Meade's Missed Opportunity?

P.S. as a matter of curiousity, when Meade finalyu got around to bridging the Potomac, does anyone know how long it took him to actually get the AoP across. I ask this because when McClellan Finally got around to crossing the Potomac, I understand it still took almost a week to cross the same river that Lee crossed in a day.

As previously posted, it took a day to construct the first bridge. at Berlin, which was either 1500+ feet or 1700+ feet (I've seen both used). The 2nd bridge at Berlin (which looks like it is perhaps 100 yards away in the photo) took longer to finish, probably because they had insufficient material to complete it. The Engineers scavanged material wherever they could find it to do the job -- including raising damaged pontoons from earlier operations off the bed of the Potomac so they could repair them with wood from cracker boxes.

Using these two bridges, it took the AoP about 4 days and nights to cross the bulk of the troops, using both bridges and crossing constantly. Once Lee had moved off, they also started repairing the bridge at Harpers Ferry (badly damaged by a Union raid on the 5th, in use by the Confederates before then).

Tim
 
I have probably said 50 times in this thread that Meade did well. Not brilliantly; he shows no special genius -- but he does show himself a more than competent commander of an army throught the campaign, before, during and after the battle.

Aye. But there seems to still be some attempt by those weighing the rewards more heavily (or overestimating how much Meade could get out of the AotP) to argue he failed to meet that.

That is the major reason Meade should have tried more, been more aggressive. Cold-blooded as it may sound, the Union could afford the losses if he failed, and might win the war quickly if he succeeded. That doesn't change the odds at all, but it does change the stakes. In effect, Meade can afford to bet and lose. Lee can only afford the bet if he wins.

Yeah. Given a slight advantage he didn't have (as said earlier, even a fresh cavalry division), he had the resources to at least try. I'm not at all confident in "succeed", but it would take a disaster (not likely) to leave the Union overall worse off.

But while Lee has a harder time affording "the bet", he has a easier fight (just one with much worse consequences for any level of defeat).

However, the real opportunity is before that, in the period from July 4 to 8. This is when the AoP should have been driving forward like the hounds of Hell were behind them.

Yeah. Given a fresher Sixth Corps and Meade should have put them on the road within the hour of hearing Lee was even begining to move. (given what he had, that might have been asking too much of them...Lee's army hasn't had a gruelling march to the field, Sedgewick's men have, so Lee -does- have advantage there) and send Fifth and Twelfth Corps in the next moment (what to do with 2nd and 3rd I'm not entirely sure, and First and Eleventh are both in terrible shape.)

Ultimately, we are left with wondering whether or not Meade could have done more - he is battling bad weather and such. And while Lee is as well, Lee's men have desperation speeding their steps if worst comes to worse, Meade's men don't have any such thing.

So I think this sorts out to the following:

Me: Meade did enough. More is not a realistic expectation, though it is not an impossible one.

You: Meade -could- have done more, though what he did do was more than competent.

I can accept that, I'm just more reluctant to trust that the situation's promise is that bright.

Still, Meade as a B+ (with an A requiring more than he did) seems a just sum up.
 
Meade's Missed Opportunity

"Now while I am not in favor of reattempting to cross here, yet I was in favor of crossing if a suitable place could be found agove or below, where we could rapidly cross and attack them before they could get ready to receive, and I believe we could whip them, and a victory, I did not care under what circumstances, gained or with what results followed would be of immense advantage to us."(emph. mine)

"I agreed with Franklin that the James River was our proper and only base; but as they were determined in Washington that we should not go there, I thought rather than stand still, we ought to attempt a practical thought less desireable line; and should it be forbidden, I was still in favor of making an attempt to whip them, if there was any reasonable probability of our doing so, even though we should not be either able or desirous of following up our victory."(emph. mine)

"But the fact is, I am tired of this Playing War without risks. We must encounter risks if we fight, and we cannot carry on a war without fighting. That was McClellan's vice. He was always waiting to have everything just as he wanted before he would attack, and begfore he could get things arranged as he wanted them, the enemy pounced on him and thwarted all his plans. There is no doubt he allowed three distinct occasions to take Richmond slip through his hands, for want of nerve to run what he considered risks. Such a general will never command success, though he may avoid disaster."(Emph. mine)

Now this Meade, is who Lincoln needed just after Gettysburg. Instead he got the Meade who wrote:

"They have refused to relieve me, but insist on my continuing to try to do what I know in advance it was impossible to do."

