Question about McClellan the morning of the battle of Antietam

Andrew

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I recently attended a hike on the Antietam battlefield that focused on the fighting in the West Woods. The ranger who led the hike mentioned something that I had not heard before. He said the reason that Sumner had to wait so long for his orders for his II Corps that morning was that McClellan was dealing with some intestinal problems (diarrhea). Does anyone know of a source for that statement? I meant to ask the ranger but didn't get around to it.

I have read in a few places that McClellan was actually still sleeping, which is what Ezra Carman and other later authors claimed. However, in his footnote in Carman, Tom Clemens disagrees and provides a couple of sources stating that McClellan was not asleep. No reason is given for the delay in providing orders to Sumner, though. And I haven't seen elsewhere any mention of McClellan being incapacitated by sickness on Sep 17. Has anyone else?
 
Sumner launched his Corps at 0720 hrs according to his report. This means he'd received a written order before this. Let me expand upon this; in the old army a verbal order wasn't worth much as there was no proof the order had been given. Hence most old army officers did not act on verbal orders except as a preparatory order, and wouldn't move without a written one (see for example his refusal to assume command in the field at Williamsburg until a written order from McClellan placed him in command). The same probably happens with Burnside, an initial verbal order before 0700 taken as a warning order, then a written order at 0800 (delivered by Lt Wilson), and another around 0910 after it's reported Burnside hasn't attacked yet.

This probably means McClellan had issued orders before 0700. Sumner had made his CP at the Pry House, but McClellan (according to Strother, one of his staff officers) was at Newcomer's house around this time giving an O-group to some subordinate generals. That's the house just west of the creek at the middle bridge.

The story I think that's being alluded to is the one Sumner's son gave in 1918 in a paper to the Massachusetts Historical Society. It shows the 56 year gap between events, with S.S. Sumner not understanding why Richardson's division didn't immediately follow for example.

Putting the accounts of Strother and S.S. Sumner together would suggest that Sumner was at the Newcomer House with McClellan for orders relating to his command (1st, 2nd and 12th Corps).
 
Thanks for the reply. In addition to the 1918 paper you linked to, there is also apparently a letter S. S. Sumner wrote to George B. Davis on April 4, 1897 in which he states he was not sure if "General McClellan was asleep or engaged inside" his HQ. Though this is dated after Davis left the Antietam Battlefield Board, I am assuming this letter was part of the research that ended up in Carman's manuscript and the battle maps.

In the Mass. Historical Society paper S. S. Sumner mentions waiting about "an hour and a half", and in his letter he says he and the general waited "quite an hour or more as I remember it" for orders. Are you suggesting that General Sumner was given verbal orders relatively quickly, and spent the rest of the time waiting for the written orders? I'm not sure that makes sense, for if he had received verbal orders before 7:20 then S. S. Sumner would not have questioned whether McClellan was asleep. Just looking for clarification here.

Also, I'm not familiar with the term "O-group". Officer group?

And no mention of abdominal distress anywhere...
 
Thanks for the reply. In addition to the 1918 paper you linked to, there is also apparently a letter S. S. Sumner wrote to George B. Davis on April 4, 1897 in which he states he was not sure if "General McClellan was asleep or engaged inside" his HQ. Though this is dated after Davis left the Antietam Battlefield Board, I am assuming this letter was part of the research that ended up in Carman's manuscript and the battle maps.

In the Mass. Historical Society paper S. S. Sumner mentions waiting about "an hour and a half", and in his letter he says he and the general waited "quite an hour or more as I remember it" for orders. Are you suggesting that General Sumner was given verbal orders relatively quickly, and spent the rest of the time waiting for the written orders? I'm not sure that makes sense, for if he had received verbal orders before 7:20 then S. S. Sumner would not have questioned whether McClellan was asleep. Just looking for clarification here.

Also, I'm not familiar with the term "O-group". Officer group?

And no mention of abdominal distress anywhere...

O-group = orders group. Sorry, I sometimes drop back into nomenclature.

I'm not sure how much of Sumner's tale is correct, as it's decades later and memories drift. Strother's diary is contemporary at least. The notes by Clemens say that Snell saw McClellan well before 0700, during the cornfield fight. Snell's account is here, and he found McClellan, Porter and their command team on a "bare hill" which would either be the one west of the Pry House or opposite the Ecker House. Assuming McClellan didn't move his CP then this was by the Ecker House, where they built by a redan for the staff and Porter's 5th Corps HQ was.

