On the evening of the 26th, Hooker proposing to carry out his purpose, telegraphed Halleck, asking, "Is there any reason why Maryland Heights should not be abandoned ?" adding that he proposed to visit the place on the next day to satisfy himself on that point. Halleck replied the next morning: "Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them." This seems to have been the last straw with Hooker to break the camel's back. On returning to his headquarters and finding Halleck's reply, at 1 P.M., on the 27th, Hooker telegraphed Halleck, asking to be relieved at once of the command of the Army.
Halleck replied at 8 P.M., that his request would be referred to the President. No doubt he was secretly pleased at the opportunity afforded of getting rid of Hooker, but it was an awkward thing to change commanders in the field on the eve of an impending battle, and the situation caused grave anxiety at Washington. The matter was one which admitted of no delay, and after a conference with his advisers, the President selected Meade to succeed Hooker, and an order was immediately prepared to that effect, which, together with a letter from Halleck, was entrusted to General Hardie, to be delivered in person to Meade. The letter was received by him during the early hours of the morning of the 28th. In reference to the selection of Meade, Mr. Wells, in his diary, says, with some apparent chagrin, the cabinet were advised about it the next morning, and "were consulted after the fact.
In his modest acknowledgment of the order, General Meade announced that he should move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy was checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, of if he turns toward Baltimore, give him battle. Meade's letter must have been satisfactory to Halleck, for he was assured that every available assistance should be given him: That General Schenck's troops outside of the line of defenses, at Washington, and General Couch's forces on the Susquehanna, were subject to his orders, and were directed to co-operate with him. At the same time Meade asked permission to withdraw a portion of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, leaving a detachment to guard Maryland Heights, to which Halleck replied: "The garrison at Harper's Ferry is under your orders, you can increase or diminish it as you think circumstances justify." In addition to these re-inforcements, a large number of horses as remounts were forwarded by the Quarter-Master, which helped to swell the numbers of the cavalry.
On the 27th, Hooker had written to Halleck, when he asked for more troops, saying, "That there may be no misunderstanding as to my force, I would respectfully state that including the portions of General Heintzelman's command, and General Schenck now with me, my whole force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed one hundred and five thousand men."
General Meade in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, puts the number slightly less. The field returns of the Army of the Potomac, on file among the official records at Washington, show present for duty, officers and men, on June 30th, 117,930.
There are no existing data from which the strength of the Confederate army under Lee, can be gathered with equal accuracy. Colonel Walter H. Taylor, assistant Adjutant General, after consulting the Archives in Washington, and making a study of the subject, estimates General Lee's strength, embracing his entire effective force of all arms, to have been in round numbers, 67,000.
The 28th was employed by General Meade, in making himself acquainted with the situation. On the 29th he informed Halleck that the army was in motion towards Westminster and Emmittsburg, the first and eleventh corps being destined for the latter place, the third and twelfth for Taneytown, and the other three for Frizzelburg, Union and New Windsor, with the cavalry guarding the flanks and rear: That if Lee was moving for Baltimore, he should get between his main army and that place. If he was crossing the Susquehanna, he would rely upon Couch holding him in check, until he should fall upon his rear and give battle. That he had abandoned Harper's Ferry, and the garrison there, with the exception of a detachment sent to Washington, would join him. That the line by rail from Frederick to Baltimore was abandoned and in moving forward he should incline to the right toward the Baltimore and Harrisburg Railroad (Northern Central).
Early's demonstration towards York, caused Meade's inclination to the right, but when informed from Washington that the pressure towards the Susquehanna was relaxed, he swung his right wing forward so as to touch Manchester, and his line then connected that place with Taneytown.
On the 30th of June, Reynolds was again assigned to the command of the first, third and eleventh corps, constituting the left wing of the army. On the evening of that day, two divisions of the first corps lay at Marsh Run, half way between Emmittsburg and Gettysburg, and within about five miles of the latter place. The remaining division lay a little to the southwest at Moritz Tavern. The eleventh corps was at Emmittsburg, and the third a mile or so to the east in the direction of Taneytown.
continued
Halleck replied at 8 P.M., that his request would be referred to the President. No doubt he was secretly pleased at the opportunity afforded of getting rid of Hooker, but it was an awkward thing to change commanders in the field on the eve of an impending battle, and the situation caused grave anxiety at Washington. The matter was one which admitted of no delay, and after a conference with his advisers, the President selected Meade to succeed Hooker, and an order was immediately prepared to that effect, which, together with a letter from Halleck, was entrusted to General Hardie, to be delivered in person to Meade. The letter was received by him during the early hours of the morning of the 28th. In reference to the selection of Meade, Mr. Wells, in his diary, says, with some apparent chagrin, the cabinet were advised about it the next morning, and "were consulted after the fact.
In his modest acknowledgment of the order, General Meade announced that he should move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy was checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, of if he turns toward Baltimore, give him battle. Meade's letter must have been satisfactory to Halleck, for he was assured that every available assistance should be given him: That General Schenck's troops outside of the line of defenses, at Washington, and General Couch's forces on the Susquehanna, were subject to his orders, and were directed to co-operate with him. At the same time Meade asked permission to withdraw a portion of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, leaving a detachment to guard Maryland Heights, to which Halleck replied: "The garrison at Harper's Ferry is under your orders, you can increase or diminish it as you think circumstances justify." In addition to these re-inforcements, a large number of horses as remounts were forwarded by the Quarter-Master, which helped to swell the numbers of the cavalry.
On the 27th, Hooker had written to Halleck, when he asked for more troops, saying, "That there may be no misunderstanding as to my force, I would respectfully state that including the portions of General Heintzelman's command, and General Schenck now with me, my whole force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed one hundred and five thousand men."
General Meade in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, puts the number slightly less. The field returns of the Army of the Potomac, on file among the official records at Washington, show present for duty, officers and men, on June 30th, 117,930.
There are no existing data from which the strength of the Confederate army under Lee, can be gathered with equal accuracy. Colonel Walter H. Taylor, assistant Adjutant General, after consulting the Archives in Washington, and making a study of the subject, estimates General Lee's strength, embracing his entire effective force of all arms, to have been in round numbers, 67,000.
The 28th was employed by General Meade, in making himself acquainted with the situation. On the 29th he informed Halleck that the army was in motion towards Westminster and Emmittsburg, the first and eleventh corps being destined for the latter place, the third and twelfth for Taneytown, and the other three for Frizzelburg, Union and New Windsor, with the cavalry guarding the flanks and rear: That if Lee was moving for Baltimore, he should get between his main army and that place. If he was crossing the Susquehanna, he would rely upon Couch holding him in check, until he should fall upon his rear and give battle. That he had abandoned Harper's Ferry, and the garrison there, with the exception of a detachment sent to Washington, would join him. That the line by rail from Frederick to Baltimore was abandoned and in moving forward he should incline to the right toward the Baltimore and Harrisburg Railroad (Northern Central).
Early's demonstration towards York, caused Meade's inclination to the right, but when informed from Washington that the pressure towards the Susquehanna was relaxed, he swung his right wing forward so as to touch Manchester, and his line then connected that place with Taneytown.
On the 30th of June, Reynolds was again assigned to the command of the first, third and eleventh corps, constituting the left wing of the army. On the evening of that day, two divisions of the first corps lay at Marsh Run, half way between Emmittsburg and Gettysburg, and within about five miles of the latter place. The remaining division lay a little to the southwest at Moritz Tavern. The eleventh corps was at Emmittsburg, and the third a mile or so to the east in the direction of Taneytown.
continued