"PICKETT'S CHARGE"

On the evening of the 26th, Hooker proposing to carry out his purpose, telegraphed Halleck, asking, "Is there any reason why Maryland Heights should not be abandoned ?" adding that he proposed to visit the place on the next day to satisfy himself on that point. Halleck replied the next morning: "Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them." This seems to have been the last straw with Hooker to break the camel's back. On returning to his headquarters and finding Halleck's reply, at 1 P.M., on the 27th, Hooker telegraphed Halleck, asking to be relieved at once of the command of the Army.

Halleck replied at 8 P.M., that his request would be referred to the President. No doubt he was secretly pleased at the opportunity afforded of getting rid of Hooker, but it was an awkward thing to change commanders in the field on the eve of an impending battle, and the situation caused grave anxiety at Washington. The matter was one which admitted of no delay, and after a conference with his advisers, the President selected Meade to succeed Hooker, and an order was immediately prepared to that effect, which, together with a letter from Halleck, was entrusted to General Hardie, to be delivered in person to Meade. The letter was received by him during the early hours of the morning of the 28th. In reference to the selection of Meade, Mr. Wells, in his diary, says, with some apparent chagrin, the cabinet were advised about it the next morning, and "were consulted after the fact.

In his modest acknowledgment of the order, General Meade announced that he should move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy was checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, of if he turns toward Baltimore, give him battle. Meade's letter must have been satisfactory to Halleck, for he was assured that every available assistance should be given him: That General Schenck's troops outside of the line of defenses, at Washington, and General Couch's forces on the Susquehanna, were subject to his orders, and were directed to co-operate with him. At the same time Meade asked permission to withdraw a portion of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, leaving a detachment to guard Maryland Heights, to which Halleck replied: "The garrison at Harper's Ferry is under your orders, you can increase or diminish it as you think circumstances justify." In addition to these re-inforcements, a large number of horses as remounts were forwarded by the Quarter-Master, which helped to swell the numbers of the cavalry.

On the 27th, Hooker had written to Halleck, when he asked for more troops, saying, "That there may be no misunderstanding as to my force, I would respectfully state that including the portions of General Heintzelman's command, and General Schenck now with me, my whole force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed one hundred and five thousand men."

General Meade in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, puts the number slightly less. The field returns of the Army of the Potomac, on file among the official records at Washington, show present for duty, officers and men, on June 30th, 117,930.

There are no existing data from which the strength of the Confederate army under Lee, can be gathered with equal accuracy. Colonel Walter H. Taylor, assistant Adjutant General, after consulting the Archives in Washington, and making a study of the subject, estimates General Lee's strength, embracing his entire effective force of all arms, to have been in round numbers, 67,000.

The 28th was employed by General Meade, in making himself acquainted with the situation. On the 29th he informed Halleck that the army was in motion towards Westminster and Emmittsburg, the first and eleventh corps being destined for the latter place, the third and twelfth for Taneytown, and the other three for Frizzelburg, Union and New Windsor, with the cavalry guarding the flanks and rear: That if Lee was moving for Baltimore, he should get between his main army and that place. If he was crossing the Susquehanna, he would rely upon Couch holding him in check, until he should fall upon his rear and give battle. That he had abandoned Harper's Ferry, and the garrison there, with the exception of a detachment sent to Washington, would join him. That the line by rail from Frederick to Baltimore was abandoned and in moving forward he should incline to the right toward the Baltimore and Harrisburg Railroad (Northern Central).

Early's demonstration towards York, caused Meade's inclination to the right, but when informed from Washington that the pressure towards the Susquehanna was relaxed, he swung his right wing forward so as to touch Manchester, and his line then connected that place with Taneytown.

On the 30th of June, Reynolds was again assigned to the command of the first, third and eleventh corps, constituting the left wing of the army. On the evening of that day, two divisions of the first corps lay at Marsh Run, half way between Emmittsburg and Gettysburg, and within about five miles of the latter place. The remaining division lay a little to the southwest at Moritz Tavern. The eleventh corps was at Emmittsburg, and the third a mile or so to the east in the direction of Taneytown.

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The distance of these troops from Gettysburg was about as follows: The first corps five miles, the eleventh corps ten miles, and the third corps ten or thirteen miles, according to either of two routes open to it. The twelfth corps, under Slocum, near Littletown, was about ten miles away, and marching to the battle-field, on the day of the 1st, reached there about 7 P.M., a little in advance of the third corps under Sickles, marching by the Emmittsburg road. Buford, with a division of cavalry, had moved on the left of the army when it left Frederick, into the Cumberland Valley, which he reported clear of the enemy. Passing through Fountain Dale, where the roads from Emmittsburg and Gettysburg unite, he took the Gettysburg road, and occupied that place at 11 A.M. on the 30th.

A brigade of Heth's under Pettigrew, which had been sent forward on that day, found Buford's cavalry in possession of the place, and retired without a collision. Heth's camp fires could be seen that evening on the mountain side at Cashtown, by Buford's pickets, who advanced some miles from Gettysburg on the road to that place, and Buford in his report says, that by daylight on the morning of the 1st of July, he had gained positive information of the "enemy's position and movements." The other two cavalry divisions under Gregg and Kilpatrick, moved on the right flank of the army and were busily engaged looking up Stuart, who was now discovered to be moving still further to their right. Kilpatrick succeeded in coming up with him at Hanover, where a sharp engagement ensued, but Stuart, though superior in numbers, could not afford to have his progress delayed, and he shook off Kilpatrick as quickly as possible and resumed his march. In a letter written by General Reynolds, on the 30th, to Butterfield, chief of staff, he says: "If we are to fight a defensive battle in this vicinity, the proper position is just north of Emmittsburg, covering the Plank road to Taneytown. He (the enemy), will undoubtedly endeavor to turn our left by way of Fairfield, and the mountain road leading down into the Frederick and Emmittsburg pike near Mt. St. Mary's College."

Circulars and orders issued on the 30th, from army headquarters, show General Meade to have been altogether undecided at this time what course he should pursue. It was announced in one of these, that the Commanding General had received information that the enemy was advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg, and it was his intention to hold the army "pretty nearly in its present position until the plans of the enemy were more fully developed."

General orders of the same date from headquarters, directed the advance of the first, third and eleventh corps to Gettysburg, while a letter, also of the same date, written by Meade to Reynolds, at 11:30 A.M., after advising him of the location of the enemy, adds the following postscript: "If, after occupying your present position, it is your judgment that you would be in a better position at Emmittsburg than where you are, you can fall back without waiting for the enemy or for further orders. Your present position was given more with a view to an advance on Gettysburg, than a defensive point."

During the day of the 30th, and as late as midnight, dispatches from General Couch, at Harrisburg, continued to pour into Washington, that the Confederate forces were rapidly leaving Carlisle and moving towards the Cumberland Valley. These dispatches forwarded to General Meade, must have caused him to change his mind, after the orders were issued to Reynolds to occupy Gettysburg the next day, for on July 1st, a circular was issued from headquarters at Taneytown, stating: "The Commanding General was satisfied the object of the movements made by his army had been accomplished by the relief of Harrisburg, and the prevention of the invasion of Pennsylvania beyond the Susquehanna, and it was no longer his intention to assume the offensive, unless the enemy's movements or position, made such an operation certain of success, and further, that should the enemy attack, it was his intention, after holding them in check a sufficient time, to withdraw the army from its present position, and form line of battle along the direction of Pipe Creek. That for this purpose General Reynolds, in command of the left, would withdraw the forces at present at Gettysburg. The time for falling back, it was added, would be developed by circumstances."

It is apparent from these orders, that General Meade did not design to bring on a battle at Gettysburg, and that he attached no strategic importance to the place. He was evidently in no hurry to seize it, for like every one else, he was in ignorance of its strength as a defensive position. The letter from General Meade to Reynolds, advising him to withdraw, never reached the latter. It required several hours for a courier from headquarters at Taneytown to reach Reynolds, and he moved from Emmittsburg early on the morning of the 1st, to accompany Wadsworth's division on the way to Gettysburg. So late as I2:30 of the 1st of July, and after the battle was begun, the contemplated withdrawal was still in the mind of General Meade, as will be seen by a letter, written at that time by Butterfield, chief of staff to Hancock, directing that "in view of the advance of Generals A. P. Hill and Ewell, on Gettysburg, and the possible failure of General Reynolds to receive the order to withdraw his command by the route through Taneytown, thus leaving the centre of our position open, that you proceed with your troops on the direct road to Gettysburg from Taneytown. When you find that General Reynolds is covering that road instead of withdrawing by Emmittsburg (which it is feared he may do), you will withdraw to Frizzelburg, as directed in circular of directions for the positions issued this morning."

So far then as General Meade was concerned, the battle of Gettysburg was a pure accident.

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Let us see how it was on the other side. In his official report of July 31st, already referred to, General Lee states "that preparations were made to advance upon Harrisburg, but on the night of the 28th, information was received from a scout, that the Federal Army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached South Mountain," &c.

In General Longstreet's official report he makes a similar statement: "That on the night of the 28th, one of the scouts came in with the information, that the enemy had passed the Potomac, and was probably in pursuit of us," and in his book, "From Manassas to Appomattox," the scout is described as one who had been employed by him, and that he brought the additional intelligence of Meade's assignment to the command of the Federal army. Colonel Mosby has pointed out the extreme improbability, or as he thinks impossibility, that the scout referred to could have brought the news of Meade's assignment.

The messenger conveying the order of assignment did not reach Frederick until the morning of the 28th, and the order would not be promulgated and become known generally among the troops, so that it could be picked up by a spy until probably late in the day, when it would be next to impossible for a scout in the Federal camps at Frederick to reach Longstreet at Chambersburg the same night. It would appear too, notwithstanding the language of both these official reports, that General Lee must have had some knowledge of Hooker's movements prior to the news brought in by the scout on the night of the 28th. For in his letter to General Ewell, dated June 28, 1863, 7:30 A.M., from Chambersburg, he says, "I wrote you last night stating that General Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac, and is advancing by way of Middletown," &c. He adds, "That in that letter he had directed him to return to Chambersburg, or if there were any reason against it, to proceed in the direction of Gettysburg." The information, then, which reached General Lee on the 28th must have been that the column had reached South Mountain and not that it had crossed the Potomac. That it had reached South Mountain, and that up to this time, he had not heard a word from Stuart, doubtless surprised and disturbed him. Two cavalry brigades of Jones and Robertson, which had been left behind on the Potomac, and who were to receive their orders from Stuart, appear to have been still lagging on the banks ofthat stream, and Robertson only reported on the 2d of July.

General Lee was in a hostile country, and the only information he could pick up was the loose and uncertain news gathered from rumor, and brought to him by scouts. It was of the utmost consequence to him to have accurate and reliable information of the movements of the enemy: As the cavalry are said to be the eyes of an army, General Lee was like a blind man groping in the dark.

As an illustration of the conditions which prevailed at the time with the Confederate forces, the following incident may be mentioned. A number of the artillery horses in the third corps had given out since the march began from Fredericksburg, and there was urgent need for fresh ones to supply their places. Before Fayetteville was reached, Lieut. J. Hampden Chamberlayne of the corps, a brave and resolute officer, was directed by the Chief of Artillery to proceed with a small detachment of men drawn from the several battalions into the country adjacent to the line of march and gather up some draft animals. The lieutenant and most of his men were quickly gobbled up by the hostile cavalry hovering upon the Confederate flanks, and the mishap was only learned through those who escaped.

Up to this time the chief occupation of the army had been gathering in supplies; it now became necessary to concentrate. As soon as positive information was received of General Meade's movements, General Lee issued orders to bring his different corps within supporting distance.

His headquarters were with Longstreet's corps at Chambersburg. Colonel Charles Marshall, General Lee's Military Secretary, was heard to say on one occasion, "It is a fact which seems to have escaped comment, that when the army was in motion, General Lee always moved with Longstreet's corps, and there was a reason for it. That General Lee once said, 'that when he wanted General Jackson to do a thing, all he had to do was to send him an order; when he wanted General Longstreet to do a thing, the safest way was to go along with him.'"