Anyway, let my correct myself. If you ever read Pry's original story he said that McClellan stayed in bed until 0800, then breakfasted at length before heading to the battle. This is contradicted by every other observation and must be rejected as an untruth. Of course by 0800 McClellan had committed every available division to action, including Richardson's.

If I assume that SS Sumner's memory is fuzzy but basically correct then it may be that Sumner rode over to the Newcomer or Ecker House (Pry House and outbuilding was where Hooker and Sumner had their HQ's, and Sumner and staff, not McClellan, slept there on the 16th but Hooker had crossed the creek) and waited outside, or somewhere else, and was found by McClellan around 0700 when McClellan and given orders directly. Hell, it might be that McClellan's staff officers had gone to Sumner's HQ to give him orders and couldn't find him. Here is a rich ground for speculation.

McClellan's main HQ was back at Keedysville, but we know he spent the night of the 16th/17th at one of the corps HQ on the field, probably Porter's (Ecker House).

One thing that certainly isn't true is that McClellan being asleep or ill inside the Pry House.

So in sum:

The main house at the Pry Farm was taken over by Hooker as his Corps HQ, Sumner took the other building as his HQ.

McClellan's HQ was near Keedysville and he slept probably in the church there on the night of the 15th/16th, but sent Strother and other aides back to Keedyville on the evening of the 16th/17th, but slept at one of the corps HQ's on the field. It might have been Hooker's now vacated HQ (Pry House), but I think it was Porter's HQ at the Ecker House.

If Sumner went next door to knock on the Pry House he may have gone to the wrong place, or if McClellan did sleep there he was long gone and on horseback with Porter watching Hooker's advance. I however find it unlikely Sumner would have waited meekly outside a door hoping someone would notice him....
 
I am reading McClellan's War by Ethan Rafuse and came across something interesting and relevant to this discussion. On page 315, Rafuse says that Sumner arrived around 0600 and was told "to his intense dismay" that McClellan wanted the Second Corps to remain where it was. Hooker was having success against the enemy's left at this point, so McClellan sent an aide to Burnside to tell him to prepare to attack the enemy's right. The Second and Fifth Corps were to be used to either attack the center if the flank attacks were successful, or provide support to "counter a Confederate counterstroke."

Soon after the aide left, Hood's forces entered the fight and Hooker was in trouble. It was at this point that McClellan gave the 0720 order to Sumner to take two of his divisions across the Antietam.

According to this account, then, Sumner wasn't waiting for orders for over an hour. He instead received an order soon after arriving around 0600. This order was to stay put until further developments on the battlefield warranted putting his Second Corps into action. Those developments occurred around 0720 and the resulting orders were given. Sumner may have been waiting impatiently for further orders for over an hour, according to Rafuse, but the waiting was not due to McClellan being asleep or sick.

One thing I cannot find, though, is the original source for the claim that McClellan told Sumner that he wanted the Second Corps to remain where it was, as opposed to the claim made in other sources that McClellan couldn't be found and no order to wait was given. I've checked the sources I have access to in Rafuse's footnote for this paragraph, but none speak to McClellan's verbal order to stay put. I wonder if this is Rafuse's best guess as to what happened.

Anyone have any thoughts about this?
 
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My personal thought is that McClellan ordered Sumner in at what he thought was the appropriate time. Sumner indicates that he received the order at 7:20 a.m. and I see no reason to doubt that. As noted by 67th Tigers that order would have been written before that time, probably about 7:00 a.m. based on the relatively close proximity of Sumner's Second Corps to McClellan's HQ. What was happening at 7:00 a.m.?

The map above, one of a series of plates prepared by the Antietam Battlefield Board published in 1904, gives a snapshot of the battlefield at that time. Joseph Hooker's First Corps has engaged the Confederates in the Cornfield and the East Woods. Mansfield's Twelfth Corps, also under Hooker's command is moving into action - Williams' Division is deploying and Greene's division is still advancing in a column formation. On the Confederate side troops from Jackson's Left Wing are withdrawing while Hood's counterattack is just beginning. Sumner's command, on the east bank of the Antietam is ordered to advance on a line that will bring them in on the right of the action at that time. I have to assume that McClellan was aware of these circumstance either by personal observation or by reports from his staff.

