Significance of Antietam?

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What is the significance of the battle of Antietam?

I had always assumed it was the one place where, had McClellan acted with uncharacteristic energy, he could have ended the war, then and there, and so it was sort of a "lost" significance for the Union Army. But are there other significances about it? For example, is there a connection between the Emancipation Proclamation being issued less than a week after Antietam, or just a coincidence?

Your thoughts?

Pam
 
It "looked" like a victory, politically speaking. So, Lincoln used it to issue the EP. McC has his chance(s) at Antietam but, he blew it. RE Lee also took advantage of his opponent's weaknesses.
Lee might've made a heck of a sports coach.
 
The "Lost Orders" showed that Lee's army was scattered. Jackson was down in Harpers Ferry, Longstreet was up in Hagerstown. A little hurry-up and McC could have rolled up the pieces one-by-one. He gave Lee time to bring the pieces back together.


He still could have won, but he threw his troops in piece-meal, giving Lee the chance to move his men along interior lines. At the end of the day, when Lee's men were exhausted and all but out of ammo, McC let them stay a whole day on the field with no further action. And his rather large reserve only watched.

But as Crazy mentioned, it was enough of a "victory" to try his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.

Ole
 
What is the significance of the battle of Antietam?

I had always assumed it was the one place where, had McClellan acted with uncharacteristic energy, he could have ended the war, then and there, and so it was sort of a "lost" significance for the Union Army. But are there other significances about it? For example, is there a connection between the Emancipation Proclamation being issued less than a week after Antietam, or just a coincidence?

Your thoughts?

Pam

The way I understand it, the issuance of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation after Antietam was intentional.

Actually, Lincoln wanted to issue the EP back in July.

If you recall, Lincoln met with his cabinet on July 22, 1862, and he read to them his first draft of the EP.

David Herbert Donald, in his biography Lincoln, writes:

"Postmaster General Blair, who came in late, deprecated the proposed policy 'on the ground that it would cost the Administration the fall elections.' Secretary of the Interior Smith said nothing but was strongly opposed to emancipation; he was already thinking of resigning from a cabinet where he felt increasingly out of sympathy with the President. Seward, who had been thinking over the consequences of emancipation since his carriage ride with Lincoln and Welles, argued strongly against promulgation of the proclamation. He feared it would 'break up our relations with foreign nations and the production of cotton for 60 years.' Foreign nations might intervene in the American civil war in order to prevent the abolition of slavery for the sake of the cotton their factories so badly needed. More persuasively, he argued that issuing an emancipation proclamation at this particular moment, afetr the severe military reverses experienced by the Union armies, would 'be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help.' 'His idea,' Lincoln recalled later, 'was that it would be considered our last shriek, on the retreat.'

"With his advisers divided, Lincoln adjourned the cabinent meeting without reaching a decision on issuing the proclamation, though he later told one visitor that he expected to issue it the next day. (My emphasis). But that night Seward's ally, Thurlow Weed, came to the White House and again strongly argued that an emancipation proclamation could not be enforced and that it would alienate the important border states. Reluctantly Lincoln put the document aside. Shortly afterward, when Sumner on five successive days pressed the President to issue the proclamation, Lincoln responded, 'We mustn't issue it till after a victory."

Antietam was victory enough, I suppose.

What I find interesting is that when the EP officially goes into effect on Jan. 1, 1863, it comes just weeks after the Union's worst defeat at Fredericksburg. So much for timeliness.
 
"Little Napoleon" MacClellan not only threw in the troops with out coodination he also failed to use all his men. The same type of mistake that Hooker made at Chancellorsville. Allen Pinkerton's overestimation of Confederate forces always had the Federal Generals holding a large reserve for Lee's nonexistant troops. The Federal generals were always afraid of losing their "last reserve" and being unable to stop the "overwhelming" forces of Lee. Now this is a stupid question--who did Grant get "intelligence" information from? I had never thought about this untill now.
 
