Franklin The Battle of Franklin and the 16th Tennessee

Joined
May 18, 2005
Location
Spring Hill, Tennessee
This is another draft of my chapter on the Battle of Franklin. Tell me what you think please. This isn't the whole chapter, just the portion consisting of their fight. The title of the chapter is "Mowed down like grain before the sickle."



When Lane’s and Conrad’s Yankees turned rushing back to their main line of entrenchments, the vast majority of them converged on the one and only opening in the Federal line of works instead of maneuvering the array of obstacles that confronted them. A gap had been left open at Columbia Pike to allow baggage wagons, artillery and other passage through to the interior side of the works. Both east and west of this opening, the Federals had constructed strong works that consisted of an exterior ditch—about two to three feet deep and five to eight feet across—and a thick parapet made of the soil from the ditch with a convex face. The top of the works had been lined with head-logs of trees and timbers from deconstructed structures at the Carter Farm. Thirty to fifty feet in front of the ditch, the enemy had constructed an obstruction of fence posts that were planted in the ground at a forty-five degree angle—top toward the Rebels—planted so closely together that a man couldn’t squeeze between them without forcing two or more out of the ground. These obstructions, as well as a grove of Locust trees that had been cut down with their branches felled toward the attackers less than a hundred yards west of the pike, forced most of the Federal troops to take the path of least resistance with the Rebels in hot pursuit. The Rebel brigades of Gist, Gordon, Granbury and Govan similarly found themselves funneled by the obstructions while in pursuit of the Yankees that ran for dear life toward their comrades-in-arms. Additionally, no less than fourteen of the twenty-eight cannon confronting the Rebels occupied Brown’s division frontage. A Yankee battery of Kentuckians was stationed behind the works just east of Columbia Pike. One section of an Ohio battery was arriving in front of the Carter House. Four guns of the 20th Ohio were stationed adjacent to the Carter’s smoke house on a retrenched line in rear of the main line, and to their right, four more cannon of Bridges’ Illinois battery were placed on Carter Hill commanding all approaches from the south and west.

The Yankee rush back to the main line took only a few minutes. With the horde of friendly troops pouring back to the main line, the Federal troops occupying it were obliged not to fire for fear of killing their own men. However, massive volleys of musketry and cannon fire erupted both on the left and right flanks of the main line that dropped scores of men from Bate’s division on the west and two divisions of Stewart’s corps on the east. Strickland’s Yankee brigade that occupied the main line—due south of the Carter House—was overwhelmed by the multitude of friendly troops running pell-mell onto and over their lines. Soon, two regiments—the 50th Ohio and 72nd Illinois—began to waver and break to the rear in the face of the on-rushing Rebs. Suddenly and without warning, the troops at the retrenched line and the artillery—sixty yards in rear of the main line adjacent to the Carter smoke house—opened fire with a massive eruption of flame and sulfuric smoke. The Sixteenth—with Carter’s brigade—was just reaching the first line of works that had been taken when the concussion of the battle in the center shook the ground beneath them. Suddenly, their front was obscured in a thick cloud of smoke and flashes. What was happening? From their vantage, the scene had become so quickly and effectively enveloped in smoke that nothing could be discerned.

Unbeknownst the Rebels in Carter’s and Strahl’s brigades, the rush and convergence of Gist, Gordon, Granbury and Govan’s brigades had fractured the Yankee center. The main line had been abandoned for up to one-hundred yards on the west of the pike and another twenty-five yards east of the pike. The four hell bent brigades poured over and into the Federal center sweeping everything in its front. But two factors weighed heavily on the success of the breakthrough. The Rebels had just sprinted nearly five-hundred yards and were exhausted by the time they arrived at the opening at the pike. On both sides of the pike, many Confederates merely collapsed in the outer ditch to catch their breath. Of the hundreds that poured over the earthworks and pressed toward the Carter House, they were met by the fresh brigade of Colonel Emerson Opdycke. His blue-coats had been resting for nearly two hours in defilade on the north slopes of Carter Hill. When they heard the crash of musketry in their front, and saw troops rushing in disorder to the rear, they responded with an immediate rush to the works. This fresh brigade—with the assistance of two green regiments fresh from Ohio and Missouri—immediately plugged the massive hole torn in the retrenched line and poured staggering volleys into the suddenly overwhelmed and exhausted Rebels. A huge number of men from Gordon’s brigade found themselves cut off and surrounded by blue-coats. After a fierce hand to hand encounter with bayonets and clubbed muskets, most of them relented and surrendered. The Rebs that weren’t captured turned from the counter-attack, rushing back to the outer ditch of the main line where they continued to load and fire in the face of massive Yankee reinforcements.

Three-hundred yards south, Carter and Strahl continued a steady tread toward the earthworks. As they neared, the order to double-quick was given. Within a few hundred yards, random shells and spent bullets began to take a toll. Here and there, a man would be struck and abruptly drop to the ground—perhaps fortunate not to make it to the bowels of hell experienced in the outer ditch of the main line. At least two of the Sixteenth’s members fell in this advance. Robert Tucker of Company B was hit in the right hip by a shell fragment, and A. D. Ware of Company H was wounded by an exploding shell. One soldier described the cannon fire as “almost deafening.” Finally as they closed the distance to the works, the order to charge was given. They rushed through “a field and opening in which was no protection.” “The rebel yell was terrifying as we never heard it before,” wrote Lieutenant Talley. As the 8th/16th/28th Tennessee neared the main line and entered the thick billows of smoke, they were confronted by the obstruction of the felled Locust grove. Here, the regiment lost all semblance of organization. In this charge, the Sixteenth’s color bearer fell. Seeing him drop to the ground and the flag fall from his grasp, another of the boys rushed to seize the flag. This man carried it some distance further when he too was dropped by the heavy fire. Once again, another member of the regiment ran to seize the colors. Twenty-year old 2nd Sergeant Sam Lusk of Company D grabbed the colors and was struck and killed almost the moment he raised them. To a large degree, the boys tried to flank to the east of the obstruction of Locusts—some with success. Others found themselves entangled in the thorny branches of the trees while absorbing a devastating fire of canister and minnié balls that plowed into the branches and trunks all around them with a loud “crack.” Captain Holman, commanding one of the consolidated companies of the 28th Tennessee, fell killed in this charge—leaving Lieutenant Talley in command. In minutes that seemed like hours, the majority of the boys had made it through the obstructions and to the outer ditch of the main line under a murderous fire. The consolidated regiment’s approach brought them to a portion of the vacated main line that had been occupied by the 111th Ohio on the right and also to a portion of the line that was still occupied by the same regiment to their left. The battle raged with “fury and swiftness.” Talley wrote that, “Our men were mowed down like grain before the sickle.”[1]

