rebelatsea
Captain
- Joined
- Mar 30, 2013
- Location
- Kent ,England.
The Parliamentary Committee formed in 1858 to enquire into the relative naval strengths of Britain and France. They reported that ,discounting sailing vessels, both had 29 steam ships of the line built or completing, while France had 34 large steam frigates to Britains 26. Additionally the French ironclad programme had been commenced in March. Britains answer was to commence a new programme of steam line of battleships, of which only those completed as ironclads were ever put afloat.
A glance at Hans Busks "The navies of the World" shows the relative state of the navies in 1859 only two years prior to ACW, and 4 years before a possible European intervention. The French had stopped their wooden ship of line programme, and Britain had not even started. Napoleon III was only too well aware of this weakness, and took the opportunity to demonstrate his fleet before all and sundry and Queen Victoria in 1858 at Cherbourg. The "close alliance" was a sham, with Britain was using French adventure abroad to deter Russia from adventures toward Turkey and India.
The conversion of the old auxilliary powered ships of line by Dupuy De Lome into transports was commenced before any thoughts of Mexican adventures with the sole purpose of being able to use them to put a French army into England.
Any suggestion that it would go ashore at the most heavily defended port - Dover, is a joke, when in fact there were hardly any serviceable defences anywhere else including Portsmouth. Prime Minister Palmerston initiated construction of the large chain of batteries known as Palmerston's follies specifically to deter the Freit's Mexicvan Squadronnch.
That the French Navy was capable of putting an army ashore was demonstrated, admittedly against little opposition in Mexico, by putting 35,000 men ashore with support. And the French Navy felt secure enough that it could afford to send an ironclad with it's Squadron of Mexico.
The listing of military strength is misleading as most of the at home battalions were not then maintained in the fighting condition that is modern practice , being in the army equivalent of care and maintenence, and would take months to bring to readiness, this was deliberate policy, we have always had an inbuilt suspicion of large fully equipped standing armies at home, and that tradition is still alive and well, a certain section of the political elite being happier with the army occupied abroad than in barracks at home. Of those battalions, the majority would have been moved to strengthen garrisons in the South of England and to guard Ireland, seen as a ready French target, not for the first time. Foreign military adventures in strength were most certainly not on the agenda in 1862 or indeed for some considerable time afterwards.
A glance at Hans Busks "The navies of the World" shows the relative state of the navies in 1859 only two years prior to ACW, and 4 years before a possible European intervention. The French had stopped their wooden ship of line programme, and Britain had not even started. Napoleon III was only too well aware of this weakness, and took the opportunity to demonstrate his fleet before all and sundry and Queen Victoria in 1858 at Cherbourg. The "close alliance" was a sham, with Britain was using French adventure abroad to deter Russia from adventures toward Turkey and India.
The conversion of the old auxilliary powered ships of line by Dupuy De Lome into transports was commenced before any thoughts of Mexican adventures with the sole purpose of being able to use them to put a French army into England.
Any suggestion that it would go ashore at the most heavily defended port - Dover, is a joke, when in fact there were hardly any serviceable defences anywhere else including Portsmouth. Prime Minister Palmerston initiated construction of the large chain of batteries known as Palmerston's follies specifically to deter the Freit's Mexicvan Squadronnch.
That the French Navy was capable of putting an army ashore was demonstrated, admittedly against little opposition in Mexico, by putting 35,000 men ashore with support. And the French Navy felt secure enough that it could afford to send an ironclad with it's Squadron of Mexico.
The listing of military strength is misleading as most of the at home battalions were not then maintained in the fighting condition that is modern practice , being in the army equivalent of care and maintenence, and would take months to bring to readiness, this was deliberate policy, we have always had an inbuilt suspicion of large fully equipped standing armies at home, and that tradition is still alive and well, a certain section of the political elite being happier with the army occupied abroad than in barracks at home. Of those battalions, the majority would have been moved to strengthen garrisons in the South of England and to guard Ireland, seen as a ready French target, not for the first time. Foreign military adventures in strength were most certainly not on the agenda in 1862 or indeed for some considerable time afterwards.