Unfortunately for McClellan and the AoP significant time elapsed between the ordering of Sumner's advance and his arrival on the field. Subsequent maps in the series show that at least an hour elapsed before the first of Sedgwick's Division crossed the Antietam and another hour before they got into action. By that time Hooker was wounded, Mansfield was dead and the Federal troops had retreated north of the Cornfield enabling Jackson to position his troops to meet Sumner's advance.
 
I am reading McClellan's War by Ethan Rafuse and came across something interesting and relevant to this discussion. On page 315, Rafuse says that Sumner arrived around 0600 and was told "to his intense dismay" that McClellan wanted the Second Corps to remain where it was. Hooker was having success against the enemy's left at this point, so McClellan sent an aide to Burnside to tell him to prepare to attack the enemy's right. The Second and Fifth Corps were to be used to either attack the center if the flank attacks were successful, or provide support to "counter a Confederate counterstroke."

Going through Rafuses references:

Ruggles to Sumner, September 16, 1862, OR, vol. 51. pt. 1: 839; (link) is McClellan's orders for Sumner sent 1750 hrs on the 16th. It includes orders for Sumner to place his artillery over the creek on the 16th (which I think Marion gives to Sumner's own initiative) and for the corps to be ready to march "an hour before daylight". A second order stamps 1930 hrs tells Sumner to establish two batteries behind general HQ.

Strother, “Personal Recollections,” 281; (link) is Strothers account of Antietam in his diary. He found McClellan at the Newcomer House, and around 0730 hrs McClellan and aides ascended the hill behind the house to watch Hooker's advance. A little later McClellan rides off to the "same commanding knoll" he'd set his CP up on the 15th; this is the knoll next to the Ecker house overlooking the middle bridge.

Samuel S. Sumner, “The Antietam Campaign,” in Civil War and Miscellaneous Papers, vol. 14 (Boston: Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, 1918), 10; discussed above.

Oliver Otis Howard, Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard, Major General United States Army, 2 vols. (New York: Baker and Taylor, 1907), 1: 291; (link) is Howard's account and basically says he didn't receive an order to march until 0720 (this is probably taken from Sumner's report). He does add a tale that on the night of the 16th some of the HQ wagons rocked and were driven off by artillery.

Marion V. Armstrong, “A Failure of Command? A Reassessment of the Generalship of Edwin V. Sumner and the Federal II Corps at the Battle of Antietam,” in Leadership and Command in the American Civil War, ed. Steven E. Woodworth (Campbell, Calif.: Savas Woodbury Publishers, 1995), 75– 76; is Armstrong's interpretation, but he adds two new primary sources - Page's History of the 14th CT (link) which says they were woken up at 0200 hrs, and Sumner's testimony to the JCCW (link), where he says the same as his report (also referenced, link), that he didn't receive an order to advance until 0720.

Sears, George B. McClellan, 305; is Sears' take on Sumner's tale, and he goes far further than the source material would indicate - this references the same SS Sumner to GB Davis 4th April 1897 letter discussed above.

McClellan, McClellan’s Own Story, 603; (link) is McClellan discussing Burnside's failure to move.

Burnside to Williams, September 30, 1862, OR, vol. 19, pt. 1: 419; (link) is Burnside's report.

The one piece of cited primary evidence we don't have intimate access to is the Sumner to Davis letter, and it is the lynchpin that the Sears type argument is founded upon. All we have is fragmentary quotes, the fullest of which is in Armstrong:

"The artillery could be heard plainly on the right, and General Sumner was so impressed with the necessity of reaching the field of battle that he, personally, rode over to the army headquarters hoping to facilitate the movement of his command... I don’t know if General McClellan was asleep or engaged inside. I know General Sumner was uneasy and impatient….We remained outside Headquarters for some time, quite an hour or so as I remember it"
 
Thanks so much for taking the time to provide those links. Sears and Armstrong are the two that I don't have available to me at the moment, though I do have both of Armstrong's recent books, Unfurl Those Colors! and Opposing the Second Corps at Antietam, checked out from my local library.
 
My personal thought is that McClellan ordered Sumner in at what he thought was the appropriate time. Sumner indicates that he received the order at 7:20 a.m. and I see no reason to doubt that. As noted by 67th Tigers that order would have been written before that time, probably about 7:00 a.m. based on the relatively close proximity of Sumner's Second Corps to McClellan's HQ. What was happening at 7:00 a.m.? ...

This seems to be Rafuse's point of view too. It seems reasonable given the few sources available.