At least a portion of the outer ditch where the regiment arrived was enfiladed by fire from an angle in the enemy’s works east of the pike over one-hundred yards away. This ditch was already nearly filled with survivors from the breakthrough of Gist and Gordon’s brigades. The boys on this portion of the line not only suffered from a heavy fire in their front, but the heavy fire from their right slaughtered the Rebels that could find almost no cover from the fire—except that gained from their dead comrades. Just as Lieutenant Talley reached the ditch, he was glanced by a ball in the head—breaking his skull—and dropped unconscious in the ditch. Strahl’s brigade—intermingled with them, but massed mostly on their right—was decimated by the fire from the angle at even closer range. However, the fight didn’t stop at the outer ditch of the main line. The initial contact between the opposing forces took place around sunset—4:34 P.M; by 4:45 P.M., the regiment was in the ditches of the main line. Daylight was rapidly fading, and in the dense smoke of battle, darkness came on even more quickly. Reaching the line and catching their breath, the surviving officers of the consolidated regiment urged the men over the works in an attempt to gain the retrenched line. Forty yards away under cover of hasty fortifications, thousands of Federal troops confronted the Butternuts. In one of several attempts to cross the Carter garden—that occupied the space between the main and retrenched lines—the boys poured over the works taking casualties at every step. Some were struck just mounting the earthworks, others were hit jumping to the ground, and still others as they took their first steps toward the Yankee position. They received fire from their right, front and left. The 111th Ohio that had withdrawn from a portion of the works refused their left flank and poured a devastating crossfire into the Rebel mob coupled with canister fired from the 20th Ohio battery at point-blank range directly in their front. Even with this unrelenting fire, the boys of the Mountain Regiment with their comrades of the 8th and 28th Tennessee were able to make it most of the way across the garden. When “within about 10 steps of the 3rd line of defense,” twenty-two year old Jeptha M. Fuston was hit by a ball in the left leg between the tibia and fibula. At almost the same time, he was struck in the right Achilles tendon above the ankle. He dropped hard to the ground writhing in pain. In the confusion of smoke and gunfire, he gained his feet and staggered back to the main line—rolling into the outer ditch of the earthworks. He soon found himself “fast failing” from loss of blood. As darkness continued to fall, the enemy’s shots were not so much as aimed, but merely pointed in the antagonist’s direction. Perhaps it was this, coupled with the smoke and din of battle that enabled Fuston to cooperate “with a comrade who was wounded in the right shoulder, loaning his left” to make it to safety at the field hospital a mile back.[2]

Still, as the sun sank, the chaos and ferocity of battle failed to slacken. The dead and wounded from Gist’s and Carter’s brigades in the outer ditch continued to mount. Soon, Brigadier General Francis Cockrell’s Missouri brigade rushed into the center of the line with its left pouring in behind these two brigades. Once again, a large number of boys joined Cockrell’s men in their attempt to cross the main line and seize the retrenched line, but just as the times before, the mob melted away in ones, twos and piles in the attempt to cross the garden. Major Ben Randals struggled to keep the men supplied with ammunition helping to seize ammunition from the dead and wounded and passing it on to the survivors that continued to pour a heavy return fire toward the retrenched line. On the left of the Carter’s brigade, troops from no less than three different brigades hunkered in the outer ditch. There, they loaded and raised their rifles over the parapets and discharged their guns in the very faces of the enemy. As the last light of day faded from the horizon and darkness cloaked the field, only the flashes of rifle fire and artillery instantaneously lit the surroundings. Through the dense smoke, snapshots of figures could be seen at a single moment in time as they mounted the works to fire or reel from the impact of an enemy projectile. Many of the wounded now used the cover of darkness to remove to the rear. Some staggered back through the abatis and toward the field hospitals, others crawled. For the boys that remained in the ditch—some miraculously still unscathed and others only slightly wounded—the end was nowhere in sight. The thunderous crash of artillery and roar of musketry continued.

About 6 P.M. after more than an hour in the works with the fire escalating and then receding—during a lull in the gunfire, the boys were able to discern the snapping of branches, commands of officers and muffled sound of troops approaching in their rear once again. Suddenly, another massive eruption of fire from the Federal lines slammed into the interior side of the parapet and the whiz of minnié balls buzzed overhead. In moments, another brigade—this time Manigault and Deas’ brigades of Ed Johnson’s division—stumbled through the darkness and over dead and wounded from the previous attacks joining both Carter’s and Gist’s men in the ditch. They didn’t stop there; dropping ammunition boxes and sweeping forward, the surge of fresh Rebel troops pressed onto and over the works taking the survivors of Gist and Carter with them in another attempt to gain the retrenched line—forty yards away. General Manigault was wounded seriously in the head during the attack, as well as two of his successors. Unbeknownst to the boys in Carter’s brigade, General Carter had been gut shot just before darkness. He slumped from his saddle and was miraculously carried to the rear without being hit again. While the fight near the Locust grove and across the Carter garden surged back and forth, two more brigades of Johnson’s division slammed into the main Federal line to the left of Carter and Gist. Three times, the Rebels mounted assaults after being reinforced by Johnson’s division. At least one of the assaults met with limited success to the left of Carter’s brigade along the frontage defended by the 107th Illinois; but owing to the darkness, the success could not be exploited. Three stands of colors were taken by the Rebels in the bloody, chaotic fighting. An aide-de-camp of Johnson’s division later wrote a brief account of the battle from his vantage in rear of the struggle.

…our noble fellows, notwithstanding they were worn out with fatigue and loss of sleep, swept like an avalanche over the breastworks and fortifications, carrying everything before them. The conflict was terrible. The two lines now met face to face about ten feet apart, and poured into each other’s ranks murderous volleys of musket balls. The ground was covered with the dead and dying. It was now dark and still the battle raged with unabated fury. Oh! what a scene now presented itself. Along the extended line, from right to left, was heard the roaring musketry, while flashes from thousands of guns could be seen like lightning bugs on a summer’s night, while the whole heavens seemed filled with bursting bombs and crashing grape and canister. Onward and still onward pressed our noble men until the flashing muskets revealed the combatants engaged hand to hand, whilst the Union and Confederate flags were rustling together amid the deadly conflict. We conquered, and the enemy was driven from their works…[3]

