The Confederate attempt to cut Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend

historicus

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When I was traveling over the Christmas holidays, I stopped at Vicksburg National Park as it was on the way to my destination. I went to the Visitor's Center at Vicksburg National Park, and I watched the documentary film Here Brothers Fought about the Siege of Vicksburg. In the film, the narrator says that Confederate troops attempted to cut Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend (I probably misspelled Milikan's, but I'm sure that my spelling is close enough that anyone can figure out what i'm writing about.). The narrator said that black Union troops fought the Confederates at Milikan's Bend to defend Grant's supply lines. The black Confederate troops drove the Confederate troops off.

Did the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend come from Pemberton's Army of Mississippi? Or did the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend come from Joseph Johnston's Army of Tennessee? Or did the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend come from somewhere other than Pemberton's Army of Mississippi or Johnston's Army of Tennessee?

If the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend came from Pemberton's Army of Mississippi, how did these Confederate troops reach Milikan's Bend? Did they fight their way through the Federal lines? Or was there a gap in the Federal lines?
 
When I was traveling over the Christmas holidays, I stopped at Vicksburg National Park as it was on the way to my destination. I went to the Visitor's Center at Vicksburg National Park, and I watched the documentary film Here Brothers Fought about the Siege of Vicksburg. In the film, the narrator says that Confederate troops attempted to cut Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend (I probably misspelled Milikan's, but I'm sure that my spelling is close enough that anyone can figure out what i'm writing about.). The narrator said that black Union troops fought the Confederates at Milikan's Bend to defend Grant's supply lines. The black Confederate troops drove the Confederate troops off.

Did the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend come from Pemberton's Army of Mississippi? Or did the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend come from Joseph Johnston's Army of Tennessee? Or did the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend come from somewhere other than Pemberton's Army of Mississippi or Johnston's Army of Tennessee?

If the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend came from Pemberton's Army of Mississippi, how did these Confederate troops reach Milikan's Bend? Did they fight their way through the Federal lines? Or was there a gap in the Federal lines?

The attack at Milliken's Bend was carried out by Walker's ("Greyhounds") Division, who moved down from Arkansas. This was an effort at siege relief undertaken by the Confederate Trans-Mississippi command of Gen Edmund Kirby Smith.

It was too little too late to help Pemberton. Contemporary accounts show the federals favorably viewed the performance of the Black soldiers.
 
Battle of Milliken's Bend, June 7, 1863
In the spring of 1863, Gen. Richard Taylor desired to use Maj. Gen. John G. Walker's Texas Division in an advance on Berwick Bay, overrun the LaFourche, and threaten New Orleans. Taylor, however, was overruled by Kirby Smith who directed him to strike at the Federals in Madison Parish. Taylor opposed the idea and later wrote,

"Remonstrances were to no avail. I was informed that all the Confederate authorities in the east were urgent for some effort on our part in behalf of Vicksburg, and that public opinion would condemn us if we did not try to do something." Taylor insisted, "that to go two hundred miles and more away from the proper theatre of action in search of an indefinite something is hard; but orders are orders."


In accordance with his orders, Taylor reluctantly directed the Texans to Richmond, LA. Taylor himself went on ahead of the Texans and reached Richmond at dusk on June 5. He immediately set about gathering information concerning the enemy dispositions and troop strengths at Milliken's Bend and Young's Point. Much of the data gained by Taylor was provided by Lt. Col. Isaac F. Harrison of the 15th Louisiana Cavalry Battalion. Some of it was correct and some was not. Harrison, for example, underestimated enemy troop strength at both points; faulty intelligence played a key role in the Confederate plan of action.

The Texans tramped into Richmond at 10:00 a.m. on June 6, where they cooked rations and rested for several hours. Walker was informed of the enemy's dispositions and briefed on the plan of action. Taylor's plan called for Walker's Division to launch simultaneous assaults on the enemy at Milliken's Bend and Young's Point, while a combat patrol led by Col. Frank Bartlett of the 13th Louisiana Cavalry Battalion attacked the Federal enclave at Lake Providence.

On June 6, as the Confederates planned for action, the Federals at Milliken's Bend made a reconnaissance in the direction of Richmond. The Federals had been monitoring the increased Confederate activity and feared an attack on Milliken's Bend was imminent. Consequently, Brig. Gen. Elias S. Dennis, commander of the District of Northeast Louisiana, ordered Col. Hermann Lieb to make a reconnaissance toward Richmond.