Early says that orders recalling him were received at York on the 29th. As these came through Ewell, who was thirty miles distant at Carlisle, and Carlisle is about the same distance from Chambersburg, it is probable that Ewell sent orders to Early immediately on receipt of the first letter from General Lee, written the night previous to the 28th. On receipt of General Lee's letters? Ewell, who was about to set out for Harrisburg, having sent forward his engineer to reconnoitre the defenses of that place, recalled his scattered divisions and turned his immense trains to the rear. The latter moved in a continuous stream towards Chambersburg, passing through that place the greater part of the night of the 29th. Johnson's division accompanied these and moved to Green Village, about seven miles from Chambersburg, whence it turned east on the 30th and marched via Scotland towards Gettysburg. The other two divisions of Ewell's countermarched, and Rodes moved, on the 30th, almost due south, about twenty miles to Heidlersburg, nine miles northeast of Gettysburg; and Early moved almost due west to a point three miles distant from Rodes on the road leading to Berlin.

In view of the order to Ewell to return to Chambersburg, and the subsequent order "to proceed to Cashtown or Gettysburg as circumstances might dictate," it is a little surprising to find in A. P. Hill's official report, after stating that his corps on the 29th was encamped on the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, that he proceeds to say, "I was directed to move on this road, in the direction of York, and to cross the Susquehanna, menacing the communications of Harrisburg with Philadelphia, and to co-operate with General Ewell, acting as circumstances might require," without any mention of change of plan, or the reception of orders other than those originally given. His report proceeds, "accordingly on the 29th I moved General Heth's division to Cashtown, some eight miles from Gettysburg, following on the morning of the 30th with the division of General Pender, and directing General Anderson to move in the same direction on the morning of July 1st. On arriving at Cashtown, General Heth, who had sent forward Pettigrew's brigade to Gettysburg, reported that Pettigrew had encountered the enemy at Gettysburg, (principally cavalry) but in what force he could not determine. A courier was then dispatched with this information
to the General commanding, and with orders to start Anderson; also to General Ewell informing him, and that I intended to advance the next morning and discover what was in y front." Heth's division of Hill's corps moved on the 29th from Fayetteville to Cashtown, at the east base of South Mountain, where it remained until the morning of the 1st. Pender's division on the afternoon of the 30th, moved up to the north or west side of the mountain, from which point it moved on the morning of the 1st.


Anderson's division reached Fayetteville on the 27th, where it remained until the morning of the 1st. Longstreet's corps, except Pickett's division, which was left at Chambersburg to guard the rear, was moved on the 30th to Greenwood.

The respective distances of these two corps from Gettysburg on the morning of the 1st was as follows: Heth's division nine miles; Pender's in rear of Heth's a short distance further; Anderson's at Fayetteville, seventeen miles; two divisions of Longstreet's corps, Hood and McLaws at Greenwood, fourteen miles; and Pickett's at Chambersburg, twenty-four miles. General Lee, writing from Greenwood on July 1st to Imboden, who with a force of cavalry had marched from West Virginia and was about joining the army, directs him to relieve Pickett, who was to move forward to Greenwood, and giving further directions says, "You will at the same time have an opportunity of organizing your troops, refreshing them for a day or two and getting everything prepared for active operations in the field, for which you will be speedily wanted. Send word to General Pickett at this place to-morrow, which is eight miles from Chambersburg, the hour you will arrive there, in order that he may be prepared to move on your arrival. My headquarters for the present will be at Cashtown, east of the mountains." This letter does not indicate that Lee regarded an action as then imminent, but the opposing columns must have been almost, if not quite, in contact before the letter was dispatched.

Neither side showed any haste to get into motion on the morning of the day that was again to witness a trial of strength between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia. Wadsworth's division, the nearest to Gettysburg, after a leisurely breakfast, took up its line of march at 8 o'clock along the Emmittsburg pike. Pender left at the same time from the top of South Mountain, and as the two divisions of Heth's and Pender's filed into the Cashtown pike, the rays of the morning sun were already adding to the heat of a sultry day. Heth's division led, the infantry to the front, a battalion of artillery, Pegram's, following; then Pender's Division; a battalion of artillery, Mcintosh's, well to the front, the infantry following. The smell of battle was already in the air and the jocularity which always attends the early stages of a march, was tempered by a secret feeling that serious business was ahead. A few miles march brought Heth's skirmishers up against Buford's pickets, and the first scattering shots served as tell-tale messengers that the conflict was at hand. A running fight followed between the dismounted cavalry and the infantry, the former offering a stout resistance wherever the ground afforded cover. At 10:10 A.M. Buford sent to Meade this dispatch, "The enemy's force (A. P. Hill's) are advancing on me at this point and driving my pickets and skirmishers very rapidly. There is also a large force at Heidlersburg that is driving my pickets at that point from that direction. General Reynolds is advancing and is within three miles of this point with his leading division. I am positive that the whole of A. P. Hill's force is advancing." Buford could not then have received Pleasanton's order of July 1st, directing him "to fall back to Taneytown and then to Middletown in case the enemy should advance upon you and press you hard."

When Heth's line of skirmishers paused before a heavy line of dismounted cavalry posted on both sides of the road, he ordered forward his two leading brigades, and Archer moving to the right, formed in line on that side of the road, while Davis moving to the left, formed on the opposite side. Buford had massed his cavalry and posted them along a ridge which extended across the road, as a favorable point to make a stand. Before Heth's brigades had fully deployed, Pegram, who never lost an opportunity to be first in the fight, unlimbered in the road, a section of rifle guns and threw a number of shells at a body of horsemen in the distance. It was currently reported at the time that one of these struck General Reynolds and caused his death. Pegram's battalion of artillery, moving on the north side of the road, followed Davis' advance, and McIntosh's battalion, quickly coming up, followed Archer on the south side of the road, the guns of either battalion being used in the advance whenever a favorable opportunity offered.

When Davis moved to the attack, the dismounted cavalry occupied the east slope of Willoughby Run, and several hundred yards beyond and in the rear of the ridge occupied by them, was a higher and more commanding ridge, running generally in the same direction and extending northerly to Oak Hill where the view was lost in the forests. Davis' right rested on the turnpike and overlapped, for a considerable distance the line of an unfinished railroad, running nearly parallel with the turnpike, with alternate cuts and fills. A considerable portion of the ridge was in wood, the intervening spaces being open and under cultivation or in grass and intersected by ditches and fences. As Davis advanced the contest became warm and he soon discovered that the position he was assailing was supported by artillery and infantry. General Reynolds, riding with Wadsworth's division when it left Marsh's Creek, hearing the firing, turned the head of the column to the left and marched it across the fields to the Cashtown road at Seminary Hill, riding on himself in advance.

It was while observing the ground and giving directions where the approaching infantry should be posted that he was mortally wounded and the command devolved on General Doubleday.

The leading brigade of Cutler had scarcely time to form in line before meeting the shock of Davis, who had ordered a charge. A fierce fight followed, but Cutler was finally driven back, and after one or two vain efforts to resist the rush, was forced from the field towards the town, the artillery being gotten away with much difficulty. In a short time the fight was renewed, and Davis was in turn driven back, but rallying his men, he made a second charge and regained his advanced position. By this time Cutler was receiving support, and the appearance of a considerable force on Davis' right forced him to retire, and in doing so a number of his men were captured in the railroad cut. The loss in this engagement was severe, and the captures considerable on both sides. Cutler reported his loss in one regiment as two hundred and seven killed and wounded out of three hundred and eighty in the space of half an hour. Some of the other regiments fared no better. Davis reported that out of nine field officers present, but two escaped unhurt.

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Archer, after pushing the cavalry out of his way, crossed Willoughby Run in the face of the enemy, and moved forward to the charge on the eastern slope of that stream. His progress was retarded by the undergrowth, but after clearing that with great effort, his men advanced with a yell, and delivered their fire within forty or fifty feet of the enemy's lines. They were met by the "Iron Brigade" under Meredith, composed of a splendid body of troops from Wisconsin, Michigan and Indiana. Meredith largely overlapped Archer and the latter's flanks became exposed and subjected to a cross fire which compelled a retreat. In recrossing the stream, he together with a considerable portion of the command were taken prisoners.

In describing how the action was brought on, General Heth says, that being ignorant what force was at or near Gettysburg, and supposing it to consist of cavalry, most probably supported by a brigade or two of infantry, he made a reconnaissance to determine in what force the enemy was, and whether or not he was massing his force on Gettysburg, and that accordingly Davis and Archer were directed to advance, "the object being to feel the enemy ;" that ascertaining from the first conflict, that the enemy was in heavy force, he proceeded to form his division in line of battle, and after resting an hour or two, he received orders to attack, and was notified that Pender would support him."

The question has pertinently been asked, if the movement was in the nature of a reconnaissance, and the object was "to feel the enemy," why was it necessary after that had been done to renew the battle. The enemy had been pretty severely felt, and the reconnaissance had ended in a most serious engagement, and it was known that General Lee did not wish to bring on a general engagement.

General Heth's reply is that he was ordered after a rest to renew the attack. The question recurs, why then, was the battle renewed? The discussion of the question has provoked some criticism upon the conduct of the corps commander and the events of the first day.

Captain Cecil Battine, of the 15th Hussars in the English army, who has written a most graphic and intelligent account of the campaign, thinks Hill did not display his usual vim during the first day, and that his actions were characterized by a timidity unusual to one of his intrepid nature, and that he committed a mistake in putting his troops into action by brigades and fighting the battle piecemeal. On the other hand, Colonel Mosby fiercely assails Hill in having departed from General Lee's plan in moving beyond Cashtown. He contends that this place and not Gettysburg was selected by Lee as the point for the concentration of the army, and that Hill and Heth in making the so-called reconnaissance, were acting entirely upon their own initiative, and with a selfish desire to acquire a little glory on their own account. Neither of these criticisms, the one suggesting timidity, the other, charging unauthorized temerity, are deserved. Hill and Heth were both brave and gallant soldiers, and Hill met an honorable death in the face of the enemy in front of Petersburg on April 2d, 1865.

When General Lee ordered Hill's division to report to Jackson in July, 1862, he wrote to Jackson that he would find A. P. Hill a "good officer," "with whom you can consult."

Previous to the battle of Cedar Run, Hill was ordered by Jackson to move his division on a certain road at daylight the next morning.

Hill was ready to move at the appointed time, but found the road occupied by another division, which delayed the movement. This greatly angered Jackson, who put Hill under arrest. Hill made counter charges, and demanded a court martial, but General Lee decided the good of the service would not permit it. Notwithstanding this early friction between the two men, Jackson had high regard for Hill's ability, and it is said the last words which passed his lips in his dying moments, was calling upon A. P. Hill to bring up his division.

As to the first point made by Colonel Mosby, that Cashtown and not Gettysburg was the objective of the army, the authorities are all against him. Ewell was directed towards Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might require. The movement ultimately was determined towards Gettysburg. General Longstreet, in his official report made at the time, after speaking of events on the 30th, says, "On the next day the troops set out for Gettysburg." But if there could be any doubt about so plain a proposition, it is settled by a personal letter from General Lee to Mr. Davis, written on the 4th of July, just after the battle, in which this passage occurs, "Our whole force was directed to concentrate at Gettysburg."

As to the charge that Hill should have remained at Cashtown, and that his advance beyond that place was reckless and unauthorized; had he stood still at Cashtown, he would have blocked the passage of Longstreet's corps, which was on its way to Gettysburg, and which, as it was, was greatly retarded by Anderson's division and by Ewell's trains. In the absence of special instructions for the day, it may be asked what was the natural and proper thing for Hill to do. General Lee stood greatly in need of information as to the enemy. Hill was his lieutenant, and in the absence of cavalry, who, it may be asked, but the lieutenant in charge of the advance, could furnish the information wanted, and in what other way could this be done than by a reconnaissance, even supposing Gettysburg were not the objective point of the movement. The effort to make it appear that Hill's advance beyond Cashtown was unauthorized, in the light of these facts, falls to the ground. As to how far and with what insistence the reconnaissance should have been pressed, opinions may differ. On the one hand he was handicapped by the knowledge that General Lee did not wish a general engagement brought on; this led him to put his troops into action by detachments and exposed him to the criticism which Captain Battine makes; at the same time he was too sturdy a fighter, willingly to give ground, and he must have thought the alternative, in the face of increasing numbers, was between a vigorous
offensive and abandoning his ground. Doubleday, on the Union side, has been censured for pretty much the same thing. In replying to criticisms, against him on this account, he says, "A retreat without hard fighting has a tendency to demoralize the troops who retreat, and would in the present instance, in my opinion, have dispirited the whole army and encourage the enemy in the same proportion." It has been said, too, of Reynolds that he committed a blunder, which cost him his life, in not halting at Cemetery Heights instead of rushing his men on to Seminary Ridge, but he acted on the true military instinct which impelled him to the firing line where assistance was wanted, and his action in doing so has made him the Federal hero of the battlefield.