Next time I visit Antietam I will have to ask a/the ranger about the events we've been discussing.
 
Just on a common sense level, I think there is no chance that McClellan was sleeping. A massive battle, the showdown of a long and dramatic campaign, was to finally commence and yet he would oversleep? No human on Earth would oversleep in his position, nor would his staff let him in any event.

On a personal level, I wonder how people in his position are able to get a more than a few hours of fitful sleep, at best, on the night before battle. So much responsibility on their shoulders.
 
Thanks to Tom Clemens I now have the full letter from SS Sumner to Davis. Hopefully Prof. Clemens will let me release a transcription. However SS Sumner starts his letter by stating it was entirely from memory (35 years after the events) and he had no memoranda or documentation from that time. He does indeed state they waited for more than an hour on the steps of the Fry [sic] house. He says they rode there, which seems odd, and Sumner's HQ was 50 yards from the Pry House (Hooker's HQ)....

Reading Marion Armstrong's book I picked up a fact that I missed earlier. I have taken it that Sumner established his HQ at one of the Pry buildings, which I think I read. I was wrong. Armstrong reports Sumner actually established his HQ in Keedysville at the German reformed church, referencing a letter he sent on the evening of the 16th September from there.

Clemens' CWT article references a note from one of McClellan's ADCs to Sumner on the 16th stating that "The general will be for the present at General Hooker’s headquarters.". Since Hooker's HQ was indeed the Pry House it makes some sense that early in the morning Sumner rode from Keedysville with his staff to the Pry House. However, it seems likely that McClellan simply wasn't there, and it was some time before McClellan or one of his staff found Sumner and directed him towards the Newcomer House. I would speculate given other evidence that early in the morning when Sumner arrived at the Pry House McClellan was on the hill 800 yds north of the Pry House which is a 210 ft height (the tallest feature in the vicinity) and is clear of the woods around the Pry House. As moved to relocate his CP to Porter's HQ he might have found Sumner and picked him up, giving him his orders and explaining the plan at the Newcomer House around 0700.

Clemens' CWT article reference the regimental history of the 93rd NY (link) which says McClellan slept in bivouac in the line of battle. The 93rd NY was McClellan's HQ guard, and so is in a position to know. So that suggests McClellan didn't sleep at the Pry House in the first place.
 
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Excellent thread, great detective work by all. Just goes to show how ingrained "facts" can be totally false but have been cherry picked by authors for a hundred years or more to prove McClellan's ineptitude. I can't say I am totally on board with the thought that he was actually a good (or great) general but instances like this certainly give me pause for thought.

Dave
 
As always, @67th Tigers, thanks for your comments and information. If you have a transcription or copy of SS Sumner's letter that you can share, I'd be interested in seeing it.

Excellent thread, great detective work by all. Just goes to show how ingrained "facts" can be totally false but have been cherry picked by authors for a hundred years or more to prove McClellan's ineptitude.

Agreed. I think part of the reason for this is the lack of studies of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign until relatively recently. Off the top of my head, I think Carman, Palfrey, Murfin and Sears were the only major studies of the battle/campaign for the first 120 years following the battle. With so few voices chiming in, it's easier for mistaken "facts" to remain out there.

And Sears, who wrote a very compelling narrative in Landscape Turned Red, doesn't do McClellan any favors, ever. I read part of his biography of McClellan for the first time this week and was amazed at how Sears presents almost every decision and action that McCellan makes in the poorest light possible, sometimes to the point of caricature. Had I not read several of the more recent accounts of the campaign before reading Sears, I wouldn't know any better.

I'm still curious if anyone can determine on what Rafuse bases his claim that Sumner was given the positive order to keep his Corps where it was soon after arriving at the Pry House. Regarding my initial query related to McClellan's illness, I just read that he was in fact ill the day following the battle. So maybe that was the source of the ranger's statement.

In any case, I'm still learning and appreciate all the input everyone has contributed here. Keep it coming.
 
By the time Sumner showed up the union first and twelfth had fought jackson and longstreet to a stand still and visa versa. the twelfth had two rookie regiments around dunker church. jackson hit theses in his drive north to crush Sedgwick. another counter attack by jackson to releive the sunken road sputtered out. the sixth corps comes up and counter attacks hence the drawing of irwins brigade going in.
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Andrew,

I definitely had Sears in mind when I wrote "cherry picking". I can't remember the specific title of the thread now; something about McClellan and Antietam, I think. 67th Tigers brought up a number of instances where he (Sears) stretched the facts in order to present McClellan in the worst possible light. Like you, I had enjoyed his previous books and didn't question any of Sears' motives for writing them. Must say, 67th Tigers opened my eyes in his spirited defense of "Little Mac".