Will agree with others. The most important thing about Antietam was the issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation and its affect on the war (especially on European powers).

Now, if Grant was at Antietam, there would have been a Round II on the second day with Union victory. Think Shiloh.
 
Mclelland was energetic at two things....organizing and politizing. When it came to taking the field or fighting a battle or even helping a fellow general he was slow to the point that certain people in the North thought he was more on the South's side than the North's.

He was AP Hill's roommate at Westpoint and did not hold much credence in the abolitionists. But he did belive that the AofNV was much larger than it actually was. Whether that belief was self serving in his desire to have everything perfect before fighting is anyone's quess.
And someone could have easily told him "If my momma was you I wouldn't even been born yet!":laugh1:
 
If Grant had been there there probably would not have been a second day. He would have put everyone on the line. The ANV would have been broken by the use of the FULL Federal army. This was a perfect scenario for Grant's sledgehammer technique.
 
The "Lost Orders" showed that Lee's army was scattered. Jackson was down in Harpers Ferry, Longstreet was up in Hagerstown. A little hurry-up and McC could have rolled up the pieces one-by-one. He gave Lee time to bring the pieces back together.


He still could have won, but he threw his troops in piece-meal, giving Lee the chance to move his men along interior lines. At the end of the day, when Lee's men were exhausted and all but out of ammo, McC let them stay a whole day on the field with no further action. And his rather large reserve only watched.

The decisive battle of the Maryland campaign is not Antietam, but rather Crampton's Gap. McClellan threw his army forward very rapidly after receiving SO191 (to the point of reading it and verbally giving orders to move within 30 minutes of its receipt), and Franklin's 6th Corps (the left, and leading pincer of McClellan's envelopment) was very badly handled by McLaws, allowing Lee to concentrate behind the Antietam.

At Antietam, McClellan certainly didn't have a large reserve, by 4pm every single division was either in the line or shattered. The extreme attritional fighting on the Union right meant that between 1st, 2nd and 12th Corps had a single intact division between them, and had to be extracted from contact by committing 6th Corps (which McClellan wanted to commit to the left, but pleas from Meade that he was about to be overrun changed his mind. Actually a major opportunity for Lee to destroy the AoP was squandered on that flank when Stuart gained the Union flank, but didn't actually attack).

5th Corps was holding the centre, and 9th Corps was obviously over Burnside's Bridge. 5th Corps were trying to shift weight to support Burnside.

On the 18th, the AoP was as shattered as the ANV, and while they didn't press any attacks there was heavy skirmishing that day. Still McClellan's morning states of the 18th showed that he'd lost fully half his army that day (2 to desertion/ straggling for every 1 hit). Little wonder he threw out a screen and tried to reoganise for another attack on the 19th, and as soon as Lee's movement was detected he threw out a vigourous pursuit, ending in AP Hill's desperate rearguard action at Shephardstown on the 20th.
 
Fifth and Sixth Corps were barely engaged if at all. While First, Second and Twelfth were savagely chewed on, so were Lee's units...Jackson's old division, for instance, is not even a hollow shell.

McClellan may have felt he put every man under his command "in line", but he did so extremely ineffectively if we accept a claim that he did so at all.
 
Fifth and Sixth Corps were barely engaged if at all. While First, Second and Twelfth were savagely chewed on, so were Lee's units...Jackson's old division, for instance, is not even a hollow shell.

McClellan may have felt he put every man under his command "in line", but he did so extremely ineffectively if we accept a claim that he did so at all.

One only has to look at his dispositions at nightfall, 6th Corps was holding the right, 5th the centre and 9th the left. 1st, 2nd and 11th had been pulled out of the line.

As to how hotly they were engaged, it's questionable (6th Corps was engaged late in the day, 5th was holding the centre, but moving it would have divided McClellan's army).
 
McClellan's idea of "unfit for further service in this fight" was to put it generously compassionate and to put it more truthfully pessimistic.