Could Hill have known the strength of the force in his front, he could have overwhelmed it at the first with his superior numbers, and moved to the occupation of Gettysburg and the surrounding heights, and such it now seems would have been the thing to do. But in ignorance of the situation and knowing the wishes of the Commander, he temporized for delay and for the arrival of Ewell. As the result proved, the policy cost him dearly.

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When Archer's brigade was shattered, and Davis driven back, the Federal infantry occupied substantially the same positions they did when the fight opened. Heth now moved Pettigrew's brigade forward to his centre, and placed the remainder of Archer's brigade on the right, while Brockenbrough's brigade was moved up on Pettigrew's left and reinforced Davis. These movements occupied some time, during which a spirited artillery fire was kept up on both sides, the advantage being apparently with the Confederates. In the meantime the Federal forces were not idle. The two remaining divisions of the first corps had come on the ground. The first under Robinson was held for a time in reserve on Seminary Ridge, and the other under Rowley was advanced to the support of Wadsworth. General Howard, with the eleventh corps, was also near at hand. He had ridden in advance of his corps, and upon arriving on the field, took over the command from Doubleday, and turned over the command of his own corps to Schurz.

When the attack was renewed the contest waxed fiercer if possible, than before. Those engaged at the first had recovered their wind and replenished their ammunition, while the fresh troops who had only scented the battle were full of zeal and confident they would be able to turn the scale.

The Northern troops felt the influence of being on their own soil, and their spirits were animated by the stirring appeals issued from headquarters, admonishing them of their duty and urging them to a supreme and heroic effort. This was manifest in the determined resistance offered to every fresh assault from the Confederate lines, and in the dash with which they delivered a counter-charge. Each side fought with the most desperate valor. There were times when the opposing ranks delivered their deadly volleys almost in each other's faces.

The railroad cuts and embankments played as before, a conspicuous part in affording protection at one moment and serving as a death trap the next. The cut was sometimes raked by artillery and again taken in flank by infantry. The smoke of battle added to the terrific heat of the day, and the suffering of the troops was aggravated by the want of water.

While Howard was sending urgent messages to his own corps, and to those of Slocum and Sickles, to push on as rapidly as possible, Hill, with another division at hand, permitted Heth to cope single-handed with his antagonists. He was waiting to hear from Ewell. When the latter learned from Hill on the morning of the 1st that he was advancing on Gettysburg, Rodes' division, moving in the direction of Cashtown, was turned to the left at Middletown, and its course directed towards Gettysburg. It was after 2 o'clock when the bright steel barrels of Rodes' men were seen glistening in the sun as his brigades emerged from the woods and deployed on the slopes of Oak Hill. They were none too soon, for Heth's men were well nigh exhausted, and they welcomed the hour of relief. The three leading brigades of Rodes' moved across the slope in splendid style, with ranks evenly dressed, at right angles to Heth's front, with the purpose of taking the enemy in flank and rear. The distance to be traversed was greater than expected, and unexpected obstacles made several changes of direction necessary. Before the enemy was reached, Robinson's division had been moved forward to connect with Wadsworth's right, forming at the junction, the apex of an angle, while Schurz's division was pushed forward on Robinson's right, leaving, however, a gap between.

Iverson's and O'Neil's brigades, sent forward by Rodes, missed their direction, and became involved in much confusion, during which they suffered a flank attack themselves, and met with stunning losses. The remaining brigades fared better and after a severe struggle, succeeded in forcing back their opponents.

The appearance of Rodes was the signal for Pender's advance.

Heth's men opening ranks, Pender's swept through them with extended front and the combatants were again locked in deadly embrace.

The struggle continued as before with varying success. While at its heighth, Early with his division came up on Rodes' left. Gordon's brigade made an impetuous charge on Barlow's division, which in general prolongation of Schurz' line, faced north a short distance beyond the town.

Gordon took advantage of a gap between Schurz and Barlow, and after a short struggle, Barlow's division was routed, and the General left for dead upon the field. This was the beginning of the end. The eleventh corps soon gave way and beat a hasty retreat into and through the town, Ramseur, Daniel and Gordon in pursuit.

continued
 
Pender was meanwhile, hotly engaged, and confronted with the same obstinate resistance and valor, which earlier in the day had withstood for so many hours the Confederate assaults. Wadworth's division in the centre of the first corps, had continued the fight from the time it relieved the cavalry, and now with the assistance of Rowley's and Robinson's divisions was still holding its antagonists at bay. Nothing, however, could finally resist the rushes of Pender's fresh troops, and after many fierce struggles the first corps with its batteries was driven back to Seminary Ridge. Here a last and determined stand was made, and the artillery of the Federals massed in great force. Colonel Perrin, commanding McGowan's brigade, reports that the charge up the hill, which drove the enemy to his last position at Seminary Hill, was made without firing a shot. Here, he says, he received the most destructive musketry fire to which he had ever been exposed, and which for a moment staggered his men, and it looked as if one regiment had been entirely destroyed; that finally piercing the enemy's lines and turning in either direction, he succeeded in taking them in flank and effecting, a complete rout. Two of his regiments reduced to one-half the number they carried into battle, pursued the enemy into the town of Gettysburg, capturing two field pieces and many prisoners. While this was the work of two regiments, a third attacked the forces posted behind a stone fence to the right of the college, which was entirely successful, and made it easy for the remainder of the brigade now coming up to drive the enemy down the opposite slope and across the open field west of Gettysburg. "This (he adds) was the last fight of the day. The enemy completely routed and driven from every point, Gettysburg was now completely in our hands."

Having the town in their power, apparently gratified the ambition of the Confederates, and its possession unfortunately caused them to relax further efforts. A greater military blunder was never committed. It is the more surprising, because by this time General Lee and both his lieutenants, Hill and Ewell, were on the ground. The Union troops driven into the town from different directions were wedged and jammed in the streets, and soon became a disorganized mass. Artillery and ambulances struggling to get through the tangled crowd added to the confusion. Had the fugitives been allowed no pause, and had the Confederates followed close upon their heels the very momentum of the flight, to say nothing of the contagion of panic, would have swept aside every support, and the pursuers could easily have rushed the cemetery and the surrounding heights. As it was, a part of Steinwehr's division, which in response to urgent calls for aid from Schurz, had been sent into the town to his assistance by Howard, was involved in the retreating mass, and the only remaining troops left upon Cemetery Hill, consisted of a single brigade with some artillery.

Colonel Taylor says, that General Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through Gettysburg, and up the hills beyond, and he went to Ewell with a message from Lee, that the enemy were seen retreating without organization and in great confusion, and it was only necessary to press them to get possession of the heights, and if possible, he wished it done.

The reason given by General Ewell in his subsequent official reports for failing to press forward, are that he understood the order to be to attack, if he could do so with advantage; that he feared he could not bring artillery to bear on the hill; that his troops were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and he was told that Johnson's division, the only one of his corps not engaged, was close to the town, that he proposed with Johnson to take possession of a wooded hill, which could command Cemetery Heights, but before that was effected night had come on. The official reports of the brigade commanders of the second corps show that several of the brigades, notably Hays' and Ramseur's, were almost intact, and equal to any further calls which might be made on them

General Early seems to have had a better perception of the situation, and after the first halt, was inclined to attack, but hesitated, he says, to procure co-operation,—that he rode to find Ewell or Rodes or Hill for the purpose of urging an immediate attack, but' before he could find either of these officers he was influenced by a report, which he did not believe, that the enemy was appearing on his left, and his resolution seems to have given way under the influence of the rumor. General Hill rested, he says, because being under the impression the enemy was entirely routed, and his two divisions exhausted by six hours' hard fighting, prudence led him to be content with what had been gained. No one can read these subsequent reports without a painful consciousness that there was a lamentable want of vigor on all sides, and an utter failure to apprehend the situation.

When Perrin cleared Seminary Ridge, and as he says "made it easy to drive the enemy down the opposing slope and across the open field west of Gettysburg," another approach to Cemetery Heights was open besides that from the town, which seems to have been overlooked.

continued
 
Looking from Seminary Hill at that time across to Cemetery Heights, the confusion from the town was seen to extend to the Heights, and batteries could plainly be seen limbering up and apparently making for the rear. There is no reason why the Seminary Ridge should not then have been occupied with Confederate artillery to play upon the opposing heights. Had this been done, and the demoralized troops on Cemetery Heights been subjected to an artillery fire, it is certain the effect must have been disastrous, and' might have led to an abandonment of the position. The two artillery battalions of the third corps, which had been actively engaged during the day, had met with severe causalities and several guns had been disabled, but their fighting efficiency was still unimpaired. Each had a complement of sixteen guns, about one-half of which were rifled pieces, and by this time Garnett's battalion of artillery had arrived. It was easily practicable to have placed thirty or forty guns on Seminary Ridge, south of Cashtown road, and used them precisely as they were used before Pickett's charge on the third day.

General Pendleton, chief of artillery of the army, says the proposition did occur to him, but on General Ramseur's suggestion that it would draw fire upon his troops in the town, it was allowed to drop. The suggestion was an untimely and ill-judged as its acceptance was weak and unfortunate.

Viewing the intervening ground as it looked the next day, and as it looks now after the lapse of forty-four years, it is almost incomprehensible how the situation could have escaped the attention of General Lee or of General Hill, or their subordinates in rank. It would appear that everybody was of the same mind as A. P. Hill, and was "content with what had been gained."

Up to this time two brigades of Pender's divisions had not been seriously engaged. Lane's brigade with Johnson's battery was looking out for Buford's cavalry on the flank, and both that and Thomas' brigade were fresh enough for further work. There was still three hours of daylight, and Anderson's division was close at hand. But the golden opportunity was let go by, and the Confederates contented themselves with the capture of about four thousand prisoners and a few pieces of artillery.

It is due to General Early to say that after the war he published an article in the Southern Historical Society Papers, inspired doubtless by a generous desire to vindicate the reputation of his corps commander, to whom he was greatly attached, in which he zealously and eloquently defends the action of General Ewell on this occasion, and admits that he himself had changed his opinion in reference to the advisability of further pursuit on the afternoon of the 1st, owing, he says, to information subsequently acquired by him, in reference to the preparedness of the enemy to resist further attack. The article further undertakes to show, that the possession of Cemetery Hill on the afternoon of the 1st, by the Confederates, was a matter of no importance and not worth the effort, inasmuch, as it would not, if occupied have been decisive, and would only have pushed back the battle ground to another field, probably to Pipe Creek. In reference to General Early's first point, if the facts as we have cited them, and the concurrent opinion at the time are not reasonably conclusive, we will supplement them by the opinion of General Hancock, expressed in a letter written to General Fitz Lee, dated January 17, 1878, in which he says, "—I am in receipt of yours of the 14th instant, and in reply have to say that in my opinion, if the Confederates had continued the pursuit of General Howard on the afternoon of July 1st at Gettysburg, they would have driven him over and beyond Cemetery Hill. After I arrived on the field, assumed the command, and made my dispositions for defending that point (say 4 P.M.) I do not think the Confederate force then present could have carried it." John B. Bachelder, of the Union army says there is no question but what a combined attack on Cemetery Hill, made within an hour, would have been successful.

As to General Early's second point, it would seem to be sufficient to say, that if the Confederates had taken Cemetery Hill the first day, they would have accomplished what they vainly tried to do on the 2d and 3d days; the moral effect would have been as inspiring to one side as depressing to the other; the tremendous losses suffered in the efforts to take it on the 2d and 3d days would have been averted, and Meade could nowhere have selected or stumbled upon a line of defense so impregnable as Cemetery Hill and Round Top proved to be.

In the engagements which have been described as occurring on the first day, six pieces of my command, Johnson's battery and a section of Hurt's were put in position on high ground to our right, and with Lane's brigade were engaged in holding in check Buford's cavalry. The two long ranged Whitworths occasionally shelled the woods and distant points wherever the enemy could be seen. The remainder of the battalion under my immediate command actively supported the attacks of Archer and Pender. This gave me an opportunity to witness a large portion of the battlefield, including Oak Hill where Rodes' brigades deployed in line.

It also gave me the opportunity of witnessing from the college near the Cashtown road, when the enemy had been put to flight, the confusion which prevailed on Cemetery Hill, and which even without the aid of field glasses was plainly discernible. The casualties of the first day were surprisingly small. Lieut. Wallace had one rifle piece disabled by a solid shot striking it full in the face.

