Longstreet's plan to hit the Left

Whether Longstreet's alternative 'plan', was a viable option, seems, to me, to be dependent upon whether Longstreet actually had some definite geographical position in mindm upon which to lure Meade into rashly attacking. Rather than a shot in the dark and hoping something good falls.
 
Longstreet wanted to continue a defensive campaign, it had worked well for he and Lee in the past. I beleive he would have moved left and done so as quickly as possible. He knew a frontal attact would be very costly in terms of casualties. In my visits to Gettysburg I am amazed that any army would attept that charge against a fortified opponient. Had Lee have allowed Longstreet to move to the left I believe everything would have changed. The ground fought on could only have improved and the artillary may not have been as effective. The worse case scenario would have been the same results as Picketts charge. Longstreet openly disagreed with Pickett's charge, had his plans for moving to the left been approved I believe we would have seen a differnt Longstreet on day three. We will never know now but I doubt the results could have been much worse than what actually happend

Welcome to the forum.

Longstreet wanted to move to the right, not the left. Moving to the left would put them between the Union Army and the Susquehanna River. But there weren't any good roads to move to the right. Also, Stuart didn't arrive with the good cavalry to do any screening of the movement or reconnaissance of the route until the night of July 2. Finally, such a movement would surely have been observed by the Union signal station on Jack's Mountain, who would have relayed the information through Little Round Top's station to Meade, who would then be able to strike the column while it was moving, leading to a worse disaster than happened on July 3.

In order to do what Longstreet proposed somewhat safely, the confederates would have to move to the west of South Mountain, then move south and try to find a road heading east. Lee addressed this in his report. The length of the wagon train made it impractical to attempt this.

Next time you're at Gettysburg, look at where the Virginians formed and marched from. It's by the Spangler Farm, and they were completely hidden from the Union forces on Cemetery Ridge. Remember also that the artillery bombardment was used in an attempt to drive off the Union artillery. Also, part of Lee's planning for the campaign was for a confederate force of troops from North and South Carolina to take up a position around Culpeper, Virginia, forcing Meade to detach troops to guard against a threat to Washington. That part didn't happen, but Lee was unaware of it because the courier carrying the message to him telling him about it was captured in Greencastle by Ulric Dahlgren. So Lee went to Gettysburg and into July 3 believing that a significant part of the Army of the Potomac wasn't there. We know today they were there, but Lee didn't know that, and neither did Longstreet. Lee didn't find out about the missing dispatches until he read about it in the New York Times on July 8.
 
Also, part of Lee's planning for the campaign was for a confederate force of troops from North and South Carolina to take up a position around Culpeper, Virginia, forcing Meade to detach troops to guard against a threat to Washington. That part didn't happen, but Lee was unaware of it because the courier carrying the message to him telling him about it was captured in Greencastle by Ulric Dahlgren. So Lee went to Gettysburg and into July 3 believing that a significant part of the Army of the Potomac wasn't there. We know today they were there, but Lee didn't know that, and neither did Longstreet. Lee didn't find out about the missing dispatches until he read about it in the New York Times on July 8.

Very interesting, I didn't know that part and it makes much more sense of why Lee did what he did and not that he was just being stubborn/over confident. I've always read that his dander was up and should have known the entire AotP was on the field after two days of fighting.
When was the courier captured? And maybe this helps explain Stuart's actions on the 3rd if they thought the VI Corps wasn't on the field.
 
Very interesting, I didn't know that part and it makes much more sense of why Lee did what he did and not that he was just being stubborn/over confident. I've always read that his dander was up and should have known the entire AotP was on the field after two days of fighting.
When was the courier captured? And maybe this helps explain Stuart's actions on the 3rd if they thought the VI Corps wasn't on the field.

He was captured on July 2. Lee didn't allow himself to be ruled by his emotions, so I tend to discount all the "fighting blood was up" and "dander was up" claims as utter nonsense. Stuart's actions can be explained by him being there to guard the left flank of the ANV. That's how his actions make sense.
 
He was captured on July 2. Lee didn't allow himself to be ruled by his emotions, so I tend to discount all the "fighting blood was up" and "dander was up" claims as utter nonsense. Stuart's actions can be explained by him being there to guard the left flank of the ANV. That's how his actions make sense.

After looking at maps of where the ECF is in relation to the main battle, it wasn't as far east or behind Union lines as I initially thought. Yes, I see now Stuart was only on the left flank of the ANV and not any farther afield than that. Thanks for the correction.
 
After looking at maps of where the ECF is in relation to the main battle, it wasn't as far east or behind Union lines as I initially thought. Yes, I see now Stuart was only on the left flank of the ANV and not any farther afield than that. Thanks for the correction.

And if he was there to try to break through, why announce his presence by firing a cannon in all four directions, and why break off the fight in ECF so quickly? If, however, he was there to protect the flank and see where the Federals were, all that makes sense and it falls into place.
 
And if he was there to try to break through, why announce his presence by firing a cannon in all four directions, and why break off the fight in ECF so quickly? If, however, he was there to protect the flank and see where the Federals were, all that makes sense and it falls into place.

Not to mention that Lee, in his report, stated that Stuart was out protecting the left flank of the army.

R
 
Very interesting, I didn't know that part and it makes much more sense of why Lee did what he did and not that he was just being stubborn/over confident. I've always read that his dander was up and should have known the entire AotP was on the field after two days of fighting.
When was the courier captured? And maybe this helps explain Stuart's actions on the 3rd if they thought the VI Corps wasn't on the field.
I agree, I had never heard that before either. I expect I'll learn much more now that I've found this site. Thank you!
 
Instead of attacking against the fortified union on the high ground, should Lee have quickly moved towards DC, putting the Confederates between DC and the Union? He could have then chosen a better location to fight on.
 
Instead of attacking against the fortified union on the high ground, should Lee have quickly moved towards DC, putting the Confederates between DC and the Union? He could have then chosen a better location to fight on.

He needed roads to do that, he needed his good cavalry to screen his movements and to reconnoiter ahead, and he needed to have a place to go. He didn't have any of those.
 
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