What if european countries helped the CSA?

The Parliamentary Committee formed in 1858 to enquire into the relative naval strengths of Britain and France. They reported that ,discounting sailing vessels, both had 29 steam ships of the line built or completing, while France had 34 large steam frigates to Britains 26. Additionally the French ironclad programme had been commenced in March. Britains answer was to commence a new programme of steam line of battleships, of which only those completed as ironclads were ever put afloat.
A glance at Hans Busks "The navies of the World" shows the relative state of the navies in 1859 only two years prior to ACW, and 4 years before a possible European intervention. The French had stopped their wooden ship of line programme, and Britain had not even started. Napoleon III was only too well aware of this weakness, and took the opportunity to demonstrate his fleet before all and sundry and Queen Victoria in 1858 at Cherbourg. The "close alliance" was a sham, with Britain was using French adventure abroad to deter Russia from adventures toward Turkey and India.
The conversion of the old auxilliary powered ships of line by Dupuy De Lome into transports was commenced before any thoughts of Mexican adventures with the sole purpose of being able to use them to put a French army into England.
Any suggestion that it would go ashore at the most heavily defended port - Dover, is a joke, when in fact there were hardly any serviceable defences anywhere else including Portsmouth. Prime Minister Palmerston initiated construction of the large chain of batteries known as Palmerston's follies specifically to deter the Freit's Mexicvan Squadronnch.

That the French Navy was capable of putting an army ashore was demonstrated, admittedly against little opposition in Mexico, by putting 35,000 men ashore with support. And the French Navy felt secure enough that it could afford to send an ironclad with it's Squadron of Mexico.

The listing of military strength is misleading as most of the at home battalions were not then maintained in the fighting condition that is modern practice , being in the army equivalent of care and maintenence, and would take months to bring to readiness, this was deliberate policy, we have always had an inbuilt suspicion of large fully equipped standing armies at home, and that tradition is still alive and well, a certain section of the political elite being happier with the army occupied abroad than in barracks at home. Of those battalions, the majority would have been moved to strengthen garrisons in the South of England and to guard Ireland, seen as a ready French target, not for the first time. Foreign military adventures in strength were most certainly not on the agenda in 1862 or indeed for some considerable time afterwards.
 
It's understandable why there's not a lot of awareness of the international situation during the Civil War; the way it's taught on this side of the Atlantic is purely from an American standpoint, with Britain and France only coming into the story as they impinge the war in some direct manner (the Trent incident, Maximilian). (And I'm sure in some classes they don't even get that far afield...) Naturally, the entire world was simply paying attention to what was happening here, right? :laugh:
 
"What if european countries helped the CSA?"

When Britain declared neutrality and the other European powers followed - that was help for the CSA.
 
It's understandable why there's not a lot of awareness of the international situation during the Civil War; the way it's taught on this side of the Atlantic is purely from an American standpoint, with Britain and France only coming into the story as they impinge the war in some direct manner (the Trent incident, Maximilian). (And I'm sure in some classes they don't even get that far afield...) Naturally, the entire world was simply paying attention to what was happening here, right? :laugh:

Often forgotten is that there was a European war in 1858 (Prussia vs. Denmark), in 1859 (France & the Kingdom of Sardinia vs. Austria) and in 1864 (Prussia and Austria vs. Denmark) In between, there was almost a continent-wide war in 1863 over the revolts against the Russians in Poland and Lithuania. In 1866, there was the Austro-Prussian War, followed by the 1870 Franco-Prussian War in 1870. Europeans had their own troubles and would have been reluctant to get involved in a bloody war far away.

Tim
 
The Parliamentary Committee formed in 1858 to enquire into the relative naval strengths of Britain and France. They reported that ,discounting sailing vessels, both had 29 steam ships of the line built or completing, while France had 34 large steam frigates to Britains 26. Additionally the French ironclad programme had been commenced in March. Britains answer was to commence a new programme of steam line of battleships, of which only those completed as ironclads were ever put afloat.
A glance at Hans Busks "The navies of the World" shows the relative state of the navies in 1859 only two years prior to ACW, and 4 years before a possible European intervention. The French had stopped their wooden ship of line programme, and Britain had not even started. Napoleon III was only too well aware of this weakness, and took the opportunity to demonstrate his fleet before all and sundry and Queen Victoria in 1858 at Cherbourg. The "close alliance" was a sham, with Britain was using French adventure abroad to deter Russia from adventures toward Turkey and India.