Early on the morning of the second day the battalion with the exception of the Whitworths was placed in position along the crest of the Seminary Ridge extending south from the college. To make room for Pegram to get in line, Rice's battery was withdrawn a short distance in rear and held in reserve. Pegram and Garnett subsequently changed their relative positions. Mine was maintained with little change during the 2d and 3d instants. From this point the country was open to Cemetery Hill opposite, and the heights south of it, and the attack of Anderson's division on the afternoon of the 2d and the greater portion of Pickett's charge on the 3d could be seen to advantage.

During the night of the 1st, skirmish lines were established in the intervening valley between Seminary and Cemetery Hills by both sides, and during the two succeeding days, there were frequent and fierce encounters between the skirmish lines, sometimes supported by heavy reserves. These engagements were frequently participated in by the artillery of both sides.

Along the new line on Pender's front ran for part of the way a rough irregular stone wall or fence from two to three feet high, with occasional gaps a few feet in width. One of Capt. Hurts' guns happened to be placed opposite one of these gaps. The wall afforded some protection, and observing the location of the gun I directed it to be changed; before this could be done, however, a sharp engagement sprang up, and a shot passing through the gap mortally wounded the lieutenant in charge, taking off one of the poor fellow's legs.

General Meade, as we have seen, was at 12:30 P.M. on the 1st still issuing orders looking to the withdrawal of his troops. At 1:10 P.M. he heard of General Reynold's death, and immediately sent Hancock to the front to assume command. Meade's plan and intentions were fully known to Hancock, and he was instructed, that if in his opinion the position at Gettysburg was favorable for a battlefield that he should advise him and he would order up all the troops. At 5:25 P.M. Hancock dispatched to Meade from the field that he had arrived an hour before, and found that the troops had given up the front at Gettysburg and the town, and had "taken position in Cemetery, which could not well be taken, but could easily be turned. That the battle was then quiet, and he thought they would be all right until night, when it could better be determined what was best to be done: That he thought they could retire, and if not, they could fight, as the ground appears not unfavorable with good troops."

continued
 
Shortly after Hancock sent another dispatch saying, that he regarded the position as a very strong one, that it had the disadvantage, however, of being easily turned, and that it remained for the General commanding to determine whether the battle should be fought at Gettysburg or at the first place selected by him. When Slocum arrived on the field, Hancock transferred the command to him, and returned to report to Meade. The latter left Taneytown at 10 P.M. and arriving upon the ground at I A.M. on the morning of the 2d. Hancock rejoined his corps, which arrived about 7 A. M., the three divisions being posted along the crest from Cemetery Hill towards Round Top, connecting on the right with the eleventh corps, and on the left with a division of the third corps. Sykes, with the 5th corps, left Union Mills the morning of the 1st, and marching by Hanover, reached the ground about 8 A.M., on the ~d, covering a distance of twenty-six miles, and took position on the right near Rock Creek.

Sedgwick with the sixth corps left Manchester on the 1st, and after a march of over thirty miles, was on the ground by the afternoon of the 2d, and one division supported the fifth corps in its engagement after 5 P.M. Two brigades of Birney's division of the third corps reached the ground about sunset the first day, and two brigades of Humphrey's division arrived on the following morning.

There is no doubt that Meade, before he reached the battlefield, anticipated a renewal of the fight on the 2d, and even contemplated an attack himself. He was satisfied his army was sufficiently united to give battle. At 6 P.M., on the evening of the 1st, he dispatched a joint message to Howard and Doubleday, in which he said' "It seems we have so concentrated, that a battle is now forced on us, and that if we get up all our people, and attack with our whole force tomorrow, we ought to defeat the force the enemy has."

A memorandum addressed to Sedgwick at 10 P.M., says: "The general purposes to make a vigorous attack upon the enemy tomorrow," and on the morning of the 2d, a note was addressed by the Chief of Staff to the commander of the twelfth corps, directing him to make an attack from the front and that he would be supported by the fifth corps, and that the attack should be a strong and decisive one." These instructions must have been recalled. General Meade's intentions to attack never materialized, and no mention is made of them in his official report.

It has been stated, that General Meade upon his arrival on the field, was not favorably impressed with the position, and that an order to withdraw was prepared. It is even said that so late as 3 P. M., on the 2d, he sent a dispatch in cypher to Halleck, that if the enemy failed to attack, and he found it hazardous himself to do so, or became satisfied that the enemy was manoeuvering to get in his rear, he should fall back to Westminster. The official records as published do not disclose such papers, if they exist.

Lee now had his army fairly united, one division only besides the cavalry being absent, and he too, proposed an early morning attack, which was doomed to disappointment. The failure to execute it as planned, has given rise to much discussion.

General Lee's report, which is the only authoritative expression we have from him on the subject, says: "It had not been intended to deliver a general battle, so far from our base, unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal army, to withdraw through the mountains, with our extensive trains, would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time, we were unable to await an attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who would restrain our foraging parties, by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle, had therefore, become in a measure, unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue." The report continues, "that to carry out this purpose, it was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy's left, and Longstreet was directed to place McLaws and Hood's divisions on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in. Ewell and Hill were expected to make demonstrations and co--operate with Longstreet, when he made the real attack."

The ground occupied by the Federal forces during the 2d and 3d days fight may be thus described: The high well defined ridge, which begins at the Cemetery on the southern outskirts of the town, runs in a southerly course, about three miles, and terminates in a high rocky and wooded peak called Round Top, which was regarded as the key of the position, because it enfiladed and commanded the line north of it. The less elevated portion near where the crest rises onto Round Top, is called Little Round Top, being a spur of the former. The crest of the ridge has a general slope to the east, while to the west it falls off in a cultivated and undulatory valley which it commands.

The ridge at its northern extremity at the Cemetery, turns eastward a short distance, and then southward, terminating in a bold promontory called Culps Hill.


The Federal line on its right wing, thus faced northward to the town, with a bend to the east. Its extension along Cemetery Heights and Round Top faced to the west. The Confederate forces occupying the outer line, were spread over a greater distance, and from the Cashtown road southward, occupied what is known as Seminary Ridge, a little less than a mile distant from and generally parallel to the Cemetery Ridge. Longstreet faced Round Top, and part of Cemetery Ridge; Hill continued the line from the left of Longstreet, and Ewell held the town, sweeping round the base of Cemetery Hill, and ending on the left in front of Culps Hill.

continued
 
There is a mass of concurring testimony from a number of officers of high standing in the army, and some of whom participated in a conference, held by General Lee during the night of the 1st, that the attack should be made by Longstreet at sunrise the next morning, or at least as early as possible on the enemy's left. General Longstreet in publications, emanating from him since the War, denies this statement and claims that General Lee never in his life gave him orders to attack at a specific hour, and that no conclusions was arrived at as to the point of attack until 11 o'clock. There is no doubt that Longstreet and Lee were in company at 5 o'clock P.M., on the afternoon of the 1st, and that Lee then declared his intention, of attacking the next morning. Longstreet, according to his own account, was opposed to a direct attack and urged a flank movement to the right.

Orders for a concerted attack at an early hour on the morning of the 2d, must have been issued, as shown by the report of Early, and that such orders were received and extended by Longstreet, appears by the fact that his two divisions present acted upon them.

General Hood arrived in front of the heights shortly after daybreak and filed his troops into an open field nearby. Brigadier General Kershaw says he bivouacked two miles from Gettysburg, and was ordered to move at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 2d. General E. P. Alexander, commanding Longstreet's reserve artillery, arrived at 9 A.M., and was directed to accompany McLaws and Hood in the attack on the left. General McLaws' account is that he reached the field at an early hour, and went to General Lee, who pointed out to him on the map the road across which he was to place his division, that Longstreet who was walking back and forth some distance from Lee., came up and pointing to the map, showed how he wanted the division located, to which General Lee replied: "No, General, I want it placed just the opposite," and that Longstreet appeared irritated and annoyed.

General Lindsay Walker, commanding the artillery of the third corps, says General Lee rode to where he was between 9 and 10 o'clock A.M., and eagerly inquired where General Longstreet was, that he offered to ride with him to where he thought they would find Longstreet, and on the way, so great was General Lee's impatience at the inaction, that for a little while placed himself at the head of a brigade to hurry the column forward.

The attack instead of being made at sunrise, was not made until 4 o'clock P.M. No matter what may have been General Longstreet's suggestions to General Lee, as to the advisability of the attack, and no matter what pretexts or excuses may be offered by him or in his behalf for the delay, they cannot break the force of the fact that an attack which was to be made at sunrise or at an early hour, did not come off until late in the afternoon.

An attack at sunrise would have found only the second corps and a division of the third in occupation of the heights south of the Cemetery, and General Lee's idea of enveloping the enemy's left by Longstreet's extension, appeared feasible enough. By 4 o'clock the remainder of the third corps of the Federal army had arrived and taken up its position in prolongation of the Federal line. The fifth corps when relieved by the sixth, was also moved up to reinforce and extend the left.


In the early morning Meade's line of battle did not take in Little Round Top, and no guns were posted upon it or on Big Round Top beyond. When the brigades of Hood's division completed their flank movement in the afternoon, and wheeling to the left, emerged through the woods, they found upon the crest and sides of the hill two lines of infantry and a number of guns frowning down upon them.

It is difficult to account for General Longstreet's course throughout all the forenoon and into the afternoon of the 2d. He was always regarded as a sturdy fighter, and was called General Lee's "Old War Horse": The soldiers familiarly spoke of him as "Old Pete," and he enjoyed the fullest love and confidence of his command. The only complaint ever made of him was that he was slow to move, and it is said that General Lee expressed himself to that effect to some of his general officers on the night of the 1st.


His loyalty to Lee, however, was never questioned, and the relations between them were cordial and friendly. In the publications of General Longstreet since the war, the tone of superiority, which he assumes in speaking of his intercourse with Lee and the claims made by him for the possession of superior judgment in the conduct of the campaign, have astonished all who knew the two men. They contain statements which are not easily reconciled with the official reports made at the time, and the air of hostility and even arrogance, which is sometimes manifested towards the General commanding in some of his utterances, must be attributed largely to the rancorous feeling which sprang up between himself and some of his old comrades on account, of political differences.

When the battle was finally opened by Longstreet at 4 P.M., the veterans of the first corps were not wanting in their old time spirit, and they added renewed lustre to the splendid record which they have always borne. General Longstreet pronounced the battle to be "the best three hours' fighting ever done by any troops on any battlefield."


The alignment of the Federal forces was now quite different from what it was in the early morning. The lines were not only extended, but Sickles had swung his right from its first alignment about three-fourths of a mile to the front, with the object of securing high ground on the extension of Seminary Ridge, and his right rested on what is now known as the Peach Orchard. This necessitated a wider movement on the part of the Confederates, but inasmuch as it put Sickles' right in advance of Hancock's left, it made an awkward situation, for which General Sickles has been severely criticised. General Meade says that he had ridden to the extreme left when he discovered Sickles' change of line, and was explaining to him that he was too far in advance, when the shock of McLaws' attacked occurred. McLaws' first object was to get possession of the Peach Orchard where Sickles' right rested. This was accomplished only after a hard fight, and that position was gained and proved valuable for the use of artillery. The marshy ground which lay between the two ridges was the next theatre for a long and protracted struggle, every foot of which was contested. When this ground had been gained, the fences and boulders near the foot of the mountain formed good rallying points for the Federals, and large reinforcements were sent to Sickles' assistance. In the meantime Little Round Top, the importance of which then came to be realized, was occupied with newly arrived troops, and with that stronghold in the occupation of a large force, the Confederate position became critical. An attempt was made to carry it both from McLaws' and Hood's front. On the part of McLaws it brought on a series of desperate charges which were only partially successful. Hood, on the right of McLaws, who was to make the enveloping movement and begin the attack, had a still longer detour to make than McLaws. His Texan's and Alabamians clamboring over heavy bowlders and up the precipitate sides of Round Top, gallantly led the assault on the right.

continued
 
General Hood and Brigadier-General Anderson were both severely wounded and compelled to leave the field soon after the action began. No full and satisfactory report of the occurrences on this part of the field have been given. Colonel Oates of the fiftieth Alabama, says that after many struggles with the enemy and forcing his way over almost inaccessible ground, he found the enemy posted in force behind large rocks and at still greater elevation, and after repelling a number of charges, finding the enemy appearing on his right and threatening his rear, he ordered a retreat. General Longstreet's account is largely devoted to the operations of McLaws' division, with which he was present. He complained that McLaws' left was not sufficiently protected by the brigades of Anderson, of the third corps, which he claims were to move in echelon on his flank' That Hood's extending to the right left McLaws only a single line of battle, and finding no co-operation on any side, to have moved his men further forward would have been madness, and McLaws was withdrawn to the Peach Orchard.