Dave
 
How is Ethan Rafuse's book on McClellan? That is one I have not yet read.

I recently read the two chapters about the Maryland Campaign through Antietam. I thought the Antietam chapter presented a plausible account of McClellan's reasoning and decision making during the battle. It's definitely an antidote to Sears' biography. Rafuse does say that McClellan was asleep the morning of the battle, and as I mentioned above, claims that Sumner was given orders to hold the Second Corps where they were without any substantiation that I could find. Overall, it's a good read and seems a level-headed assessment of McClellan. I'd definitely recommend it.
 
In regard to the sleeping McClellan, I thought I would follow up in the O.R. and see if anyone noted the hour when Burnside/Cox received the order(s) to approach and then seize the bridge. Here are the quotes from McClellan,
Burnside and Cox:

Early on the morning of the 17th, I ordered General Burnside to form his troops and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in his front, and to await further orders. At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieutenant Wilson, Topographical Engineers, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear.

OR 19, pt. 1, pp. 63 (McClellan’s report)


On the morning of the 17th the enemy opened a heavy artillery fire on our lines, but did us little harm. Our batteries were soon brought to bear on their batteries, which were soon silenced and two of his caissons blown up. About this time I received an order from the general commanding to make my dispositions to carry the stone bridge over the Antietam
nearly opposite our center, but to await further orders before making the attack. I accordingly threw my lines forward.
... At 10 o'clock I received an order from the general commanding to make the attack. I directed Colonel Kingsbury, of the Eleventh Connecticut, to move forward with his line of skirmishers, and directed General Cox to detail General Crook's brigade to make the assault.


OR 19, pt. 1, pp. 419 (Burnside’s report)


Shortly after daybreak on the 17th the enemy's batteries opened upon the batteries of our line, and a brisk artillery fight began, in which Benjamin's battery and Durell's battery (the latter sent forward a little to the right of our position, under charge of Captain Rawolle, by General Sturgis) took an active part, co-operating with batteries of other corps on our right. Two of the enemy's caissons were exploded, and many of their guns silenced. The shot and shell fell thickly in our
bivouac, but little damage was done. About 7 o'clock orders were received from General Burnside to move forward the corps to the ridge nearest the Antietam, and hold it, in readiness to cross the stream, carrying the bridge and the heights above it by assault. The command was moved forward in column as it had been formed the previous night, and promptly took position as directed, and the light artillery was ordered to cover the movement; McMuIlin's, Durell's, Clark's, Muhlenberg's, and Cook's batteries being placed on the heights to right and left and somewhat to the front of Benjamin's
battery, to which a section of 20-pounders from Simmonds' battery was also temporarily attached. Willcox's division was also brought up and held as a reserve.
About 9 o'clock the order was received to cross the stream. Immediately the Eleventh Conuecticut Infantry, Colonel Kingsbury commanding, was detailed from Rodman's division to deploy as skirmishers and drive the enemy from the head of the bridge.

OR 19, pt. 1, pp. 424 (Cox’s report)

So, according to the above reports, Cox received the warning order to seize the bridge around 7 a.m., and then the order to assault around 9 ( or 10) a.m. which, I think, would fit McClellan issuing the warning order before 7 a.m., and the order to attack around 8 a.m.

Dave
 
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The Newcomer House currently serves as a visitor center for an organization called, as you can see on the sign, the Heart of the Civil War Heritage Area which includes a swath of land stretching from Gettysburg down into Virginia. It has been nicely restored and contains exhibits about the various sites included in the area it promotes but unfortunately has nothing specific to Antietam or it's function during the battle so this is new and welcome information to me.

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It can also be seen in the background of this photo of the statue of Gen. R. E. Lee near the Middle Bridge:

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Of course the Pry House is part of Antietam National Battlefield Park but is currently interpreted as an extension of the National Medical Museum of the Civil War at Frederick as a field hospital museum. I'd wondered why Hooker was brought here after being wounded in the foot in the Cornfield area; knowing this had been selected prior to the battle as HIS headquarters and NOT McClellan's explains that nicely! This was also where Maj. Gen. Israel Richardson died following his mortal wounding at Bloody Lane.
 
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