The most important action at Gettysburg?

Lee did not want a battle but Heth forced one. At the end of Day 1, Lee should have broken contact and sought a defensive position elsewhere. His army lost the race to the high ground at G-burg, and that terrain dictated the outcome of the battle.
 
There are so many events that affected the battle's outcome, ( Buford, Ewell, Greene, Pickett's Charge etc. ) but for my two cents worth I'm going to say the charge of the 1st Minnesota was the most important. On the second day, Hancock ordered the 1st to attack a much larger force ( 262 vs. 1600 ) which was Wilcox's Brigade, being instructed by Hancock to take the enemy's colors. Their charge bought time for reinforcements to be brought up and it prevented the Confederates from pushing the Federals off of Cemetery Ridge. In addition, the 1st lost 215 men out of the original 262.

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Well said! This is the photo I took in September of the marker at the point that Hancock ordered the charge.

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Lee did not want a battle but Heth forced one. At the end of Day 1, Lee should have broken contact and sought a defensive position elsewhere. His army lost the race to the high ground at G-burg, and that terrain dictated the outcome of the battle.

If Lee did not want a battle, he could had avoided it... He is the one who attacked, no?
 
If Lee did not want a battle, he could had avoided it... He is the one who attacked, no?
I think the problem that Lee faced was that Heth got in over his head, and so A.P. Hill disobeyed Lee's order to avoid a general engagement and deployed his Corps to support Heth, and Union reinforcements were pouring into the area to support Buford and Reynolds.

At that point, Lee could have withdrawn his forces, but this would forced him to give up the initiative that Heth had inadvertently given to the Confederate army, and Lee may have been worried about appearing cowardly in the face of the enemy. Also, Lee was probably hoping that Longstreet's Corps could secure the high ground south of Gettysburg and Ewell's Corps would arrive in time to flank the Yankees and get behind the Union army.
Plus, Lee was hot off the major victory at Chancellorsville and had little reason to believe that the Union army would be any more capable in Pennsylvania than it had been in Virginia.

Obviously Lee was wrong, and years of strategy wargaming have led me to believe that retreating to the heights west of Gettysburg would have been a much better decision, but I think that once Hill had deployed his Corps, the decision had largely been forced upon Lee.
 
If Lee did not want a battle, he could had avoided it... He is the one who attacked, no?
Heth's orders were not to bring on a general engagement. Lee wasn't on the field when Heth attacked. My point is that even though Day 1 was a success, Lee was on the scene that evening and could have opted to disengage and find defensive ground. Instead, he attacked into a meat grinder.
 
Lee did not want a battle but Heth forced one. At the end of Day 1, Lee should have broken contact and sought a defensive position elsewhere. His army lost the race to the high ground at G-burg, and that terrain dictated the outcome of the battle.

Where? Lee's forces are scattered and he doesn't know where the AotP is. So very difficult in that scenario the agree to move the entire army to somewhere and await attack because you could be marching right into the teeth of the AotP.
 
Heth's orders were not to bring on a general engagement. Lee wasn't on the field when Heth attacked. My point is that even though Day 1 was a success, Lee was on the scene that evening and could have opted to disengage and find defensive ground. Instead, he attacked into a meat grinder.

A meat grinder that nearly ended in success on Day 2. There are some very small changes you make to the events of July 2 and the end result of the battle are very different. The ANV was not that far off from a victory that day.

July 3rd was a meatgrinder deluxe.
 
A meat grinder that nearly ended in success on Day 2. There are some very small changes you make to the events of July 2 and the end result of the battle are very different. The ANV was not that far off from a victory that day.

July 3rd was a meatgrinder deluxe.

I could not agree more. Gettysburg Day Two had many opportunities for loss from Cup's Hill to that maneuver by Sickles on the other end of the line (which compromised the left end of the Union line, ultimately forcing the weakening of the right end by requiring reinforcements to be pulled from Culp's Hill to support LRT). Day Two could have been catastrophic to the Union.
 
I could not agree more. Gettysburg Day Two had many opportunities for loss from Cup's Hill to that maneuver by Sickles on the other end of the line (which compromised the left end of the Union line, ultimately forcing the weakening of the right end by requiring reinforcements to be pulled from Culp's Hill to support LRT). Day Two could have been catastrophic to the Union.

Had Sickles stayed put, July 2 could have also been catastrophic for the Confederacy. Many points in history have outcomes that stand tall upon the head of a pin. A little nudge in any direction opens the door to a Gordian knot of alternative possibilities.
 
Had Sickles stayed put, July 2 could have also been catastrophic for the Confederacy. Many points in history have outcomes that stand tall upon the head of a pin. A little nudge in any direction opens the door to a Gordian knot of alternative possibilities.
I have always found it amazing how Sickles' move was so disastrous that it not only cost him his leg but it effectively destroyed his military career and ruined his legacy. (I have yet to see anyone using a Dan Sickles avatar). He even seemed to have realized the mistake, and offered to withdraw when he found out how mad General Meade was, but it was too late and he was already under fire.

Had he stayed put, he may have become the Hero of Little Round Top, while Gouvener Warren and Joshua Chamberlain faded into obscurity.
 