Major General Anderson on McLaws' left, in his account of the battle says, "It was not until 5:30 o'clock in the evening that McLaws' division, by which the movement of my division was to be regulated, had advanced so far as to call for the movement of my troops. The advance of McLaws' division was immediately followed by the brigades of mine in the manner directed. Never did troops go into action with greater spirit and more determined courage. The ground afforded them but little shelter, and for nearly three-fourths of a mile they were compelled to face a storm of shot and shell and bullets, but there was no hesitation or faltering. They drove the enemy from the first line and possessed themselves of the ridge and much of the artillery with which it was crowned. But the situation discovered the enemy in possession of a second line with artillery upon both our front and flanks. From this position he poured a destructive fire of grape upon our troops. Strong reinforcements pressed upon our right flank, which had become disconnected from McLaws' left, and the ridge being untenable, the brigades were compelled to retire."

General A. R. Wright, who commanded the leading brigade, has given a most graphic and spirited account of the charge of his brigade over nearly the same ground upon which Pickett charged the following day. This charge was witnessed by the portion of Hill's corps not actively engaged, and filled them with admiration and delight at the splendid behavior of their comrades. Wright say that his men leaping over the stone fence from which the enemy was driven, charged up to the top of the crest and drove the infantry in rear of their batteries: That he gained the key of the position, but with his narrow front, was unable to hold it for the want of support upon his flanks, and was forced to beat a retreat. This failure of Wright to hold the position he had won on the 2d, filled the minds of many with mistrust, when it was learned on the next day that Pickett would attempt the same thing.

General Ewell on the left was directed to delay his attack until he heard Longstreet's guns upon the right. About 5 P.M., a cannonade was directed from Johnson's front against Cemetery Hill, followed by an attack just before sundown by Johnson on the hill in his front. Johnson described the position as a rugged, rocky mountain, heavily timbered and difficult of ascent, a natural fortification, rendered more formidable by intrenchments and abattis; nevertheless, George H. Stewart's brigade on the left seized a portion of the breast-works and held them until the following day.

Two of Early's brigades, taking up the movement begun by Johnson, also penetrated the enemy's lines, bringing off several pieces of artillery and a number of prisoners. Before Rodes had completed his arrangements, Early had withdrawn and dusk set in, so that he did not, nor did Pender's division on the right participate in the attack. It is apparent there was want of concert throughout. The attack which was to be made at sunrise, or at an early hour by Longstreet, was not made until 4 P.M. Instead of a simultaneous attack by Ewell, he opened his guns at
5, and not until after an hour's fighting. The attack was begun by Johnson on the left a little before dark and taken up by Early, but not followed up by Rodes and Pender.

In spite of those discouragements, success lay on the whole, with the Confederates at the close of the second day. Their lines had been materially advanced, a number of prisoners and some artillery had been captured, and they had inflicted enormous losses on the enemy.

On the right the high ground near the Emmittsburg road had been secured for the use of the artillery, and McLaws and Hood had pushed forward beyond Devil's Den, and reached out to the foot of Little and Big Round Top.

On the left, Johnson had captured a considerable line of breastworks, and was in immediate proximity to the enemy's main line. Though not aware of it, he was within a short distance of Meade's headquarters and a park of reserve artillery.


General Lee, while disappointed, was not dismayed. He says in his report, "The result of the day's operations induced the belief that with proper concert of action and with the increased support that the position gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting column, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time."

In passing upon the correctness of General Lee's judgment in renewing the assault on the third day, no one can venture to say that success was not possible and that his plans could not have carried with better co-operation. In that case success would have borne its own vindication. Judged by results, the most sagacious critics will probably agree that General Lee did not correctly estimate either the difficulties of the position or the difficulties of procuring the concert of action upon which he relied. He had already, on the previous day, experienced the difficulties of the latter on such an extended line, and the failure of Anderson's assault on the same ground was an ominous warning that the conditions were too difficult to be overcome.

He thoughts however, to supply this by making the assaulting column larger and putting in fresh troops. His confidence in his army was unshaken, and his own courage rose with the occasion. General Longstreet, on the other hand, was full of foreboding and had no confidence in the attack. He was for adopting the move which Reynolds wrote to Butterfield, the Confederates would attempt, that is, to turn their left in the direction of Fairfield.

It was most unfortunate that while differing with the General commanding as to the policy of the campaign, the difference was one not simply of opinion, but one which seems to have affected General Longstreet's conduct, and was in itself sufficient to mar the success of any enterprise.

In his official report he says, "On the following morning (3d) our arrangements were made for renewing the attack by my right, with a view to pass around the hill occupied by the enemy on his left, and to gain it by flank and reverse attack. This would have been a slow process probably, but I think not very difficult. A few moments after my orders for the execution of this plan were givens the commanding General joined me and ordered a column of attack to be formed of Pickett's, Heth's and part of Pender's divisions, the assault to be made directly at the enemy's main position, the Cemetery Hill."

It appears then, that Longstreet had given orders for the execution of a movement at variance with the plan of the commanding General, and which was only prevented by Lee's joining him and countermanding the order. Inserted, as it is, in his official report made at the time, it bears the marks of a purpose not only to act independently of his superior, but also to distinctly declare and put on record what the purpose was.


In the account of the battle subsequently given, speaking of General Lee's report, he says, "This is disingenuous. He did not give or send me orders for the morning of the 3d day, nor did he reinforce me by Pickett's brigade for the morning attack. In the absence of orders I had scouting parties out during the night in search of a way by which we might strike the enemy's left and press it down towards the centre. I found a way that gave promise of results, and was about to move the command when he rode over after sunrise and gave his orders. His plan was to assault the enemy's left centre by a column to be composed of McLaws' and Hood's divisions reinforced by Pickett's brigades. I thought that it would not do, that the point had been fully tested the day before by more men while all were fresh," &c.

The singular thing about this account is, the statement that the assaulting column was to be "composed of McLaws' and Hood's divisions, reinforced by Pickett's brigades." This confirms the language of General Lee's report that the attack was to be made "by Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades" and supports the contention of certain of General Lee's staff and others in the army, that the attack was to be general and that the assaulting column was to be actively supported on either flank.
As a matter of fact, McLaws' and Hood's divisions did not unite in the attack.

The official reports on file coming from these divisions, as well as the Federal reports from the fifth and sixth corps confronting them, show that there was no engagement between these respective lines on the 3d day beyond occasional skirmishing, and the activities of a brigade in Hood's division warding off a threatened attack of cavalry.


continued
 
While the failure of McLaws and Hood to attack and co-operate actively with Pickett may well be said to have affected the result, the personal attitude of General Longstreet during the day of the 3d should be taken into account.

Granting that he differed with Lee as to the policy and plan of giving battle, and that his conceptions were right and those of Lee were strong, and granting, too, that he was affected, as he says he was, by the prospect of a useless effusion of blood, it was no less his duty to give a hearty and cordial support to his commander when the plan of battle was once determined. Whether this was done, any one may judge for himself from the following extract taken from his own account: General Lee said the attack of his right was not made as early as expected,—which he should not have said. He knows that I did not believe success was possible; that care and time should be taken to give the troops the benefit of positions and the grounds; and he should have put an officer in charge who had more confidence in his plan. Two-thirds of the troops were of other commands, and there was no reason for putting the assaulting column under my charge. He had confidence in General Early, who advised in favor of that end of the line for battle. Knowing my want of confidence, he should have given the benefit of his presence and assistance in getting the troops up, posting them and arranging the batteries; but he gave no orders or suggestions after his early designation of the point for which the column should march." These post bellum utterances of Longstreet and similar expressions found in his book, accentuate the attitude displayed by him before the opening of the campaign, and throw light upon his conduct during the third day.

According to Ewell the attack on the third was to be renewed at daylight in co-operation with Longstreet.

In compliance with Ewell's orders, Johnson was about to do so, when he himself was attacked, and a vigorous effort made by the Federals to regain the works captured by General George H. Stuart the evening before.

Johnson attacking in turn pressed the enemy nearly to the top of the hill, when he was checked by abattis and other earthworks. Ewell in his report says that a half hour after Johnson attacked and when it was too late to recall him, he received notice "that Longstreet would not attack until ten o'clock," but it turned out his attack was delayed until after two o'clock.

This scarcely justified Longstreet's retort, speaking of the previous day, that "He (Ewell) was to hold himself in readiness to support an attack when it was made. It is silly to say that he was ready at sunrise, when he was not ready at four o'clock, when the attack was really made."

The countermanding of Longstreet's move to the right in the early morning, and the unexpected engagement of Johnson on the left, necessarily interrupted General Lee's plan of an early attack.


The difficulty of getting a move on General Longstreet was found to be as great as on the previous day. He confesses that he shrunk from the task before him, and intrusted its execution to subordinates. The positions for the guns were selected by the artillery officers, and General Pickett was charged with the duty of arranging the lines behind the batteries. It was two o'clock when these arrangements were completed.

The assaulting column was formed under cover of a wood. It consisted of Pickett's division, with two brigades, Kemper's and Garnett's in front and Armistead's as a support in rear. Heth's division, under Pettigrew, was formed in two lines on Pickett's left, with a space of several hundred yards between the two, and two brigades of Pender's division under Trimble formed in rear and in supporting distance of Pettigrew.

Wilcox's brigade from Anderson's division was ordered to move on Pickett's right flank and in his rear as a protection to that flank.


The whole number of troops composing the assaulting column was between fourteen and fifteen thousand. The distance between the two opposing lines on Pickett's front was about fourteen hundred yards, and the column was directed towards a Salient of the Federal line on Cemetery Heights, occupied by Hancock with two divisions under Hays and Gibbon, Hays being nearest the Cemetery. Pickett's division was to guide the assaulting column, and to strike the desired point it was necessary to oblique slightly to the left. As the opposing lines were not exactly parallel, and Pickett's right was nearer the enemy than Pettigrew's left, it was designed that the movement on the left should be accelerated, so that the two divisions should arrive together and strike the Salient at the same time.

On the Federal side, Hays' and Gibbon's divisions were posted along the crest of Cemetery Hill, facing to the west. A stone wall ran just below the crest of the hill a portion of the way, which was supplemented in places by earthworks, behind which the infantry lay, with another line on the crest in rear, so that the latter could fire over the heads of those on the slope in front. Infantry reserves were distributed at desirable points in rear of the crest, and at intervals on this part of the line were twenty-six guns of the second corps, so placed as to rake the ground to the front and sides.

A house and barn upon Hays' front was burned so as to afford unobstructed artillery fire. Besides the guns in front, additional guns were placed on the left, making according to General Hunt's estimate seventy-five guns on the western crest line.

The ground occupied by McLaws and Hood and their advanced brigades was much nearer the Federal lines than where Pickett formed, and the positions occupied by the fifth and sixth Federal corps were also in advance of Hancock's line, so that the Confederate advance was exposed to a fire from the right as well as from the front.


continued
 
To the right of Hancock a number of guns had been massed on the preceding day. Major Osborne reports that thirty-two were sent him, among which were six twenty pound rifles, four ten pound rifles and sixteen three inch rifles, which he says were effectively used in replying to the Confederate guns, and in playing on the infantry as they advanced across the plain. On the Confederate side there was, according to General Pendleton, sixty guns engaged excluding howitzers, belonging to the first corps. In the third corps, excluding twelve pound howitzers and batteries in reserve, the number did not exceed forty-five. In addition, Ewell's corps contributed eighteen guns, making the whole number engaged on that side about one hundred and twenty-five guns, which was in excess of the number in use at any one time by their opponents.

The Federals had the advantage of higher ground and heavier metal. The Confederates were able to bring into action a greater number of pieces, and had the advantage of a convergent fire.

The plan of battle was, that the assault should be preceded by a heavy and concentrated artillery fire, directed upon the point of attack, which was expected to silence the opposing batteries, and so disorganize the infantry, that the assaulting column seizing the opportune moment should advance and pierce the enemy's main line, to be followed up by a general advance on the right and left of the assaulting column.

The success of the scheme depended in the first place upon the ability of the Confederate batteries to overcome the fire of their opponents and carry confusion into the ranks of the infantry, and the initial effort as it turned out was a failure.

When the signal was given, the Confederate cannoneers sprang to their guns, and began a rain of fire upon the hill in front.

Alexander of the first corps had posted a number of guns in advance of the assaulting column and these fired rapidly and effectively. Other guns to the right and left at greater distances opened fire at the same time. The challenge was instantly taken up by the opposing batteries, and in a moment over two hundred guns were belching forth volumes of flame and smoke, and the air became thick with flying missiles and bursting shells. Rifts of smoke floated over the landscape amidst which the occasional explosion of a caisson or limber chest lit up the scene, and added to the terror of the battle.