If McClellan had the willingness to force the issue, he could have broken Lee's lines. Again.

And this time (the next day), Lee would not have had the reserves or the Hill-is-coming to save him.
 
McClellan's idea of "unfit for further service in this fight" was to put it generously compassionate and to put it more truthfully pessimistic.

If McClellan had the willingness to force the issue, he could have broken Lee's lines. Again.

And this time (the next day), Lee would not have had the reserves or the Hill-is-coming to save him.

but his stragglers were coming in. He fought on the 17th with about 40,000 odd (and about 35,000 combatants), lost about 10,000 but they rounded up a very significant number of the stragglers and was probably stronger on the 18th than the 17th despite the losses of that day.

McClellan had gone from 87,000 (with a combatant strength of about 50,000) to 45,000 (with an effective combatant strength of about 25-30,000).

McClellan's army was utterly wrecked, both by the speed of his advance and the ferocity of the fighting (and of course an outbreak of Foot and Mouth in his train). Only Porter's 5th Corps was in any state to pursue.
 
I would be delighted to hear where you are drawing this from, because this sounds like something McClellan would have offered as an excuse rather than something founded on what could be found if one pushed the Army of the Potomac as hard as possible.

By your reckoning, Lee was cautious to the point of timid in not counterattacking as soon as possible.
 
At Antietam, McClellan certainly didn't have a large reserve, by 4pm every single division was either in the line or shattered. The extreme attritional fighting on the Union right meant that between 1st, 2nd and 12th Corps had a single intact division between them, and had to be extracted from contact by committing 6th Corps (which McClellan wanted to commit to the left, but pleas from Meade that he was about to be overrun changed his mind. Actually a major opportunity for Lee to destroy the AoP was squandered on that flank when Stuart gained the Union flank, but didn't actually attack).

There was an awful lot of Union artillery up there, and the Confederate left had been slashed and gashed just as badly as the Union right. There wasn't much strength up there.

As to Stuart attacking, here's what he says in his report:
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This fire was kept up with terrible effect upon the enemy, and the position of the artillery being somewhat endangered, Early's brigade was sent to me by General Jackson as additional support. The enemy had advanced too far into the woods near the Dunkard church for the fire to be continued without danger of harming our own men. I accordingly withdrew the batteries to a position ****her to the rear, where our own line could be seen, and ordered General Early to rejoin his division, with the exception of the Thirteenth Virginia Infantry, commanded by Captain [F. V.] Winston, which was retained as a support for the artillery. The artillery opened from its new position, at close range, upon the enemy with still more terrible effect than before. The Thirteenth Virginia Infantry, being within musket range, did telling execution. Early's division now pouring a deadly fire into their front, while the artillery and its support were bearing so heavily upon their flank, the enemy soon broke in confusion, and were pursued for half a mile along the Williamsport turnpike. I recognized in this pursuit part of Barksdale's and part of Semmes' brigades; and I also got hold of one regiment of Ransom's brigade, which I posted in an advantageous position on the extreme left flank after the pursuit had been checked by the enemy's reserve artillery coming into action. Having informed General Jackson of what had transpired, I was directed by him to hold this advance position, and that he would send all the infantry he could get in order to follow up the success. I executed this order, keeping the cavalry well out to the left, and awaiting the arrival of re-enforcements. These re-enforcements were, however, diverted to another part of the field, and no further engagement took place on this part of the field beyond a desultory artillery fire
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Jackson's report says:
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In the mean time General Stuart moved his artillery to a position nearer to the main command, and more in our rear. Early, being now directed, in consequence of the disability of General Lawton, to take command of Ewell's division, returned with his brigade (with the exception of the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, which remained with General Stuart) to the piece of wood where he had left the other brigades of his division when he was separated from them. Here he found that the enemy had advanced his infantry near the wood in which was the Dunkard church, and had planted a battery across the turnpike near the edge of the wood and an open field, and that the brigades of Lawton, Hays, and Trimble had fallen back some distance to the rear. Finding here Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, with a portion of Jackson's division, which formed on his left, he determined to maintain his position there if re-enforcements could be sent to his support, of which he was promptly assured. Colonel Grigsby, with his small command, kept in check the advance of the enemy on the left flank, while General Early attacked with great vigor and gallantry the column on his right and front. The force in front was giving way under this attack when another heavy column of Federal troops were seen moving across the plateau on his left flank. By this time the expected re-enforcements (consisting of Semmes' and Anderson's brigades and a part of Barksdale's, of McLaws' division) arrived, and the whole, including Grigsby's command, now united, charged upon the enemy, checking his advance, then driving him back with great slaughter entirely from and beyond the wood, and gaining possession of our original position. No further advance, beyond demonstrations, was made by the enemy on the left.