Or:

"Yet in the face of all these facts, well known to them, I am urged, pushed and SPURRED to attempting to pursue and destroy an army nearly equal to my own--falling back upon its resources and reinforcements, and increasing its MORALE daily." (emph. Meade)
"This has been the history of all my redecessors and I clearly saw that in time this fate would be mine. This was the reason I was disinclined to taking the Command, and it is for this reason I would gladly give it up."(emph.mine)

In this particular post It is not a condemnation, but simple statement of fact, that although a competent general and army commander, in technical and professional terms. Meade lacked the wil to confront Lee and the ANV, because he had no confidence that he could win and this lack of confidence found its excuse in his lack of confidence in the officers and men of the AoP.


P.S. although some of the quoted letters above, may have been written after Meade had been forced South of the Potomac, by Lincoln, to seek a decision against Lee, IMO they also, accurately reflect Meade's thoughts and actions during the pursuit phase in Pa.
 
OpnDownfall, I don't see any acknowledgement of any of the difficulties Meade is facing here.

Tired troops? Shot up formations? Lack of good corps commanders? None of that relevant, must ADVANCE NOW!

McClellan had a fresh and vigorous army if only he used it on the Pennisula. The army Meade is being expected to pursue Lee to his doom with is tired, cut up, and missing its best offensive commanders.

Your quotes are are comparing two wildly distinct situations as if they were the same in saying that there was something wrong with the Meade who recognized that he had a hard row to hoe.

Will is not what's missing. Resources to give any reasonably prudent general anything like confidence are.

Risks may lead to rewards. Or failure. Weighing only the possible rewards and ignoring the risks is irresponsible.
 
Dammit, Vareb. You've just blown another New Year's resolution. Gonna hafta get that book.

Ole
 
Dammit, Vareb. You've just blown another New Year's resolution. Gonna hafta get that book.

Ole

Well, ole! I am SURPRISED at you for even making such a resolution!! But then again, if there is a second person involved, I do understand!! :wink:

I was just browsing around looking to see if there was anything else I could find to add to the thread, and discovered this book.

I just read a little of it. Might have to buy that one myself. I bet it will answer a lot of questions.
 
It is not necessary to list the difficulties that prevented Meade from acting on his professional training and instincts. Meade's letters leave little to the imagination and resemble closely McClellan's litany of woes.
I am not comparing situations, but the mind sets of two army commanders who, from the historical record, both are capable of only appreciating,too clearly, how something could Not be done. (Like McClellan's dispatches, Meade's are filled with all the reasonson, nothing could be done, with a single line buried in the dirge, suggesting that he might be able to do anything active. (If everything comes together at the proper time, place with the planets and the stars in proper alihgnment)
I question whether weighing only the possible rewards and ignoring the risks, is any more irresponsible that weighing only the risks and ignoring the possible rewards. There is much more evidence that Meade did far more of the latter than the former.
Until, July of 1863. a smaller army with less Resources, less equipment, less manpower, regularly defeated the army with more and better equipment, more resources and manpower. Was the difference in the armies, their resources, or their commanding generals?
I say again study Meade's order of march during his pursuit of the ANV, does anyone here, claim that if the Potomac had not flooded, that Meade would have ever seen the ANV, until Lincoln forced Meade to cross the river to search for him?
 
It is not necessary to list the difficulties that prevented Meade from acting on his professional training and instincts. Meade's letters leave little to the imagination and resemble closely McClellan's litany of woes.
I am not comparing situations, but the mind sets of two army commanders who, from the historical record, both are capable of only appreciating,too clearly, how something could Not be done. (Like McClellan's dispatches, Meade's are filled with all the reasonson, nothing could be done, with a single line buried in the dirge, suggesting that he might be able to do anything active. (If everything comes together at the proper time, place with the planets and the stars in proper alihgnment)
I question whether weighing only the possible rewards and ignoring the risks, is any more irresponsible that weighing only the risks and ignoring the possible rewards. There is much more evidence that Meade did far more of the latter than the former.
Until, July of 1863. a smaller army with less Resources, less equipment, less manpower, regularly defeated the army with more and better equipment, more resources and manpower. Was the difference in the armies, their resources, or their commanding generals?
I say again study Meade's order of march during his pursuit of the ANV, does anyone here, claim that if the Potomac had not flooded, that Meade would have ever seen the ANV, until Lincoln forced Meade to cross the river to search for him?