On the left flank of the 8th/16th/28th Tennessee, the 4th Confederate/6th/9th/50th Tennessee occupied the outer ditch directly in front of the 111th Ohio. As the final attempt to take the works by Deas’ Brigade failed, “a strippling [sic] lieutenant of Johnson’s division, leaped on top of the works, sword in hand, and called to his men to follow, this they endeavored to do but were hurled back, by the storm which burst in their faces from the enemy’s line, but the young man stood there under the fire of a thousand rifles and appealed to his men to try again. He was finally pulled back in the trenches by Major Wilder, of Carter’s Brigade.” The valor shown in that brief, bloody engagement was not limited to a few men. Adjutant and 2nd Lieutenant Joseph Leipshuts of the Eighth was killed on the works in an attempt to storm the Yankee line. William Buchanan of the same regiment was severely wounded in one of the attacks within feet of the retrenched line. During a lull in the firing, he was carried into the Federal lines and taken captive. He had shown “great bravery” in the fight according to one of his comrades. Pendleton Huff—also of the Eighth—was shot in the mouth with the ball nearly shearing his lips off. 2nd Lieutenant James F. McCue was killed late in the fight at the angle of the works. Joseph Hamlet had enlisted in the 8th Tennessee in December of 1862. A friend of his dreamed that he would be killed in battle that day and begged him not to go into the fight. Joe replied that “he had rather be killed than disgrace his children.” His comrade’s premonition was verified when he was killed at the works during a Federal attempt to retake the portion of the line occupied by he and his comrades.[4]

The consolidated regiment of Tennesseans occupied a limited frontage in the ditch—probably not more than one-hundred yards in length. All the Tennesseans displayed great courage in the fight. The casualties in the Sixteenth and Carter’s entire brigade mounted steadily as the fight continued. Adjutant Alfred Claywell of the Sixteenth was wounded as well as another member of the field and staff—Horace McGuire who was the regimental bugler. Tennessee M. Hooper was shot in the left arm and hand; James Johnson was wounded seriously in the left leg; John Meadows was struck with a horrible wound in the right leg and foot in one of the attacks; John Sutton was shot in the left shoulder. The list continued to grow. In the hours past about 7:30 P.M., the fire began to slacken but would increase for brief periods of time whenever an unusual commotion was detected in front of the Federal lines. By 10 P.M., the fire was nominal, and the steady tread of wounded that could move continued in ones and twos to the rear. While some of the seriously wounded drifted into unconsciousness and death, others—exhausted from the hard march and immediacy of battle—attempted to make their way out of the ditches and to the rear. Some of the boys remained in the ditch—surrounded by dead and wounded piled three or four deep in some places. The moans and groans of the wounded tore at the hearts of the boys. Finally, as the fight gradually came to a close, the smoke dissipated and the smallest amount of ambient starlight was cast across the field. The slightest silhouettes of frozen figures littered the landscape. The motion of a wounded man swaying a leg or arm grabbed the attention of the naked eye in the darkness. Most of the men had chosen to remain in the ditch and let the battle end around them. They knew the commotion or racket created in going to the rear may bring on another deadly volley. And so the last few hours passed with only sporadic gunfire that punctuated the stillness of night.

Near midnight, Lieutenant Talley regained consciousness. Realizing he was wounded in the head, he tried to gain his feet several times, “but in every attempt I would fall back to the ground.” His vision was so impaired that “it seemed I must climb a very steep hill.” “The ground and everything I could see was right up in front of me and I could only be convinced of my impaired vision by trying to place my hands on objects that I apparently saw.” After maintaining his balance on his knees for some time, he crawled from the ditch and moved into the Locust thicket, “and it was by holding to these little bullet shattered trees that I could stand and stagger along by holding to them.” Finally after a time consuming undertaking through the thicket, Talley was assisted by the litter corps and placed in an ambulance. Although the day had proved comfortable, night brought on a chill, and shortly after midnight, a frigid north-westerly wind began to gently blow across the battlefield. It was about this time that soldiers in Johnson’s division became aware of the absolute silence in their front. When small parties of Rebels advanced without bringing on any gunfire, it was quickly established that the enemy had withdrawn. As the word spread back to the boys in the ditches, whole groups of men began to wander back to the rear through the darkness. Others went in immediate search of the dead and wounded friends and comrades. Next, fires began to spring up haphazardly across the field of battle. Torches were lit, and many dozens of them were wielded across the battleground with an occasional pause while a comrade turned bodies over for identification or called out men’s names.[5]


[1] Talley, Final Segment; Stan Castles, E-mail Correspondence.

[2] Fuston, Tennessee Civil War Veterans Questionnaires, Vol. 2, p. 871-3.

[3] “An Error Corrected.” The Richmond Dispatch (Richmond, VA) December 28, 1902, p. 19; “The Battle of Franklin, Tennessee.” Yorkville Enquirer (Yorkville, S.C.) January 4, 1865, p. 2.

[4] “An Error Corrected.” The Richmond Dispatch (Richmond, VA) December 28, 1902, p. 19; Quarles, Memoirs of Captain John S. Quarles, p. 3, 25.

[5] Talley, Final Segment.
 
It's sounds good jamie, I'll buy this book also since I really enjoyed your first book.one minor question I wonder is your mention of Bate's men that scores fell with the first volley.his division had had the lowest casualties there so seems a little out of place.
 
Excellent! I did notice one contradiction, however. You say that Cockrell's Missouri Brigade came charging up much later, while other authors suggest that his brigade was one of the first to come in contact with the main Federal line. Eric Jacobson in his book on the battle, as well as Phil Gottschalk in his history on the Missouri Brigade both say that Stewart's Corps got ahead of Cheatham's in the initial advance, due to the fact that Cheatham's Corps was slowed by Wagner's troops. Walthall's brigades to Cockrell's right were then slowed by the Osage abatis, so it's thought that Cockrell was the first to hit the main Federal line. Also, according to these authors, Cockrell's men hit to the right of the pike in front of the Cotton Gin.
 
It's sounds good jamie, I'll buy this book also since I really enjoyed your first book.one minor question I wonder is your mention of Bate's men that scores fell with the first volley.his division had had the lowest casualties there so seems a little out of place.
It is true that Bate's division reportedly suffered only 319 casualties: 47 killed, 253 wounded and 19 missing, but they took such light casualties in comparison to the other divisions because they were so effectively checked in their initial attack. The vast majority of their casualties came in the first ten minutes of action - and they were immediately repulsed - excepting a portion of Jackson's and Smith's brigades that made it to the outer ditch. The majority of Bate's division literally broke and ran to the rear seeking cover in a stream-bed near the Bositck house or "Everbright" mansion.
 