In the afternoon, in obedience to instructions from the commanding general, I moved to the left with a view of turning the Federal right, but I found his numerous artillery so judiciously established in their front and extending so near to the Potomac, which here makes a remarkable bend, as will be seen by reference to the map herewith annexed, as to render it inexpedient to hazard the attempt.
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While there may have been an opportunity there, Stuart didn't have the strength to do anything about it, and the constant meatgrinder to the south ate up any reinforcements he might have been sent. Even if you reverse that, it doesn't sound like the attack could have been anything but desperate, with very heavy casualties if it succeeded or failed. That would have left Jackson unable to do much after breeching the line -- and McClellan would still have had reserves available.

Tim
 
Lee was in Maryland to restore a lost star to the Confederacy. If Lee had prevailed, we might have seen how serious were the loyalties of both Maryland
Unionists and secessionists.
 
Lee was in Maryland to restore a lost star to the Confederacy. If Lee had prevailed, we might have seen how serious were the loyalties of both Maryland
Unionists and secessionists.

The decision to commit to invading Maryland is the evolution of Lee's border strategy. Aware that he'd actually lost the 7 days and that McClellan could shift his line of operations along the James (as indeed he intended to), Lee tried to protect Richmond by making Lincoln react to him (and indeed Lincoln was played like a fish).

He'd sent Jackson's Corps north to try and create a distraction and stop Pope operating against Northern Virginia, while keeping the bulk of his army (Longstreet and Hill's Corps, the Cavalry and Reserve Arty) facing McClellan. Jackson was under orders to not place himself in a situation where he couldn't easily reinforce Lee if McClellan received reinforcements sufficient to renew his advance.

As it turns out, Lincoln ended up reacting to Lee by ordering the withdrawal of McClellan, and Lee used the opportunity to fall on Pope. He regarded 2nd Manassas as a failure, since he'd simply driven the intact Union army under Pope back, and intended to capitalise on his success, and draw out the "new levies" for destruction. Thus the objective of his Maryland campaign is to force the destruction of a major Union Army (i.e. Pope's) in a battle of manoeuvre. Unfortunately for him, it was McClellan, not Pope who he faced.
 
Significance of Antietam

So Lee was outright lying to Marylanders in his proclamation to the people of Maryland, when he moved into Mc.?
 
So Lee was outright lying to Marylanders in his proclamation to the people of Maryland, when he moved into Mc.?

It was something his political masters (i.e. Davis*) wanted, and Lee obeyed, but he (Lee) believed that his primary objective was to secure Richmond by smashing the Federal's north of the Potomac as part of his "Border Strategy". Lee did not envision a permanent occupation of Maryland, since he didn't have the forces to and it would take his army out of position to defend Richmond.


* Davis' "drive for the Ohio" was occurring at roughly the same time. That is a general offensive by *all* Confederate armies. Davis very much did want the "extra star", but Lee was more concerned with defeating the Federals rather than expanding the CSA to it's "natural borders".
 
Davis' official proclamation, arrived After both Lee and Bragg had already issued their own proclamations. But the question still remains, did Lee mean what he proclaimed, or not?
 
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