No such cannonade had been experienced before by either army, and it required all the staying qualities of those under fire to resist its effects. After a time the fire of the Federal batteries slackened and it was believed they had been partially disabled and silenced.

Pickett was waiting the signal for him to move, and the supreme moment had now arrived when the order was to be given. When Alexander, in charge of the advance artillery, and who was to give the signal, informed Longstreet that his ammunition was nearly exhausted, the latter advised him to stop Pickett until his ammunition was replenished, to which Alexander replied there was no ammunition with which to replenish, and that if the assault was to be made, it should be made at once.

General Longstreet says, "That he then saw there was no help for it, and that Pickett must advance under his orders."

The impression that any very serious effect had been produced upon the enemy's lines by the artillery fire proved to be a delusion; the aim of the Confederate gunners was accurate, and they did their work as well as could be, but the distance was too great to produce the results which they sanguinely hoped for. Previous experience should have taught them better. It is not a little surprising that General Lee should have reckoned so largely upon the result. Both sides had been pretty well taught that sheltered lines of infantry cannot be shattered or dislodged when behind breastworks, by field artillery, at the distance of one thousand yards and upwards.

The soldier who has been taught by experience to hug tight to his breastworks, and who knows that it is more dangerous to run than to lie still, comes to regard with stoical indifference the bursting missiles which are mostly above or behind him.


The slackening of fire of the Federal batteries, which was taken to be an auspicious moment for the advance, proved to be for the purpose of removing disabled guns and bringing up fresh batteries instead, and before Pickett's column was fairly launched, their places were supplied by others.

When Pickett and the other divisions emerged from cover and advanced to the open, they presented a thrilling spectacle, and one which no beholder can ever forget. The ranks were beautifully dressed and the battle-flags told off the different commands. Many a brave heart in the Federal ranks must have blanched at the prospect which loomed so terribly before them. One of them, conveying his impression at the time says, "the perfect order and steady but rapid advance of the enemy called forth praise from our troops, and gave them the appearance of being fearfully irresistible."

As the lines advanced, and the batteries of the enemy again opened? and the gaps in the ranks began to grow wider, and then to shrivel and shrink up beneath the deadly withering fire of the infantry, and the stream of the wounded began to pour back in increasing volume, the hearts of those who were spectators were filled at first with a deep hush of expectancy, and then with a feeling of agonized despair when the goal seemed to be reached and hanging suspended a moment, the tide rolled backward broken into fragments, and the brave fellows who a half hour before marched so valiantly up to the cannons' mouth now lay prostrate on the green slopes, or else came tramping back battered and bleeding. There is no need for repetition of the details. The monuments on the ground attest the desperate valor with which each side fought.


Of Pickett's brigade, commanders, Kemper was first shot and borne from the field, Garmett was killed near the stonewall, and Armistead leaping the wall with sword aloft, at the head of a few followers, finally fell overcome by his foes. Pettigrew and Trimble met with the same fate as Pickett. Wilcox reports that shortly after the advance began, he received successive orders to advance in support of Pickett: that he put his brigade in motion and advanced, "near the hill upon which were the enemy's batteries and intrenchments," but that owing to the smoke of the battle he was unable to perceive a man of the division he was ordered to support, and being subjected to a severe fire, he determined to retire.

Anderson says he was about to move forward Wright's and Posey's brigades when General Longstreet directed him to stop the movement as useless, the assault having failed.

Rodes to the north of the town, says his troops were about half way between the artillery of the 2d corps and that on Cemetery Hill, that while on the lookout for a favorable opportunity to attack, and having notified Ewell he was about to do so, and just as he was about to give the order to advance, it was announced and was apparent to him that the attack had already failed. Outside of the artillery, the attack was made on the part of the Confederates by two divisions and a half, out of nine divisions in the army. General Warren, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, stated that Meade had nearly half his army in a good and sheltered position on his left, from where he could conveniently reinforce other points on the lines, and that when the repulse took place, Meade intended to move forward all the forces he could get, and in turn assault the enemy. That he ordered the advance of the 5th corps, but it was carried out so slowly it did not amount to anything. The Confederates anticipated that a countercharge might be attempted, and Anderson's division with the nearby batteries was prepared to receive it; the demonstrations proved too slight however to excite serious apprehension.

continued
 
General Lee rode forward to encourage and animate the scattered troops as they returned.

His greatest concern at the moment seemed to be to break the shock of the repulse, and its possible effect upon the troops, and probably it was this, coupled with his great magnanimity, that led him to say as reported, "It is all my fault." Whether this speech fell from General Lee or not, it is conceded on all points that the assaulting column was not lacking in courage, and that the failure did not rest upon the shoulders of the troops.

Was the failure then because the plan was inherently weak and incapable of success; or because there was no concerted and simultaneous action from the centre and wings at the same time, or because of both?
It would seem the plan was inherently weak because of the immense distance to be traversed by the assaulting column before reaching the point of attack, and because of the want of cover to shield its progress. The distance to be traversed, and the projection of the column so far in advance, necessarily made the movement largely independent, and put it out of reach of support at the critical moment of its life, even had a general advance been vigorously pressed. No general advance could have kept pace with the assaulting column. It could not have been expected to do so. The most that could have been expected was that a vigorous attack all along the line would keep the enemy's attention engaged, and prevent reinforcements being sent to the crucial point. But unless Pickett succeeded in establishing himself securely in the enemy's position so that he could hold it, he was out of reach of immediate help.

A more vigorous attack by the Confederates would doubtless have aided Pickett, and prevented to some extent the relief sent to Hancock, and to the disabled Federal batteries, but it is unreasonable to suppose that such an attack however general or vigorous would have successfully carried the lines at other points or brought it in reach of Pickett, or materially interfered with Meade's dispositions. As Meade occupied interior lines with shorter communications, and now with superior numbers, and with his troops under excellent natural cover, it was well nigh impossible by any attack the Confederates could have made, to prevent the easy shifting of his men to points where they were most needed.

The road from Gettysburg to Taneytown ran just in rear of the Federal line and the conformation of the ground not only afforded cover for the troops, but made it easy to move them from one point of the line to another.

While, therefore, there was great want of concert of action on the part of General Lee's lieutenants, as will be seen from their several reports, and while a more vigorous demonstration on the part of McLaws and Hood as well as on the part of Hill and Ewell, would have been useful in dividing the attention of the enemy, it is not believed it would have materially affected the result.

General Lee assigns as a reason for giving battle the difficulty of withdrawing from Meade's front through the mountains in his rear with his large train. The fact that he was able to do so after the battle, justifies the belief that Longstreet was right in his opinion that an attack in front was not advisable, and that General Lee committed an error in determining upon that course. It is seen now from their correspondence that Meade and Reynolds both were prepared to withdraw, in case a flanking movement had been attempted.

General Lee's fame as a soldier will not suffer, however, from the untoward result. The greatness of his character was most conspicuous in the hour of defeat. He never appeared more serene than on the days succeeding the battle, when after holding his lines for twenty-four hours, he quietly withdrew, and conducting his army through the mountain passes, again offered battle to the enemy, and awaiting for the swollen waters of the Potomac to subside, effected his passage safely without loss of stores or baggage.

The night of the 3d and part of the 4th were spent in the sad duty of burying the dead and removing the wounded to places of greater safety, and also in the task of refitting and preparing for the future.

The ordnance officers report after the battle showed an expenditure of 1,395 rounds of ammunition fired during the three days engagement by my battalion. The number of rounds fired by Pegram's battalion was more than double that number. That of the other battalions of the corps much less. Pegram's battalion had more guns actively engaged on the first day than mine had, and his fire was so free preceding the charge of Pickett's division on the last day that his ammunition was nearly exhausted, and he came to me when the battle was over to borrow from my supply.


[retreat ommitted]
The final result of the Gettysburg campaign was to stay all further attempts on the part of Meade to advance on Richmond until the following spring, when hostilities were resumed by General Grant.
DAVID GREGG MCINTOSH.
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Col Fry and the 13th AL

Col Fry of the 13th AL was a cousin of mine and was in Pickett's Charge. He was wounded but survived. How many of us would have crossed that deadly ground? They were brave men who were scared sh..less.
 
Confederate Military History, Vol. 7
ALABAMA--BIOGRAPHICAL.
Brigadier-General Birkett Davenport Fry was born in Kanawha county, Va., June 24, 1822. His father was Thornton Fry, grandson of Col. Joshua Fry, who figured in colonial history. He was educated at Washington college, Pa., at the Virginia military institute, and at West Point. He did not remain at West Point to graduate, but studied law, and was admitted to the bar in 1846. When ten new regiments were raised for the Mexican war he was commissioned a first lieutenant of United States voltigeurs and foot riflemen, of which Joseph E. Johnston was lieutenant-colonel. He served as adjutant at Contreras and Churubusco, and led a company at Mo-lino del Rey and Chapultepec, where he was mentioned as distinguished. After the war had ended and the regiment had been disbanded at Fort McHenry, Md., he, with a party of other young men, went across the plains to California, where he remained until 1856. Going then to Nicaragua, he joined Walker's expedition as colonel and general. He commanded at Granada and defeated the army of Guatemala. After the failure of that expedition he returned to San Francisco, continuing there until the autumn of 1859, when he went to Alabama and, settling at Tallassee, engaged in cotton manufacturing until the opening of the civil war. On July 19, 1861, he was commissioned colonel of the Thirteenth Alabama infantry. Reporting at once with his regiment at Richmond, he was ordered to Yorktown, where he remained until its evacuation. At the battle of Seven Pines he was wounded in the hand. After an absence of six weeks he returned to his regiment and remained with it until his left arm was shattered, near the shoulder, at Sharpsburg. The surgeons decided that it would be necessary to amputate the arm. "What are the chances of my living without the operation?" "One in three hundred," was the answer. "Then I will take it," he replied. He rejoined his command in time for Chancellorsville, where he led his brigade (Archer's) on the second day. Here he was again wounded, but did not leave his regiment until Gettysburg, commanding it or the brigade until that battle. The Thirteenth Alabama, with Archer's brigade, Heth's division, was among the first to be engaged in the hard fighting for position at Gettysburg, July 1st, and after the capture of General Archer that day he took command of the brigade, and led it in the second furious assault. "Colonel Fry judiciously changed his front," said General Heth, "thus protecting the right flank of the division during the engagement. This brigade (Archer's), the heroes of Chancellorsville, fully maintained its hard-won and well-deserved reputation." On July 3d his brigade was on the right of the division, under Pettigrew, and was the brigade of direction for the whole force, being immediately on the left of Pickett's division. He led it gallantly up Cemetery ridge, under a fire which melted away his line, until he reached the stone wall, where he fell, shot through the shoulder and the thigh, and again became a prisoner of war. He lay in field hospital six days; then was taken to the hospital at Fort McHenry, and in October was sent to the Federal prison on Johnson's island, in Lake Erie. By a special exchange he returned to the army in Virginia in March, 1864. He was ordered to take command of Barton's brigade at Drewry's bluff, and led it in the battle in which Beauregard drove back Butler's army. Being sent now to Lee, Gen. A. P. Hill placed him in command of Archer's and Walker's brigades, and this force, with some other troops, he led in the second battle of Cold Harbor, holding the left of the Confederate line. On May 24, 1864, he had been promoted brigadier-general, and a few days after the battle of Cold Harbor he was ordered to Augusta, Ga., to command a district embracing parts of South Carolina and Georgia. This he held until the close of the war. He then went to Cuba, but in 1868 returned to Alabama and resumed his old business of cotton manufacturing at Tallassee, in which he continued until 1876, when he removed to Florida. After spending some time there he went back to Alabama and resided in Montgomery, where his wife died. This estimable lady was Martha A. Micau, born in Augusta, Ga., but living in San Francisco when married, In 1881 General Fry went to Richmond, Va., and engaged in cotton buying. He was president of the Marshall manufacturing company of that city from 1886 until his death, February 5, 1891.

M. E. Wolf
 
Southern Historical Society Papers.
Vol. XXXVIII. Richmond, Va., January-December. 1910.
Unwritten History Of The Gettysburg Campaign.

Longstreet's Courier—Memorable Words of Confederate Leaders--A Time when they were Sorely Tried--What Might Have Been--The Part Played by Hood.
By WILLIAM YOUNGBLOOD, of Alabama.