Excellent! I did notice one contradiction, however. You say that Cockrell's Missouri Brigade came charging up much later, while other authors suggest that his brigade was one of the first to come in contact with the main Federal line. Eric Jacobson in his book on the battle, as well as Phil Gottschalk in his history on the Missouri Brigade both say that Stewart's Corps got ahead of Cheatham's in the initial advance, due to the fact that Cheatham's Corps was slowed by Wagner's troops. Walthall's brigades to Cockrell's right were then slowed by the Osage abatis, so it's thought that Cockrell was the first to hit the main Federal line. Also, according to these authors, Cockrell's men hit to the right of the pike in front of the Cotton Gin.

This is interesting indeed, however, after researching this fight for soooo very long, I can't find one single soldier's account that served in Cockrell's brigade that says they were the first to hit the line. In fact, the only accounts of participants from that brigade state quite the opposite. I think most of the assumption made in Gottschalk's book is based off of the casualty percentage that they suffered - possibly the highest of any of the confederate brigades with Granbury, Gordon's brigades right up there with them. For example, I have three sources that state what the Missouri boys did. The first is a member of the 1st/3rd Missouri and is clear that there was a force in front of them that had already struck the works and were repulsed. The second account is a member of the 6th Missouri that clearly states the same, and that the field they were charging across was littered with wounded. The last account is by a staff officer of Govan's brigade who had just been wounded and was walking to the rear to his horse when he saw Lowery and Cockrell advancing toward the works. This would all have been after the initial breakthrough and actually makes more sense as to why Cockrell's brigade took such high casualties. His brigade struck the works alone, probably right after Lowery - who struck about the same time Carter and Strahl did. This meant that all of the Federal fire could be concentrated on the Missourians as they attacked.

Lastly, Cockrell's brigade DID strike on the right of the pike, but as they veered diagonally across the Yankee breastworks, receiving a vary heavy fire, the left of the brigade DID in fact strike as far left as the 111th Ohio (fully 80+ yards to the left or west of the pike). This is verified by a letter written by a member of the 111th Ohio that passed back over the battlefield on December 17th. In the letter he counted the graves of the different regiments in his front which were most notably - Tennessee and MISSOURI regiments! Makes you rethink the battlefield when you find these goodies! The other three sources are below - I'll look for the 111th source, but may not find it soon (tucked in a folder somewhere probably).

“Why the Band Played at Franklin”
The Review Appeal
Oct. 13, 1910
S.C. Trigg of Lebanon, Tenn.
1st/3rd Missouri

“When we were near the works, the first line or advance column, which had been repulsed, met us and passed back through our lines, I did not inquire and never learned what command the retreating troops belonged.”

“The 1st Missouri continued its charge till we reached the obstruction of brush in front of the enemy’s works, where we found Texans, Arkansas, Tennesseans. We all worked together making gaps through this obstruction. Near these gaps were piled the dead in heaps of four or five some from all of the above mentioned states. We buried one hundred and nineteen of our men in one grave near the pike between the cotton gin and pike where we did our fighting.”

Confederate Veteran
James Synnamon, 6th Missouri
p. 582

“I was with General Stewart in the battle of Franklin and was in the last charge, about sundown, when Stewart and Cheatham attempted to take the works from which our troops had been repulsed. It seemed to me that the air was all red and blue flames, with shells and bullets screeching and howling everywhere, over and through us, as we rushed across the cottonfields strewn with fallen men. Wounded and dying men lay all about in ghastly piles, and when we reached the works at the old cotton gin gatepost only two or three of my companions were with me. They went into the ditch, but I was tumbled over by a Yankee bullet and was dragged over and laid a prisoner by the old gin house.”

Letter to Irving A. Buck from Adjutant George Williams (Govan’s Brigade).
Dated Dec. 14, 1864

“Before reaching my horse, I saw Stewart moving up, and met Lowery going to our assistance. Brigade after Brigade was hurled against that work, sometimes carrying a part, but without general success. Cockrell charged over our ground, and left his brave Missourians scattered thick amongst our Texans and Arkansians.
 
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It is true that Bate's division reportedly suffered only 319 casualties: 47 killed, 253 wounded and 19 missing, but they took such light casualties in comparison to the other divisions because they were so effectively checked in their initial attack. The vast majority of their casualties came in the first ten minutes of action - and they were immediately repulsed - excepting a portion of Jackson's and Smith's brigades that made it to the outer ditch. The majority of Bate's division literally broke and ran to the rear seeking cover in a stream-bed near the Bositck house or "Everbright" mansion.
So basically Bate's men were out of the fight after the initial contact.in William C.Davis' book the Confederate General vol.1 on his bio of Gen Bate he states he was praised by his superiors for his actions at Franklin.if your division breaks and runs how does one receive praise for this action.was it a case that Cheatham was his Corps Commander and was a fellow General from Tennessee.I know Hood wasn't going to praise him for that or do we have another case of modern historians not checking the primary source of the facts.
 
This is interesting indeed, however, after researching this fight for soooo very long, I can't find one single soldier's account that served in Cockrell's brigade that says they were the first to hit the line. In fact, the only accounts of participants from that brigade state quite the opposite. I think most of the assumption made in Gottschalk's book is based off of the casualty percentage that they suffered - possibly the highest of any of the confederate brigades with Granbury, Gordon's brigades right up there with them. For example, I have three sources that state what the Missouri boys did. The first is a member of the 1st/3rd Missouri and is clear that there was a force in front of them that had already struck the works and were repulsed. The second account is a member of the 6th Missouri that clearly states the same, and that the field they were charging across was littered with wounded. The last account is by a staff officer of Govan's brigade who had just been wounded and was walking to the rear to his horse when he saw Lowery and Cockrell advancing toward the works. This would all have been after the initial breakthrough and actually makes more sense as to why Cockrell's brigade took such high casualties. His brigade struck the works alone, probably right after Lowery - who struck about the same time Carter and Strahl did. This meant that all of the Federal fire could be concentrated on the Missourians as they attacked.

Lastly, Cockrell's brigade DID strike on the right of the pike, but as they veered diagonally across the Yankee breastworks, receiving a vary heavy fire, the left of the brigade DID in fact strike as far left as the 111th Ohio (fully 80+ yards to the left or west of the pike). This is verified by a letter written by a member of the 111th Ohio that passed back over the battlefield on December 17th. In the letter he counted the graves of the different regiments in his front which were most notably - Tennessee and MISSOURI regiments! Makes you rethink the battlefield when you find these goodies! The other three sources are below - I'll look for the 111th source, but may not find it soon (tucked in a folder somewhere probably).