Lieb was a feisty soldier. Born in Switzerland, he emigrated to the United States and settled in Illinois. At the outbreak of the war, he enlisted for ninety days as a private in Company B of the 8th Illinois Infantry. Upon reorganization of the regiment as a three-year unit in July of 1861, Lieb was elected captain, and the following year was promoted to major. He saw action at Fort Donelson and at Shiloh, and during the Louisiana operations, he was colonel of the 9th Louisiana Infantry (African Descent), commanding the post at Milliken's Bend.

At 2:00 a.m., on June 6, Lieb moved out with his own regiment and several companies of the 10th Illinois Cavalry. His force pushed to within three miles of Richmond when they made contact with Confederate forces. After driving in the pickets, Lieb became apprehensive and decided to return to Milliken's Bend. Half-way back to the post, Lieb's men were surprised to see the Illinois troopers dashing up in their rear, hotly pursued by Confederate cavalry. Reacting quickly, Colonel Lieb deployed his regiment into line. A single volley sufficed to drive off the Southerners.

Convinced that his post was in danger, Lieb requested reinforcements. In response to the colonel's urgent request, the 23d Iowa (a white regiment) was hurried from Young's Point to Milliken's Bend, and the ironclad Choctaw was sent by Admiral Porter to provide additional support. That night, the Federals fortified their camp by constructing abatis and barricades of cotton bales. His confidence bolstered by these preparations, Lieb had his men under arms at 3:00 a.m. on June 7.

The Confederate plan of action called for a night march. The Texans left Richmond at 6:00 p.m. on June 6, in hopes of arriving at the enemy camps at sunrise. One Texan recorded the march with these words:

"In sections four abreast, and close order, the troops took up the line of march, in anticipation of meeting almost certain death, but with undaunted, unquailing spirits. In breathless silence, with the high glittering stars looking down upon them, through dark and deep defiles marched the dense array of men, moving steadily forward; not a whisper was heard — no sound of clanking saber, or rattle of canteen and cup."

At Oak Grove Plantation the road forked, the left leading to Milliken's Bend, the right to Young's Point. Walker sent McCulloch's Brigade toward Milliken's Bend and Hawes' Brigade toward Young's Point, while he remained at Oak Grove with Col. Horace Randal's Brigade.

McCulloch's Brigade, 1,500 strong, arrived within 1.5 miles of Milliken's Bend at 2:30 a.m., when it was fired upon by enemy pickets. McCulloch quickly deployed his brigade into line of battle with Col. Richard Waterhouse's* 19th Texas Infantry on the right, Col. R. T. P. Allen's 17th Texas Infantry in the center, and Lt. Col. E.P. Gregg's 16th Texas Cavalry (dismounted) on the left, while Col. George Flournoy's 16th Texas Infantry was held in reserve.

The Confederate cavalry scouts in front fell back precipitably when fired upon. In the darkness and confusion, the cavalrymen were then shot at by McCulloch's skirmishers. Fortunately, no men were injured.

As the Federal pickets began falling back, Lieb placed his men on the levee behind cotton bales. His units consisted of the 8th, 9th, 11th, and 13th Louisiana Infantry Regiments (African Descent), 1st Mississippi Infantry (African Descent), and the 23d Iowa Infantry, totaling 1,061 men. The Black troops were recently recruited, poorly trained, and poorly armed. In many cases, they were also poorly led. But, they had the advantage of position, and were supported by the guns of the powerful ironclad Choctaw.

McCulloch placed his Texans into line of battle astride the Richmond road and drove the Federals from hedgerow to hedgerow. One Texans wrote, "It was impossible for our troops to keep in line of battle, owing to the many hedges we had to encounter, which it was impossible to pass, except through a few gaps that had been used as gates or passageways." Once passed the hedgerows, McCulloch reformed his brigade within twenty-five paces of the main Federal line. Shouting, "No quarter for the officers, kill the damned abolitionists," the Texans scaled the levee and closed on the enemy. A withering volley stunned the Southerners, but the poorly trained blacks were unable to reload their cumbersome weapons before the Texans were upon them. McCulloch reported, "The line was formed under a heavy fire from the enemy, and the troops charged the breastworks, carrying it instantly, killing and wounding many of the enemy by their deadly fire, as well as the bayonet." The brigadier noted, "This charge was resisted by the negro portion of the enemy's force with considerable obstinacy, while the white or true Yankee portion ran like whipped curs almost as soon as the charge was ordered."