For many years I have thought of writing out for the public what I know of the battle of Gettysburg; but the political surroundings of myself and of him conspicuously interested have deterred me. To every one to whom I have ever told this incident of my soldier's life he has said that I ought to reduce it to writing and give it to the world or to the people of this country--that it might go into the archives. I have determined to tell the story in this way, every word of which is the truth, absolute and pure.

In June, 1863, Lee's army commenced the movement to Pennsylvania I was then a private soldier in the Fifteenth Alabama Regiment, commanded by Colonel William C. Oates; our division crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains at Ashby's Gap, and soon came to the Shenandoah River, where our Commander, General Hood, was sitting on his horse directing the crossing. I approached General Hood and asked for permission to take off my clothes before wading the river, but was told to go in--"No time could be allowed for dressing and undressing"--so in I went with the balance; and although it was a hot June day, the water was biting cold, so cold that I crawled upon a projecting rock in the middle of the stream until I was forced to leave it. We moved down the river, where we camped for several days. At Millwood, in the Valley of Virginia, I went to General Longstreet and appealed to him to detail me to his headquarters as courier upon his staff. He sent the order to General Lee for approval, making it special, giving me ten days' leave of absence to obtain better clothes and to mount myself. Within the ten days I joined Longstreet six miles to the north of Hagerstown, Md., on the pike to Chambersburg, Pa., which place we reached within a day.

At Chambersburg we halted to await the movement of General A. P. Hill, who was near Gettysburg. In a few days we moved on toward Gettysburg, General Longstreet and his staff in advance of the troop. It was less than a day's ride for the General and his staff. We arrived at or near where the line of battle was being pitched about four in the afternoon. General Longstreet looked over the field and surroundings that evening, which was the first day of July, went back behind Cashtown and pitched tents for the night. The troops had approached to about three or four miles of Gettysburg, arriving about night, and had gone into camp. I had not had time to unsaddle and feed my horse before Colonel Sorrell called me to his office (a fly tent) and told me I must go back to Chambersburg for General Pickett; that I would find him on the east side of the town awaiting orders. I asked for time to feed myself and horse, and was given thirty minutes. This started me on my night's ride to Chambersburg, through an enemy's country, on a dark night. I found the ride as lonesome and dull as if no man was near or had a few hours before passed over it. As I passed the smouldering ruins of Thad Steven's iron works I could smell the unsavory smoke, and it seemed as if I was passing the burial ground of some ruined hospital with the dead and dying all around. I found General Pickett, as I expected. As I approached a sentinel called out, "Halt! Who goes there?" I answered, "A courier hunting General Pickett."

A man lying upon the ground at the foot of a tree arose into a sitting position and said, "Here is General Pickett; from whom do you come?" I replied, "Longstreet." One of his staff struck a match, and the General read the dispatches which I had brought, and said to the staff officer, "We must move at once into line and lead the movement." There was not ten minutes' time consumed in this movement. Pickett and staff were mounted and we all rode off together, the men following silently in a steady tramp behind. I had been in the saddle from early morning till then, except the thirty minutes referred to. It was about 1 o'clock A. M. at night. It was about 4 o'clock when I turned my old jaded horse into clover field, dropped his rein upon the ground, lay down in a fence comer, and a few minutes was sound asleep. I waked up about 6 o'clock by the tramp of the soldiers going by. I hurried into a long trot until I had overtaken General Pickett, told him of the road in front of him, and as he was instructed to halt near Cashtown I forced my horse and found General Longstreet in a wheat field about 8 A. M. awaiting the coming of the troops, some of whom were passing into position on the battle line. I begged a morsel of food from one of the couriers; my horse ate the heads of wheat.

In the afternoon about 2 o'clock General Barksdale's brigade of Mississippians having taken position, General Wofford, of Georgia, with his brigade of Georgians, filing in on Barksdale's right, and a South Carolina Brigade passing very near to General Lee, Longstreet and Hood getting into position upon Wofford's right, while the Alabama (Law's) Brigade was being put into position on facing Round Top, and upon the South Carolinians' right; this was our extreme right. I was sitting on my horse within hearing of Generals Lee, Longstreet and Hood. There were some others (I don't remember who) nearby. General Lee was standing upon the ground; an orderly was holding his gray nearby; all others were in their saddles. General Hood said to General Lee: "My scouts report to me that there is a wagon road around Round Top, at its foot, which has been used by farmers in getting out timber, over which I can move troops. I believe I can take one of my brigades, go around this mountain and simultaneously attack from the flank or rear, with the men in front, and capture Round Top." General Lee asked General Longstreet's opinion, Longstreet said "I have great faith in General Hood's opinions and his ability to do whatever he plans to do." This was all the reply Longstreet made. General Lee stood with head bowed, looking upon the ground in deep thought, for, it seemed, a long time. When he raised his face to look at Generals Longstreet and Hood he said: "Gentlemen, I cannot risk the loss of a brigade; our men are in fine spirits, and with great confidence will go into this battle. I believe we can win upon a direct attack." Extending his hand to General Longstreet, he said: "Good-by, General, and may God bless you"; turned and, shaking General Hood's hand in farewell, said, "God bless you, General Hood; drive them away from you, take Round Top and the day is ours," and with tears in his eyes he turned, mounted the iron gray and rode away.

Hood went to his command. Longstreet dismounted and held his reins over his arms, dispatched his staff officers and couriers along the line of battle to note and watch the movements and report to him, selecting me to remain with him. The South Carolina men had passed and the line was formed, and thirty minutes after General Lee left us the cannonading gave the signal for attack. General Longstreet quickly threw himself into the saddle. I followed suit, and side by side we spurred to the front, and the men were upon the charge.

Just as we rode from the timber into the open, which brought us face to face with the Union army, I noticed that we were riding in front of Wofford's men. I called General Longstreet's attention to this, and suggested the danger of being shot down by our own troops. He checked his horse and held him until Wofford's men had gotten in front of us. The Union army was found between our people and the peach orchard upon a road along which they had piled rails and whatever else they could get that would aid in making a breastworks, and were lying behind these rails awaiting our attack. The peach orchard was on Wofford's left and Barksdale's right. General Longstreet from the minute he came into the open where could see Round Top, had his field glasses constantly upon that end of his line, deeply interested in Hood's efforts. Upon approaching the peach orchard the Union forces had fallen back beyond the orchard; our people were driving them, but General Barksdale's Brigade had halted behind the small breastworks which the enemy had abandoned, while Wofford's men had gone on. I called General Longstreet's attention to this, and said, "Do you want General Barksdale to halt?" He turned his head and said, "No; go tell him to retake his position in the line." I turned my horse and clashed to Barksdale's, jumping a fence to do so, when I fell, pulling myself back into the saddle by my horse's neck. I found General Barksdale on his horse standing behind a brick milkhouse, and giving him the order from General Longstreet he put spurs to his horse, dashed a little ways along his line, giving the order to charge at double-quick, when I distinctly heard a shot strike him and saw him fall from his horse. I went back to General Longstreet, who was guiding his horse into the peach orchard, told him of Barksdale's fall; when he said, "Go on beyond this orchard and tell General Alexander to advance his artillery, and to keep in touch with Wofford's left. I hunted my way to this battery. The smoke, noise of shells, thunder of cannon, the hissing of balls was so thick and so great that one of the artillerymen led my horse to General Alexander, whom I found a few feet in front of his own guns, his glasses to his eyes, standing the bravest of the brave. I gave him the order; he pointed and said, "Tell General Longstreet that as soon as I drive back this column of advancing enemy I will advance." This column was coming into the vacuum caused by Barksdale's halt.

continued
 
Southern Historical Society Papers.
Vol. XXXVIII. Richmond, Va., January-December. 1910.
Unwritten History Of The Gettysburg Campaign.
(continued)

Simultaneously Wofford's men had seen that they were not protected or supported on the left, and had begun to retreat, which Longstreet's and Wofford's personal appearance on the field prevented from becoming a panic. I aided in rallying Wofford's men get the line reestablished and rested for the night. Darkness was coming upon us; a little daylight only was left. Just at this moment Major Walton, of Vicksburg, a member of Longstreet's staff, came up to me, face powder-stained from biting off the cartridges, told me that his horse was killed, and being afoot on the battlefield, he got a gun from a fallen Confederate and went into the fight. He asked me for my horse, telling me to go seek the headquarters and wait there for him. I gave him my horse, and as he rode away, leaving me there on the battlefield, I looked around for a moment, when a Georgia soldier directed my attention to a horse grazing between the two lines of battle, with saddle and bridle. I told him how dangerous it was to get that horse. He laughed and said, "It is easy." So I went upon hands and knees, keeping the horse between me and my friends, the enemy. The horse was too tired and hungry to escape. I mounted him, and, lying along his body and neck, I put both spurs into his flank and quickly had him out of range. I heard the whistle of several balls in making this run. He proved to be a good draft horse, but a poor saddle horse.

Thus with me ended the great battle day, the 2d of July. Both sides lay on their guns. General Pickett was in reserve, about four miles from the battlefield. To me, whatever was done until Pickett's charge was without note. The next day General Longstreet (Lee having consented to General Pickett that he might make the charge) took his position in full view of both lines, and upon the booming of 100 guns, which our side had placed to open upon the enemy's line, General Pickett was seen coming back in a gallop, his long black hair waving in the wind, and he was yelling, "Where is General Longstreet?" I was dispatched to intercept him, and as he approached General Longstreet in terrible agony, he cried out. "General, I am ruined; my division is gone--it is destroyed." General Longstreet consoled him by the assurance that it would not be so bad as he thought that in a few hours he would get together quite a number of his men. What occurred after that I know not.

That night about midnight I was called to Colonel Sorrell's tent (we had headquarters near the "Black Tavern") and he told me that I was to hunt up some officers along the line and give them sealed orders. It was then drizzling and the night was dark. I had but little trouble in finding the people I was sent to, except as to Colonel Walton, Chief of Artillery, Longstreet's Corps.

On my return to the Black Horse Tavern, I found General Longstreet's wagon, and he and staff in the road, waiting on somebody or for some signal. We moved on in the rain for an hour or more. I did not know, but we had a presentment that our move was a retreat. It was a hard, very hard march. The roads were muddy, wagon ruts deep, the night awful. We had, besides our own people, about 7,000 prisoners to take care of. After a hard march of a day and night we approached falling water on the Potomac, where the pontoons had been laid to cross into Virginia. The rain had swollen the Potomac, and all had to cross on the pontoons. I had been out doing courier work all day and night, and arrived at the pontoon a little before daylight, where General Longstreet was on the ground directing the men, wagons, artillery, etc., across. I pushed off to one side, out of the way and out of sight, squatted at the root of a tree, tied my bridle reins to my arm, and did not wake until after daylight, when to my horror, I found myself within a few feet of the river, and my horse so close that one step more would have put him over the bank. I made my way to the bridge. General Longstreet told me to go on across. I went over and up the bluff into the main road. Looking to my left I saw General Lee on his horse, accompanied by some of his staff, watching the pontoon and the men coming across. While there a man whom I did not know rode up and said: "General, there is a rumor throughout the army that General Longstreet failed in his duty is the cause of our disaster at Gettysburg." General Lee, with firmness and fire, replied: "It is unjust. Longstreet did his duty. Our failure is to be charged to me. My shoulders are broad and can bear it."

Thus ends what I know of the battle of Gettysburg. Who knows what might have happened if General Hood had been permitted to make the flank movement he advised? Who knows what might have happened if General Barksdale had not lost his position in the line of battle, when we had the Union army going to the rear?

No State ever furnished braver nor better soldiers than that grand old State of Mississippi. No troops were ever commanded by a braver man than General Barksdale. Wofford's, Kershaw's and Law's Brigades were beyond reproach, as game and true as ever carried a sword or gun. This was Hood's Division. "That could, with Hood to lead, cut their way through any line that could be formed against them"--boasted General Hood.
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Southern Historical Society Papers.
Richmond, Va., Sept., 1915. New Series, Vol. 2, Old Series, Vol. XL.
The Gettysburg Campaign.

By Randolph H. McKim, late 1st Lieutenant and A. D. C. Brig.-Gen. Geo. H. Steuart's Brigade, Major-Gen. Edward Johnson's Division, Ewell's Corps. I.
I. PRELIMINARY STRATEGY.
On the 12th of June, 1863, Gen. Joe Hooker with his great host of one hundred and thirty thousand men, lay encamped on the Stafford Heights, on the Rappahannock River, opposite Fredericksburg, within sixty miles of the Capital of the Southern Confederacy.