“Why the Band Played at Franklin”
The Review Appeal
Oct. 13, 1910
S.C. Trigg of Lebanon, Tenn.
1st/3rd Missouri

“When we were near the works, the first line or advance column, which had been repulsed, met us and passed back through our lines, I did not inquire and never learned what command the retreating troops belonged.”

“The 1st Missouri continued its charge till we reached the obstruction of brush in front of the enemy’s works, where we found Texans, Arkansas, Tennesseans. We all worked together making gaps through this obstruction. Near these gaps were piled the dead in heaps of four or five some from all of the above mentioned states. We buried one hundred and nineteen of our men in one grave near the pike between the cotton gin and pike where we did our fighting.”

Confederate Veteran
James Synnamon, 6th Missouri
p. 582

“I was with General Stewart in the battle of Franklin and was in the last charge, about sundown, when Stewart and Cheatham attempted to take the works from which our troops had been repulsed. It seemed to me that the air was all red and blue flames, with shells and bullets screeching and howling everywhere, over and through us, as we rushed across the cottonfields strewn with fallen men. Wounded and dying men lay all about in ghastly piles, and when we reached the works at the old cotton gin gatepost only two or three of my companions were with me. They went into the ditch, but I was tumbled over by a Yankee bullet and was dragged over and laid a prisoner by the old gin house.”

Letter to Irving A. Buck from Adjutant George Williams (Govan’s Brigade).
Dated Dec. 14, 1864

“Before reaching my horse, I saw Stewart moving up, and met Lowery going to our assistance. Brigade after Brigade was hurled against that work, sometimes carrying a part, but without general success. Cockrell charged over our ground, and left his brave Missourians scattered thick amongst our Texans and Arkansians.
Thanks for the reply, gunny. I didn't mean to doubt your research; this has sort of questioned me as well, as I remember reading those excerpts from Trigg's and Synnamon's accounts in Logsdon's "Eyewitness at Franklin". Both Jacobson and Gottschalk quote Trigg, yet they don't include those small excerpts from his account. Gottschalk also includes a bit of Synnamon's account, but it sounds like he believes Synnamon was describing a later attack, after what was supposedly the initial repulse of the brigade.

Both also mention that Cockrell's brigade later took position in front of Sears'. If it is true that Cockrell did in fact stay behind the front line, as you mention, then did Sears actually maintain his position on the front line and take part in the initial attack? Also, most seem to suggest all the brigades stepped off at the same time, yet if those brigades positioned in reserve came up well after the first line hit, then were Cockrell, Lowery, Carter, and Strahl halted at some point or were they just so far behind that by the time they reached the main line the major breakthrough had already occurred and was already driven back out?
 
So basically Bate's men were out of the fight after the initial contact.in William C.Davis' book the Confederate General vol.1 on his bio of Gen Bate he states he was praised by his superiors for his actions at Franklin.if your division breaks and runs how does one receive praise for this action.was it a case that Cheatham was his Corps Commander and was a fellow General from Tennessee.I know Hood wasn't going to praise him for that or do we have another case of modern historians not checking the primary source of the facts.
Yeah, I'm not sure where Davis got information that Bate was "praised" for his actions at Franklin. All of his actions on the Tennessee Campaign could be considered questionable at best. He commanded brave troops, but I think his men had lost confidence in him. Bate hit the lines much earlier than historians give him credit for. That wasn't really a good thing. It allowed fire to be concentrated on him before other portions of the line struck. He was so handily repulsed that only Smith's brigade and portions of Jackson made it to the outer ditch. The remnants of Jackson, some of Smith and all of Finley retreated and lacked the strength (or motivation) to try it again.
 
Thanks for the reply, gunny. I didn't mean to doubt your research; this has sort of questioned me as well, as I remember reading those excerpts from Trigg's and Synnamon's accounts in Logsdon's "Eyewitness at Franklin". Both Jacobson and Gottschalk quote Trigg, yet they don't include those small excerpts from his account. Gottschalk also includes a bit of Synnamon's account, but it sounds like he believes Synnamon was describing a later attack, after what was supposedly the initial repulse of the brigade.

Both also mention that Cockrell's brigade later took position in front of Sears'. If it is true that Cockrell did in fact stay behind the front line, as you mention, then did Sears actually maintain his position on the front line and take part in the initial attack? Also, most seem to suggest all the brigades stepped off at the same time, yet if those brigades positioned in reserve came up well after the first line hit, then were Cockrell, Lowery, Carter, and Strahl halted at some point or were they just so far behind that by the time they reached the main line the major breakthrough had already occurred and was already driven back out?
I didn't mean to sound defensive, so forgive me if I did. I just wanted to show you the sources, and they undeniably state what they did. :smile:

The thing about Synnamon's account though: Why would he write CV an article about the battle of Franklin and describe in detail a SECOND attack that he participated in - but not the first attack? To me, his account reads that the attack that his brigade participated in was one of the last of Stewart's corps. Have to remember also, the sun was setting as they stepped off, and was actually set when they were making initial contact. Most of the most ferocious attacks took place between 4:30 and 5:15 or so which was nautical twilight.

Although General French's book described the battle, since he didn't write a report immediately after, it is kind of hard to interpret unless to take the above sources into account.

French says:
"It was only the work of a few minutes to crush the outer line, and when it broke and tried to gain the main works they were so closely followed by our men that friends and foe, pursuer and pursued, in one mass, rushed over the parapet into the town. During this time the fire from the enemy on this part of the line ceased so as to admit their own troops. But the Confederates now inside were confronted with a reserve force and either killed or captured." (This is his visual description of the first assault that broke the line before his men were engaged heavily.)

(Then he states: "As our division overlapped, immediately another line made the assault, (Lowery, Carter and Strahl) and again the smoke cloud of battle so obscured the plain that I could see only beneath the cloud an incessant sheet of flame rolling on the ground, in which the combatants flitted about like the pictures of demons in Tophet. The shock was too violent to last. Its force was soon spent. The fire slackened, and as the smoke was wafted away in broken clouds, the sight was appalling! What a ghastly scene was in front of the gin-house! The dead and wounded were visible for a moment, only to again be enveloped in the cloud of battle beneath which the Angel of Death garnered his harvest." (It appears that his mention of the line overlapping is one of his brigades being forced in rear of Cleburne's division at that point.)

(Now, it appears he describes his division's assault.) ""On! on! forward! forward!" was the cry. It was death to stop, and safety was in a measure found in the ditch beneath the fire from the parapet. There thousands remained all night; others were repulsed and driven back. My division was re-formed beyond the range of musketry, but exposed to artillery in front and from the fort across the river. Gen. Sears's men, those that were repulsed, fell back with some or order, but Cockrell's brigade had nearly all disappeared. Now and then a few came out. Cockrell was wounded. Col. E. Gates came out riding with his bridle reins in his mouth, being wounded in both hands. I was on foot."