You are not convincing me. Maybe others. You consitantly try to prove something that is just not there.
I think you are beating a dead horse, sir.
 
meades missed op.

i believe that meade did the the right thing by not following on day 4-7 of gettysburg. hard to fight a army when its on the move to the potomac. once they got to the potomac lee had good defences.
i believe the best time would have been a immediate counter-charge after picketts charge into the confederate center. with a massive artillary bombardment on all the confederate positions they could have penetrated the southern lines and blocked their escape. stuarts calvery was tied up at the time with union calvery.

we could have sent in at least 2 corp,s.

this would have been a disaster to lee immediately after the charge.
i dont think he could have held.
m.k. :sabre:
 
I question whether weighing only the possible rewards and ignoring the risks, is any more irresponsible that weighing only the risks and ignoring the possible rewards. There is much more evidence that Meade did far more of the latter than the former.
Until, July of 1863. a smaller army with less Resources, less equipment, less manpower, regularly defeated the army with more and better equipment, more resources and manpower. Was the difference in the armies, their resources, or their commanding generals?
I say again study Meade's order of march during his pursuit of the ANV, does anyone here, claim that if the Potomac had not flooded, that Meade would have ever seen the ANV, until Lincoln forced Meade to cross the river to search for him?

There is much evidence that you are dismissing the risks as not worth acknowledging because of the rewards that might exist if things worked. Meade is dealing with a much tougher situation than McClellan ever faced...he does have a battered army to deal with, something McClellan never had to fight with.

As for Meade and seeing the ANV...had Meade had things go as he desired (Lee is certainly working hard to ensure that's not the case), yes.

Meade might well have crossed before seeing Lee, but that he would have does not seem nearly as questionable as you think it is.
 
Victory

One must remember the Army of the Potomac wasn't use to defeating R.E. Lee.
Meade has performed a near miracle, and then someone come up with the idea -why didn't he destroy Lee's army.

Unfortunately, Lee's retreat from Gettysburg was never really well documented or written about over the years, so that retreat is more in a cloud of history.

Look at Grant in 1864. It took him many casualties to get Lee into a siege position at Petersburg.
Then he sat until 1865, broke through, caused a retreat and took the surrender of an army that was down to some 8,000 soldiers.
Wasn't very easy for Grant.
 
Well, the historical record shows that Imboden reached Williamsport on the 6th and Longstreet reached Hagerstown on the 7th (on that day, Meade had moved his Hq's to Frederick) it took, 4 days for Meade to get through the South Mtn. passes and the AoP restablished contact with the ANV on the 12th. Without the Potomac flooded, it would not have taken 4 or 5 days for Lee to have replaced his destroyed bridges and escaped before Meade came up on the 12th.
A part of Meade's dispatch to Halleck, July 6th;
"If I can get the Army of the Potomac in hand in the valley and the enemy have not crossed the river, I shall give him battle, trusting, should misfortune overtake me that sufficient number of my force, in connection with what you have in Washington, woule reach that place so as to render it secure"(my emph.)
Surely no one can read that and reasonably conclude that this denotes any degree of confidence.
 
Personally, I see something in that "IF I can get the Army of the Potomac in hand..." that indicates Meade is more worried about that than what Lee is going to do...particularly since the mention of Lee and what Meade is worried about is "crossing the river".

Treating Lee crossing into Virginia as a (serious) failure by Meade is kind of unfair to Meade, because it would take a lot, even assuming a hell for leather pursuit (whether it was worth risking that or not, it seems clear it would have taken something of that sort), to smash up the Army of Northern Virginia before it crosses.
 
Personally, I see something in that "IF I can get the Army of the Potomac in hand..." that indicates Meade is more worried about that than what Lee is going to do...particularly since the mention of Lee and what Meade is worried about is "crossing the river".