Two weeks later this splendid army under its gallant leader is on Pennsylvania soil marching north to intercept Lee's army, which is moving on Harrisonburg on the Susquehanna River.

Richmond has been relieved: scarcely a Federal soldier remains upon the soil of Virginia; and the burden of war has
Note.--The following is a table of distances which may be useful in studying the campaign:
Gettysburg to Washington 77 miles
Gettysburg to Emmetsburg 10 miles
Gettysburg to Frederick 34 miles
Gettysburg to Rockville 62.7 miles
Gettysburg to Littlestown 10.2 miles
Gettysburg to Westminster 24.3 miles
Gettysburg to Monterey 15 miles
Gettysburg to Waynesboro 22 miles
Gettysburg to Hagerstown 34 miles
Gettysburg to Cashtown 7.7 miles
Gettysburg to Chambersburg 24.5 miles
Gettysburg to McConnelsburg 46 miles
Gettysburg to York 28 miles
Hagerstown to Frederick 25.9 miles
Hagerstown to Washington 69.3 miles
Hagerstown to Boonsboro 10.3 miles

been transferred from that battle-worn State to the shoulders of the State of Pennsylvania.

It is Washington now, not Richmond, which is threatened! Here surely is a great military achievement--and it has been accomplished without fighting a pitched battle, in fact, with insignificant loss to the forces of the Confederate chieftain.

In studying the Gettysburg Campaign I ask you to note this splendid result of Lee's masterful strategy--the great army of General Hooker drawn a hundred and thirty miles north, clear out of Virginia and across the State of Maryland into Pennsylvania,--by the sheer force of strategy.

Observe then that in the primary purpose of this campaign, the relief of Virginia from the presence of war, Lee was successful.

The more it is studied the more is the admiration of the students of war elicited by the skillful manner in which the Confederate army was withdrawn from Hooker's front. A large part of it was marched a hundred miles north to Winchester, Va., in six days and the whole of it was transferred in about two weeks from the Rappahannock River to the Potomac, without the movement being discovered for many days after its inception. As late as June 12th Gen. Hooker wrote Gov. Dix:
"All of Lee's army so far as I know is extended along the Rappahannock from Hamilton's Crossing to Culpeper," (quoted by Thos. Nelson Page, Life of Lee, p. 315.)

If we ask how this was achieved the clear answer is, by Lee's skillful strategy, seconded by the adroit handling of his cavalry by his gallant and resourceful Cavalry Chief, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. Later we shall see that it was the unfortunate absence of his cavalry which primarily accounts for the comparative failure of the rest of the campaign.

The boldness of Lee in marching his whole army out of Virginia and thus leaving Richmond uncovered, is notable. When Gen. Hooker at last discovered that the Confederate army was on the march for Pennsylvania, he proposed to the Washington authorities an immediate march on Richmond. This was promptly disallowed by Mr. Lincoln and his military adviser, Gen. Halleck. Doubtless Lee's experience had satisfied him that the safety of Washington would be considered the supreme object to be kept in view, and for this reason he felt no great anxiety for the Confederate Capital in making his march into Pennsylvania.

I cannot proceed to the story of the battle itself without calling your attention to an important feature of Lees' plan of campaign which is apt to be overlooked. I mean his purpose that General Beauregard should be ordered to Culpeper Courthouse, Va., in order to threaten Washington while Gen. Lee himself was marching into Pennsylvania. He believed that an army at that point "even in effigy," as he expressed it, under so famous a leader, would have the effect of retaining a large force for the defence of the capital, and diminishing by so much the strength of the army which would oppose him in Pennsylvania. The government at Richmond, however, was unwilling, or felt itself unable, to carry out this part of Lee's plan, though we now know there were certain brigades which were available for the purpose.

We touch here a fact of moment in forming an estimate of the military capacity of Gen. Lee: I mean that he was never in supreme command of the Confederate armies until a few weeks before the close of the war, when it was too late. Field Marshal Lord Wolseley remarks that for this reason we can never accurately estimate the full measure of Lee's military genius Strange indeed that this great soldier should have been obliged to submit the plan of his campaign to the President and Secretary of War at Richmond before he could make any arrangements for putting it into operation! And should have been obliged, by their disapproval, to abandon a part of his plan, which was really of great importance for the general result. So good a military critic as Capt. Cecil Battine, of the English army, is of opinion that this proposal, if carried out, might have had a decisive effect upon the issue of the campaign. (See. "Crisis of the Confederacy.")

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Southern Historical Society Papers.
Richmond, Va., Sept., 1915. New Series, Vol. 2, Old Series, Vol. XL.
The Gettysburg Campaign.
(continued)

II. THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA--MOVEMENT OF THE CAVALRY.

I come now to consider the second stage of the Gettysburg campaign, the actual invasion of Pennsylvania.

Seldom has an army entered upon a campaign under more hopeful auspices. The victories of Fredericksburg, December, 1862, and of Chancellorsville the following May, had inspired the Army of Northern Virginia with confidence in itself and with renewed faith in the genius of its great commander. It had been strengthened by the return of the two divisions of Longstreet's corps. It had been skillfully reorganized. In a word, it was the finest army Lee had ever commanded, although not the largest; better equipped and armed than ever before; thoroughly disciplined. The organization of the Confederate artillery has been pronounced by distinguished Federal authorities "almost ideal;" although it was far inferior in number of pieces and weight of metal to the artillery of the Union Army. Col. Fiebiger, Professor of Engineering at the U. S. Military Academy, says: "If the differences of the two armies are fairly weighed, the chances of success in the campaign about to be opened, were in favor of General Lee, notwithstanding his numerical inferiority." Gen. Long, of Gen. Lee's staff, says: "The Army of Northern Virginia appeared the best disciplined, the most high spirited and most enthusiastic army on the continent. The successful campaign which this army had recently passed through, inspired it with almost invincible ardour."

Again, he says: "Everything seemed to promise success and the joyful animation with which the men marched north after the movement actually began, and the destination of the army was communicated to them, appeared a true presage of victory."

Gen. Lee himself said: "Never was there such an army; it will go anywhere and do anything if properly led." Upon which Chas. Francis Adams remarks: "This is not an exaggerated statement. I do not believe any more formidable or better organized force was ever set in motion than that which Lee led across the Potomac in 1863. It was essentially an army of fighters, and could be depended upon for any feat of arms in the power of mere mortals to accomplish; they would blench at no danger."

Nevertheless, in spite of these favorable auspices the campaign did not achieve victory. Why then did it fail? If any experienced soldier had been able to look down from a balloon, or an aeroplane, upon the advancing columns of Lee's army after they had crossed the Potomac, and were moving northward toward the Susquehanna, the reason of the ultimate failure of the campaign would at once have suggested itself. He would have said,--"where is the cavalry that should be marching on the right flank of the army?" And had he, a few days later, turned his eyes eastward and seen Stuart with his 5,000 horsemen marching through Maryland on the right flank of the Federal army, entirely severed from communication with the Confederate army, he could not but have been greatly astonished.

Lee's campaign in the opinion of the best European and American critics suffered from a fundamental error--the absence of the larger part of his cavalry with their skillful and intrepid leader, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. "At Gettysburg," says Col. G. F. R. Henderson, "you have an instance of this screen, the cavalry, being altogether absent; and I think the difficulties of the General arising from this absence will illustrate how completely the other arms are paralyzed without the aid of the cavalry." (*)

Again, he says: "What were the circumstances that thus paralyzed his army, and his own great skill in daring manoeuvres? Why was a flank march, possible in front of Hooker in June, impossible in front of Meade in July? The answer is simple--the absence of the cavalry."

Major Steele, in his "American Campaigns," says (p. 362): "Never did Lee so much need 'the eyes of his army' that were now wandering on a fool's errand. Without his cavalry, his army was groping in the dark; he was in the enemy's country and could get no information from the people. He did not know where Meade's army was. All he could do was to concentrate his forces and be ready for a blow on either side."

General Lee's own opinion on the subject is recorded by Gen. Long in his Memoirs, (p. 275): "Gen. Lee now exhibited a degree of anxiety and impatience, and expressed regret at the absence of his cavalry. He said that he had been kept in the dark ever since crossing the Potomac, and intimated that Stuart's disappearance had materially hampered the movement, and disorganized the campaign."

Here then we have a sufficient reason for the failure of the Gettysburg campaign which had begun so auspiciously: the major part of Lee's cavalry did him no service whatever during the first week of the invasion.

But why was it absent? Was Gen. Lee ignorant of the importance of using his cavalry in screening his front, in reconnoitering, and securing information of the movements of the enemy? Such a supposition is absurd. On the other hand, knowing, and realizing as he must have done, the great importance of this use of his cavalry, did he fail to give his chief of cavalry the necessary orders to fulfill this function?

In other words, was Gen. Lee responsible for this fundamental mistake in his campaign? was it his intention to be separated from the bulk of his cavalry in his advance into Pennsylvania? To answer this ,question I direct your attention to the instructions given by General Lee to General Stuart. He wrote Gen. Ewell that he had instructed Gen. Stuart to "march with three brigades across the Potomac and place himself on your right and in communication with you; keep you advised of the movements of the enemy and assist in collecting supplies for the army." To Gen. Stuart himself Gen. Lee wrote, June 22: "You can move with the other three brigades into Maryland and take position on Ewell's right (Ewell was to march northward June 23d), place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of Ewell's army will probably move towards the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route, another by Chambersburg."

This order was repeated in a letter to Gen. Stuart dated June 23d, a part of which I will quote:

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Major-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart,
Commanding Cavalry.
General:
* * * I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain tomorrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In other words, after crossing the river you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc. * * * I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after tomorrow, the better. I am
Very respectfully and truly yours,
R. E. LEE,
General
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Thus, in the very last communication received by General Stuart from General Lee the order was emphatically given that as soon as he crossed the river he should place himself on Ewell's right and march with him toward the Susquehanna. The Commanding General indicated Frederick, Md., as Stuart's first objective, and he thought that he had better cross at Shepherdstown; but gave him the option of crossing east of the Blue Ridge and passing around the Federal army if he could "do so without hindrance."

This refers to a suggestion which General Stuart had made, viz.: that he should pass through Hopewell or some other gap in the Bull Run Mountains, gain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body and Washington, and cross info Maryland, joining our army north of the Potomac.

Now, at the time of this correspondence, Ewell's corps whose right flank Stuart was to guard, was just beginning its march northward from Hagerstown, and General Hooker's army was still in Virginia. General Stuart's plan then contemplated passing round General Hooker's rear while his army was still south of the Potomac; and General Lee's conditional authorization contemplated that, and that only. It did not authorize General Stuart to carry out his plan of passing round the enemy's rear after the enemy had transferred his army to the north side of the Potomac. Col. Mosby confirms this view, for he says in his book, p. 212, "the orders contemplated Stuart crossing the Potomac in advance of both armies." Col. Mosby also says "the object was to go by the most direct route to Ewell." (*)

Now, did General Stuart carry out the above instructions and do these things? The history of the campaign shows that he did none of these things; he was not on Ewell's right in the march toward the Susquehanna; he did not guard his flank; he did not keep him advised of the movements of the enemy. But it has been affirmed that General Lee gave Stuart discretion to take the route that ,he did, viz.: to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge and pass by the enemy's rear. I submit that this is a complete misapprehension of the instructions of the Commanding General. In the first place, as just pointed out, his assent to the plan of passing around Hooker's army was given when Hooker's army was in Virginia. He was instructed to cross the Potomac in advance of Hooker, he had no permission to pass around Hooker's army after that army had crossed the Potomac. Only, it should be observed that General Lee's consent to Stuart's plan was conditional. Here is General Lee's language: "You will be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance." Now, when Stuart attempted that move he found all the roads obstructed by the columns of Hooker's army moving to cross the Potomac. Was not this a most serious hindrance? and did not its existence cancel Lee's conditional permission to cross the Potomac east of the mountains? It follows that Stuart departed from Lee's orders when he crossed east of the mountains and thus cut himself off from the Confederate army. Moreover, General Lee wrote that he should cross the river on the 24th. He did not cross till the night of the 27th. In doing so the gallant Stuart committed a serious error of judgment. Now it is not a pleasant task to point out the responsibility of this splendid officer for the failure of the Gettysburg campaign; but we are confronted by the alternative of convicting General Lee of a serious and inexcusable error in the plan of his campaign, or recognizing what the facts and the correspondence establish beyond contradiction,--that it was General Stuart, and not General Lee, who committed the error. He failed to keep in view the main object of his expedition, which was to co-operate with Ewell in his march through Maryland to Harrisburg.

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