Clubbed muskets and bayonets were freely used as the Texans surged over the cotton bale barricades atop the levee. Joseph P. Blessington of the 16th Texas recalled, "The enemy gave away and stampeded pell-mell over the levee, in great terror and confusion. Our troops followed after them, bayoneting them by hundreds." Sweeping through the Federal encampment, McCulloch's men raced toward the second levee next to the river. Their efforts, however, were driven back repeatedly by the rapid fire of Choctaw's big guns.

Unable to cross the levee, McCulloch's men mopped-up isolated pockets of resistance and plundered the Federal camp. The brigadier sent an urgent request to Walker for reinforcements, but before help arrived, McCulloch spotted a second gunboat, the Lexington, coming upriver. Realizing that his troops were no match for gunboats, and without waiting for Walker's arrival, McCulloch ordered a withdrawal to Oak Grove Plantation.

In the engagement at Milliken's Bend, McCulloch's Brigade suffered losses of 44 killed, 131 wounded, and 10 missing. The Texans, however, inflicted 652 casualties on the Federals of which number 101 were killed, 285 wounded, and 266 captured or missing.

*(Richard Waterhouse was the only colonel then serving in the Texas Division who would rise up to be named a brigadier general. Born in Rhea County, Tennessee, on January 12, 1832, he ran away from home to serve in the Mexican War. At the outbreak of the Civil War he helped raise the 19th Texas and on May 13, 1862, was named colonel of the regiment. He served in the Trans-Mississippi Department throughout the war and saw action in both Arkansas and Louisiana. "Assigned to command" as a brigadier general by Kirby Smith in 1864, Waterhouse was not officially appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate until March 1865.)

https://www.nps.gov/vick/learn/historyculture/battle-of-millikens-bend-june-7-1863.htm
 
Inside the Old Depot Museum on the Vicksburg waterfront there is a painting of the Choctaw engaged at the Battle of Milliken's Bend.
choctaw.jpg
 
The attack at Milliken's Bend was carried out by Walker's ("Greyhounds") Division, who moved down from Arkansas. This was an effort at siege relief undertaken by the Confederate Trans-Mississippi command of Gen Edmund Kirby Smith.

It was too little too late to help Pemberton. Contemporary accounts show the federals favorably viewed the performance of the Black soldiers.

Walker's attack at Milliken's Bend was one of two efforts by Confederates in the Trans-Mississippi Department to attempt to relieve Vicksburg. Lt. Gen. Theophilus Holmes's army of the District of Arkansas attacked at Helena and was badly repulsed by a small but fortified Union garrison with support of the USS Tyler. What was even more unfortunate for the Confederates is that Holmes attacked on July 4, the day Pemberton surrendered.

Both cases demonstrated how viable naval superiority was. Without naval support the Confederates could not effectively respond to the Federal naval gunfire interdicting them.
 
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Milliken's Bend was also one of the few times that shore spotting was used for naval artillery. It proved effective.

I've never seen that painting before, 1stMS-Arty; thank you for sharing! I note the forward casemate of Choctaw is depicted as square... it's one of the mysteries/confusions of the riverine war (in some images, it's rounded).
 
When I was traveling over the Christmas holidays, I stopped at Vicksburg National Park as it was on the way to my destination. I went to the Visitor's Center at Vicksburg National Park, and I watched the documentary film Here Brothers Fought about the Siege of Vicksburg. In the film, the narrator says that Confederate troops attempted to cut Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend (I probably misspelled Milikan's, but I'm sure that my spelling is close enough that anyone can figure out what i'm writing about.). The narrator said that black Union troops fought the Confederates at Milikan's Bend to defend Grant's supply lines. The black Confederate troops drove the Confederate troops off.

Did the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend come from Pemberton's Army of Mississippi? Or did the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend come from Joseph Johnston's Army of Tennessee? Or did the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend come from somewhere other than Pemberton's Army of Mississippi or Johnston's Army of Tennessee?

If the Confederate troops who attempted to cut off Grant's supply lines at Milikan's Bend came from Pemberton's Army of Mississippi, how did these Confederate troops reach Milikan's Bend? Did they fight their way through the Federal lines? Or was there a gap in the Federal lines?
I think you meant to say black Union troops. Indeed, the black troops' performance at Milliken's Bend was a great milestone in convincing skeptical northerners that African-American soldiers could and would fight just as well as anyone else.
 
Milliken's Bend was also one of the few times that shore spotting was used for naval artillery. It proved effective.

I've never seen that painting before, 1stMS-Arty; thank you for sharing! I note the forward casemate of Choctaw is depicted as square... it's one of the mysteries/confusions of the riverine war (in some images, it's rounded).
yessir i noticed that also...the paintings are fairly modern with somewhat of an impressionist flair.......art critic that i am....