I have Busk, the numbers for steam battleships I quoted were from it. The balance was approximately:

Steam Battleships: 51+9 vs 9+24
Heavy Cruisers: 38 vs 7+13 (20 guns +)
"Medium" Cruisers: 39 vs 4 (12 guns +)
Light Cruisers: 86 vs 4+2 (less than 12, not gunboats or gunvessels)
Gunboats and Gunvessels: ~ 180 vs 23+3

(where the second figure if given is for incomplete conversion to steam)

Historically the British thought of nothing of reducing the Channel Squadron to a mere 4 battleships in December 1861. It was the Mediterranean Fleet that was not heavily reduced, retaining 12 battleships and remaining a much larger force than that sent to American waters.

Of course some claim the French rivalled the British fleet. Tosh. The numbers of screw battleships completed were:

1st January British
French
1853
18
7
1854
24
8
1855
26
18
1856
42
20
1857
45
26
1858
49
36
1859
53
39

Clearly the British had more and this understates the case. Some of the converted French ships were antiques of no fighting value.

The conversion of the old auxilliary powered ships of line by Dupuy De Lome into transports was commenced before any thoughts of Mexican adventures with the sole purpose of being able to use them to put a French army into England.
Any suggestion that it would go ashore at the most heavily defended port - Dover, is a joke, when in fact there were hardly any serviceable defences anywhere else including Portsmouth. Prime Minister Palmerston initiated construction of the large chain of batteries known as Palmerston's follies specifically to deter the Freit's Mexicvan Squadronnch.


The decision to build these defences was made in July 1863. In fact the debate of the bill delayed the debating of Roebuck's private members bill recognising the CSA just long enough for news of Lee's defeat at Gettysburg to reach the UK.

Also, these were fortifications *of ports*, not the coastline. As an aside I note wikipedia has the 1860 Defence Act and 1863 Fortifications of the Royal Arsenals etc. Act confused. The former only reserves the right of HMG to compulsarily purchase land for fortifications, whilst the 1863 act is the one the "follies" were built under.

That the French Navy was capable of putting an army ashore was demonstrated, admittedly against little opposition in Mexico, by putting 35,000 men ashore with support. And the French Navy felt secure enough that it could afford to send an ironclad with it's Squadron of Mexico.


About 6,000, using an already occupied port (the Royal Marines of Hugh Dunlop's squadron had already seized Vera Cruz). The steamers could carry a battalion of line infantry, a battery of artillery or a squadron of cavalry. Hence the 16 could just squeeze in Bazaine's Division. They had no landing craft and unloading without a dock would have been extremely difficult.

Should Bazaine's division have landed on the Kentish coast he would have been swiftly overwhelmed by Pennefather's Corps out of Aldershot, Mansel's Division out of Shorncliffe and William Paulet's Brigade out of Porsmouth who collectively outnumber the French expeditionary division about 4:1.

The listing of military strength is misleading as most of the at home battalions were not then maintained in the fighting condition that is modern practice , being in the army equivalent of care and maintenence, and would take months to bring to readiness, this was deliberate policy, we have always had an inbuilt suspicion of large fully equipped standing armies at home, and that tradition is still alive and well, a certain section of the political elite being happier with the army occupied abroad than in barracks at home. Of those battalions, the majority would have been moved to strengthen garrisons in the South of England and to guard Ireland, seen as a ready French target, not for the first time. Foreign military adventures in strength were most certainly not on the agenda in 1862 or indeed for some considerable time afterwards.


This doesn't happen until Childers-Caldwell over a decade later. Also, the army is recalled from the colonies and strengthened 1853 onwards, just in time for the Crimean, where having a mere 80,000 regulars a home and the colonies (bar India) was problematic. The army of 1862 is maintained at more than twice the strength of that of 1853 giving HMG a lot of muscle in the early 1860's. Strength declined immensely the second half of the 1860's, but in 1861 HMG really could project 80,000 regulars to Canada to back up 150,000 militiamen.
 
