pipe dream.
 
If I remember correctly, the Missouri State Guard was originally formed to protect the state from both sides, until General Lyon marched against Governor Jackson and his administration.

That was the cover story. Reality was that it was a completely secessionist organization, as were most of Missouri's legislators. The populace had a much more mixed view, as is apparent from the Missouri Constitutional convention delegates that were selected. Elected legislators tended to be first arrivals from Kentucky and the like. Their interests differed markedly from the mean of the population.

Missouri can't be classified into two or even three camps very well. There were at least two prominent union camps alone who jockeyed for dominance. As the MSG was forming so was a Union Home Guard made up of Missourians who wanted nothing to do with secession. Many of these Home Guard later enlisted in early Missouri regiments. Some ended up in various other Union militia (e.g. 6 month units) and the Missouri State Militia cavalry. I find ancestors from several different family branches in a variety of these early organizations.
 
Missouri would have eventually been lost by the Confederacy.

Missouri was on the northern western side of the Confederacy, too far from the Confederate logistic centers in Alabama and Virginia. New Orleans, the Mississippi River, and more importantly to Missouri, the Missouri River would be controlled by the Union. The Confederacy lacked Steamboat control and thereby would lose Missouri.

The Confederacy never did capture St. Louis, Missouri, an important steamboat center on the Mississippi River.
 
I would suggest that the State would have erupted into a mini civil war. Both sides would have armed and requested assistance. The outcome would have probably depended upon who received assistance first. Today I found this firsthand account of what was happening. It was sent to a Michigan newspaper by a Michigan man who worked at the United States Express Co. at St Joseph. He wrote the letter May 13 1861.

The fight that took place in St. Louis yesterday, between the U.S. troops and those of the State, has cast a fearful gloom over out city. The secessionist are blistering about and searing revenge on the “d----d abolitionists.” The Unionists eye the “Sesceh” boys suspiciously, and vice versa. …. Every man is arming himself for the contest, but such is the scarcity of arms that it is impossible for them all to do it. We have sent to New York, Chicago and Cincinnati for some revolvers, but the reply comes back that “none can be had.” I have to-day sent an order to Pike’s Peak for some.
Your Son Chas. A. Ten Eyck.

In a later letter he wrote “Tell mother I received the shirts she sent me, but they don’t happen to be the color wanted. “Red, White and Blue” combined is now my style.”

Major Bill
 
I would suggest that the State would have erupted into a mini civil war. Both sides would have armed and requested assistance. The outcome would have probably depended upon who received assistance first. Today I found this firsthand account of what was happening. It was sent to a Michigan newspaper by a Michigan man who worked at the United States Express Co. at St Joseph. He wrote the letter May 13 1861.

The fight that took place in St. Louis yesterday, between the U.S. troops and those of the State, has cast a fearful gloom over out city. The secessionist are blistering about and searing revenge on the “d----d abolitionists.” The Unionists eye the “Sesceh” boys suspiciously, and vice versa. …. Every man is arming himself for the contest, but such is the scarcity of arms that it is impossible for them all to do it. We have sent to New York, Chicago and Cincinnati for some revolvers, but the reply comes back that “none can be had.” I have to-day sent an order to Pike’s Peak for some.
Your Son Chas. A. Ten Eyck.

In a later letter he wrote “Tell mother I received the shirts she sent me, but they don’t happen to be the color wanted. “Red, White and Blue” combined is now my style.”

Major Bill

That's a very interesting letter, I haven't seen it before. Thanks for posting it!

One thing to keep in mind though, is that the letter was written after the Camp Jackson Affair, which was what really split up the state. Before that event most Missourians really just wanted to remain neutral, and I believe, they actually just wanted to be left alone.

On the other hand, since both Lyon and Jackson were very committed to their own side, it is very likely that if the Camp Jackson Affair did not occur there would have been another event that would have produced the same affect.
 
The state had a mini-Civil War anyway. Actually it wasn't so mini--it was very much fighting a war of its own throughout most of the state. In Summer of 1861 it was chaos with the MSG forming and various Union volunteer units chasing them, then being run off by them in the wake of Wilson's Creek and Fremont's cluelessness. Finally the MSG commands were pushed back into the southern corners again and into Arkansas.

By 1862 guerrillas and recruiters were mounted, sometimes interchangeable and they both moved and fought together, then separated as recruiters moved with their new commands into other districts. The answer in Missouri was to raise the MSM cavalry to aggressively pursue both types. This resulted in a number of extremely intense engagements in July and August. They were not large battles, but the casualty rates were high. The northern recruiters were broken up fairly well, but still managed to get enough men South to form new regiments. The western portion of the state had an even larger influx of recruiters and was more successful.

After that the warfare was primarily guerrilla, punctuated with fast moving cavalry raids by Marmaduke/Shelby, and finally Price.
 
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