(Later in the text he describes why Sears took less casualties.) "Sears's Brigade met with less loss, because it stopped a few minutes in the exterior line before moving to the main line."

What I piece together from this is that owing to the overlap of units, his division was squeezed in rear of Cleburne's right. While Sears paused, Cockrell continued in rear of Lowery several hundred yards. He then struck where the breakthrough had taken place over-lapping the pike considerably both east and west. Many of his casualties came as he veered across the Federal frontage toward the previous breakthrough - as Lowery's men had already fallen back and/or taken refuge in the outer ditch. Sears advanced immediately after him to his right, but didn't make it as far to the works as Cockrell did.

So, yes - I conclude based on what I have found, that Cockrell hit the line after the first wave (Gist, Gordon, Govan and Granbury) had already struck the line, made the breakthrough and been repulsed. Lowery, Carter and Strahl were the second wave, and missed the opportunity of the breakthrough also - being halted at the outer ditch. Then - thirdly - French's division with Cockrell slightly in advance veers across the field at an angle taking fire the whole way - to the point where the breech had originally taken place. His brigade - not very large anyway - has the concentrated fire of the whole Federal center - rifles and artillery, and suffers horrible casualties. Sears' men strike immediately thereafter more in front of the gin-house and are repulsed with less loss - as they don't go all the way to the works excepting a few for the same reasons (the concentration of fire).
 
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I didn't mean to sound defensive, so forgive me if I did. I just wanted to show you the sources, and they undeniably state what they did. :smile:

The thing about Synnamon's account though: Why would he write CV an article about the battle of Franklin and describe in detail a SECOND attack that he participated in - but not the first attack? To me, his account reads that the attack that his brigade participated in was one of the last of Stewart's corps. Have to remember also, the sun was setting as they stepped off, and was actually set when they were making initial contact. Most of the most ferocious attacks took place between 4:30 and 5:15 or so which was nautical twilight.

Although General French's book described the battle, since he didn't write a report immediately after, it is kind of hard to interpret unless to take the above sources into account.

French says:
"It was only the work of a few minutes to crush the outer line, and when it broke and tried to gain the main works they were so closely followed by our men that friends and foe, pursuer and pursued, in one mass, rushed over the parapet into the town. During this time the fire from the enemy on this part of the line ceased so as to admit their own troops. But the Confederates now inside were confronted with a reserve force and either killed or captured." (This is his visual description of the first assault that broke the line before his men were engaged heavily.)

(Then he states: "As our division overlapped, immediately another line made the assault, (Lowery, Carter and Strahl) and again the smoke cloud of battle so obscured the plain that I could see only beneath the cloud an incessant sheet of flame rolling on the ground, in which the combatants flitted about like the pictures of demons in Tophet. The shock was too violent to last. Its force was soon spent. The fire slackened, and as the smoke was wafted away in broken clouds, the sight was appalling! What a ghastly scene was in front of the gin-house! The dead and wounded were visible for a moment, only to again be enveloped in the cloud of battle beneath which the Angel of Death garnered his harvest." (It appears that his mention of the line overlapping is one of his brigades being forced in rear of Cleburne's division at that point.)

(Now, it appears he describes his division's assault.) ""On! on! forward! forward!" was the cry. It was death to stop, and safety was in a measure found in the ditch beneath the fire from the parapet. There thousands remained all night; others were repulsed and driven back. My division was re-formed beyond the range of musketry, but exposed to artillery in front and from the fort across the river. Gen. Sears's men, those that were repulsed, fell back with some or order, but Cockrell's brigade had nearly all disappeared. Now and then a few came out. Cockrell was wounded. Col. E. Gates came out riding with his bridle reins in his mouth, being wounded in both hands. I was on foot."

(Later in the text he describes why Sears took less casualties.) "Sears's Brigade met with less loss, because it stopped a few minutes in the exterior line before moving to the main line."

What I piece together from this is that owing to the overlap of units, his division was squeezed in rear of Cleburne's right. While Sears paused, Cockrell continued in rear of Lowery several hundred yards. He then struck where the breakthrough had taken place over-lapping the pike considerably both east and west. Many of his casualties came as he veered across the Federal frontage toward the previous breakthrough - as Lowery's men had already fallen back and/or taken refuge in the outer ditch. Sears advanced immediately after him to his right, but didn't make it as far to the works as Cockrell did.

So, yes - I conclude based on what I have found, that Cockrell hit the line after the first wave (Gist, Gordon, Govan and Granbury) had already struck the line, made the breakthrough and been repulsed. Lowery, Carter and Strahl were the second wave, and missed the opportunity of the breakthrough also - being halted at the outer ditch. Then - thirdly - French's division with Cockrell slightly in advance veers across the field at an angle taking fire the whole way - to the point where the breech had originally taken place. His brigade - not very large anyway - has the concentrated fire of the whole Federal center - rifles and artillery, and suffers horrible casualties. Sears' men strike immediately thereafter more in front of the gin-house and are repulsed with less loss - as they don't go all the way to the works excepting a few for the same reasons (the concentration of fire).
Interesting. So IIRC the major breakthrough occurred so quickly that the second wave, along with Cockrell, didn't even have to halt at any point on their way to the main line, with the exception of Sears. As they rolled up, the first four brigades had already been driven out of the gap.
 
Interesting. So IIRC the major breakthrough occurred so quickly that the second wave, along with Cockrell, didn't even have to halt at any point on their way to the main line, with the exception of Sears. As they rolled up, the first four brigades had already been driven out of the gap.
That's right. In the letter from Adjutant George Williams he says "as usual, the supporting lines were too far in the rear to help" with the initial breakthrough. That's paraphrasing, but I can give you the exact quote later if you like?
 
I guess I should add my two cents about Cockrell's boys. French stated that Cockrell and Sears swapped spots during the march (first and second excerpt). I indeed said it was possible that Cockrell's men hit the line first, but there really is nothing definitive. However, I think it is absolutely definitive that Stewart's Corps hit the Federal line first and that Cheatham's Corps (especially Cleburne and Brown) were delayed by Wagner's advanced position. In fact, that is why Sears and Cockrell ended up alternating - because Sears got tangled up in the left (east) of Wagner's line.

I think Trigg and Synnamon's accounts could well be accurate, and they are relating seeing Walthall's troops on the ground. As for Williams I cannot say, but the evidence does not support his letter, even though it was written soon after the battle. There are just two many Federal soldiers in particular who said the action to the east (the Federal left) exploded first and that the wave that fell upon the center come very shortly thereafter. I only included a few in my book, but I have about 20-25 of them and they all say pretty much the same thing.