I think there was a thread not too long ago already covering this topic...or, something very similar about Great Britain. You can search topics to find it, and this may help to avoid duplicating threads.

If this had happened, then would we have seen World War I about 50 years early?
 
What would they have done? Invade the North? Supplement the Rebel Armies?

Invasion of the North would be a problem. One defeat on Northern soil and they'd be in trouble, as it would be sometime before re-enforcements could be transported in any real numbers. Also, this would change the war in that now the South becomes what the North have been discribed as, the aggressor.

If the Brits supplement the Southern armies, I see a few issues. Supplies, who would have command, and when does the foreign army leave?
 
rbasin, you have raised a very valid point there, if you invite a foreign, albeit allied army on to your soil, how do you get rid of it assuming you won ?
Andrew Uffindell, in "Hell on Earth" postulated a French Army from Mexico marching through the South to join the Army of Virginia, ( he had France and England as allies to the Confederacy). If that happened, how many would go home again.
It's slightly different I know, but we have very many families of Italian and even German descent form POWs who didn't go home !
 
IMHO

We need more than the mere assumption of foreign support for the CSA.
We need to know the circumstances that led to the support.
Type of support
How much
When the support was given.
Where the support was given.
Who supplied it.
Somehow realistic assumptions on the speculations.
 
A European army in North America will face the same issues the Confederates faced, something to eat. And if there was some sort of foreign support, ala the French support of the American Revolution, any Northern opposition to the war would evaporate. Add to that significant Northern economic capacity which was not fully employed in the CW. The European army would end up surrendering after horrific casualties.

A great what if would be the naval war. I will leave it to the squids for that speculation, but I suspect the USN would do poorly at first, then give the RN a run for the money.
 
A European army in North America will face the same issues the Confederates faced, something to eat. And if there was some sort of foreign support, ala the French support of the American Revolution, any Northern opposition to the war would evaporate. Add to that significant Northern economic capacity which was not fully employed in the CW. The European army would end up surrendering after horrific casualties.

A great what if would be the naval war. I will leave it to the squids for that speculation, but I suspect the USN would do poorly at first, then give the RN a run for the money.

I'd suggest that in blue water the USN would have problems. In coastal waters, the RN would have problems.

However we still have the problem that the RN has to be paid for by the British taxpayers. Extended operations would be expensive. This goes back to the reason for that type of intervention.
 
A European army in North America will face the same issues the Confederates faced, something to eat. And if there was some sort of foreign support, ala the French support of the American Revolution, any Northern opposition to the war would evaporate. Add to that significant Northern economic capacity which was not fully employed in the CW. The European army would end up surrendering after horrific casualties.

A great what if would be the naval war. I will leave it to the squids for that speculation, but I suspect the USN would do poorly at first, then give the RN a run for the money.

The USN would be in better shape, IMO, because they would be fighting on the defensive, at least at first. The French and Brits would have to supply by ship, meaning that the U.S. could just interupt the shipping lanes.

The North was perfectly setup for a war of this type. Railroads were in all the major population areas, meaning troops could be moved quickly almost anywhere. The canal systems built in the early 19th century were in great positions. For example, in New York, the Erie Canal is great to defend any invading Army from Ontario or Quebec. The U.S. always had a decent size Navy on the Lakes, and with the Niagara River seperating Western New York from Southern Ontario. I guess they could land in the U.P. of Michigan, but a sizeable Union force could bottle them up.

The only thing France or the Brits could do would be to land somewhere on the east coast (Charleston?) and move to Virginia and/or Tennessee. This would adversely affect the already poor supply lines in the South.

This would have to be an extremely quick war for this to work out.
 

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A European army in North America will face the same issues the Confederates faced, something to eat. And if there was some sort of foreign support, ala the French support of the American Revolution, any Northern opposition to the war would evaporate. Add to that significant Northern economic capacity which was not fully employed in the CW. The European army would end up surrendering after horrific casualties.

A great what if would be the naval war. I will leave it to the squids for that speculation, but I suspect the USN would do poorly at first, then give the RN a run for the money.
 