Treating Lee crossing into Virginia as a (serious) failure by Meade is kind of unfair to Meade, because it would take a lot, even assuming a hell for leather pursuit (whether it was worth risking that or not, it seems clear it would have taken something of that sort), to smash up the Army of Northern Virginia before it crosses.

Based on what I see in the defenses of Williamsport, there would have been a tremendous loss of lives in the Union army if they had attacked Lee and without destroying Lee's army.

I would hope those that are interested read the following books if you haven't already done so.

http://www.amazon.com/dp/193271443X/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

http://www.amazon.com/dp/0807829218/?tag=civilwartalkc-20
 
Based on what I see in the defenses of Williamsport, there would have been a tremendous loss of lives in the Union army if they had attacked Lee and without destroying Lee's army.

I'd have to say that's pretty likely. But if Lee's Army was destroyed (on mangled/cut to pieces/etc. before getting away), would it have been worthwhile to the Union? How likely would it have been? These are the only questions that need to be answered to justify such an action by Meade.

Personally, I think that the right answers to those make it justifiable, and that Meade would have answered yes to #1. He was quite unsure about #2, and attempting to find out with care.

Tim
 
Well, the historical record shows that Imboden reached Williamsport on the 6th and Longstreet reached Hagerstown on the 7th (on that day, Meade had moved his Hq's to Frederick) it took, 4 days for Meade to get through the South Mtn. passes and the AoP restablished contact with the ANV on the 12th. Without the Potomac flooded, it would not have taken 4 or 5 days for Lee to have replaced his destroyed bridges and escaped before Meade came up on the 12th.
A part of Meade's dispatch to Halleck, July 6th;
"If I can get the Army of the Potomac in hand in the valley and the enemy have not crossed the river, I shall give him battle, trusting, should misfortune overtake me that sufficient number of my force, in connection with what you have in Washington, woule reach that place so as to render it secure"(my emph.)
Surely no one can read that and reasonably conclude that this denotes any degree of confidence.

In military terms, this is saying that if he can find an opportunity to fight Lee north of the river, he will do it. He thinks it is risky, but that Washington will still be safe even if he is badly beaten.

It isn't the most aggressive statement I've seen from a general. But he is also writing it to the CO who told him his #1 priority was to make sure Washington was safe. It is what I describe as prudently aggressive. It is definitely not the defeatist attitude you are ascribing to Meade.

Tim
 
Personally, I see something in that "IF I can get the Army of the Potomac in hand..." that indicates Meade is more worried about that than what Lee is going to do...particularly since the mention of Lee and what Meade is worried about is "crossing the river".

Treating Lee crossing into Virginia as a (serious) failure by Meade is kind of unfair to Meade, because it would take a lot, even assuming a hell for leather pursuit (whether it was worth risking that or not, it seems clear it would have taken something of that sort), to smash up the Army of Northern Virginia before it crosses.

Meade is saying he thinks it is worthwhile to fight Lee north of the river if he can manage it. He is obviously cautious about it. (Who wouldn't be? In the same area less than a year before, Lee had stood off an AoP in much better shape than the one Meade had in 1863.)

From other statements and letters by Meade, it is obvious he thought that once Lee had crossed the river, it would be better to pause to reorganize and rest before continuing the pursuit. He was over-ruled from Washington on that, and so crossed the river to follow Lee down to the Rappahannock. Most of the opportunity is gone once Lee is across, and the risks are greater, so that is not a surprising position for Meade to take.

Tim
 
In military terms, this is saying that if he can find an opportunity to fight Lee north of the river, he will do it. He thinks it is risky, but that Washington will still be safe even if he is badly beaten.

It isn't the most aggressive statement I've seen from a general. But he is also writing it to the CO who told him his #1 priority was to make sure Washington was safe. It is what I describe as prudently aggressive. It is definitely not the defeatist attitude you are ascribing to Meade.

Tim

Here is a good read about Meade and what he went through with up to Lee crossing the Potomac.

http://books.google.com/books?id=2r...X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA208,M1
 
I've noted this before, but the obvious course of action isn't for Meade to assault Lee, but to force him into a position where Lee must assault.

IMO, most of the needed raw materials were present for small, but exploitable window.
 
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