A meat grinder that nearly ended in success on Day 2. There are some very small changes you make to the events of July 2 and the end result of the battle are very different. The ANV was not that far off from a victory that day.

July 3rd was a meatgrinder deluxe.
Lee's habit of spending lives on the offensive meant that Day 2 was very costly. How long can he keep that up in enemy territory?
 
As many of the wiser minds here have pointed out, there were any number of crucial actions, small and large, that contributed to the outcome. I am continually astounded by the courage of the soldiers from both the ANV and AOP, particularly when the fertilizer hit the fan. Certain images stand out for me - Benjamin Crippen of the 143rd PA shaking his fist at the oncoming Confederates, the 1st Minnesota charge, Oates' Alabama men trying to move up LRT. I sincerely doubt I could have found even a tenth of the determination or bravery they demonstrated.
 
The battle had begun before Lee was involved and on the field. The toothpaste was out of the tube already.

The first phase of the battle had begun. Nobody told him to attack the Federals the next two days (and, btw, further endanger civilians, which is a point not mentioned enough about this battle) while at a disadvantage both as far as ground and communications (Stuart) went. He could have very well chosen, not to retreat, because they won day 1, but to strategically find better ground West, re-establish communications with Stuart who was close, and have Meade come to him...

But he didn't.
 
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I could not agree more. Gettysburg Day Two had many opportunities for loss from Cup's Hill to that maneuver by Sickles on the other end of the line (which compromised the left end of the Union line, ultimately forcing the weakening of the right end by requiring reinforcements to be pulled from Culp's Hill to support LRT). Day Two could have been catastrophic to the Union.

The closest the Confederates came to success on Day 2 (and arguably the closest to victory in Gettysburg) was the evening during Early's assault of Cemetery Hill. They broke through the lines and sent the Federal front, but (and that was the story of the battle) they did not have enough reinforcements to hold their positions. Ironically, Rodes' troops were sitting on their rears, instead of supporting Early's troops. Lots of tactical mistakes and opportunities lost, but the biggest mistakes were strategic. Not doubt. The events of the evening of July 2nd are really interesting, but they are overshadowed in the story telling by the sexier stories of Dirty Dan and The 20th Maine... Here is a map to see what I mean:

Gettysburg_Cemetery_Hill.png
 
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I have always found it amazing how Sickles' move was so disastrous that it not only cost him his leg but it effectively destroyed his military career and ruined his legacy. (I have yet to see anyone using a Dan Sickles avatar). He even seemed to have realized the mistake, and offered to withdraw when he found out how mad General Meade was, but it was too late and he was already under fire.

Had he stayed put, he may have become the Hero of Little Round Top, while Gouvener Warren and Joshua Chamberlain faded into obscurity.
Sickles did not "realize the mistake". Meade pointed the mistake out to him. Meade tells Sickles it is too late to withdraw.
 
The first phase of the battle had begun. Nobody told him to attack the Federals the next two days (and, btw, further endanger civilians, which is a point not mentioned enough about this battle) while at a disadvantage both as far as ground and communications (Stuart) went. He could have very well chosen, not to retreat, because they won day 1, but to strategically find better ground West, re-establish communications with Stuart who was close, and have Meade come to him...

But he didn't.
And perhaps he should have!
 
Sickles did not "realize the mistake". Meade pointed the mistake out to him. Meade tells Sickles it is too late to withdraw.
"This had two effects: it greatly diluted the concentrated defensive posture of his corps by stretching it too thin, and it created a salient that could be bombarded and attacked from multiple sides. About this time (3 p.m.), Meade called a meeting of his corps commanders. Sickles did not appear. An aide to Brig. Gen. Gouvernor K Warren soon reported the situation. Meade and Warren rode to Sickles' position, where Meade demanded an explanation from the general. Meade refused Sickles' offer to withdraw because he realized it was too late and the Confederates would soon attack, putting a retreating force in even greater peril."
McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States). New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Pp. 657

You will note that I said that Sickles seemed to have realized his mistake, neither you nor I nor anyone else can possibly know what he was actually thinking in the moment, and he absolutely did offer to withdraw, an offer that Meade rejected since it was too late.
 
"This had two effects: it greatly diluted the concentrated defensive posture of his corps by stretching it too thin, and it created a salient that could be bombarded and attacked from multiple sides. About this time (3 p.m.), Meade called a meeting of his corps commanders. Sickles did not appear. An aide to Brig. Gen. Gouvernor K Warren soon reported the situation. Meade and Warren rode to Sickles' position, where Meade demanded an explanation from the general. Meade refused Sickles' offer to withdraw because he realized it was too late and the Confederates would soon attack, putting a retreating force in even greater peril."
McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States). New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Pp. 657

You will note that I said that Sickles seemed to have realized his mistake, neither you nor I nor anyone else can possibly know what he was actually thinking in the moment, and he absolutely did offer to withdraw, an offer that Meade rejected since it was too late.
His action cost the lives of thousands of men. Not only the 3rd corps but of those that Meade had no other choice than to order to support Sickles misguided and numbskull move. His movement cost the AOP approx. 66% of the entire casualties suffered by the AOP during the entire battle essentially crippling a large portion of the Union forces.
 
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