There are several other paintings by the same artist in the Depot....

Capture04.JPG
 
also.....wondering what would have happened if Walker had attacked with his entire division instead of splitting it into three parts..........
 
The attack at Milliken's Bend was carried out by Walker's ("Greyhounds") Division, who moved down from Arkansas. This was an effort at siege relief undertaken by the Confederate Trans-Mississippi command of Gen Edmund Kirby Smith.

It was too little too late to help Pemberton. Contemporary accounts show the federals favorably viewed the performance of the Black soldiers.
I agree, it was too late to help Pemberton.

If there was a time to help Pemberton, it was when Grant's supply line stretched 50 miles in Louisiana on one single road, stretching from Milliken's Bend all the way to Hard Times. That Pemberton had no jurisdictional control to order troops in that part of the Confederacy to halt or disrupt Grant's reported move was a command structure - or departmental structural- failure stemming, I guess, from Davis.

I heard Warren Grabau speak years ago. He said that Grant got "lucky" during this time. But I recall him saying "luck" is part of the process.

I filmed Grabau's talk and had it converted from VHS to DVD a few months back. I need to carve out time to watch it, but I'm certain Grabau talked about the 1 single, muddy road stretching, at one point for 50 miles! Anyway, that was the time to strike. Pemberton pleaded with the Trans-Mississippi (or, at least, requested) they do something. Instead, Bowen used 2 regiments - sent across the river from Grand Gulf- to monitor Grant's moves.
 
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I agree, it was too late to help Pemberton.

If there was a time to help Pemberton, it was when Grant's supply line stretched 50 miles in Louisiana on one single road, stretching from Milliken's Bend all the way to Hard Times. That Pemberton had no jurisdictional control to order troops in that part of the Confederacy to halt or disrupt Grant's reported move was a command structure - or departmental structural- failure stemming, I guess, from Davis.

I heard Warren Grabau speak years ago. He said that Grant got "lucky" during this time. But I recall him saying "luck" is part of the process.

I filmed Grabau's talk and had it converted from VHS to DVD a few months back. I need to carve out time to watch it, but I'm certain Grabau talked about the 1 single, muddy road stretching, at one point for 50 miles! Anyway, that was the time to strike. Pemberton pleaded with the Trans-Mississippi (or, at least, requested) they do something. Instead, Bowen used 2 regiments - sent across the river from Grand Gulf- to monitor Grant's moves.


It's a good point about Grant operating directly along the seam between the CS command jurisdictions. They seemed slow to grasp what Grant was up to, and then unable to agree on countermeasures. Examining the movements of Walkers division illustrates how the opportunity to hit Grant was missed. Using Elijah Petty's (Co F 17th TX) Letters from Journey to Pleasant Hill we can plot the advance, using the locations Lt Petty gave when writing home (I estimated the distances using google maps so they are very approximate to 1863 travel):


4/23 Left camp near Pine Bluff AR, en route to Monroe LA.
4/29 Fountain Hill AR.
5/1 Hamburg AR
5/7 Trenton LA (4 miles west of Monroe)

[Distance of 135 miles marched in 15 days.]

On 5/10 Petit wrote again from Trenton "Our division left this place on yesterday morning on steam boats to proceed by the Washita river, Little river and Chatahoula lake to within 20 miles of Alexandria ... We proceeded 70 miles when ... the boats turned and commenced steaming back up the river"

A week later, they marched west (80 miles):
5/19 Sparta LA
5/20 Black Lake
5/22 Campti

The Southeast on the Red River by boat (70 miles):
5/27 Alexandria

and Finally northward to vicksburg, mostly by boat(140 miles):
5/30 Tensas Bayou
6/1 "Camp onHigh Tensas"
6/4 Bayou Macon below Delhi

Petit was wounded at Milliken's Bend and furloughed to his home in Bastrop TX, returning to duty in August.


The distance from Monroe to Vicksburg is about 70 miles on I-20. If the decision had been made to move directly against Grant when Walker reached Monroe, they could have been causing problems for Grant mid-May. Instead they moved south towards Alexandria (against Banks), only to be forced back by Federal Gunboats. A week later they marched west to reach Alexandria via the Red river, by which time Banks forces had moved back across the Mississippi to assault Port Hudson, and enabled Walkers men to advance via Alexandria. It was only at this time did Walkers men move against Grants supply line.

So it was quite a circular route to Millikens Bend for the Greyhounds.
 