I have put together a series of papers showing he disposition of British and US vessels in as near to January 1862 as I could get. This is almost certainly the earliest Britain could be ready to begin hostilities. Given the Admiralty plan which Milne was given, I believe the USN would not have been as outclassed as a mere numerical listing would appear to show. The key I think is whether the RN Squadron of Mexico could defeat Farragut's West Gulf Blockading squadron. Farragut was a good Commander, Commodores Hugh Dunlop and Henry Chapman were both experienced officers who had seen action in the Crimea and elsewhere, but this would be everyone's first taste of fleet action, and all would be concious of the repercussions of the result not only in the war situation but with the world watching.
 
I have put together a series of papers showing he disposition of British and US vessels in as near to January 1862 as I could get. This is almost certainly the earliest Britain could be ready to begin hostilities. Given the Admiralty plan which Milne was given, I believe the USN would not have been as outclassed as a mere numerical listing would appear to show. The key I think is whether the RN Squadron of Mexico could defeat Farragut's West Gulf Blockading squadron. Farragut was a good Commander, Commodores Hugh Dunlop and Henry Chapman were both experienced officers who had seen action in the Crimea and elsewhere, but this would be everyone's first taste of fleet action, and all would be concious of the repercussions of the result not only in the war situation but with the world watching.
I would only argue that had there been intervention, the blockade most likely be adjusted to more of a defensive posture. The North-East coast, at least on paper, appears to be fairly easy to defend, with plenty of harbors to use. I would imagine, just looking at the maps and having a very elementary knowledge of the Union Navy, that the objective of the navy would be to protect the Delaware-Maryland coast and rivers, and start moving south slowly, going from harbor to harbor, using land forces to take and hold points. I do think that the U.S. navy would have an upper hand in being able to attack the Brits supply line, which I would assume come from Great Britain as well as the West Indies, and retreating before any sizeable enemy fllet has time to approach. Perhaps this would make the east coast of Florida more attractive to the North to take say, Jacksonville and St. Augustine, to use naval bases.
 
Well... let's look at it from an assets/liabilities point of view. Brainstorming here, so thinking as I go...

RN Assets:
  • Larger navy with better deepwater capabilities
  • More large combat units (e.g. steam ships-of-the-line)
  • Worldwide logistics support
RN Liabilities:
  • Transatlantic primary line of supply and communications
  • Lack of close deepwater harbors with extensive shore facilities, with the exception of Bermuda. (Halifax and Nassau probably too close/too vulnerable to USN counterstrikes; Confederate ports generally too shallow and with insufficient shore support facilities)
  • Smaller capability for inshore/littoral power projection
  • Distraction-- major primary mission of RN is controlling the English Channel
  • Large merchant fleet to protect
USN Assets:
  • Large and rapidly-increasing number of small/coastal combatants
  • Close to continental logistics support
  • Well-defended major harbors
  • Better potential of militarizing the Great Lakes (other than Lake Ontario)
USN Liabilities:
  • Little deepwater power projection capability
  • Little independent worldwide logistics support
  • Already involved in a major war
This is looking at the situation at about the time of the Trentincident. As time goes on, the USN becomes relatively more powerful and experienced, though still largely oriented towards coastal/littoral operations.
British Army Assets:
  • Substantial local (Canadian/Maritimes) support
  • Threat or reality of potential "Second" (northern) Front
  • Recent practical combat experience (Crimea)
  • Superior doctrine and centralized control
British Army Liabilities:
  • Primary off-continent line of supply/communications (St. Lawrence) vulnerable
  • Smaller population base to support Army; local/Canadian industry and infrastructure less developed
US Army Assets:
  • Systematic coastal defenses (at least equal to Mobile, Savannah, or Charleston)
  • Northern front relatively close to industrial centers and developed infrastructure; superior rail network
US Army Liabilities
  • Somewhat technologically and tactically backward to begin with (though rapidly improving during war)
  • Burdened with a two (or three, or four)-front war
  • Imperfect higher command structure
British Vice Admiral Milne, if I remember correctly, noted that the window of opportunity for successfully engaging the U.S. military forces began closing rapidly after the Trent incident. At the time of Trent, the British enjoyed general superiority in all areas; beginning in late 1862 and continuing thereafter, U.S. power in all areas except for large naval combatants increased markedly, continually raising the potential costs of warfare for the British. I would guess that, as of 1864, the United States forces were too powerful for the British to hope for anything beyond a stalemate (although that might be sufficient, politically).
 
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