Anyway, from this book entitled For Cause & For Country:

French’s Division numbered just two brigades, because Ector’s Brigade was on detached duty “guarding the pontoon bridges.” The small division, which passed over the Nashville & Decatur Railroad prior to the final leg of the advance, had Brig. Gen. Claudius W. Sears’ Brigade in front and Gen. Francis M. Cockrell’s hard-hitting Missouri Brigade in reserve. The Missourians soon found themselves in front leading the charge.33

33. French, Two Wars, p. 295, 297; Boyce, Confederate Veteran 19, p. 271;
Gottschalk, In Deadly Earnest, p. 463, 465-466; Tucker, Tennessee
Historical Quarterly
, Vol. 46, No.1, p. 27; Mamie Yeary, Reminiscences of
the Boys in Gray 1861-1865
, p. 117. Gottschalk said when French
deployed into attack formation the Missouri Brigade was moved to
the front and Sears’ Brigade became the reserve. French said this
occurred after the charge began. Ector’s Brigade was moving north
on Nov. 30. A man who lived just north of Mt. Pleasant said the
brigade and the “pontoon bridges” passed his house that afternoon.
See Garrett and Lightfoot, The Civil War in Maury County, p. 167.

Although the Missouri Brigade began the advance as the reserve unit, Cockrell’s men soon assumed the lead position. According to French, Sears’ Brigade became entangled with elements of Wagner’s line and was delayed for several minutes. The Missourians encountered no such impediment, and streamed past Sears’ men. Unfortunately for them Cleburne’s brigades had also been delayed by Wagner’s troops. This left the Missouri Brigade horribly exposed on its left flank. Also, the Missourians may have outpaced Walthall on their right, opening up that flank as well. It is very possible Cockrell’s Brigade was the first Confederate unit to come into contact with the main enemy line, and it paid dearly for the achievement. A Union soldier west of Columbia Pike said he watched as action east of the road broke out first. He remembered that the “boom of artillery...could be plainly heard above the yelling of the hordes in our front.”67

67. Gottschalk, In Deadly Earnest, p. 467; Boyce, Confederate Veteran 19,
p. 271; French, Two Wars, p. 297; Tucker, Tennessee Historical Quarterly,
Vol. 46, No. 1, p. 28; James Barr, “Gens. Cleburne and Adams at
Franklin,” Confederate Veteran 10, p. 155; Erastus Winters, In the 50th
Ohio Serving Uncle Sam: Memoirs of One Who Wore The Blue
, p. 121.

Located east of the cotton gin, the men of Col. John Casement’s command decimated Cockrell’s Missourians. Casement described it as “terrible slaughter.” A 65th Illinois soldier recalled how Stewart’s Corps “was the first to receive the fire from our main line” and that Cleburne’s involvement with Wagner “threw Stewart’s line too far in advance.” Even some of Gen. Reilly’s men in front of the gin became involved in the fight with Stewart’s troops. Col. Oscar Sterl, commanding the 104th Ohio, reported that his “three left companies” joined the barrage. They
turned to the left and poured a scalding oblique fire into the Rebels.68

68. OR 45, pt. 1, p. 421, 425; Barr, Confederate Veteran 10, p. 155;
Gottschalk, In Deadly Earnest, p. 467; French, Two Wars, p. 296. The
available evidence points to the Missourians coming under close-range
fire from the main Federal line at least briefly before any other unit
did. French said the men of Cockrell’s Brigade “nearly all
disappeared” while at least some of Sears’ men were reformed. In
addition to eyewitness accounts, one must consider that the
Missourians did not have to deal with Wagner’s men impeding their
progress and they suffered a percentage loss higher than any other
Confederate brigade. See Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, p. 225,
for the erroneous conclusion that the Missouri Brigade was among
the trailing units of Stewart’s Corps.
 
Is it safe to assume in all the smoke and confusion nobody knew what everyone else was doing and just lost their bearings as to where they were and what they were supposed to do.
 
French's Division suffered 30% casualties assaulting the fortifications at Allatoona Pass just 2 months prior, then fiercely assaulted the entrenchments at Franklin with horrendous loss. This was the effect of the new offensive war that the Confederacy had in desperation turned to.
 
I think Trigg and Synnamon's accounts could well be accurate, and they are relating seeing Walthall's troops on the ground. As for Williams I cannot say, but the evidence does not support his letter, even though it was written soon after the battle. There are just two many Federal soldiers in particular who said the action to the east (the Federal left) exploded first and that the wave that fell upon the center come very shortly thereafter. I only included a few in my book, but I have about 20-25 of them and they all say pretty much the same thing.
I agree also that the first Rebel attacks fell on the Federal left. What wasn't intended to be an echelon attack turned into one for Stewart's corps. Although the hope was that all of the Rebel brigades in the front line would hit at the same time, it just didn't happen that way. The factors included the advanced Federal line and the direction of attack for the Rebel brigades.

Just like the commonly used terminology of the spokes of a wagon converging on the point of attack - as the brigades and divisions were squeezed on each other - some of them had to give way for others. To me, I see the contact on the main line's extreme left coming at about the same time the advanced line is struck. As this happens, French is forced to give way to Cleburne. At the same time, Loring strikes the works on the Rebel right, and owing to the constriction of the river on the east - Walthall gives way to Loring (in a slight echelon to Loring's left-rear). French in turn has already given way to Cleburne, and now with the squeeze of Walthall on his right - French gives way to Walthall (putting him in echelon to Walthall's left-rear). Finally, French strikes, but far to the left of where he originally thought he would - due to the forcing of the troops to the left.

Williams' account is a great account really. If you look at it from a different perspective - assuming that Synnamon and Trigg are referring to the dead and wounded of Cleburne's command. Williams stated that Cockrell's Missourians "charged over our ground, and left his brave Missourians scattered thick amongst our Texans and Arkansians." He was walking to the rear wounded when he observed this, and from the letter of the 111th Ohio, it is clear a good number of Missourians were buried in front of where the 111th Ohio fought. Williams stated:

"We had been the first to attack and had struck the strongest point. About this time, whilst urging forward some laggards, and about 40 yds from the second line, I was struck in the back by a minie ball. From the sensation, I thought it was a spent grape, so large did it seem; but a grape would have finished me, I stood a minute to determine the extent of my injury: felt a wheezing in my lungs & spat blood. This looked serious, & I walked off. The bullets were coming like hail & I expected I would never get out without another wound. I feared to run lest it should cause hemorrhage. In returning my sword to the scabbard I found my arm was also hurt. I walked to my horse, and with difficulty mounted & rode to the rear, failing fast. Before reaching my horse, I saw Stewart moving up, and met Lowery going to our assistance. Brigade after brigade was hurled against that work, sometimes carrying a part, but without general success. Cockrell charged over our ground, and left his brave Missourians scattered thick among our Texans and Arkansians."