It's a good point about Grant operating directly along the seam between the CS command jurisdictions. They seemed slow to grasp what Grant was up to, and then unable to agree on countermeasures. Examining the movements of Walkers division illustrates how the opportunity to hit Grant was missed. Using Elijah Petty's (Co F 17th TX) Letters from Journey to Pleasant Hill we can plot the advance, using the locations Lt Petty gave when writing home (I estimated the distances using google maps so they are very approximate to 1863 travel):


4/23 Left camp near Pine Bluff AR, en route to Monroe LA..


One of those Confederate command jurisdictions was also undergoing a transfer of command. Starting in January 1863, Confederate forces in Texas and Louisiana were transferred from then Trans-Mississippi Department commander Theophilus Holmes to newcomer Edmund Kirby Smith. On February 9, Kirby Smith's mandate was expanded to the entire department, replacing Holmes. Holmes was then consigned to just the District of Arkansas that March. Not to mention that Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor in West Louisiana were clashing about the best use of Walker's division.
 
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yessir i noticed that also...the paintings are fairly modern with somewhat of an impressionist flair.......art critic that i am....

There are several other paintings by the same artist in the Depot....

View attachment 120755

That's a good'un... July 15, 1862, in "Old River" in the Yazoo; the Arkansas is closing in on Walke's USS Carondelet (identifiable by the red bands on the chimneys), with the 'timberclad' USS Tyler in support in the middle distance. At the right in the background, the ram Queen of the West is rather ignominiously skedaddling downstream.
 
It's a good point about Grant operating directly along the seam between the CS command jurisdictions. They seemed slow to grasp what Grant was up to, and then unable to agree on countermeasures.

Good point indeed - so obvious that I never thought of it before!

We think of the Mississippi as a transportation artery, but it was also the boundary between two commands, a classic weak spot often exploited in military strategy.
 
I agree, it was too late to help Pemberton.

If there was a time to help Pemberton, it was when Grant's supply line stretched 50 miles in Louisiana on one single road, stretching from Milliken's Bend all the way to Hard Times. That Pemberton had no jurisdictional control to order troops in that part of the Confederacy to halt or disrupt Grant's reported move was a command structure - or departmental structural- failure stemming, I guess, from Davis.

I heard Warren Grabau speak years ago. He said that Grant got "lucky" during this time. But I recall him saying "luck" is part of the process.

I filmed Grabau's talk and had it converted from VHS to DVD a few months back. I need to carve out time to watch it, but I'm certain Grabau talked about the 1 single, muddy road stretching, at one point for 50 miles! Anyway, that was the time to strike. Pemberton pleaded with the Trans-Mississippi (or, at least, requested) they do something. Instead, Bowen used 2 regiments - sent across the river from Grand Gulf- to monitor Grant's moves.
I bought and read Grabau's book in 2011, not realizing he was deceased for some time. I was so disappointed when I found out. I was hoping he could be another source for us to bounce off questions. But Parker Hills and Terry Winschell should be enough.
 
I agree, it was too late to help Pemberton.

If there was a time to help Pemberton, it was when Grant's supply line stretched 50 miles in Louisiana on one single road, stretching from Milliken's Bend all the way to Hard Times. That Pemberton had no jurisdictional control to order troops in that part of the Confederacy to halt or disrupt Grant's reported move was a command structure - or departmental structural- failure stemming, I guess, from Davis.

When did Grant's supply line stretch 50 miles in Louisiana on one single road, stretching from Milliken's Bend all the way to Hard Times? As I recall, by the time the Siege of Vicksburg began, Grant's supply line was the Mississippi River. Therefore, I am assuming that when Grant's supply line stretched 50 miles in Louisiana on one single road was before the Siege of Vicksburg began. I would just like to know the specific time period before the Siege in which Grant's supply line stretched through Louisiana on a single road.
 
Grant began his march (McClernand's Corp.) from Miliken's Bend on March 29, 1863 and ended up at Hard Times on April 28. That's about 50 miles, troops and supplies stretched the entire length of the road and bayous.
 
When did Grant's supply line stretch 50 miles in Louisiana on one single road, stretching from Milliken's Bend all the way to Hard Times? As I recall, by the time the Siege of Vicksburg began, Grant's supply line was the Mississippi River. Therefore, I am assuming that when Grant's supply line stretched 50 miles in Louisiana on one single road was before the Siege of Vicksburg began. I would just like to know the specific time period before the Siege in which Grant's supply line stretched through Louisiana on a single road.

Grant was moving supplies via this route and then through Grand Gulf until mid-May. I'd recommend 98 Days by Grabau for this, his detailed maps show Grants supply lines at various times.
 
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