Williams seems to make it fairly clear - from what he saw, that Cleburne's boys struck first - then he saw Stewart's corps coming up.
 
Another point that seems to indicate Cockrell hit after Cleburne - is the statement by Trigg that pointed out that, "The 1st Missouri continued its charge till we reached the obstruction of brush in front of the enemy’s works, where we found Texans, Arkansas, Tennesseans."

Supposing that Trigg recognized the flags of the various regiments, or at least Cleburne's men, he knew that Govan had Arkansians, Granbury had Texans and Gordon had Tennesseans. But this can't apply to Walthall's men if you take him literally. Walthall had Quarles' Tennesseans, no Texans at all and Reynolds' men didn't make it to the abattis. Additionally, Reynolds' entire brigade took only 106 casualties if I remember right (the least of any brigade except maybe Finley).

Looking through the history of the 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles (with Reynold's) and the Official Records, these sources - when combined - help make sense of the situation. Walthall states in his report that he is to conform to the movements of Loring's division. As he does so, he is forced to the left - which forces French to the left likewise.

Reynolds' brigade was originally on the left front line of Walthall's division, but owing to terrain and heavy vegetation, he is forced to move out of the obstruction and resume his place in line. As he attempts to do so, they draw closer to the enemy positions and Walthall orders Shelley to fill Reynolds' place. This puts Reynolds in reserve and Shelley on the left of Walthall's division. French - conforming to Walthall - has to move further left which places his men in rear of Cleburne. Robert Dacus, of the 1st Arkansas, states that the Alabama brigade (apparently Shelley's) is directly in rear of Cleburne's men because they had been forced so far to the west. He states that had his brigade or that of the Missouri brigade been directly in rear of Cleburne, that the breakthrough would have been supported by better troops according to him. Dacus states that his line was directed to stay 600 yards in rear of the main line, and only advance when the first line was engaged. That makes sense with regard to Adjutant Williams says when he states in regard to Govan's, Granbury's and Gordon's brigades, "I saw the brave fellows go over, bowing their heads, as if in a storm of wind & snow, then leaped the entrenchment & disappeared behind it. Alas! They were too few, and as usual, the support was not up." Once again, as in nearly every battle that had any promise - the needed support wasn't there when most needed.

Dacus says that when the Alabama brigade "came to the ditch on the outside of the breastworks instead of going over they dropped down into the ditch and refused to go any further." Whether or not they refused, or were exhausted is another story. He says, "While this was going on, our third line was out of reach, but coming up as rapidly as it could be moved in order. The enemy was also strengthening their weak points. When we were within about 200 yards of their works, we began meeting our men coming out, those in front of us and to our right telling us we couldn't get to their lines on account of the obstructions..."

Dacus continues, "Our line kept advancing until we reached the bois d'arc hedge and locust abatis. General Reynolds, seeing what was in front and knowing we would be safer there than attempting to retreat across the field for 600 yards, dashed along in the rear of our line himself, and gave the command to lie down and wait for further orders, then turned and rode out. His horse was wounded, but he was unscathed. He was right about our safety. The ground where we were lying was a little lower than where the enemy were, so they were over shooting us, while we lay still, but almost everyone who attempted to go out was shot down. It was almost sundown now. Further orders never came, so we lay there until it was getting dark, then fell back into the timber."

Now, Dacus mentions the Missouri brigade again: "I must say just here a word about the mixed brigade called the First Missouri, of which I have spoken before. They were joining us on the left, as I mentioned, and occupying the same part of the line occupied by Cleburne's men, who went over the enemy's works. They covered the turnpike [Columbia Pike - both sides apparently] which ran on a little ridge and almost level, so they had no protection from the lay of the ground; then they were fronting the part of the enemy's line that had been so strongly reinforced when Cleburne charged it. So, out of the 600 men who went in with that little brigade, 102 were killed and 300 wounded." (Pages 16-18 of Dacus' book)

This helps clarify the situation to a good degree. Walthall also states after the mention of Shelley moving into Reynolds' position in the front line that "the line moved on and did not falter till, just to the right of the pike [this is Columbia Pike he references] , it reached the abatis fronting the works. Over this no organized force could go, and here the main body of my command, both front line and reserve [Reynolds], was repulsed in confusion; but over this obstacle, impassable for a solid line, many officers and men (among the former Brigadier-General Shelley) made their way, and some, crossing the ditch in its rear, were captured and others killed or wounded in the effort to mount the embankment. Numbers of every brigade gained the ditch and there continued the struggle with but the earth-work separating them from the enemy until late in the night."
 
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I agree also that the first Rebel attacks fell on the Federal left. What wasn't intended to be an echelon attack turned into one for Stewart's corps. Although the hope was that all of the Rebel brigades in the front line would hit at the same time, it just didn't happen that way. The factors included the advanced Federal line and the direction of attack for the Rebel brigades.

Several Confederate accounts, including a soldier in the 46th Mississippi, noted that Stewart's Corps was formed en echelon prior to the attack. Foster's map (drawn for Stewart) also indicates this.
 
Like I said, I think it is quite possible that Cockrell hit the line first. But we may never know. However, to suggest that French was forced to give way to Cleburne assumes that Cleburne had the lead, or the angle. I see no evidence of that. In fact, considering the terrain and course of the river that Loring had to deal with, and Walthall to his left, and that Cleburne was unquestionably delayed by Conrad's Brigade of Wagner's Division, it was French who had the straight shot toward the Federal line. He also had some of the best terrain to navigate. Even if Cleburne had an angle for a stretch, his stopping obviated that and allowed French to move past Cleburne on the right.

Anyway, in the end, who hit the line first doesn't much matter in my opinion. However, I do feel strongly enough to say that we cannot discount what Federal soldiers who stated, almost to a man, that Cleburne was delayed, and it was Stewart that took the pounding first. Was that element of Stewart's Corps French's Division? Perhaps. Ephraim Anderson of the Missouri Brigade said the Federal infantry didn't open fire until the Missourians were within "thirty steps of the works." That seems to indicate they were leading the way.

I think Trigg and Williams are countered by multiple sources, on both sides. As for Dacus, I find some parts of his book so far-fetched that I questioned much of it. But that was just me.
 
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